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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 14 June, 1995

1. Attendees included Anthony Lake, Sandy Berger and Nancy Soderberg for the NSC, Ambassador Allbright for US/UN, Major General Michael Byron for JCS, Walt Slocombe for OSD, Leon Fuerth and Rick Saunders for the Office of the Vice President, Alice Rivlin for OMB, Warren Christopher for State, and Admiral Studeman for CIA.

2. The meeting was to discuss how the Administration would resolve the need to support the Allies on the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) while consulting with Congress on funding. There is concern that the RRF is not going to be as robust as originally envisioned and that it will cost a lot of money. Congress had informed some members of the Administration that it would not approve funding unless it were consulted beforehand.

3. The Principals agreed, despite the apparent change in the nature of the RRF, that the US should still support the unit and that the language of the UN resolution was now acceptable to the US. They preferred to explore ways to delay the US response on the UN resolution, perhaps by telling the French that generally the US approves of the initiative and wants to vote for it, but needs time to get Congress on board.

4. Meanwhile, the group agreed to inform Congress that the Administration is exploring ways to reduce its share of the funding. The US would approach its allies and seek to find ways for them to pay more. However, an ad hoc funding formula was to be avoided because of its precedential impact. The US would remind the Allies of how much it pays already, such as currently funding 50% of Operation Deny Flight.

5. The Principals reaffirmed the Deputies' decision to support negotiator Karl Bildt, but not to give him a mandate. In addition, he was not to approach the Bosnian Serb leaders at least until after all of the hostages are released.

6. There was a brief discussion of the post-UNPROFOR withdrawal strategy. Some believed training of the Bosnian Army would be difficult even out of theater. Others noted the view of Bosnian leaders that the US "owes" them "strike" for their toleration of the arms embargo. These issues were reserved for further discussion at a future meeting.

7. The Principals discussed how hard to push the Bosnians to exercise restraint in their offensive around Sarajevo. They agreed to urge privately the Bosnians to do so but avoid doing this publicly. There was concern that the French would press the US to stop

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the Bosnian offensive, but the Administration is basically powerless to do so. Also, there was question of how hard to push the French not to withdraw from Bosnia. Some argued if the Mt. Igman road was opened, there would be no need for the Bosnian offensive.

[Redacted]

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