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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee SVTS

DATE: August 11, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings
 on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
 Sandy Berger

OVP
 Leon Fuerth
 Richard Wurtz

STATE
 Strobe Talbott
 James Steinberg

DEFENSE
 Jan Lodal
 James Pardue

USUN
 James O'Brien

OMB
 Gordon Adams

CIA
 Dennis Blair
 Ray Converse

JCS
 John Walsh
 Thomas Bowden

NSC
 Nelson Drew
 Sue Bremner
 Eric Schwartz
 Mike Sheehan

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met August 11 to discuss a) the itinerary of the team that will go to the region to consult with parties to the conflict; b) the situation on the ground, including Croatian military intentions; c) planning for humanitarian assistance to Krajina Serb refugees in Bosnia and Serbia; d) UN planning for UNCRO drawdown; e) NATO inability to enforce the No Fly Zone over Banja Luka; and f) Serb threats to move refugees to Vojvodina and Kosovo. ~~(S)~~

2. Deputies agreed:

- The Lake/Tarnoff team would meet with Holbrooke and Drew in London Sunday afternoon before the latter proceeded to ex-Yugoslavia. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~

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Declassify on: OADR

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- Secretary Perry would call Defmin Susak August 11 to warn him of the dangers of military movements at this time, whether in Sector East, inland toward Montenegro from Dubrovnik, or around Banja Luka. In the course of the demarche Perry would reiterate our insistence on civil treatment of refugees. If Susak's reaction was not reassuring, the Vice President would follow up on the Perry call with a call to Tudjman. (Action: OSD/OVP) ~~(S)~~
- State and USUN would work with UN and UNHCR officials to help the latter develop a comprehensive plan of regional refugee assistance. The plan would take into account the needs of all displaced persons, including Krajina Serbs, and would call for unimpeded access to Sarajevo and Gorazde, as well as to Banja Luka. Once the plan were developed, the U.S. would consider how best to contribute to it and to refugee relief efforts already under way on the part of ICRC and other organizations. (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~
- USUN would work with UN officials to prevent precipitous action on the part of Boutros-Ghali and Akashi with regard to UNCRO drawdown, particularly considering the volatile situation in Sector East. At the same time, the Peacekeeping Core Group and others would continue to look at ways to rationalize UNCRO and consider changes to its mandate, composition and location commensurate with the changed circumstances on the ground. USUN would not attempt to slow down UN discussions, but would aim to slow down action. (Action: USUN/PCG) ~~(S)~~
- On the No Fly Zone enforcement issue, State would send a cable to USNATO instructing Ambassador Hunter to make the point that now was not the time to raise the issue of attempting SEAD, considering the diplomatic initiatives under way and the presence of large numbers of refugees in the vicinity of Banja Luka. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- CIA would continue monitoring Serb threats to move refugees from the Krajina to Vojvodina and Kosovo, and compare threats with actions. Should forced movements to Kosovo appear imminent, agencies would consider the utility of reissuing the 1992 Kosovo warning. State would review the language of the 1992 warning to determine if it remains appropriate. (Action: CIA/State) ~~(S)~~

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