The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives

A Conference Report
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The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives

A Conference Report
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Scope Note

This report contains the proceedings from a conference entitled, *The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives*, which took place from 30 September to 1 October 1993. The conference was sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency's Geographic Resources Division. It featured academic geographers and anthropologists who are specialists in ethnic issues and US Government officials with practical experience in dealing with the consequences of ethnic conflict.

This report contains the papers that the participants presented as well as the key points of the discussions that followed. Where appropriate, the authors have updated their papers to reflect events since the conference. The views herein are those of the individual participants and not necessarily those of their affiliated organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency, or any other US Government agency.

1 As of June 1995, Geographic Resources Division was renamed Conflict Issues Division.
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The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives

Overview

Since the end of the Cold War, ethnic conflicts have been of increasing importance—posing a threat to international order and demanding the attention of US policymakers. The aim of this conference report is to highlight geographic concepts and factors that contribute to our understanding of these conflicts and to identify sources of potential ethnic strife. Following the order of the conference, this report is divided into three parts:

- **The conference’s conceptual framework.** An examination of the geographic approach to the study of ethnic conflict.

- **Regional manifestations.** Current and potential ethnic conflicts by region.

- **Implications.** Looking at ethnic conflicts from a comparative basis and viewing consequences for the United States and the international community.

Part I: Framing the Discussion

**Dr. Alexander Murphy**, Associate Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Oregon, establishes the groundwork in his keynote address. He examines the geographer’s unique approach to analyzing ethnic tensions and discusses how the geographic perspective can aid in understanding these tensions, in identifying destabilizing ethnic conflicts, and in developing effective policy responses. His discussion focuses on the core concepts of location, territory, and environment.

**Dr. David Knight**, Dean of Social Sciences at the University of Guelph, provides additional insights on the geographic perspective, exploring the linked concepts of identity, territory, territoriality, and self-determination as well as numerous territorial processes that function within the nation-state system.

Part II: Regional Manifestations

**Eastern Europe**

**Dr. Ronald Wixman**, Professor of Geography, University of Oregon, identifies some potentially serious ethnoterritorial conflicts that may arise in Eastern Europe as well as others that have implications beyond the region. He also discusses the impact of Western nonaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and presents a worst case scenario for the situation in the Balkans.

**Dr. Thomas Poulsen**, the respondent, is Professor of Geography at Oregon State University. He underscores some of the key elements that affect the Bosnia situation.

**Western Europe and Canada**

**Dr. Colin Williams**, Research Professor at the University of Wales, College of Cardiff, examines ethnic issues in Western Europe, highlighting the most pressing and drawing out the implications for multiethnic accommodation to a changing world order. He emphasizes the significance of the spatial perspective at urban, regional, and continental scales.

**Former Soviet Union**

**Dr. Robert Kaiser**, Professor of Geography at the University of Missouri–Columbia, explores the factors underlying the regional variations in the ethnoterritorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Among these factors are the degree of national consciousness, the strength of attachment to place, the nature of ethnodemographic trends, and the social mobility and relative deprivation of the ethnic group. He also discusses how various groups have reacted to rising territorial nationalism.
Dr. Ronald Wixman, in his response, discusses the region from a slightly different perspective, viewing the Soviet Union as an empire that is going through stages of decolonization.

Africa
Dr. Harm J. de Blij, Landegger Distinguished Professor of Geography at Georgetown University, examines the three kinds of ethnic conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: religious, tribal, and strategic. He then looks in detail at current ethnic strife in Liberia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola and assesses the potential for ethnic conflict in Nigeria and South Africa.

Dr. Rex Honey, Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Iowa, responds by placing African ethnic conflict in a historical perspective. He associates current problems with the European colonialists’ imposition of boundaries and of the modern nation-state system.

Latin America
Dr. Gary S. Elbow, Professor of Geography, Texas Tech University, discusses the potential for ethnic conflict in South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean in the 1990s. He focuses on the potential for confrontation between indigenous peoples and national governments.

Mr. Mac Chapin of Rights and Resources responds by discussing ethnic tensions among groups in Central America. He concentrates on the marginalization of the indigenous population.

Middle East
Dr. Marvin Mikesell, Professor of Geography at the University of Chicago, examines the ethnic realities that make the Middle East a region of inherent instability and the persistent conflict between ethnic groups, many of whom share a common language and religion.

Dr. Mildred Berman, Professor of Geography at Salem State College, calls attention to refugees as another of the destabilizing aspects of the region’s human geography.

Southeast and East Asia
Dr. Dru Gladney, Research Fellow, Program for Cultural Studies at the East West Center, Hawaii, illustrates some of the potential ethnic and subethnic faultlines in Chinese society. He explores ethnicity in the context of the shifting nature of identity and proposes some policy considerations.

Dr. Eric Crystal, Coordinator for Southeast Asia Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, presents four key focuses for understanding ethnic tensions in Southeast Asia: highland-lowland divides, religious identification, cultural and linguistic differences in border regions, and ideological conflicts articulated in terms of ethnic interest. Dr. Crystal highlights the impact of outside intervention on inflaming ethnic tensions in the region since World War II and concludes with some observations for policymaking.

South Asia
Dr. Joseph Schwartzberg, Professor of Geography at the University of Minnesota, examines evolving ethnic identity in South Asia, focusing on postindependence India. Among the issues he discusses are the processes of ethnic identity formation, linguistic affiliation as an organizing principle, and Hindu nationalism.

Dr. Robert Stoddard, the respondent, is Professor of Geography at the University of Nebraska. He discusses the regionalization of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka and comments on two major perspectives of Indian nationalism, the secular and the Hindu.

Part III: Regional Comparisons and Implications for the United States and the International Community

Perspectives on Demographic and Humanitarian Issues
Dr. Gary Fuller, Professor of Geography and Population Studies at the University of Hawaii, examines the demographic underpinnings of ethnic conflict. He argues that certain demographic data, such as infant
mortality, are good indicators of a particular ethnic group's well-being. He also looks at how youth bulges—when the 15 to 24 age cohort exceeds 20 percent of a given population—affect stability within ethnic groups.

Dr. Martin Kenzer, Associate Professor of Geography at Florida Atlantic University, provides a review of post-World War II ethnically driven refugee movements and assesses the current refugee picture.

Dr. Lee Schwartz, Office of the Geographer, Department of State, examines the linkage between forced migration and ethnicity. He presents a typology of forced movements of people and a geography of the ethnic composition of such migration.

States, Nations, and Ethnic Conflict
Dr. Thomas Poulsen looks at how overlapping patterns of states (sovereign countries) and nations (groupings of peoples with common identities) affect current affairs. He examines factors that aggravate or ameliorate ethnic conflicts, especially where states and nations do not correspond, and presents some political-geographic truisms that the United States should consider in dealing with ethnic conflict abroad.

Patterns, Trends, and Regional Comparisons
Dr. Marvin Mikesell suggests that some countries—such as Finland—have done a good job accommodating minority populations and that neighboring countries could learn from this.

In her discussion, Dr. Mildred Berman relays the importance of examining population trends.

Ethnic Conflict and US Policy
Dr. Jon Gundersen, Department of State, presents his view that US foreign policy must take into account ethnic conflict, which will be on the international agenda over the long term. Concentrating on Europe and the former Soviet Union, he questions what type of state structure can best protect ethnic groups in the region. He concludes by suggesting that the problem of ethnic conflict in Europe could be addressed through a united, decentralized Continent governed by mutually accepted rules of behavior.

Mr. Wade Hinkle, Department of Defense, reiterates then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's view that ethnic/national conflict is one of the main dangers to US national security in the post-Cold War era. He then summarizes the key points of US national security strategy: remaining engaged in international affairs, preventing the effects of ethnic conflict, and forming partnerships with like-minded democratic countries.

Conclusions: Implications for the United States and the International Community—Problems and Prospects
Dr. Stanley Brunn, Professor of Geography at the University of Kentucky, examines the state of the world political map and itemizes six factors that will affect global politics over the next 20 years: environment, religion, secularization, sports, territoriality, and communications.

In the discussion, Dr. Rex Honey calls for understanding that oppressed ethnic groups have legitimate grievances and for support of human rights globally.

Dr. Harm J. de Blij, the concluding discussant, points out that ethnic strife may be related to deteriorating environmental conditions in parts of the world.
Geographic Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict

Alexander Murphy
Associate Professor of Geography
University of Oregon

Introduction

The topic of ethnic conflict has long interested geographers, and in recent years the geographical literature on the subject has attracted considerable attention. Although some of the issues raised in this literature are similar to those examined by political scientists and sociologists, the emphasis in geography on spatial, territorial, and environmental issues has translated into a distinctly different analytical approach to ethnic conflict. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the most important aspects of this approach and to discuss how a geographical perspective can help us understand ethnic tensions, identify potentially destabilizing ethnic conflicts, and develop effective policy responses to those conflicts.

The ensuing discussion centers around three core geographical concepts: location, territory, and environment. In the United States, the discipline of geography is sometimes equated with efforts simply to locate and describe the physical and human attributes of the earth’s surface. Geography is, however, much more than this; it is concerned with analyzing and explaining the nature and significance of the spatial and environmental contexts within which events and processes unfold. Geographers seek to understand and explain the patterns that make up the earth’s surface, the relationship among phenomena in particular places, the situation of places and peoples in relation to one another, and peoples’ understandings of the places where they live.

Core Concepts

The three core concepts around which this paper is structured are at the heart of these geographical concerns. The concept of location deals not only with the spatial distribution of ethnic groups but also with the relationship between ethnic patterns and other human and physical patterns. Territory is a rich concept that encompasses the nature and function of formal ethnic territories and group sense of place. The environmental concept is concerned with the relationship between ethnic groups and their tangible physical setting, including the ways in which environmental perceptions affect group definition and intergroup relations. There are obvious overlaps among these concepts, and they do not encompass all relevant aspects of geographical inquiry. Nonetheless, they provide a useful organizing framework around which a discussion of the most important geographical insights on ethnic conflict can be built.

Location: A Key To Understanding Relationships Between Ethnic Groups

In any attempt to understand ethnic conflict, the location of the groups in question must be taken into consideration. On its surface this seems obvious, but many general analyses of ethnic conflict pay remarkably little attention to locational issues. Instead, it is simply assumed that groups live in the political units or historical homelands with which they are most readily identified. Too often studies note that the Bretons live in Brittany, the French speakers of Canada in Quebec, and the Tamils in Tamil Eelam without any consideration of the distributional complexities that lie behind these generalizations.

Approaching ethnic conflict from a geographical perspective implies a much greater concern with the details of location and distribution. This means focusing on the precise character of ethnic patterns and their relationship to other political, social, and environmental patterns. A critical entry-level problem in such an endeavor is to decide who does and does not belong to a given ethnic group (see Smith 1986). How an ethnic group is delimited depends on circumstances and purpose, of course, but the process is not always straightforward or obvious. There are more people that Welsh autonomists would like to include in their ethnic group than there are people who identify themselves primarily as Welsh. The Tamils of Sri Lanka encompass two different groups from a historical and religious standpoint. On a larger scale, the Russians in...
the Baltic countries or the Germans in Eastern Europe cannot necessarily be viewed as one group. Russian
and German migrations into these regions took place over long periods of time, and those who came earlier
have distinctly different perspectives from those who migrated during the past few decades.

Once the issue of defining ethnic groups has been addressed, there is much to learn from a careful analy-
sis of group location and distribution. This can be seen through an examination of the effects of different
distributions at a large scale. As Marvin Mikesell and I demonstrated in a recent article (Mikesell and Murphy
1991), the basic distribution of a minority group within a state influences the types of demands the group is
likely to raise. We posited three scenarios (figure 1), each involving a dominant group (A) that constitutes
90 percent of the population and a minority group (B) that constitutes 10 percent of the population. In the first
scenario, group B is concentrated in one area within the state. In the second scenario, group B is intermixed
with group A throughout the state territory. In the third scenario, a significant portion of group B is concen-
trated in one territory, but many members of group B live in other parts of the state. We went on to show that
if a minority group feels marginalized or repressed, in the first scenario it is likely to make demands for sepa-
ration (S), autonomy (A), or even independence (I). This was the case for the Basques in Franco’s Spain and
is still the case for the Tibetans in China. In the second scenario, by contrast, the demands are likely to be for recognition (R), access (A), and participation (P), as exemplified by African-Americans in the United States. The third scenario, which corresponds to the situation of the French speakers of Canada, is likely to yield a mixture of demands and a greater heterogeneity of ethnic group aspirations.

An understanding of ethnic patterns at a variety of scales can tell us much about the nature of conflict and
about the viability of proposals to ameliorate conflict. Take the case of Bosnia, for example. Generalized eth-
ic distributions shown on large-scale maps became the basis for the Vance-Owen plan to divide up the
country into discrete ethnic territories. A closer examination of ethnic patterns, however, reveals distribu-
tions that are much more nuanced than those reflected in the Vance-Owen plan. Awareness of these, together
with some of the territorial issues that will be raised later, helps explain the negative reactions that the plan
generated. Similarly, a detailed understanding of the distribution of Tamils in Sri Lanka sheds light on the
problems facing the Sinhalese-dominated government in its efforts to quell separatist threats through the dev-
olution of power to regional governments. As regional governments grow in power, ethnically heterogeneous
administrative districts such as Puttalam and Ampara increasingly become the focuses of conflict.

The forgoing examples suggest that a geographical perspective on location involves more than simply
identifying where the members of ethnic groups live. It is concerned with a group’s location in relation to
other physical and human phenomena of importance. Analyzing a group’s “relative location” can provide
insight into the likelihood that one group will seek to exert control over another, the opportunities and cata-
ysts for ethnic group mobilization, the strategies employed by groups during times of overt conflict,
and the possibilities for a conflict to spill beyond state boundaries. A brief examination of each of these
points is instructive.

Attempts by one ethnic group to exert control over another often occur when one group lives in an area
that is highly prized by another (see, for instance, a number of the essays in Johnston, Knight, and
Kofman 1988). This is evident in the history of relations between dominant and minority groups in states
as diverse as Australia, Turkey, and France. In each case, minorities concentrated in areas thought to have
little value or importance were generally left alone or ignored. Those living in areas of economic, military,
political, or cultural significance, however, often encountered interference and domination by the
group in power, which in turn frequently led to conflict. In making this point, it is important to stress
that the perceptual importance of an area is not simply a function of its economic and strategic attributes;
places with great historical-cultural meaning or political significance can become focuses of conflict
as well. Thus, the presence of Albanians in Kosovo and of French speakers in the communes around
Brussels have generated serious discord because of the historical-cultural significance of Kosovo to Ser-
bi ans and the political-cultural significance of the communes around Brussels to Flemings.
Figure 1

Minority Aspirations: Significance of Distribution and Size

Turning to the importance of relative location for ethnic mobilization, groups living within areas that are disadvantaged from a socioeconomic standpoint can use that disadvantage to foster a sense of discrimination. This does not mean that ethnicity is simply a product of socioeconomic differences, but comparative standards of living often become points of contention in ethnic conflicts (see, for instance, many of the essays in Chisholm and Smith 1990). In former Yugoslavia, for example, Serbian resentment of Croats and Slovenes was heightened by the disproportionate share of tourism-related revenue that flowed into Croatia and Slovenia. The Croats and Slovenes, in turn, resented the central government’s efforts to redistribute some of that revenue to other parts of Yugoslavia.

The capacity of a group to mobilize is also tied to its location in relation to demographic and settlement patterns. There is considerable evidence to suggest that culturally distinct groups without a significant urban base are unlikely to develop and sustain a serious ethnic movement (Murphy 1992). Most ethnic movements begin among an intelligentsia with some access to established lines of power and communication (Smith 1982). Such movements develop and grow through the successful mobilization of people and resources, which in turn requires the establishment of an institutional base that is convenient to a significant number of group members and that offers access to channels of communication. Since these elements are found primarily in cities, an urban base is almost a prerequisite for ethnic mobilization. Thus, in Western Europe most successful ethnic challenges have come from groups such as the Catalans and the Flemings that have major cities within their territories. By contrast, efforts to challenge existing arrangements among Saami activists in Norway or their Basque counterparts in France have been frustrated by the lack of a central place that could become the focus of identity and nationalist activism.

Turning to the significance of relative location for the strategies employed by ethnic groups in situations of overt conflict, it has long been understood that a group’s position in relation to physical features, transportation routes, and settlement patterns affects the tactics of conflict. As is discussed in more detail below, ethnic conflicts often revolve around territorial issues, and control over territory is a primary goal in times of armed conflict. Assessing the strategies that are likely to be employed in such conflicts requires an understanding of a group’s location in relation to places of strategic or perceptual importance, the difficulties of exerting control over those places, and the advantages that can follow if control is successfully asserted. In the case of recent Serbian initiatives, for example, Ronald Wixman has argued that it is impossible to understand the military objectives of the Serbs without considering the geopolitical and strategic advantages that will follow from a successful Serbian attempt both to control the Krajina region of Croatia and to connect it to Serbia (editorial, The Register Guard, Eugene, Oregon, 6 June 1993, section B, pp. 1 and 4).

A final important dimension of “relative location” is the situation of a group in relation to similar or sympathetic groups in other states. Social scientists and policymakers are so much in the habit of looking at issues on a state-by-state basis that they often ignore cultural/ethnic continuities across international boundaries. Yet Azerbaijanis live in Iran as well as Azerbaijan, and Armenians are found in Turkey as well as in Armenia. Focusing on the relationships among the peoples living on either side of these boundaries is of critical importance if we are to understand the forces that will affect political stability in Western and Central Asia in the years ahead. Indeed, given the increasing permeability of international boundaries, an awareness of cross-border cultural continuities and interaction patterns in many parts of the world is going to be necessary if we are to comprehend the ways in which conflicts develop and their likely ramifications.

Territory: At The Heart of Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict

A territory is generally understood to be a bounded area that has some political character or meaning. As the embodiment of a particular way of understanding and using the earth’s surface, territory is at the heart of geographical thinking about ethnicity and nationalism. Geographers are concerned with the functional and
perceptual attributes of territory, the ways in which territory acquires significance in human affairs, and the nature and impact of competing strategies to control territory (Knight 1982). Much of the social science and public policy literature on ethnicity fails to consider these issues; instead, territories are treated simply as fixed units within which political and social developments are situated. This does not mean that territories are entirely ignored. Questions are asked about the role of Quebec in Canadian national politics, the political tactics of the Armenian minority living within Azerbaijan, the social consequences of ethnic heterogeneity within the states of India, and the problems that interstate resource inequalities pose for political stability in Nigeria. These questions tend to be addressed, however, without any consideration of the historical development, perceptual attributes, or spatial configuration of the territorial units involved.

The importance of such questions becomes immediately apparent if we pose a series of counterfactual questions. Would ethnolinguistic identity and intergroup conflict in Canada be different if Quebec had developed as three separate provinces instead of one? Would Armenian-Azerbaijani relations be any different if Stalin had not created an Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan? Would ethnic relations in Nigeria be different if the state had been divided into 30 instead of 19 constituent units? The obvious “yes” that each of these questions commands indicates the importance of going beyond approaches that take the territorial status quo for granted.

Two related territorial issues are at the heart of geographical work on ethnic conflict: (1) the nature and scope of ethnic senses of territory and (2) the development and institutionalization of particular political-territorial arrangements. Turning to the first issue, the habit of taking territorial arrangements for granted means that we often do not consider the disjunction between territorial structures and group sense of territory. Yet a map showing group sense of territory can tell us much more about the likelihood of conflict than can a static political map. It is, of course, difficult to delimit a group’s sense of territory with any precision, but insights can be gained through an examination of historical political patterns, group rhetoric and iconography, population concentrations, and the distribution of sites with particular ethnocultural significance (see Gottmann 1973). When the same area clearly falls within more than one group’s sense of territory, the potential for conflict is heightened (see, for instance, White 1992).

It is important to note that not all senses of territory are monoethnic in character. One of the fundamental flaws of many analyses of pre-civil-war Bosnia is the failure to recognize the strength of a multiethnic Bosnian sense of territory. The number of people in Bosnia who were declaring themselves as “Bosnian” on census and survey forms grew steadily in the post–World War II era, and many inhabitants came to think of the country as a territorial synthesis of cultures. The recent partition plans developed for Bosnia fail to grasp this reality. Instead they propose dividing the country into ethnically discrete units. Since such proposals neither can build upon preexisting senses of territory nor can possibly lead to the establishment of truly monoethnic territories—the groups are too intermingled for that to happen—their implementation would at best create a highly unstable situation; each of the new subdivisions would have an explicitly monoethnic rationale, yet each would be ethnically heterogeneous and would fall within more than one group’s sense of territory (Jordan 1993).

The Bosnian example suggests that, when policies are implemented that ignore underlying territorial ideologies, instability is likely to result. The issue of sense of territory is thus closely linked to the second core territorial issue: the development and institutionalization of particular political-territorial arrangements. Focusing on the process by which formal territories come into being is important because it can provide insights into how territorial arrangements shape ethnic identity and interaction, how conflicts develop and are sustained, and how territory is used to advance particular political ends (see generally Sack 1986).

Many groups sharing basic cultural traits did not become self-conscious ethnic groups until fairly recently. Some 200 years ago there was no widespread sense of Palestinian, Kurdish, or Flemish identity. Those identities were forged in the context of political-territorial developments that served to differentiate peoples based on cultural characteristics. In the case
of the Kurds, a larger sense of group identity developed out of a territorial struggle that marginalized and ignored the Kurdish peoples. In the Flemish case, the implementation of a territorial strategy by a movement initially focused on individual language rights provided a crucible in which a larger sense of ethnic identity could develop. In both cases, ethnic demands and intergroup relations are fundamentally tied to the development and institutionalization of particular territorial arrangements.

The political-territorial history of a region is also implicated in the development and conduct of intergroup conflict. This is because particular issues take on significance as territorial structures come into being and because those structures, in turn, provide the frameworks within which the issues in question are confronted. This complex point can best be illustrated through an example. In early 20th century Belgium, the Flemish movement sought to secure the rights of Dutch or Flemish speakers to use their language in public life. Frustrated by their lack of success and concerned about the growing use of French in northern Belgium, they changed strategies and began to call for the partitioning of the country along language lines. This eventually occurred, and the country is now a federation made up of language regions with broad competencies over economic, social, and cultural matters. The adoption and implementation of a territorial approach to the language problem shifted attention away from individual language rights and directed it toward territorial issues; disputes over the use of language in governmental and commercial affairs were replaced by conflicts over the regional affiliations of certain communes along the language boundary and around Brussels. Moreover, since powers over a broad array of issues were devolved to the language regions, many economic, social, and political matters took on ethnoregional significance. As a result, the internal territorial structure of Belgium has promoted ethnoregionalism. Without a consideration of the development and institutionalization of territorial arrangements in Belgium, this point could easily be missed.

A final reason for focusing on the processes by which territorial arrangements come into being is that such an approach provides insight into the purposes behind the creation of ethnic territories. This, in turn, can tell us much about the circumstances that lead to ethnic conflict (see Wixman 1986). General analyses of legal arrangements in multiethnic states draw a distinction between “personal” and territorial policy approaches. The latter encompasses laws that set aside some territory for a given ethnic group. The assumption is often made that these laws are pluralist in intent and effect; it is assumed that they are acknowledgments of the existence of ethnic diversity and that they operate to sustain that diversity. A closer examination of territorial policies in multiethnic states reveals a much more complicated picture (Murphy 1989). In some cases, territorial policies reflect a desire to recognize and sustain diversity (for instance, Switzerland, India, and Canada). In other instances such policies have distinctly different intents and effects. Territorial policies are adopted to diffuse international pressure (for instance, the recognition of ethnic territories in Burma), to promote rivalry between groups (for instance, Soviet manipulation of borders in the Caucasus and Central Asia), and even deliberately to constrain ethnic rights (for instance, the creation of "homelands" for the indigenous peoples of South Africa). Understanding the intent and effect of such policies is clearly important if we are to judge what a territory means for a given group and the role that the territorial context plays in intergroup relations.

Environment: Its Context in Ethnic Conflict

Geographers are fundamentally concerned with the relationship between people and the environment. This relationship is important in the context of ethnic group relations because ethnic identity is often tied to a particular environmental context, because ecological issues can become focuses of intergroup conflict, and because the manipulation of the environment is a frequently used tactic to advance particular ethnoterritorial ends. A brief examination of these three factors provides insight into the importance of the geographical concern with the environmental foundations of ethnic relations.

In many parts of the world, ethnic identity is closely linked to a people's understanding and use of the environment. The strong tie between ethnic identity and
environmental context can often be seen in the rhetoric and iconography of ethnic movements; great attention is paid to the unique physical characteristics of a group's homeland in the songs, poems, art, and literature of the group. In many cases, these environmental characteristics are so much a part of group identity that any threat to them can precipitate a crisis. The link between ethnicity and environmental context is even deeper in parts of the world where differences in subsistence practices define ethnic boundaries. In the highlands of Nepal, agriculture and ethnicity are closely linked. An understanding of the intricacies of that link is of considerable importance if we are to gain insight into the types of events that can precipitate conflict. Knowing that the Hindus equate brown grains with impurity, for example, allows us to understand the potential implications of a decision emanating from Katmandu to introduce brown rice into the area.

The state of the environment in an ethnic region can also become a source of conflict. The ethnopolitical consequences of ecological degradation were apparent in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s; concerns over the rapidly deteriorating state of the environment in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland provided a rallying point for those seeking to bring down Soviet hegemony in the region. Within states, policies that promote environmental degradation in ethnic homelands or territories, whether intentional or not, can spark dissention and conflict. This can be seen in former Czechoslovakia where the central government decided to support the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric dam project on the Danube River. The project, which will result in the flooding of land within the part of Slovakia where Hungarians are concentrated, sparked protests amongst Slovakia's Hungarian minority.

Manipulation of the environment is also frequently used as a tactic in ethnic conflicts. In some cases, efforts are made to demarcate the boundaries of ethnic territories through the building of particular structures (for instance, walls and fences), the erection of signs, or the emplacement of more subtle indicators of ethnic group territoriality (for instance, symbolic icons or structures) (see Rumley and Minghi 1991). In other cases, land use decisions are made with the goal of asserting control over a given area. This is most clearly seen when settlements are established in disputed territories (for instance, the establishment of settlements by Israeli Jews in the West Bank). More subtle land use decisions are also linked to ethnic conflict. In a provocative recent study, Shaul Cohen (1993) has shown how the Israeli Government and the Palestinians use tree planting to assert their claims to land, the former through afforestation schemes and the latter through the planting of olive groves. Studies of this sort highlight the importance of landscape and land use issues for understanding ethnic conflict.

Policy Implications and Conclusion

The forgoing account has only scratched the surface of the ways in which geographical perspectives can enhance our understanding of ethnic conflict. Each of the highlighted themes could be greatly expanded, as will undoubtedly become clear in the regional papers that follow. Looking at ethnicity through a geographical lens has a variety of implications for the formulation of policy responses to ethnic conflict, but three stand out: (1) the importance of looking beyond political leaders, (2) the importance of looking beyond individual states, and (3) the importance of looking at maps—not just political maps, but ethnic, economic, environmental, and perceptual maps as well.

Turning to the first two points, most of the questions we ask about the world are framed in terms of states and state leaders. The assumption is made that states are the units that really matter in the world today, and the key questions are thought to be those that focus on the viability and policy stances of political regimes. While this assumption made some sense during the Cold War era, it is increasingly problematic. The very ubiquity of ethnic conflict points to its limitations. If we are to grasp the dynamics and power of ethnic conflict in the modern world, we must be prepared to look at ethnicity from a bottom-up perspective, one that begins with the aspirations and needs of groups, not one that always begins with the existing pattern of states.

This is where geography comes in, for a geographical perspective provides important insights into ethnicity and ethnic relations that go beyond conventional
political analyses. Its power is ultimately to root our understanding of ethnicity in a context that is not simply one of political leadership and political initiatives. By focusing on the locational, territorial, and environmental dimensions of ethnic conflict, a geographical perspective directs attention to basic opportunities and constraints, to issues that may precipitate tensions, and to vital connections across international boundaries that may be missed if we approach ethnic conflict on a state-by-state basis. Maps can be extraordinarily important tools in this endeavor, for they encourage us to think about the relationships between ethnic processes on the one hand and their territorial and environmental contexts on the other. Maps should not be seen as ends unto themselves, however. Rather, their usefulness is in helping us to see relationships and issues that otherwise might be missed.

The perspectives on ethnic conflict outlined in this paper are suggestive of a larger challenge for US foreign policy: the need to redefine our national interest in a way that transcends conventional assumptions about the power and static character of the existing political-territorial order. Ethnic conflicts are likely to intensify, not abate, in the years ahead, and in places they may well lead to changes in the political organization of territory. Since there is little the United States can do to alter this situation, US foreign policy should not be driven by the assumption that regional stability is most likely to occur in places where there are no changes in the world political map. Instead, long-term stability is likely to be achieved only in situations where political and territorial arrangements are organized to protect the basic cultural and political rights of ethnic groups. This implies the need for a US foreign policy that is open to political-territorial structures that promote representative pluralism, whether or not those structures reflect the existing pattern of states.
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Identity, Territory, and Self-Determination: Factors Underlying Potential National and International Conflict

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The State

States\(^1\) remain the principal territorial framework for international society. Whereas all States are legally equal within the international system, in geographical terms there are great differences within and between States, including differences that find reflection in the way individual States may be perceived as participants in the system (Cohen 1991; Knight, 1993).

The State, a physical and legal entity, is a bounded container for the contents of a particular portion of the earth’s surface, which includes the people, their government, resources, and means for communication and movement. The State, theoretically, is “the chief custodian of overall social order; it is monitor, controller, arbitrator” of all people, things, and processes operating within the delimited bounds (Greer and Orleans, cited in Knight, 1982). Further, as Johnston (1982) has observed, the State acts as the promoter of accumulation, as the legitimator of capitalism, and as the creator of social consensus and order. In order to perform these three roles, each State develops its own instruments and mechanisms by which the structural links between social formation and the State can function hierarchically and so enable the reproduction of the system.

The State is thus itself a geographical factor because things happen that have spatial consequences as a result of decisions and actions by State agents and institutions. States’ actions pertain to their own and others’ territories. An essential quality of statehood is territory; all States have territory that is bounded, formally or informally, by human decisions and actions.

 Territory

Territory by itself is a passive concept. People, by their beliefs, decisions, and actions, give meaning to territory. Territory thus is not; rather, it becomes! It is true that many people obtain meaning from “their” territory and the landscape within it by believing that the territory and its landscape are living entities that are already filled with meaning. And it is true that such meanings may be reflected in a people’s cultural ecology, the spatial patterning of their settlement and land use systems, their naming of places, their patterns of movement, and perhaps in reverential beliefs they hold about specific parts of the landscape around them. To suggest that these meanings are simply figments of the collective imagination—parts of the “geographies of the mind”—is to be radical, at least for those people who accept the apparent truth of such meanings. Meanings gained from territory—which are really attributions to the territory—reflect a cultural relationship with the territory. Consider, for instance, the powerful links most US citizens have to Washington, DC, where the human-created capital landscape serves as an important symbolic place for members of the American nation.

A State’s territory is thus not value-free; it holds different kinds of meanings for its people versus—but from quite different perspectives and degrees of knowledge, insight, and appreciation—those who do not belong. People of the State will revere and gain strength from their territory. People will see certain structures or specific locations, such as statues, capital cities, battlefields, and even the territory as a whole, as sacred or at least very special. In sum, territory is a social construction (Williams and Smith, 1983).

If it is accepted that territory “becomes,” then States are not geographical givens. No State exists because of firm geographical factors. States and their spatial parameters—dimensions, shapes, and boundaries—exist because human actions and various local and world economic-political-social processes have led to their creation and continuation. These actions and processes occur in specific time-space settings and so

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\(^1\) State, with a capital “s” herein, refers to an internationally recognized independent, self-governing territory, sometimes called a country. State with a lowercase “s” refers to a politico-territorial unit within a State, such as Minnesota within the United States.
involve geographical considerations, with resulting actions and processes having sometimes profound, sometimes subtle geographical impact.

For those who belong to and control a territory, there will undoubtedly be powerful symbolic links to “their” territory, no matter how little the territory is actually known or how weakly it is perceived; it is enough that it is theirs! But what if the territory in question does not coincide with the bounds of a particular State, either in terms of its internal or inter-State structures? Where there is a distributional disparity, there is the potential for conflict.

The Inherent Contradictions of Territory

The attachments people have to their territory can have spiritual and psychological bases that go deeper than anything generated simply by economic factors. These attachments and linkages help to bond people both to their territory and to others who also “belong” to it and accept it as theirs.

Territory, according to the French geographer Jean Gottmann (1973), when delimited with a system of government that has effective control over it, provides both security and opportunity for those who live within its bounds. On the one hand, there is security to be gained from being an isolated community, whereas, on the other hand, there is opportunity to be derived from being a part of a larger whole. Inwardness and security, outwardness and opportunity—stress is caused by these contradictory dimensions of territory, for elements of both undoubtedly are always present in any situation. In terms of foreign policy and international trade and other linkages, States may be further along the continuum toward one extreme or the other at different times, thus more toward stressing an outward-looking opportunity perspective than an inward-looking security perspective at one time, and vice versa at another. That there is an interplay between the two contrasting, fundamental dimensions of territory is vital to any understanding of the political geography of specific States, the international system of States, and the various group politico-territorial identities around the globe that are challenging the status quo.

Territorial Processes

For any State to exist there must be numerous “centripetal forces” operating that link people, places, and socioeconomic and political processes (Whebell 1983; table 1). A key process is centralization, whereby the people and their territory are “welded” together via socioeconomic and political integration. Centralization processes vary, and the degrees of success in achieving unification, if such is the goal, also vary. It has been almost an article of faith that by the modernization of all within the State’s bounds a unified developed State can be achieved, with the center—be it political or economic—providing supposed solutions to the development needs of periphery. The efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, in many States, did not achieve such a goal. Still, even when unity eluded States, modernization processes generally linked people and regions together. Core-periphery relations have internal and international dimensions for all States (Gottmann, ed., 1980). They operate in colonial situations too, as when the center establishes and then strengthens its links to the colonial periphery center.

States also constantly have to deal with various decentralizing processes. Whereas various centripetal forces strengthen and unify the State, countervailing, centrifugal forces reduce its cohesion. A weak central government; poor communications; or significant ethnic, cultural, religious, or other divisions among people within the State serve as examples of centrifugal forces. If the divide is too great between a regionally based group and the central government, self-determination and secession may be demanded. To deal with demands from a peripheral portion of the State, the government may grant devolution whereby legislative power is devolved from the center to a region—such as what Scots nationalists want from the English-dominated parliamentary center in London or when a new sub-State territory is created as in Jura in Switzerland (Jenkins, 1986). If centrifugal forces prove to be too destructive within a State, a people may demand internal self-determination by throwing out a government and reforming the State, as happened early in the 1990s in Poland and Hungary when Communist governments and their apparatuses were overthrown and
Territorial Processes*

Centralization subsumed:
- "Centripetal forces."
- Socioeconomic and political integration.
- Modernization.
- Metropolitanism.
- Core-periphery relationships.

Decentralization subsumed:
- "Centrifugal forces."
- Self-determination—processes involved in a demand for the restructuring of the State, with new power to the people.
- Devolution—legislative power from center to region(s).
- Colonial rule.
- Decolonization—instigated by the imperial power.

Capital city location:
- Site selection process and consequences of site selection.

Boundary establishment's three stages:
- Definition.
- Delimitation.
- Demarcation.

Expansionist subsumed:
- Imperialism.

Irredentism subsumed:
- Annexationism—change in political control from one unit to another.

Separatism subsumed:
- Autonomism—implies territorial distinctiveness.
- Self-determination—processes involved in a demand to be separated from the existing State.
- Decolonization—initiated by colony.
- Secessionism—detachment to create a new territory.

Based on Whebell (1983), with modifications and additions by Knight.

replaced by multiparty democratic systems responsive to ballot box results. Colonial rule, under the guidance of a governor, is a form of decentralization, as is decolonization that occurs by imperial action.

All States, through their governments, deal with competing centripetal and centrifugal forces. Competition between and among the regions of the State and with the center provides evidence of this. The selection of a capital city generally brings both forces to the surface as competing territorially based biases and opinions are expressed. Hence the selection of a new capital can itself be a territorial process, as evidenced by the bitter case in Canada in the 19th century (Knight, 1992) and in united Germany over whether Berlin should once again become the capital.

Other territorial processes include:
- Boundary establishment—the creation of limits to a territory. This can involve dynamic processes, as governments determine the areal extent of their control. Boundary conflicts remain the primary cause for conflict between States (Boundary Bulletin).
• Expansionism—the areal extension of a State and domination of neighboring States’ territories and peoples (Parker, 1988) or the claiming of others’ territories overseas (Christopher 1988).

• Irredentism—the claiming or taking of another State’s territory based on a cultural claim, whether true or not. Nazi Germany’s claiming and taking the Sudetenland (in Czechoslovakia) in 1938 is the classic example.

• Separatism—the separation of one part from another, whether partially or totally. If a regionally based group causes friction between the region and the center, accord may be achieved by the granting of autonomy as in Euskadi, northern Spain. Decolonization and the granting of statehood due to demands from within a colony is another form of separatism; it is significant that most colonies obtained independence within their colonially derived boundaries because separatist threats were perceived to be too great to permit otherwise.² If an internal-to-a-State solution to discord is not enough, the State may disintegrate as a result of secessionism, whereby the territory is divided into two or more parts as with the recent breakup of Czechoslovakia.

Measures of Identity

All these territorial processes imply people. Of concern here are people in groups. The word “people” has legal meaning; it normally encompasses all the inhabitants of a State. All people living within Botswana, for example, are said to be Batswana, whether or not they all have allegiance to such a definition of group “self.” Some sub-State groups claim they are “people” and thus deserve international recognition (Knight 1988; Crawford 1988). Many other terms are used to describe groups of people, including nations, ethnic groups, and tribes. All evoke feelings of self-worth by members and feelings of suspicion toward nonmembers. To get around the problems of evocative definitions, I have offered the phrase “group territorial identity”; that is, if the group becomes active in a political manner and makes it needs known with the State, it becomes a “group politico-territorial identity” (Knight, 1982).

Group territorial identities, involving as they do numerous ways for people to identify and bond and yet also to be separate, form an aspect of the geographies of the mind, because the links—while sometimes having physical expression, as with flags, national anthems, favored symbolic sites (Zelinsky, 1988)—remain essentially in the mind, to turn off or on. Each definition of group self implies some other group, with different values, different attachments, and different allegiances—the description of which may not reflect reality from the perspective of that other group (Said, 1993; Godlewska and Smith 1994). Just as territory has inward and outward consequences, so too does identity. Some groups look inward, stressing the need for security, whereas others are keen to look outward, seeking opportunities for interaction with others. The concepts of territory and identity thus share a fundamental tension between these competing elements.

We operate at several levels of identity. At the center is the self, normally set within a family. Beyond that, we are amazing creatures because we have the capacity to attach ourselves to many aspects of our group identities, such as in a neighborhood, a religious community, a scout troop, a football team, a region of the country, or even the nation—all of which are tied to particular places (Tuan, 1977). We can flick a switch in our minds and change attachments, as is appropriate at the moment. But each of us ultimately gives priority of belonging to a particular level of abstraction of identity. For many people priority in the people-to-territory link is at the level of the State. However, for many others, priority is given to a lower order allegiance. For instance, some may have allegiance to a regionally based identity, as to Punjab rather than to India. Others may give primary allegiance to their tribe/ethnic group/sub-State nation. The latter three forms of group identity may be based on claims of common ancestry; common language; (selective) history; traditions; and, above all, in the name of the group, a particular territory.

² This conservative view is under threat, as demonstrated by the recent creation of Eritrea out of part of Ethiopia, a territorial break that perhaps is but a prelude to territorial partitioning and new State creation that could occur throughout Africa.
What is not well understood is why people can at one moment share a higher level of identity that links two or more separate identities but then drop back into placing their local level of identity first, thus leading to the exclusion of previously accepted neighbors and, perhaps, to conflict. For example, in Yugoslavia people for a time accepted a trans-subgroup “Yugoslavian” identity but then, as the State apparatus rapidly crumbled, shocked that ephemeral level of identity and returned to giving priority to their age-old ethnic identities.

Territoriality

We are all territorial beings, exhibiting territoriality in varying manners, depending upon in which culture we are brought up. Although people vary from one culture to another in terms of what they regard as their personal space, most will defend their home turf at a personal scale—be it the home from burglars, the team’s territory during a hockey game, or the claimed locations for our desks in the office. At a different scale, ethnic and national territory may also be defended if threatened. Groups, as with individuals, exhibit territoriality. Geographer Robert Sack (1981, 1986) notes that territoriality is a powerful and indispensable geographic strategy for controlling people and things by controlling area. Territoriality implies the need to possess, occupy, and defend a particular territory.

Why should people sometimes link together and at other times not? It is not a given that some people can cooperate and share territory whereas others must be divided. The link between territory, identity, and territoriality becomes especially dynamic when discord exists between two or more group territorial identities that share a single space—such as Walloons and Flemings in Belgium, Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, contrasting peoples in Sudan—or, indeed, lie across the shared bounds of two or more States, as do the Kurds in Southwest Asia.

Self-Determination

When the concern for identity, territory, territoriality, and self-determination are combined, a dynamic definition is possible: “territory is . . . space to which identity is attached by a distinctive group who hold or covet that territory and who desire to have full control of it for the group’s benefit” (Knight, 1982, p. 526). Self-determination is at once a legal concept that finds expression in international law and a geographical concept because it links identity, territory, and the desire for control and has territorial processual consequences.

In the West there is a tendency to discuss human rights from an individual basis, whereas in the former USSR and in many Third World States stress is given to group rights. Group rights form the basis for many claims, especially when the nation is involved, because most people today still put the needs of their nation above personal needs—thus the call to arms is so often heeded in times of danger. Group rights also find expression in self-determination, for the term is used to refer to groups, not individuals. Maoris in New Zealand use the word *turangawaewae* to refer, literally, to “the standing place for the feet.” Implied in this is “the rights of a tribal group in land and the consequential rights of individual members of the group” (cited in Knight, 1988, p. 126). This phrase links identity, territory, and rights. Control is implied too, for without control the people’s rights and responsibilities cannot be fulfilled, and the identity within territory is threatened. Control over both identity and territory is self-determination. Many groups, varying defined, claim self-determination by maintaining they have valid links between their identity and their territory and have the expectation of rights and control that would come from the granting of self-determination.

Despite the clamoring for self-determination and its application following World War I in many places in Europe, Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, in 1921 believed that national safety, historic rights, and economic interests should take precedence over self-determination. He felt the term self-determination was “loaded with dynamite!” Thus Lansing and other politicians then and later, even to this day, have given priority to existing States (Knight 1985). Although the UN Charter states that “all people have the right to self-determination,” the UN—which is made of representatives of States, after all—gives priority to respecting the territorial integrity of existing
States over any substate group politico-territorial identity's claim to part of the State's territory; to do otherwise would "dismember or impair, totally or in part, the existing State" (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XV), cited in Knight, 1985, p. 259). There is an out, for under international law, as currently written, secession may occur if the majority of the people of the total State—or the government, which claims to speak in their name—agrees to the dismantlement of governmental authority in part of the State and to its secession.

The concern for the territorial integrity of States has recently been severely challenged by three things. First, by the development of human rights expectations that are said to apply to all States. Second, by the disintegration of the former USSR and the claiming of self-determination by numerous formerly sub-State groups—some of whom find themselves to be still sub-State groups but now within different or restructured States. Third, by US-led UN interventionist actions in several States. Perhaps we will soon see a rewriting of international law. Any application of self-determination implies change, whether change within a territory or change as a consequence of the splitting of a territory into at least two parts. In each case, people, with distinctive identities, seek change.

Conclusion

The linked concepts of identity, territory, self-determination, and numerous territorial processes give power and meaning to the actions of many group politico-territorial identities who seek to better their lot. While a variety of additional factors need to be considered when examining potentials for ethnic or national conflict (Kliot, 1989; Gosar, ed., 1993), it is necessary to appreciate the importance of the essential concepts and processes discussed here to more fully appreciate why certain conflicts are due to ethnic and national tensions, bounded as they are within certain territorial structures and influenced by—or which cause—certain territorial processes.

Pressures are mounting for territorial (and other) alterations to the existing international system of States. Some of the pressures are now severe, as evidenced by savagery in parts of the former USSR and Eastern Europe, where many distinct group politico-territorial identities have sought or are seeking to establish their own States separate from the politico-territorial units in which they now find themselves. Is the day far off before similar pressures mount elsewhere—in Africa, Asia, or even the Americas—for secession, with or without violence? Not all claims for self-determination need involve secession, as suggested above, because accommodations are often reached within existing State structures. Nevertheless, secession as a recourse to discord remains—and, indeed, has become increasingly—an option.
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Summary of General Discussion

DR. POULSEN: I would like to elaborate on one of the points that Dr. Murphy made about ethnic mobilization and socioeconomic status as they relate to territoriality. Dr. Murphy referred to the ability of the Serbs to mobilize themselves on the basis of their envy and resentment toward the Slovenes and Croats, who are much more economically developed. Ethnic group mobilization can work in the reverse as well, when more developed regions resent the flow of resources to poorer regions. For example, the Croatian identity that developed since the 1960s certainly originated, in part, because this group was the productive part of Yugoslavia and the Croats felt that the revenues they generated were being wasted in Serbia and in the southern parts of the country. One can point to a similar situation in Spain where the separatist feelings that exist among the Basques and the Catalonians come, not because they lack resources, but, again, because they reside in the most productive part of Spain—on a per capita basis—and their productivity goes to the benefit of non-Catalonian and non-Basque regions.

DR. MURPHY: That is an important point. I tried to allude to this after saying there was Serbian resentment of Croats and Slovenes because of the disproportionate share of tourism-related revenues that they receive. The key to understanding socioeconomic patterns in terms of relative location, which is the way I framed it, is not simply to think that a map of socioeconomic well-being necessarily tells us something about ethnicity, but rather to think about socioeconomic well-being in relation to how it is understood and interpreted. Whether you are well off or poor, the key issue is whether you feel like your well-being is threatened—a feeling of marginalization. That is what is important in considering patterns of socioeconomic differentiation.

QUESTION: Both the speakers have presented some very tantalizing concepts that I think would fit well into a strategy of conflict prevention, which I hope we talk a little bit about in the next two days. I would like to ask Dr. Murphy to say something about conflict resolution. Once people have decided to use guns to readjust these territorial boundaries and once that dynamic is engaged in places like Bosnia, what can the geographic discipline tell policymakers that can help us as we attempt conflict resolution—especially in cases where the conflicts are violent?

DR. MURPHY: Conflict resolution is clearly one of the most important issues that we have to deal with. It is difficult to answer that briefly in a way that gets beyond generalities. Nevertheless, let me say a few things.

Understanding the issues of territory, scale, and location is necessary to make sensible and intelligent proposals to ameliorate existing conflicts.

First of all, conflict resolution requires an understanding, in part, of the strategies that are likely to be employed by the participants. This, in turn, requires an understanding of how participants understand and perceive territory. I think it is actually fairly clear why the Serbian military has pursued aggression in particular areas. It is further clear why that is happening in terms of basic strategic concerns. An understanding of underlying territorial motives and objectives, I think, is helpful in formulating any kind of response to something like the current conflict in the Balkans.

Another issue that it is necessary to understand in terms of conflict resolution is that of scale. One must be cognizant of the impact of a particular proposal for resolving conflict. An important question that needs to be asked is, “What does this solution mean for Bosnia?” “What does it mean for the larger Islamic world?”

But third, and most important, is the need to have a clear understanding of a region’s territorial and ethnic realities. Conflict resolution implies some kind of plan to create a stable situation. I made some comments about the inefficacy of the Vance-Owen plan. I made them because the plan and other plans that have been articulated for the division of Bosnian territory into monoethnic regions fail to take into consideration several fundamental territorial and ethnic realities—one of which is that, for all the usefulness of the generalized ethnic map of the country, it hides as much as it
reveals. We have to recognize that. It is not a reflection of underlying patterns of territorial ideology, nor of functional patterns of interaction before the 1989 civil war. It is, in fact, not even really in any conceivable way possible to create monoethnic territories in that region. This implies the need for a different kind of strategy to conflict resolution.

One would have to use different kinds of strategies in dealing with other problems. In the case of Belgium, if I were advising the Belgian Government on how to keep its ethnoregional situation under control, I would suggest giving the old provinces more political-territorial significance within the state. Then their citizens could vote on a fiscal issue and have it not always be an ethnoregional issue. So the answer, of course, has to be tied to the particularities of each case. It seems that the issues of territory, scale, and location are part of what has to be in the mix in order to make sensible and intelligent decisions.

QUESTION: Is there a correlation between socioeconomic status and ethnic conflicts? Would it be valid to say that a commonality in socioeconomic status would ameliorate ethnic conflict? Is socioeconomic status a factor we should examine in attempting to determine whether there is a potential for ethnic conflict?

How important is marginalization of the deprived population a factor in ethnic conflict as opposed to merely a difference in socioeconomic status?

DR. MURPHY: Is there a correlation? Yes. Is it reducible to socioeconomic differences? The short answer is no. The key question—and this plays off of some of Dr. Knight's comments—is one of perception. How are socioeconomic differences understood and perceived?

To draw on the Belgium case again, one could take a look at that country in the late 19th century and generalize about the north. One could say that northern Belgium was then less well off than southern Belgium, so that must be a reason why the Flemish movement mobilized at that time. That is a tempting interpretation if you think in simplistic regional terms—but the modern ethnolinguistic regions of Belgium had no meaning at that time. There were socioeconomic differences between the north and the south, but they were understood to be a rural-urban rather than a regional phenomenon. Although a statistical correlation existed between region and socioeconomic differences in the late 19th century, this did not really explain ethnic mobilization at that time. The mobilization had much more to do with the inability of Flemish speakers to use their language in public life. That issue, in turn, began to take on regional significance as efforts to achieve greater language rights were frustrated.

Socioeconomic differences can be significant; the key is to understand how these are perceived and used. Would a commonality of socioeconomic status mean that conflicts would not be as intense in many cases? Yes. Would it mean ethnic conflict would cease entirely? Probably not, because there are lots of other issues that correlate as well. I think we made a mistake about 15 years ago when we wanted to reduce ethnicity to economics. Ultimately, it just does not work.
Ethnic and Territorial Conflicts in Eastern Europe

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Introduction

Today’s Eastern Europe consists of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Yugoslavia (consisting today of Serbia and Montenegro), Albania, Greece, and European (or Thracian) Turkey. One can also add to this list Moldova (Bessarabia) and the western part of Ukraine, as they are culturally, historically, and geographically tied to the rest of this greater region. At this point in time, on the other hand, Eastern Germany and Austria should not be considered part of the East European realm. The reasons for including Greece and Thracian Turkey in Eastern Europe are both historical and cultural and represent a reality important to the current geopolitical situation in the Balkans. These last two regions have always been part of the East European culture realm, but for purely political and military reasons related to the Cold War period they were classified differently.

Throughout Eastern Europe, there are serious issues of nationalism that threaten the stability of individual countries as well as the region as a whole. Most serious of these are conflicts stemming from ethnic- and cultural-territorial—geographical—demands by one or more parties. While some of the issues center primarily on ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural rights and privileges, others are manifested in extremely serious demands for control of given regions, in open conflict based on ethnic or territorial claims or in international disputes over the recognition or nonrecognition of given countries.

Most serious for Europe and the United States, however, are those that deal with territorial conflict based on various ethnic claims that demand changes in national control of these regions and/or population exchanges or attempts at ethnic cleansing. Indeed, many of the justifications for current actions are related to experiences with ethnic cleansing and population resettlement policies in the near or distant past. We must be careful to distinguish between issues that potentially could lead to serious conflict and those that are merely local cultural demands. In the latter category are issues related to simple demands for ethnic recognition or the right to one or another cultural institutions (native language in the media and education, native language press, or freedom of religion) that do not threaten to destabilize any given state or nation or that will probably not result in open hostility between groups.

Quite serious to a rapidly changing picture of causes for interethnic conflict in Eastern Europe is the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The current war in Bosnia may be the precursor to an even greater war that might involve many other nations, including America’s NATO Allies Turkey and Greece on opposite sides of the conflict. In addition, the applied policies by the Western powers toward this ongoing conflict affect not only the Balkans as a whole but also other parts of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The response, for example, to Serbian territorial aggression and ethnic genocide (ethnic cleansing) both sets a precedent for other countries with problematic minorities and forces others to assess their own situations relative to foreign nations with exclaves populations.

Before discussing ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe today and the impact of Western policy in the “Yugoslav War,” a brief discussion is provided on the distinction between the reasons for and justifications for territorial claims. This distinction is necessary if one wishes to obtain an accurate picture of ethnoterritorial conflict in this diverse region. Claims to territory on ethnic, national, religious, linguistic, and historical grounds are common around the world. Sometimes two groups claim the same territory with differing but equally understandable reasons for doing so. The Jewish/Palestinian conflict represents such a situation. Here two peoples are fighting over the same piece of territory, as it is tied to their current ability to exist as distinct nations. On the other hand, many conflicts are tied to far more distant issues in which historical
events are distorted to provide a legitimacy for current claims. The Greek claim to the name Macedonia is a good example of the use of historical justification.

Reasons deal with actual situations related to actual (or perceived) threats, actual security issues, or attempts to redress recent injustices that have resulted in serious problems for a given people, nation, or state. Justifications, on the other hand, are excuses used to legitimize the desires or actions of one or another group to achieve their own aims. A variety of historical—and more so folkloric-historical—justifications, for example, have played a major role in Serbia's aggression against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Greece's anti-Macedonian stance. These two are deeply intertwined and explain to a great extent Greece's open support for Serbia in the current conflict in Bosnia.

Potential for Ethnic Conflict in Eastern Europe

We can divide the current issues of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe into three categories. The first represents the least problematic situations where individual groups request recognition of minority rights. These are composed of individual ethnic groups that do not threaten the territorial integrity of any nation or whose demands or requests will not result in anything more than local demonstrations (even violent ones) or protests. The second category is made up of those ethnic issues that may result in some degree of violence or even territorial changes that are of local importance only (for instance, those that do not threaten greater instability throughout the region) or those that are quite serious but in which the Western Allies (or the United States individually) should not become involved. The last category represents those ethnic issues that could lead to serious regional conflicts, to major international conflict, or to major regional destabilization that may require outside intervention.

Minority Rights Issues

Minority culture groups exist in every country in Eastern Europe. There are, for example, populations of Jews and Roma (Gypsies) in every country. In addition, there are ethnic Germans in significant numbers in Poland; the Czech, Slovak, and Croatian Republics; Romania; and Hungary. Vlah communities exist in various parts of former Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. In Latvia one also finds a territorially compact group of Latgilians (Catholic Latvians who speak a distinct dialect of the Latvian language) around the city of Daugavpils. Similarly there are Tatars in Romania, Bulgaria, and Moldova who have begun to ally themselves with the Turks in Turkey. A full listing of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities in the region is not useful because most are of little importance other than in cultural contexts. These and other cultural questions need not, and should not, be given too much shift by American policymakers.

In many cases, there are also small groups of one or another nationality living in neighboring territories. While those of the Russians, Serbs, and Hungarians in neighboring countries present serious problems (albeit to varying degrees), others do not. Although Slovenians in Slovenia hope that the Slovene minorities in Italy, Hungary, and Austria will be treated fairly and that support will be given to the survival of the Slovene language and culture in those areas, there is little chance that any major conflict will erupt involving Slovenes in these countries in the near future. The same can be said for the small colonies of Croats and Serbs in Hungary, the Romanians in border areas of Bulgaria and Serbia, or the Poles in Belarus or Ukraine.

Potentially Serious Conflicts on a Local Level

The second category of ethnic issues in the region comprises situations that may lead to serious conflict between two or more peoples within a country or between neighboring states. This last group is represented by two types of issues: those related to

1 The Vlahs are the descendants of Latinized Illyrians from the coastal regions of Dalmatia (Latinized during the Roman period) who maintained a nomadic or seminomadic way of life through the mid-20th century. For the most part, they have been assimilated by other Balkan nations, but communities of Vlahs still live in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia. These peoples should not be confused with Romanians who migrated out of Wallachia into bordering areas of Serbia and Bulgaria but who are also locally called Vlachs (Vlasi).
demands for the return of territories deemed to be unjustly under the control of foreign groups or states, and those related to the liberation of coethnics living in exclave communities in neighboring countries or regions. In this first category, I include only those issues in which the Western powers cannot or should not become involved, in spite of the fact that they may result in open warfare. In many of these, however, diplomatic discussion before the outbreak of hostilities may be useful.

There are six potentially serious local conflicts that may arise in Eastern Europe that are based on ethn-territorial issues. These include both claims to territories in other countries that are based on historical grievances and issues of national liberation of ethnic minorities living in someone else's country. Four concern transborder peoples: 1) the Russian minorities in Ukraine and the Baltic states; 2) the Moldovan question, which includes both issues of ethnic rights for Russians and Ukrainians in Moldova and border issues between Ukraine and Romania; 3) a possible secessionist movement in western Ukraine; and 4) Hungarian minorities in neighboring Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania. Two involve minority issues: Muslim minorities living in the former Yugoslav lands and Bulgaria and ethnic Turkish minorities in the Balkans.

**Russians in Ukraine and the Baltic States**

The collapse of the USSR and the declaration of independence by the former non-Russian republics has left millions of Russians outside Russia. Their situation is debated both locally and in Russia and plays a major role in the current political relations of Russia and these states. In a few cases, the issue is not just cultural and ethnic. In the cases of Ukraine and Estonia, the Russian population has a significant presence on the border of Russia, and in those two cases (as with Kazakhstan), Russian nationalists are demanding that these areas be reincorporated into Russia. In eastern Ukraine and eastern Estonia, this can be even more serious because these regions are major industrial areas vital to the economic well-being of these new republics.

The situation of the Russians in Estonia is serious. Here the Russian issue is not merely ethnic but also territorial. On the eastern margins of Estonia one finds a large Russian population. In the area north of Lake Peipus (Chudskoe Ozero in Russian) as far as the Baltic Sea, Russians form a clear majority of the population. Indeed, Narve is a Russian city in Estonia. There is a great potential for a Russian attempt to secede from Estonia and join Russia itself. This would lead to a great deal of conflict. Most of these Russians do not represent the descendants of early Russian immigrants to Estonia but rather part of the huge Russian population that arrived after World War II.

In Latvia, Russians—when combined with Belorussians and Ukrainians—account for slightly less than half the country's population. In Riga, Slavs far outnumber native Latvians. In both Latvia and Estonia, as well as in neighboring Lithuania (where the Slavs compose only about 20 percent of the population), there is a fear that Russia may use the presence of these significant Russian minority populations as a pretext (i.e., a justification) to reincorporate these small countries into a new Russian-dominated state.

In Estonia, Latvia, and—to a lesser extent—Lithuania, local governments are devising various forms of legislation to induce the Russians to leave. Although it is reasonable for Estonians and Latvians to demand that citizens learn the local language and swear allegiance to those countries—as all nations of the world demand allegiance to the new homeland to obtain citizenship—it is clear that the two states desire to get rid of the Russians. Open hostility toward or attacks upon Russians will provoke problems with Russia, so it is left to a game of politics. This could escalate into a serious conflict with Russia, especially if a Russian nationalist government arises in Moscow. Regardless of how this goes, it is clear that the United States and its Western allies cannot and should not do anything in the event of such a showdown. On the other hand, the West's inaction in the Croatian and Bosnian conflict may play a great role in increasing hostilities and conflicts in the Baltic region. This is discussed later in this paper.

**The Moldovan Question**

Upon declaring independence from the USSR, Moldova found itself in a unique position among the former
Soviet Republics. Rather than seeking mere independence, it proclaimed its desire to join, or rather rejoin, Romania. The Moldovans are Romanians who as a result of history found themselves under Russian rule. While Russians in Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and other republics were in general not frightened of the independence movements taking place in the non-Russian republics, that of Moldova threatened to place them under alien (Romanian) rule. Violent protests erupted, and open warfare ensued in the Trans-Dniestr region, which attempted to secede from Moldova and join Ukraine.

Moldova itself became part of Russia as a result of Russian imperial expansionism. Moldova was annexed from the Ottoman Empire. After World War I it was reunited with Romania, only to find itself being passed back to the USSR after World War II. This war resulted in a drastic diminution of the Jewish and German populations, and many Tatars also left for Turkey and Romania. On the other hand, Stalin deported many Moldovans, attached the southern part of Moldova (Budjak) to Ukraine, and induced the in-migration of hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians. In addition, the Trans-Dniestr region, which was formerly part of Ukraine, was added to Moldova (in an attempt to gerrymander borders, effectively reducing the Moldovan proportion of Moldova’s population) and Bucovina/Bukovina (the area around Chernovits/Chernivtsy) was detached from Romania and transferred to Ukraine.

Deep antagonisms exist between Ukrainians and Romanians, between Russians and Ukrainians in Moldova, and between ethnic Russians and Moldovan-Romanians in Romania. Moldovan nationalist talk of anschluss between Moldova and Romania has led to uprisings among the Russians, Ukrainians, and other non-Romanians of the region. This has the potential to become a serious problem not only on a local level but also in Romania as well. We should remember that one of Ceausescu’s major demands from Brezhnev was the return of Moldova to Romanian control.

The Gagauz (Bulgarian Orthodox Turks) of Moldova have also expressed serious concerns about the rise of Moldovan-Romanian nationalism and fear the merger of Moldova with Romania. As such, they have allied themselves with the Russian and Ukrainian populations in Moldova. In and of themselves they do not represent a serious problem to Moldova, Romania, or Ukraine. Their importance is transient and is tied to the greater Slavic-Romanian split in Moldova.

Western Ukraine
The western part of Ukraine (Galicia and Ruthenia) became part of the Russian Empire and the USSR for the first time after World War II. In this area there had been a strong Central European and Catholic influence. Here distinct dialects of Ukrainian are spoken, and the Uniate Church has recently been reinstated as an officially recognized religion. The Uniate Church (Byzantine Rite Catholics) had millions of followers among the Ukrainians, Slovaks, Romanians, and Hungarians. In most cases this religious institution was declared illegal during the Soviet period. Although the demands for its recognition are great throughout the greater region of Ukraine, only in the western part of Ukraine does it represent any potential threat to the stability of a nation. Because western Ukraine became part of the Soviet Union only in the post–World War II period and because the Uniate Church in that region used Ukrainian and not Russian as the language of the church, it is considered by its members as the “true” Ukrainian church. Among Ukrainians themselves there is a deep cultural split between those who lived under Russian and Soviet rule for the past 200-plus years and those who lived under Polish or Austrian

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2 The origin of the Gagauz is still debated. They are either linguistically Turkified Bulgarians, Bulgarian Orthodox Christianized Turks, or a combination of both. Regardless of actual origin, today they are Turkish in speech (for instance, Istanbul Turkish) and are Bulgarian Orthodox in religion.
Western Ukrainians are demanding more cultural and religious autonomy from Ukraine, and this may create some potential for real conflict. As yet, however, it is merely cultural and not political and territorial. Even if it were to bring about open conflict, this is a purely internal matter and not of any concern for the West or neighboring states.

**Hungarian Minorities.** The borders of current Hungary were established after World War I and represent, in the eyes of ethnic Hungarians, a diminished state. Across those borders are a number of regions with significant Hungarian populations. In some, like parts of southern Slovakia and northern Vojvodina—in northern Serbia—the Hungarian population forms the majority of inhabitants. In Romania, Hungarian communities exist throughout western Romania and in Transylvania—a region with great cultural and historical significance to the Hungarian people. We must remember that for more than 150 years Hungary was under Ottoman Turkish domination. During that time Transylvania and southern Slovakia, as Hungarian regions, were independent of the Turks. Indeed, during this time Bratislava (Pozsony in Hungarian) was the capital of a free Hungary, and until World War I ethnic Hungarians outnumbered Slovaks in this city, the capital of Slovakia.

The division of Czechoslovakia into two states has changed the sectarianism of living in the area. While Hungarians were not subject to open policies of Slovakization under the Czech-dominated Czechoslovak Government, the situation today is different. The position of the Slovak Government is that the Hungarians are really Slovaks whose ancestors were forced to become Hungarians (Magyars) during the 1,000 years of Hungarian rule and therefore should be re-Slovakized. The Hungarians consider southern Slovakia as part of the Kingdom of Hungary historically. Indeed Kossuth, the father of modern Hungarian nationalism, was born in Slovakia (in fact he was a Magyarized Slovak). Here we see the use of historical figures and events by ethnic groups as the justification for current demands on both sides.

At high levels in the Hungarian Government, it has been made clear to the Slovaks that Hungary does not claim territory from Slovakia but that it requests that Hungarians in Slovakia be given full citizenship and rights as a minority. This is the same position held by the Hungarian Government vis a vis Transylvania and Vojvodina. But many ethnic Hungarians and lower level political leaders are demanding the “return” of these “Hungarian lands” to Hungary. As a minimal demand, the Hungarians in Hungary appear to be concerned about the rights of their ethnic brethren in neighboring countries but are not demanding border changes. However—and this is a big however—this stance is contingent on fair treatment of Hungarians and a continued moderate position of the Hungarian regime. Persecution of Hungarians in any neighboring country may lead to a severe shift in Budapest’s official position. This is now being tested in Vojvodina, where the Serbian Government is relocating Serbs from other areas of Yugoslavia into areas dominated by ethnic Hungarians and where young Hungarian males are subject to the draft and are being sent to the war zone in Bosnia. Many Hungarians have fled Vojvodina to Hungary. This is leading to a rise in rightwing Hungarian nationalism that may change the official position of the Hungarian Government. The impact of Western inaction in Bosnia on the Hungarian issues in Vojvodina, Slovakia, and Romania is discussed later in this paper.

**Muslim Minorities in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria**

After the Ottoman Empire withdrew from the Balkans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a number of Islamicized groups remained. Among these were Muslim Bosnians (now called Muslimani), Serbs (mostly in the Sandzak and Kosovo-Metohija regions of Serbia), Macedonians (called Torbesi), Bulgarians (called Pomaks), Greeks, and Albanians. Only among the Albanians did the Muslim converts form

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4 The Hungarians saw the Czech majority as advanced and civilized as themselves. The Hungarian view of Slovaks as a people is quite different. Slovakia is seen as low in levels of civilization, and the Slovaks are also far more anti-Hungarian than the Czechs.

5 These Muslims should not be confused with ethnic Turks who form a distinct ethnic minority in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, and Greece and who are either the descendants of Turks or of mixed Turkish and other ethnic backgrounds. Their ethnic identity is with Turkey, and they do not consider themselves to be of local origin.
a majority population in the given group. In all other cases the Christian majorities attempted to force conversion to Christianity or to have the Muslims reclassify themselves as Turks and emigrate to Turkey. In addition, a series of population exchanges took place during which Muslim groups went to Turkey and Christians were resettled in the Balkans. This was especially true of the Greeks; hundreds of thousands of Greeks emigrated from western and northeastern Turkey and were resettled in what is today Greek Macedonia and other parts of Greece.

After World War I, Serbian nationalists followed a policy of intimidation of Muslims (both Muslim Slavs and Albanians) in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia (then called South Serbia). Tens of thousands fled to Turkey at that time. Bulgaria has continued to harass its Muslim Bulgarian population. Policies outlawing Muslim cultural practices and enforcing name changes (to Christian ones) led to massive emigrations to Turkey as well. It was convenient for Greeks, Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarians, and others to purport that these were Turks—not Slavic or Greek peoples whose ancestors chose to adopt the Islamic religion—and to promote emigration.

The Muslim subgroups, although persecuted, do not pose serious threats to their regions. It is interesting to note that the Torbesi of western Macedonia and many Serbian Muslims of the Sandzak and Kosovo have reclassified themselves as Albanians, rather than assimilate into the greater Serbian or Macedonian nations.

The Turkish Minorities

The Turkish question is still an open one. To date, however, the Turkish position (for instance, that of the Republic of Turkey) is similar to that of the Hungarians regarding their ethnic compatriots in neighboring states. The Turkish Government basically expected Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to respect the Turks as ethnic minorities in those countries. Recently, Bulgaria pressured ethnic Turks into emigrating to Turkey. Approximately 300,000 Turks left. Although the Turkish Government protested this, it did not invade. The Turks feel pressured by European powers who use the issue of Turkish entry into the European Union as a means of keeping Turkey out of intervention in Bulgaria and parts of former Yugoslavia. In Turkey itself, literally millions of Turks have ancestors who immigrated from various Balkan countries. These groups lobby for Turkish involvement in their homelands to protect the Turkish and Muslim peoples there. The Turkish situation is discussed at the end of this presentation with particular reference to its relationships with Europe and the EU.

Potentially Serious Conflicts With Implications Extending Beyond the Region

The Macedonian Question

A very serious situation exists regarding Macedonia, in which major ethnic groups—Greeks and Serbs—and their respective states are attempting to use historical issues and incidents as justifications for their positions regarding this territory.

The Greeks claim title to the name Macedonia based on fallacious historical claims. They assert that Alexander the Great was a Greek and that therefore Macedonia is Greek—a claim backed by historical records. Not only do all early Greek sources make the point that he was a non-Greek (the Macedonians were Illyrians related to today’s Albanians) but also that the Macedonians were the enemy of Greece. Certainly the Macedonian Empire maintained Greek language as the lingua franca of the Empire and had a policy of Hellenism, but Macedonia was itself not Greek.

Rather than engage in debates about a man who lived in the 4th century BCE, one should consider more important historical facts as well as current realities. Does the concern deal with the name, with Alexander the Great's nationality, or with current ethnonterritorial realities? Clearly it is the latter. After the arrival of the Slavs in Macedonia (including what is today Greek Macedonia) starting in the 4th century CE, the Macedonian Slavs maintained close relations with those of Bulgaria. The Macedonian and Bulgarian Slavs came to form one people with a common language and church. After the arrival of the Turks their territory was administratively (not ethnically) divided. This division lasted into the 19th century when Bulgarians (with the help of the Russians) tried to reunite with their ethnic Macedonian kinsmen. As a result of Western intervention this was not accomplished.
During the second Balkan War (1912-13) the Greeks and Serbs, with the help of the Romanians, invaded Bulgaria and took land from it. Romania seized Dobruja (Dobrogea) while the Serbs and Greeks divided Macedonia between them. Not only did they take the land, but also they instituted policies aimed at eradicating the Bulgarian presence and claim. Serbia renamed northern Macedonia South Serbia and outlawed both the Bulgarian language and church (those used by the Macedonians themselves) and replaced them with the Serbian language and church. It was hoped that the Macedonians of South Serbia would become Serbs. Greece was far worse and Serbs, with the help of the Romanians, invaded were defeated at the battle of Kosovo and later fled lawed both the Macedonians (and Bulgarians in Thrace) were forced to accept Greek names and call themselves Greeks or flee the country. A policy of Hellenization was instituted throughout the region.

Between the second Balkan War and World War II, policies of Serbianization, Hellenization, and ethnic cleansing were openly practiced in both Macedonia and Thrace. The region was also ethnically cleansed of Macedonians and Bulgarians, as was Greek Thrace, which had a Slavic majority. In addition to this, hundreds of thousands of Greeks from the Pontic region of Turkey were resettled into those parts of Macedonia under Greek control.

The Greek objection to the recognition of a Republic of Macedonia derives from more than issues related to an ancient conqueror. Greece fears the demand for the return of the homeland by a free Macedonia and reparations for past atrocities. Greece also fears that the ethnic Macedonians will demand their homes back. This is potentially one of the most serious issues in Eastern Europe, as it can involve Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, and even Albania in a real war. More is said on this later.

The Serbs and Kosovo
A similar situation exists in Kosovo, a land claimed by both ethnic Albanians and Serbs. Geographical evidence (such as place names) clearly indicates a continuous settlement of the region by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian claim is based on a war that took place in the early 13th century. According to legend, the Serbs were defeated at the battle of Kosovo and later fled north into what is today Greater Serbia. Historically, however, the Serbs came from the north and were concentrated along the Morava valley in what is today the heartland of the Serbs. It is important to note that it was church policy to have geographical diocese within which an official language was used. There is no question that Kosovo was within the territorial domain of the Serbian Orthodox Church, but that does not mean that the population living there was Serbian. The Battle of Kosovo, the role of Krali Marko, or other folktales should not be accepted as a justification for Serbian aggression against ethnic Albanians who compose about 90 percent of that region today.

A propaganda campaign against ethnic Albanians was part and parcel of Serbian policy long before the current crises in Krajina and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Serbian propaganda claimed that the Patriarsija Convent in Pec was burned to the ground by Albanians and that the Serbian nuns there had been raped. I was there one year after the alleged fire and rape, and the Serbian nuns in the convent knew nothing about such an event. The convent was still standing, and there was no damage to it whatsoever. Claims were also made that Albanians killed, raped, and tortured Serbs in the region, yet the local Serbs in Kosovo declared to me that that was a rare occurrence. Many Serbs of Prizren, Pec, Orahovac, and Djakovica (in the western part of Kosovo), on the other hand, told me that poverty forced Serbs to sell their homes and move to Serbia proper. Some laughed at the fact that many Serbs who sold their homes to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo

7 Part of the claim is also that Prince Marko (Krali Marko) was a Serb and that he was killed at this battle. According to their own sources, he came from Priple (in Macedonia). As such, he is claimed by Macedonians as a Macedonian and by Bulgarians as a Bulgar. He may also have been a Vlah, a people renowned for their military abilities at the time. One need recognize that Albanians also have epic songs about this battle in which three Albanian princes were killed, not only a Serbian one. We should not be discussing the right to rule Kosovo, as argued by Serbs and Albanians, based on 13th century battles or folk songs, or we will have a Bulgarian-Macedonian-Serbian war as well as a Serbian-Albanian one. This is most likely the Kingdom of Morava (Moravia) referred to in the ancient texts regarding the brothers Kiril (Cyril) and Metod (Methodius), not Moravia in the Czech Republic.

6 Macedonians from Greek (Aegean) Macedonia fled to the Serbian-controlled areas of Macedonia as well as to Bulgaria, Australia, Canada, and the United States after 1913.
later claimed to have been forced out in order to get special treatment (houses and jobs) in Belgrade and other parts of Serbia where housing and jobs are in short supply.

Milosevic and other Serbian nationalists used this type of scare tactic to justify the Serbian invasions of eastern Croatia (Srem), Croatia’s Krajina region, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The threat to Serbian lives, property, and security were used, in spite of the fact that no such provocations existed. The same tactics used in Kosovo were applied to other areas where Serbs lived outside Serbia.

There is a great potential for conflict in Kosovo because approximately 1.7 million Albanians reside there and because the Serbs claim that Kosovo is not only Serbian but also is the Urheimat (original homeland) of the Serbian people. The Serbs are persecuting Albanians—closing Albanian ethnic institutions, engaging in summary arrests and torture of Albanians, and expelling Albanians. The Serbian regime is also now settling Serbs in the region. This region has the greatest potential for ethnic conflict in all of Eastern Europe. If the Serbs attempt a similar policy as that applied in Bosnia to its native Muslim population, it is most likely that Albania will not remain inactive.

Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo

Directly across the border from Kosovo is Macedonia, with a large Albanian population. In all Macedonia’s western communes (counties), the Albanians form a majority of the population. In those bordering Kosovo and Albania (like Tetovo and Gostivar), Albanians compose over 90 percent of the local population. Because Albanians in Macedonia boycotted the last census and because the ethnic Macedonians were satisfied that they did, it is unclear as to the actual population of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia itself. Having traveled there in 1990, it was obvious that throughout western Macedonia the Albanians form a distinct majority, and in much of northern and central Macedonia they form a significant minority. Should a war break out in Kosovo, it is doubtful that Macedonian Albanians would not become involved. Refugees from Kosovo would flee into Macedonia, which would be intolerable to the Slavic Macedonians who already are unhappy with their large Albanian population. Thus, a war in Kosovo would probably lead to Albanian and Macedonian involvement. Such a war has the potential to also drag in Greece and Turkey.

The Implications of Western Nonaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in parts of Croatia has destabilized the entire region. While some may see this as only a local issue of those republics, and, as such, not of vital interests to the United States or its Western allies, others with more expertise and experience in this region recognize the broader implications of this conflict. The situation of Muslims in Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia has worsened dramatically as a result of the Serbian policies in Croatia and Bosnia. It is not only Serbian action but also the response by the West that has added to the instability.

Fear of greater Serbian aggression is resulting in a rise in anger among the Albanians throughout the region. The “what if” scenarios are too numerous to discuss in this paper because they depend on many other countries and issues. What is clear, however, is that Albanians in Kosovo for the moment are resisting Serbian attempts to get them to rise up and give the Serbs an excuse to come in and smash them. In the event of a real war, however, the violence in this region would be far greater than that of Bosnia. On the one hand, the Serbian attachment to Kosovo is far greater than that to Bosnia, and, on the other hand, the Albanians are not as traditionally docile as the Bosnian Muslims. In addition, Kosovo borders an ethnically Albanian nation-state.

The West’s general inaction in Bosnia has also played a major role in creating greater destabilization. While many Westerners close their eyes to the greater and broader implications of this war, members of other countries and regions have watched keenly. Two distinct issues must therefore be addressed: 1) the precedent set and its implications in Eastern Europe itself
and 2) the implications for Turkey and the Middle East. A possible scenario is presented at the end of this presentation to illustrate the magnitude that these events may take.

Regardless of actual motive in not aiding the Bosnian Muslims or the Croats, the West has created a new situation throughout the region. Had the United States and its European allies come to the rescue of the newly established Croatian and Bosnian nations when they were invaded by the Serbs, a clear message would have been sent that the Western countries supported democratic multinational states in the newly forming countries in Eastern Europe. Many of these countries, as fledgling democracies, are struggling with situations of multiculturalism and of having large and influential ethnic minorities. By not supporting such ideas in Croatia and Bosnia, the opposite message was sent.

On the one hand, it was clear by implication that the West would not interfere in the internal matters of these states regarding ethnic issues and, on the other, that ethnic cleansing and brutality were to be only verbally censored. This leads to two problems regarding ethnic stability in the region. One is the reaction of countries to their ethnic minorities that they perceive to be problematic. The other is to actions of states fearing outside aggression in the guise of defending coethnics in their states.

In the first case we have indicated to Russia that, if it should so desire to reincorporate the Baltic states, Ukraine, or Kazakhstan on the pretext of defending the ethnic Russians in those territories, then the West is unconcerned. This may add fuel to the existing Russian nationalist groups that demand the return of those lands because: 1) they have ethnic Russians living there who need to be protected, therefore these lands should be under Russian control; and 2) lands once under the Russian people must always be part of Mother Russia. Similarly, Hungarian nationalists can use the same argument to demand the return of Vojvodina and parts of Slovakia and Romania. If it is all right for Serbs to invade and ethnically cleanse in the name of protecting Serbs in these other regions, then why not allow Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, or any number of other peoples to readjust national borders or protect ethnic minorities in other states?

The inaction on the part of the West to the plight of Muslims and Croats in former Yugoslavia may open a Pandora's box by promoting, rather than inhibiting, ethnic nationalism. A green light has been given in regions in which the fires of nationalism were already rising as a result of their newfound freedom. In all cases of decolonization, ethnic nationalism rises in the newly created state. This often results in a demand that the colonizer go home. Russians and Serbs today are victims of such policies of decolonization, as were the English, French, Germans, and others in lands formerly controlled by them.

When nothing was done to stop or punish the Serbs for their outrageous behavior, the message was also sent to nations that they better get rid of problematic minorities now rather than risk intervention from the outside. Russians, Serbs, and Slovaks may perceive the Hungarian minorities as a greater threat because the Hungarian nationalists in Hungary may try to use the existence of Hungarian colonies in neighboring countries as a pretext to change the borders. Similarly, Estonians and Latvians will fear even more so the existence of a large Russian population if the West has made it clear that in principle it is all right for Russia to liberate their people—the Russians—in Latvia and Estonia. Estonian and Latvian nationalists may feel an even greater urgency to induce the Russians to leave, so as to minimize their chances of losing their independence.

If the United States and its allies do nothing to stop the Serbs in their nationalist drive to ethnically cleanse Bosnia and to incorporate other parts of the former Yugoslavia, then why should the Serbs not do the same in Kosovo and Vojvodina? If the West did nothing in those cases, it most certainly is not going to do any more over Kosovo. We have thus promoted more Serbian aggression as well as paved the way for possible Hungarian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Estonian, Albanian, or other acts of ethnic violence against other nations and peoples.

Had the Serbs been stopped and punished (as the Germans were during World War II), a clear message would have been sent that we do not accept undemocratic behavior. Would it not be better to send the message that multinational policies are what the West
expects and that the well-being of these states, diplomatic recognition, and financial aid are contingent on fair treatment of their ethnic minorities. That the West bowed to the wishes of Greece and did not recognize Macedonia's right to independence based on its concern over a name showed a lack of resolve on the part of the West and made it clear to all in Eastern Europe that consistency, democracy, and recognition of the principle of self-determination is not a part of current Western thinking. The messages from this are all too clear to the Bulgarians, Macedonians, Turks, and others.

In addition, the example set by inaction in Bosnia made it painfully clear to the Muslims in the Middle East, including our important ally Turkey, that the West does not stand up for the rights of Muslims as a people. This perception has been reinforced by the ultraright's win in Parisian elections (in which it took 80 percent of the vote) with the slogan, "Charles le Magne stopped the Moors at the Pyrenees and Mitterrand gave them Paris and Marseilles," and the anti-Turkish acts of violence in Germany. By not acting to defend the Bosnian Muslims and by tolerating the acts of rape, murder, and terror against them by the Serbs, the message was given that the West is no friend of either Muslims or of the Middle East.

We should add to this the lack of Western resolve to stop the Greeks when they infiltrated Cyprus and precipitated the invasion by the Turks. Although Westerners did not condemn Greek acts of violence against the Turks, they did condemn the Turks for invading the island and partitioning it. The Turks ask themselves, "Why are we condemned for saving the lives of our people in Cyprus while the Serbs are permitted, in the guise of defending their people, to murder innocent Muslims?" During the summer of 1993 throughout Turkey pictures were hanging on billboards of a Bosnian child with one leg cut off by Serbs with the caption Bosnanin En Kucuk Gazisi (Bosnia's Youngest Warrior of the Faith). This was a tongue in cheek swat at the Serbs who call the Bosnian Muslims Islamic fundamentalists and claim that they (the Serbs) are defending Europe against the Muslim menace.

If the West is truly concerned about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, then it should reevaluate its position regarding the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Throughout the Middle East anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism are rising as the Western democracies that bomb Iraq, support Israel, and intervene in Middle Eastern affairs at will do nothing to stop a Christian country from annihilating a Muslim people.

A Worst Case Scenario

Given the above considerations, there is a possibility of a major war breaking out in the Balkans. Serbs are determined not to allow the formation of an Albanian ethnic entity in Kosovo, as they see it as their original homeland. Having ethnically cleansed much of Bosnia of Muslims and Croats, they have become greatly emboldened with their success. This has been exacerbated by the lack of any real deterrents by the Western powers. A Serb attempt to ethnically cleanse Kosovo may trigger a series of events that will draw other peoples and powers into the dispute. It is doubtful that Albania will be able to remain neutral under those circumstances, and it is most likely that Kosovar Albanians would be forced to flee into Macedonia and/or Albania itself.

A regional war might break out that would create great instability. The existence of Macedonia as a state would again come into question. One possibility is that Macedonia would seek reentry into a Yugoslav entity. However, the large Albanian population would oppose that, and war would be imminent between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in such a case. Macedonia lies among hostile Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, all of whom lay claim to its land.

In a war in the Balkans, it is highly possible that Turkey might get involved, especially if requested to by Albania. We need also consider that hundreds of thousands of Turks in Turkey today are of Albanian-, Bosnian-, Serbian-, Macedonian-, Greek- or Bulgarian-Muslim extraction. Indeed, Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the modern Turkish republic, was of Albanian ancestry from Thessalonika (Greece). Just as ethnic Americans lobby our government regarding issues in their ancestral homelands, so do Turks of Balkan descent.
The Turks probably would not heed a call from the West to stay out of the conflict because they are absolutely fed up with their so-called Western allies. During my visits to Turkey in 1992 and 1993, anti-Westernism was apparent everywhere. The lack of support for the Turkish position on Cyprus is only a minor irritant as compared to Western callousness over the issue of Islam in the Balkans. We should not forget that it was the Turks who introduced Islam into the region and who built the cities of Sarajevo, Mostar, Jajce, Konjic, and others that are now sitting in ruin. They identify greatly with the monuments built by their ancestors and their coreligionists in that region. The West has asked much of the Turks in past decades—to be a bulwark against Soviet Communism during the Cold War; to embargo goods from Iran and Iraq (much to the detriment of the Turkish economy); and, most recently, to act as a moderating influence and as a surrogate for the West in many of the new nations of Central Asia. In each case, Turkey has met these requests. The Turks are understandably upset, then, when the West does not respond to their call to protect Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo or to protect ethnic Turks in Cyprus or Bulgaria.9

Involvement by Turkey in any Balkan conflict would most assuredly guarantee that Greece would aid Serbia. Of all their territorial and ethnic problems, the Turks agree that it is the Greeks who are the most serious for them.

The worst case scenario probably hinges on the Bulgarians, not only because their country lies between Greece, Turkey, Serbia, and Macedonia but also because they have real grievances against the Serbs (over Macedonia) and Greeks (over Macedonia and Thrace). Bulgarians are now terrified about their neighbors going to war; they wish to remain out of the fray. However, in the event that Greece and Serbia are fighting against Turkey and Albania, Bulgaria might be forced into the war. Bulgaria could side with Serbia and Greece (their coreligionists) against the Muslim Turks and Albanians, but the Bulgarians have a deep hatred of the Greeks and Serbs, and Sofia would gain nothing from such a situation. On the other hand, if Bulgaria sided with Turkey and Albania, it could gain territory that it has demanded for two centuries—Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia, and Greek Thrace (thereby gaining access to the Aegean)—and address its grievances against Serbia and Greece. Turkey would certainly prefer Bulgarian hegemony over Thrace, thereby eliminating a border with Greece. Turkish seizure of the islands off its coast would also guarantee Turkey full access to the Mediterranean from Istanbul (something that is currently a problem for them because Greece is uncooperative on passage through its territorial waters by Turkish ships).

If such a war broke out, the Croats and Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina would take revenge against the Serbs, and Hungary might use that as a way to seize some of the Hungarian-populated northern counties of Vojvodina. Hungarian involvement in an international dispute regarding Hungarians in another country might lead Romania and/or Slovakia to become aggressive against Hungary or the Hungarian minorities in their countries.

If a major war broke out with Greece and Turkey on opposite sides, what would the West do? If it backed Greece and closed all possibilities of Turkey joining the EU, Turkey would undoubtedly shift away from the EU to a more Islamic position. Clearly, internal pressures in Turkey—which are already mounting—would dictate such a move regardless of the desires of the moderate government. Even a neutral stance by the West would result in a Turkish popular backlash.

Of great importance is the position of Russia as a major power. While Russia may back Serbia in its war against Croatia or the Bosnian Muslims, it would back Bulgaria and Turkey should they become allies against Serbia. Russia's traditional ally in the Balkans has always been Bulgaria and not Serbia (which in the Cold War sided with the anti-Soviet West). It would also be useful to Russia to use such a stance to improve

9 Not only did Bulgaria maintain a policy of intimidation and persecution of Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) during the 1970s and 1980s, which resulted in a substantial emigration of Pomaks to Turkey, but also in the late 1980s and early 1990s more than 300,000 ethnic Turks fled Bulgaria as a result of extreme oppression. The West did little more than protest these acts. This was no different from the West's reaction to the Greeks' infiltration of Cyprus and the mass murder of ethnic Turks.
its relations with Turkey. Thus, in the event of a widen-
ing war, we may find Serbia and Greece isolated and
Turkey, Bulgaria, and Albania backed by Russia,
Croatia, Hungary, and many Middle Eastern States. It
is doubtful that we could do anything under those cir-
cumstances in terms of any involvement.

Although one can paint other scenarios, one thing is
clear—the West made a grave error in allowing and
promoting Serbian aggression. Some say it is too late
to do anything. That is an absurd position. In 1940 one
could say that Germany had won the war and that it
was too late to do anything to free Poland or Czecho-
slovakia. The Russians proved otherwise. Serbia is not
a great power and need not be feared. If after three
years of vast military superiority the Serbs still have
not won, they would be easy to push back. The main-
tenance of the embargo against the Bosnian Muslims
should be lifted and airpower should be used to liber-
ate Bosnia. It is certainly not too late to do that.

By continuing to legitimize Serbian aggression, we
are once again letting the people of Eastern Europe
know that we do not support democratic governments
or independent nation-states in that region. We should
therefore not be surprised that a greater and far more
serious war may be looming on the horizon. The
alienation of the Turks and of Turkey is a far more
serious issue in the realm of geopolitical reality than
the support of Serbian delusions of grandeur. We risk
not only a great Balkan war but also one that may
result in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey changing their
national borders. Inaction in Bosnia has also resulted
in a massive rise of anti-Western and anti-American
sentiment throughout the Middle East and other Mus-
lim areas. The United States should rethink its posi-
tion on Serbia.
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Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Thomas Poulsen

Professor Wixman has laid out both in the paper that he wrote and in summary presentation some of the key elements that explain the Bosnian situation. I would like to underscore a few of them. The first element has to do with the Serbian justification for their actions. A concept that is helpful in explaining the Serbian position is that of iconography, which was coined a number of years ago by the geographer Jean Gottman. Gottman defined iconography as the sum total of the perceptions of history, national symbols, and trivia that go to segregate one nation from another.

According to Serbian iconography, they are a heroic people. The Serbs believe that they saved Europe from the Muslim hordes. They also believe that Yugoslavia—the Yugoslavia created in 1918—was their nation-state and that it was their rightful prize because they had won World War I, which was just a continuation of their long defense of Europe. This perception can help to explain why the Serbs still see themselves as victims in the current conflict when most outside observers see them as the aggressors.

The Serbs also believe that their homeland was Kosovo, a belief derived from the fact that they suffered their greatest defeat in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, although Dr. Wixman can convincingly argue that this belief is not based on fact. He could cite an examination of place names and a number of other features that cast doubt on the Serbian assertion. But such arguments would not change Serbian beliefs. All justifications are real to the justifiers, and in the case of the Serbs—as with most people—it's not what really happens that counts, but what people believe happened.

The Serbs were wrong in trying to maintain control of all of Yugoslavia. They are wrong now in trying to maintain control of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I still think they have pretensions to the rest.

Another point that Dr. Wixman brought up that I would like to comment on is that of the role of emigres in defining national identity. There are some who would attribute the Slovak separatism that led to the demise of the Czechoslovakian state as much to the effort of Americans of Slovak ancestry who returned after the fall of Communism with images and feelings of the 1920s and the 1930s as to any real problems in the region. The same can be said, perhaps, for some of the stronger original aspects of Croatian nationalism. However, many Croats who were content to live in Yugoslavia and be proud of their Roman Catholic ethnic heritage became Croatian nationalists as a reaction to Serbian action.

My last point deals with the issue of core and periphery. It has been suggested that, in looking at the intensity of national feelings, we should consider core regions and intellectuals. Certainly—based on my experience—for an extended period of time those in Croatia who promoted a sense of difference and the need to get Croatian "rights" somehow satisfied were the professors, the schoolteachers, and the intellectuals. But in addition to students, those who were most motivated to obtain such rights were not the people of the core area but were, in fact, the people in the border regions. This is a point that Dr. Wixman also made. In Croatia, for example, the strongest members of the Ustasha, the Croatian nationalist party during World War II, did not come from Zagreb but from the outer periphery, particularly in eastern Slavonia adjacent to the Serbian region. There, they had been challenged in their Croatian identity by living with Serbs. To use a more local example, during my lifetime, one could find "120-percent Americans" in the Canal Zone more frequently than in the state of Oregon.

General Discussion

QUESTION: Professor Wixman, could you discuss the origin of the Muslim population in the Sandzak?

DR. WIXMAN: The origin of the Muslim people is the same as that of the Muslim peoples of Bulgaria (Pomaks), Macedonia (Torbesi), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslimani), Albania, and Serbia, including the Sandzak. When the Turks came into the Balkans a major conversion of local populations occurred. Most
of the converts were related to the Nestorian Christian movement (Bogomils) who formed a third Christian group throughout the Balkans at that time—that is, in addition to the formal Catholic and Eastern Orthodox groups. Having been persecuted by these churches, the Bogomils welcomed the Turks and willingly embraced Islam. Those peoples of mixed Turkish (usually the descendants of Turkish soldiers and locally converted women) tended to call themselves Turks, while those that were not of mixed ancestry retained other appellations (as mentioned above). In the Sandzak many locals adopted Islam, along with many of the Albanians. It is important to note that among the Greeks and Serbs when someone converted to Islam they were rejected as members of those ethnic communities and were usually considered Turks. On the other hand, among the Macedonian, Albanian, and Bulgarian peoples there was a tendency to identify the converts as Moslem Macedonians, Albanians, and Bulgarians, or just as Moslems. Those who converted to Islam frequently intermarried with Turks and with each other. The Sandzak Moslems of Serbia were, as the other Muslim peoples of the Balkans, pro-Turkish in their cultural and political leanings.

**QUESTION:** What role does religion play in the conflict in former Yugoslavia?

**DR. WIXMAN:** It is the position of the Catholic leaders of Zagreb and the Serbian patriarch in Belgrade that this is not a religious war. The religious overtones of the current conflict are largely the result of the elites—former Communist Party heads and intellectuals—of Zagreb, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Budapest assigning identities to local populations who often did not self-identify on the basis of religion. For example, Muslim Serbs and Muslim Croats never defined themselves as a people. They never said that they were Muslims. They called themselves Bosnians (Bosniaks). They were defined by the Yugoslav Government in 1971 as Muslimani. When the conflict got out of hand in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade pressed the idea that the Muslims must become Christian. In the Sandzak no one thought of themselves as Serbs or as Muslims. In the same way, the former atheistic Bulgarian Communist Government said that, in order to be a good Bulgarian, Turks had to change their names to Bulgarian names—that means from Muslim to Christian ones. In Albania, it was the reverse.

The Sandzak Muslims are under pressure to convert in order to prove that they are true Serbo-Macedonians. In terms of conflict, these Muslims know that they have no choice but to ally themselves with Albanians. There is an interesting demographic trend taking place. The Muslims of Macedonia have made their position clear: they are giving up Macedonian and are beginning to speak Albanian. Albanianism has become almost a rallying point for Muslims of Serbia and Macedonia under the current context.

**DR. POULSEN:** To understand Bosnia, I think, perhaps, a better perspective is to look at the situation in Northern Ireland because that is not a religious war either. Although people are identified on the basis of the traditional religions that they have inherited, the roots of the conflict lie in two different nations that are warring in a very small area.

**DR. WIXMAN:** With regard to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the most important issue to the Croats today is the Krajina. They will never compromise on it and they cannot. If the Serbs take Krajina and create a separate state or annex it to the new Serbian republic of Bosnia, all coastal Croatia and Herzegovina would be isolated and would fall of its own accord. Serbs will temporarily accommodate Croatian positions because they know that, as long as the West insists that there be a peace treaty in which this remains in Serbian hands, this falls tomorrow.

Serbian goals are to create a greater Serbia. The Serbs of Serbia do not care about the Serbs of Krajina. The Serbs want Krajina as a piece of geographical territory, and the Serbs who live there became their excuse to get it.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Wixman, could you comment on the conditions under which you think Albania might actually become involved in the Kosovo situation? I ask this against the backdrop that many people think of Albania itself as an ethnically homogeneous country. In fact, as you well know and have written about, it is a country divided between Tosks and Gegs, and the Tosks are very much in control in Albania, yet it’s the Gegs who are in Kosovo.
DR. WIXMAN: I think that's very crucial to understanding why the Albanians never claimed Kosovo. Of the 5 million Albanians in the Balkans, 3 million are Gegs. But two-thirds of Albanians in Albania are Tosk, and one-third are Geg. If Albania incorporated Kosovo with its Geg majority—and, by the way, the Geg and Tosk dialects are not close enough to be mutually understandable, and the two peoples have very different cultures—Albania would have been dominated by Gegs. This is one reason why Albania as a state and as a nation is cool toward the idea of incorporating Kosovo. However, that said, the hatred toward the Serbs is growing throughout the area. If the Serbs really attempt to annihilate the Kosovar Albanians as they did the Bosnian Muslims, can Albania sit back and maintain any credibility?

I think Albania thinks that it may be backed by Turkey, which in reality may be the case. The Turks are improving their relations with Albania and are making it clear that Kosovo is where they draw the line.
Ethnic Conflict Within Western Europe

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Introduction

Ethnic conflicts that challenge the existing order are a recurrent feature of the European political landscape. A critical feature of European history, which has produced successive periods of ethnic conflict, has been the relative lack of congruence among population, settlement patterns, and the political organization of space and territory. Sovereignty over European territory was initially determined by church and dynastic settlements following periodic warfare and population transfer. Indigenous majorities usually, albeit not necessarily, formed the constituent population of essentially multiethnic states and often discriminated against nonnationals.

Central to the process of legitimizing some cultures and alienating others has been the rise of the “territorial nation-state.” Most histories of state formation and nation building have involved the institutional denial of minority rights—in initially justified on religious grounds and more recently reflecting the exigencies of state nationalism. During the period of chauvinistic nationalism and state expansion—roughly 1789 to 1919—the destruction of ethnic minority cultures was deemed a necessary concomitant of modernity and progress. As the uneven effects of capitalism penetrated into the marginal, ethnically differentiated peripheries of Europe, outmoded cultures were considered to be anathema to the realization of a fully integrated national market. “Nation states” often sought to socialize their citizenry through a number of pivotal agencies—principally the education system, conscription into the armed forces, and legislation. These new state-controlled domains structured the range of identities that were to be recognized and sanctioned in the public realm. As a consequence, many of the current conflicts based in part upon ethnic considerations are the result of this historical lack of congruence among self-determination, economic development, and political representation.

I will address several types of ethnic issues facing contemporary Western Europe, highlight the most pressing, and draw implications for multiethnic accommodation and adjustment to a changing global order. My concern throughout will be to emphasize a spatial perspective at urban, regional, and continental scales.

Ethnic Tensions Along a Frontier Divide: Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland problem—misguidedly labeled a religious conflict—is a classic illustration of the juxtaposition of two ethnic groups, a common feature of European borderlands. It is also the most persistent, intractable ethnic conflict at present within the European Community. As a result of the English colonization of Ireland, a process that was contemporary with the English colonization of North America (see R. Sack, 1986, pp. 138-140), a major “shatter belt” was created in Ulster. This belt divided Catholic from Protestant, Celt from Anglo-Saxon, the gavelkind from the primogeniture inheritance system, and an agrarian economy from an industrial one (see T. Jordan, 1988, pp. 89-146, 393-407).

A cultural border is evident in Belfast; the neighborhood divide equates to a national, if not an international, divide. The divide is a permanent focus of stress and violence because it is not only a place-specific frontier zone but also the cultural interface between two opposing systems. In an excellent overview of the political geography of Belfast’s main troublespot, the Shankill-Falls divide, Boal and Livingstone (1983, pp. 138-58) examine the context in which the conflict takes place.
In coming to grips with the behavioral patterns in the Shankill-Falls frontier, it must be recognized that the two territories forming the frontier zone do not nest compatibly within the same state—they are parts of two apparently incompatible nationalisms, the Irish on the one hand and the Northern Irish version of the British on the other. Thus the orientation of the Protestant Shankill is “Ulster and British” while the Roman Catholic Clonard is “Celtic Irish” in inclination. This suggests, therefore, that the local frontier in the vicinity of Cupar Street is not just an expression of urban ethnic differences, but is a microcosm of national division. Boal and Livingstone, 1983, p. 154. (See figure 2.)

Boal and Livingstone draw attention to the significance of scale and the possibility of international tensions being focused within an urban district. Depending on which level in the scale hierarchy one chooses, specific places, such as the Clonard and South Shankill, can be successively interpreted as: 1) peripheries of West Belfast; 2) peripheries of their respective national cores—Roman Catholic Ireland and Protestant Northern Ireland; or 3) a periphery within a periphery of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, what Seamus Heaney (1975, p. 60) has called the “besieged within the siege.” (See figure 3.)

In their discussion, Boal and Livingstone also bring to the fore the question of how to interpret place specific events in such a context. They analyze the influence that culture, stress, violence, and lack of information have on the conduct and intensity of group conflict where key strategic locations are so infused with symbolic meaning that any criminal act can be interpreted as a “political demonstration of loyalty” to one side or the other. This is the geographic equivalent of some prisoners, who, as in the Easter Rising of 1916, refuse to accept their classification as “common criminals” but rather as “political prisoners of war” regardless of the nature and type of offence committed. History has a way of mythologizing the mundane, and often squalid, acts of man as martyrdom and heroism.

This concept of a frontier divide could also be applied elsewhere in Europe, for example, within Brussels and along the Belgian linguistic divide. It also has meaning for the cultural zone of transition separating Quebec from the rest of Canada.

The current cease-fire and complex negotiations to reintroduce Sinn Fein into the political process as a constitutional actor are finely balanced—dependent on a combination of Republican political realism and Conservatist/Unionist compromise. However, the British-Irish border, together with the urban enclaves of Republican support in Belfast and Derry, will be significant geographic reminders that political ideals and principles are often rooted in very specific locales and are given real purchase by varying perceptions of place.

Minority Nationalism

Ethnic minorities are an important element in the political landscape of Western Europe. Much of the power of minority autonomist nationalism in the region lies in the ability of minority leaders to mobilize people on the basis of their historical occupation of the land. Territory figures prominently as a context for sociopolitical processes and as a repository for threatened group identity and sustenance, while nationalism—despite its potential for destruction—provides a beguilingly complete sociocultural framework for political and economic action. Herein lies the significance of resisting harmful outside influences in both material and cultural-ideological terms and the concern with developing a comprehensive definition of the nation and its territory to establish political legitimacy that can provide the basis for a call for some form of autonomy (Williams, 1994). A. D. Smith (1993, p. 11) has phrased its allure thus:

nations derive their profound hold over the feelings and imaginations of the people because they are historically embedded. They are rooted in older and more long-lasting ethnic ties, myths, and sentiments from which these modern nations draw much of their emotional and cultural sustenance and much of what makes them distinctive, even unique. If nationalism is the normalization of the unique, then we should not be baffled by its global power. It satisfies the dual craving to preserve what is felt to be a collective self and all its special culture values, while inserting that self as a political community into the community of nations by endowing it with the standard attributes of the nation.
Figure 2
The Distribution of Protestants and Catholics, South Shankill-Clonard Frontier Zone

Figure 3
Multiple Peripherality and the South Shankill-Clonard Area, 1981

The inset in the column to the right outlines 10 structural characteristics of minority nationalism; figure 4 illustrates where such nationalism is most virulent today.

Ethnicity and Territorial Separatism: The Basques

The most critical form of minority nationalism in the European Union (EU) today is separatism, which is manifest in a surprisingly large number of member states and which in some respects acts as a counter to the general thrust of globalization and integration so suggestive of the so-called "postmodernist New World Order" (Williams, 1993). The complex process of separatism can be schematized as in figure 5, which is derived from a larger project on political territorial adjustment being undertaken by C. F. J. Whebell.

In postwar Europe, separatism is best illustrated by the Basque case, though it has relevance in explaining the Corsican, Flemish, and various Celtic cases as well. The Basques have enjoyed long periods of relative autonomy before their incorporation into the Spanish state; elements of their institutional distinctiveness, the fueros, survived until fairly recently and were used as evidence of a prior claim to legitimate statehood. Their language and culture were deemed unique because they were unrelated to any Indo-European language group and were among the oldest surviving elements of civilization in Europe.

Under the impress of state building, the government sought to ruthlessly eradicate non-Spanish elements, producing a deep resentment within the Basque community. State oppression was confirmed during the Spanish Civil War and sustained thereafter when the Spanish forces were regarded as constituting an internal colonial military occupation. This is similar to the Irish Republican nationalist interpretation of the role of British troops in Northern Ireland. Thereafter, violence and oppression characterized Basque-Madrid relations as the Franco regime sought to eradicate local political dissent and to destroy Basque cultural identity.

The creation in 1957 of Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA)—Basque Homeland and Liberty—reinvigorated Basque nationalism. Robert Clark (1979, 1984) has provided an excellent overview of the growth and development of ETA. He argues that it was the special combination of the defense of traditional cultural values, rapid industrialization, and opposition to Spanish internal colonialism, that nurtured and sustained the
Figure 4

Selected Minority Areas in Western Europe

* Major centres of political violence
* Non-violent resistance
* Elected Assemblies

Selected minority areas of Western Europe:
1. Scotland
2. Wales
3. Ulster
4. Flanders
5. Wallonia
6. Brittany
7. Alsace
8. Corsica
9. Euskadi
10. Catalonia
11. Gallece
12. Jura
13. South Tyrol
14. Sardinia
15. Silesy
16. Occitane
17. Friuli
role of violence as a movement strategy. He has also drawn attention to the manner in which the Spanish state sought to placate ethnic demands for separatism by offering a form of regional autonomy to Euskadi, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalucia. The gesture originally generated much euphoria but was followed by a decade of disappointment that was manifest in what he calls the "rejectionist option"—whereby the majority of the electorate in the Basque provinces consistently voted in an anti-Madrid fashion. The trend is obvious in each of the seven elections held since the Basque Autonomy Statute entered force. The situation was compounded by the post-1987 trend in which regionalist parties gained electoral strength in Valencia, Aragon, Navarra, Majorca, Cantabria, and Canarias—areas that had little, if any, sense of historical regionalism.

The nature of Basque nationalism is likely to change as postindustrial Spain continues to evolve and adjust. The trend toward a loosening of the central grip on the constituent regions is gathering pace here as in many other European states. Clark forecasts that:

as advanced industrial societies become more complex, diverse, and pluralistic, they require regimes that are more decentralized, disaggregated, and autonomous. In Spain, where the existing local and provincial units may be too small or too restricted in other ways to assume a vigorous role in the management of society, the solution lies in the creation of middle-range political entities called 'meso-governments,' smaller than the nation-state, but larger and more encompassing than cities and provinces" (p. 41).

This conclusion is valid for Italy, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom but unlikely to be adopted willingly, especially in the latter.

If the drift toward separatism in Spain is contained, however, a significant ethnic issue will remain in Euskadi and Catalonia. There is increasing evidence that the post-Franco reforms designed to introduce Eusquerra and Catalan to new public domains, such as education, commerce, the media, and the law, have been less effective than anticipated in assimilating nonindigenous Spaniards and North Africans into the new nationalist social order.

The nation-state structure, though fiercely criticized, is also a near-permanent political feature, and it will structure the degree of regional autonomy available to substate nationalities. A "Europe of the Nations" ideal is still a long way removed from the regional economic reality that most groups must face but, despite the apparent impracticability of the desire for regional autarky, remains one of the most strident voices heard in Europe.

The Nation-State in Transition?

The nation-state is being challenged and reevaluated by a number of contemporary forces, both from above and from below. Within the new European order, two trends have a particular bearing on the capacity of ethnolinguistic minorities to renegotiate their role in the European division of labor. The first is the weakening of national economic sovereignty and the transfer of key economic powers from state legislatures to the European Commission, and the second is the sharing of political authority among units in the state system.

Despite the current difficulties with the European Monetary Regime (ERM) and the post-Maastricht negotiations, the European Union has gone a long way toward an integrated management of the constituent economies. It has established policies on competition, trade, monetary exchange rates, science and technological research, and—to some extent—foreign affairs. At the regional level the growth of agreements such as the Four Motors program, which linked Baden-Wurttemberg, Rhones Alpes, Lombardy, Catalonia, and Wales, help sustain an element of relative autonomy from the central state apparatus; this is particularly important for job creation and for constructing a more diverse economic profile than has hitherto been the case. In places like Catalonia and Wales, where inhabitants continue to speak indigenous languages, this decentralization is an obvious way to slow down outmigration and language shift, thereby easing one of the key determinants of ethnic antagonism. Such moves represent a broader pattern of attempts that seek to bypass some central state authority and nurture regional-level power.
Figure 5
Political Territorial Processes of Separatism

*Community means “Politico-geographical community” – it may be formal (bounded) or informal, and may be revised in successive “passes”.

*Definition of Community

Institutional Organization Level

Mode of Action

Modes of Conflict

Political

Legal

Litigious

Extra-legal

Violent

Non-violent

Culminating Event

(War, Strike, Judicial Ruling, Law, Referendum)

Succeed

New Formal Unit

To other processes

Fail

Disband
We may not need to establish a de jure Federal Europe if many regions will increasingly operate as if they were constituents of a de facto Federal Europe. This is because both at the state and, to a lesser extent, at the regional level, conventional political authority—traditionally encapsulated in the concept of sovereignty—is increasingly shared among a number of units within the state system. The absolute nature of the nation-state can no longer be sustained as if it were a closed system. Pooled sovereignty, permeable borders, European Community-wide socioeconomic and environmental policymaking, freedom of movement and to a lesser extent shared foreign policy—through interrelated agencies such as the Western European Union, NATO, CSCE—all characterize the contemporary state system and render it more interdependent, both on respective member states and on subordinate constituent regions. Clearly such integration and mutual dependence is not without its structural strains.

Ethnic Insiders and Ethnic Outsiders

The major ethnic issue facing Western Europe in the coming decade is the question of the status of outsiders. Since the 1960s several regions have experienced an influx of migrants who are often religiously, ideologically, and racially different from indigenous Europeans. Approximately 30 million people entered Western Europe between 1945 and 1975, one of the largest migratory movements in modern history. An estimated 13 million legally settled non-Europeans, and perhaps as many as 2 million “illegals,” are within the European Union. Tension between indigenous Community members and “outsiders” is present and most likely will increase.

The “outsider” question has become significant in the context of the collapse of the bipolar system and the emergence of a new world order. At least two major, contradictory processes are at work here. The first is the opening up of Europe to democratic ideals and representative politics, which follows the advance of capitalism eastward and its penetration and creation of markets, resources, and supply sources. The other, occurring simultaneously, is a reaction that seeks to protect the individual character of West European states by closing borders and limiting immigration.

The resulting tension in the hindrance of the free movement of people, ideas, and goods is a major source of ethnic tension. Neonationalism, fascism, crypto-Communism, and blatant racism are all too obvious a response.

Race and Ethnicity

It might have been assumed that in tandem with the so-called “ethnic revival” of postwar Europe would have come an increased tolerance to racial as well as ethnic minorities. However, this is not the case. As MacLaughlin (1993) demonstrates, both ethnicity and race are being used to categorize groups and structure policies in ways that defend the integrity of Europeans. Within sections of the European media and the political arena, ethnicity is increasingly used to refer to the positive, quasibiological identity that links an indigenous group to a specific place in Europe. Race, in contrast, has come to “signify a set of imaginary properties of inheritance that fix and legitimate real positions of social domination or subordination in terms of cultural differences between native and foreign in the European Community,” (MacLaughlin, 1993). As a classificatory category it reflects primarily, if not exclusively, negative tendencies of dissociation and exclusion at state and EU levels.

Ethnicity, Migration, and Frontiers

For this crude distinction between ethnic and racial categorization to be maintained in an increasingly multiethnic world, Europe has to reinterpret its position, to defend its frontiers from incursions from the east, mass migration from the south, and refugee absorption from the Balkans. What sort of society would a fortress Europe thus conceived seek to construct? Surely such isolationism, state-inspired nationalism, and racial cleansing is an anathema to the European dream of free movement of labor and open borders? Unfortunately not; the lessons of history remind us that every generation since 1648 has fought for the control of the Lotharingian Axis—the Rhine-Rhone Corridor—and its associated networks. Granted that the European Union exists in part to seal the respective futures of West European societies within one common framework, but the issues of
movement and border vigilance have not been lost, merely shifted further east. Geographers, who have a long-established interest in migration, displacement, and territorial adjustment, are contributing to our understanding of the changing patterns.

James Walsh (1992) has provided an overview that suggests that in France the threat of increasing migration of Muslims animates racial passions. Fully 3.5 million foreigners make up 6.2 percent of the total population. The migrants are accused of such things as depressing average economic wage levels, refusing to integrate, clustering in Islamic neighborhoods, and undermining French culture and customs. Such charges serve the cause of the National Front under Le Pen, who won 38 percent of the November 1991 election vote and, in the regional elections of 1992, gave the National Front a larger percentage of the vote than the Socialist Party under Francois Mitterrand.

Bruno Megret, a leading theoretician of the National Front, has announced a package of migration-curbing proposals: 1) posting of $180,000 bond by all non-European visitors, 2) mandatory AIDS testing, 3) review of the status of all aliens in France, 4) stricter border control, 5) no family unity doctrine, 6) repeal of the agreement on freedom of movement for EC-member migrants, 7) no social benefits to migrant children, 8) priority for French citizens in housing and social benefits, and 9) immediate deportation for migrants with improper or no official documents, (Walsh, 1992, p. 21). Clearly such blatant state nationalism will not be adopted in policy terms by any responsible French Government, but more subtle variants of these elements have entered the agenda of respectable political parties and interest groups and will be set in sharper focus as the key policy alternatives each time urban racial violence occurs.

The former German Federal Republic was a logical destination for many displaced Europeans and others because of its historically sympathetic reception of refugees that is enshrined in Article 16 of the German Basic Law. It is estimated that some 400,000 asylum seekers were processed into Germany in 1992. Walsh suggests that 80 percent came from the Third World and that the vast majority were Muslim; he argues that an additional 4 million Turks and their families and a further 310,000 de facto refugees should be taken into account as constituting the non-German sector of the population.

Since unification and its attendant economic and fiscal difficulties, this liberal attitude has been openly challenged. Anti-immigrant violence has made many German citizens wary of an extension of their open-door policy, especially when the media are quick to point out that 93 percent of asylum seekers do not have a valid case. Thus, one inescapable conclusion is that many places within Germany are going to witness sporadic and deep-seated violence. When this general trend is applied to the borders with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Austria, it is evident that one major cause of future conflict will be the manner in which cross-border movement is handled.

The German state's response is to attempt to quench the migration flow at the source through a massive investment in the emergent capitalist economies of the east and increased immigration control at external EU borders. To some extent this will be welcomed by dependent economies that will replace the ruble with the mark, but it is also likely to create deep-seated resentment and accusations of internal colonialism, reminiscent of the first waves of German expansion in previous centuries. Such border controls will facilitate the removal of internal EU border checks but only to the extent that each constituent country is as efficient and determined as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in employing external controls, a doubtful assumption.

The most recent migrants are incorrectly viewed as economically dependent and relatively unskilled—a drain on EU resources. Miles (1992, p.41) is especially sensitive to this assumption. He argues that "this homogenization of migration flows is factually mistaken and analytically problematic" and that "...large numbers of recent migrants originate from Eastern Europe, the migration of aussiedler into Germany being of special significance; that the most important category of internal labor migration within the EU is that of skilled professional and managerial labour; and
that one of the fastest growing categories on non-EU migration into the European Union includes similarly highly skilled nonmanual labor from other sectors of the advanced capitalist world economy. In light of the new immigration, the stereotyping of immigrants as blacks originating from the Third World ironically mirrors and legitimates the discourse of EU states about the problem of immigration.” This is an important qualification and should alert us to read between the lines of official pronouncement and localized reaction.

The Implications of Globalization, Technology, and Accessibility for Ethnic Relations

If we shift attention from the conventional territorial and urban contexts for social interaction, it is evident that a major source of ethnic-racial conflict will be the differential access groups enjoy to information, space, and power in Europe. The whole history of the West has been a constant, if traumatic, dialogue between periods of opening and closing, between diversification and uniformity. The technological trends underpinning closer European integration suggest four trends as they relate to the interaction of language, ethnicity, identity, and the state system:

• First, we have already witnessed the emergence of English as the lingua franca of Europe, if not of the world. This has caused other international languages such as French, German, and Spanish to jockey for position in a secondary role within the educational, legal, and commercial domains of a restructured and enlarged Europe. Fears are already expressed about the dominance of English and of the infiltration thereof of non-European, for instance, North American influence. Thus serious consideration is being given to the following proposals: a) there should be two foreign languages for every EU citizen, b) a first foreign language should be obligatory, c) English should be taught as a second foreign language, never as the first, and d) less information and cultural loss will occur if the principle of multilingualism in most affairs can be instituted.

• Second, indigenous language groups, such as Welsh, Irish, or Basque (see inset on p. 53) will be further marginalized unless they can influence the patterns of stable bilingualism with a much reduced language switching than has hitherto been the norm. Evidence of partial success is available in domains such as education, public administration, and the law. The key instrument is the degree of influence exercised on the local state apparatus to institutionalize patterns of language behavior and service provision in new domains. One of the great ironies of many lesser used language groups is that they are simultaneously witnessing the erosion of their traditional strength in heartland areas and key cities while beginning to harness the potential of mass communication and electronic networking.

• Third, and most intriguing from a geographer’s viewpoint, pressure will increase on local and metropolitan authorities to provide mother-tongue education and other public services to the children of mobile workers and their families in multicultural cities such as Milan, London, Paris, and Frankfurt. This is set to become the major policy issue within public administration if a fully functional European Union is to be realized.

• Fourth, and most strategical, demand will grow at the Community level to provide resources for the instruction, absorption, and occupational integration of the children and dependents of non-EU migrant workers. An inability or a refusal to provide such public facilities, especially in education, health services, and community care, will undoubtedly increase the scale of ethnic tension and call into question the nature and direction of the multicultural character of the European Union itself.

A more virulent expression of such tension will be the continued importation of non-European conflicts into the multicultural cities of the Community. One chief characteristic of globalization is that the safety valve of relative insulation from other countries’ problems and issues no longer operates in a “nationally bounded” manner. In consequence, the “higher the level of globalization, the narrower the scope for escape alternatives. In this sense, globalization is also a kind of totalitarianization of world space” (Mlinar, 1992, p. 20; Williams, 1993, p. 2).
The major challenge facing us is in interpreting the trends that emerge as a result of the disjuncture between the formally structured political units—at whatever scale from local to superstructural—and the actual social behavior of an increasingly autonomous and individualistic citizenry. Coping with this new complex reality by learning to read between the lines will be the chief social skill required of both active citizen and specialist observer alike. Let me end by raising a few critical questions that geographers and others will need to address if Europe is to honor the basic rights of all its constituent citizens:

- On what basis will the new European identity be constructed—federal, regional, racial, or national?
- What effect will the enlargement of the European Union have on the internal ethnolinguistic and regional management of the Community?
- To what extent will border tensions spill into Community states, and how will these effect the grand design of opening up the frontiers of Europe?
- How permeable are the new frontiers of the European Community?
- Will ethnicity, as a base for social mobilization, increase or decrease with greater political-economic integration?
- How will political organizations, especially metropolitan authorities, cope with the increased diversity of their constituent citizens and the newly enfranchised rights of cultural pluralism?
- What role will territory and place have in structuring the life chances of hitherto discriminated minorities?
- Will we have a nested hierarchy of disadvantage aggravated by global economic changes inducing the expansion of domination and dependence of the poor and the racially distinct?
- Who controls access to information within the mother tongue and the working languages of the European minorities?
• Are minorities destined to a more dependant role, even within their own countries, because of superstructural changes favoring the dominant groups?

• Or will they achieve some relative sociocultural autonomy through the adoption of mass technology and internal communicative competence?

• What effect will globalization have on strengthening or weakening the regional-local infrastructure on which European ethnic minority groups depend?

• What role will intractable ethnic conflicts play in triggering major regional clashes, and how will the new security architecture of Europe react to such conflagrations?
Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Alexander Murphy

I would like to highlight a few things that I think are particularly significant and to raise a couple of related questions. At the heart of Professor Williams' presentation is a dichotomy between two fundamentally different kinds of ethnic issues that Western Europe will face in the years ahead. One concerns the longstanding, regionally specific minority groups, and the other concerns the migrants who have come in from North Africa and the Middle East over the last 30 or 40 years and more recently from Eastern Europe. It is important to recognize that each of these poses a fundamentally different problem for Europe in the 1990s. Most obviously, their geography differs. Longstanding minority groups often operate from a distinct regional territorial base. The migrant groups, on the other hand, are concentrated overwhelmingly in cities and do not have the same kind of territorial base. The geography of social disruption associated with each group also differs. With longstanding minority and regional minority groups, the issues, tensions, and conflicts, in general, tend to be localized, whereas migrant group issues tend to be focused for political mobilization at the national level and are often far reaching in their impact on society. These differences are evident in the public reactions to them. I agree with Dr. Williams that we are seeing a greater acceptance of the longstanding minority groups and that the focus of opposition politics around the recent migrants is one of the fundamental issues for Europe in the years ahead.

Having identified those twin issues, I will move on to note what I see as the two key geographical perspectives that Dr. Williams highlighted:

- First, ethnic conflicts play out at different scales, and these scale differences have implications for our understanding. Dr. Williams highlighted the importance of scale in his discussion of Northern Ireland.
- Second, of course, is the importance of territorial setting for ethnic conflict. Some of the comments about the changing significance of regions were particularly interesting in this regard.

A focus on the territorial setting for ethnic conflict can highlight some issues that Dr. Williams did not touch on but that are relevant for our thinking about what is happening in Europe. First, differences in how States define citizenship is critically important. One need only think about the different ways in which the Germans, French, or British have defined citizenship historically. Second, several different migrant groups exist: older new migrants, newer new migrants, and newer newer new migrants. The most recent come from Eastern Europe and look different from earlier migrants not only in terms of external characteristics but also in terms of the kinds of skills they bring and their potential level of acceptance within West European societies.

One of the critical contemporary issues is the effect that the new immigrants are having on the old immigrants. The relatively highly skilled immigrants coming in from Poland and the former western republics of the former Soviet Union are likely to be more easily integrated within the cultural traditions of the West. If this occurs, Turks and other non-Western migrants will be further marginalized.

Finally, Dr. Williams raises two critical questions. The first is that the changing political geography of Europe is affecting ethnicity and ethnic conflict. In my own view, centralization as a component of European integration has currently gone about as far as it can go. A key current issue is the importance of regions and regionalization. An example of this is a map produced by the Commission of the European Communities that illustrates European integration from a geographical perspective. It identifies development zones within Europe. These development zones do not conform to those defined by the European Regional Development Fund; they are not based on political-administrative regions within existing nation-states. Rather, the map looks at Europe without nation-state boundaries, playing off of some of the transboundary developments currently underway that are beginning to define a new kind of European political space.
The second question is: how do we evaluate the policies of individual states in relation to minority groups, in particular, territorial policies? There was an extended discussion in the paper of the Basque situation, where power has been devolved to regions of a quasiautonomous nature. Despite this devolution, a continuation of fairly strong anti-Madrid bias can still be seen in voting patterns in Spain. At the same time, overt violence has been reduced. This raises questions about the impact of state policies that acknowledge the existence of ethnic concentrations and use territorial policies to incorporate ethnic groups in the decisionmaking process. It may mean—as has happened to a degree in the Basque case—that bringing a separatist group into the decisionmaking structure may marginalize the more violent elements of the group.

DR. MURPHY: The United States has an interest in a stable and economically vital Europe. This would suggest that it is in the US interest to promote the kind of policy options that lead to stability from an ethnic standpoint. That may mean some of the kinds of territorial policies that I suggested. It also means that the United States should promote the idea of a European Community that does not just look like a much more centralized community but one that actually facilitates the kinds of regional linkages that Dr. Williams has outlined. We should be not be scared of the fact that the nation-state is changing. It is in the US interest to promote the kind of regional arrangements that will lead to a more stable and outward-looking Europe.

**General Discussion**

**QUESTION:** With regard to ethnic issues, what policies are likely to best promote US interests in the region?
Ethnoterritorial Conflict in the Former Soviet Union

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University of Missouri-Columbia

Introduction

The former USSR has been the scene of scores of active and potential ethnoterritorial conflicts. More than 200 ethnic and territorial disputes have been identified in this region since 1989, encompassing nearly all the territory of the former USSR (see figure 6). However, not all the disputes have erupted into violent conflict. In Latvia and Estonia, ethnic conflict has taken the form of “constitutional nationalism” or “ethnic democracy,” as Latvian and Estonian political elites restructure ethnic relations through the use of legislation to exclude nonmembers. In Transcaucasia, ethnoterritorial conflicts between titular nations and indigenous minorities began before 1991 and quickly escalated to open warfare. In Central Asia, sporadic outbreaks of ethnic violence against nontitular populations have occurred but have not been organized by indigenous political elites pursuing the politics of territorial nationalism. In the Russian Federation, disputes over the level of territorial autonomy for non-Russians have risen, but, aside from a few specific republics, a process of political disintegration comparable to that which occurred in the USSR does not appear to be on the horizon.

Rather than provide a descriptive summary of all 200 plus ethnoterritorial conflicts, this paper explores the factors underlying the regional variation in the ethnoterritorial conflicts that have arisen in the former Soviet Union. The factors and consequences briefly discussed are generalizations drawn from comparative research on nationalism and territoriality and from the disputes that have emerged in the former USSR. They are by no means the only important factors, and, to fully understand why some ethnoterritorial disputes escalated to violent conflict and others did not, it is necessary to explore each dispute in detail and to examine it from each side’s perspective. Nonetheless, it is also essential to understand the geographic variability in ethnoterritorial conflict in the former USSR more generally and to place the events in this critical world region in the context of a broader conceptual framework.

Ethnoterritorial Conflicts: Factors Underlying Regional Differences

The Degree of National Consciousness

The formation of a national identity is one of the most important, but also one of the most difficult, factors to grasp. Nationalists throughout this region tend to depict their nations as “primordial organisms” that were dormant during the oppressive Soviet period and were reawakened during the Gorbachev era (for example, RUKH 1989). However, it is more accurate to view the Soviet period as crucial to the national formation process, during which time nations became mass-based communities of interest and belonging that developed a sense of identity and a sense of homeland more extensive than their local environment (Kaiser 1994). However, even though this nationalization process during the Soviet era resulted in a higher and more mass-based national consciousness than existed before, not all groups are equally national.

Because national consciousness is essentially subjective, it is difficult to measure the degree to which it has become mass-based. Soviet censuses did ask a question on national identity, and this data provided one indicator of groups that were losing members as a

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1 The term constitutional nationalism, its use by the political elites of the dominant nation, the consequences of the new political reality for nonmembers, and reactions leading to violent ethnoterritorial conflict was recently elaborated by Robert Hayden (1992) with reference to Yugoslavia. According to Hayden, “constitutional nationalism envisions a state in which sovereignty resides with a particular nation, the members of which are the only ones who can decide fundamental questions of state form and identity.” Ethnic democracy has been defined by Smooha and Hanf (1992, 31) as “a democracy in which the dominance of one ethnic group is institutionalized.”

2 For such a descriptive summary of the conflicts that had emerged by 1992, see Kolossor (1992).
result of ethnonational reidentification or assimilation over time (Silver 1986). According to this measure, the least nationally conscious communities are the small groups of people of the Siberian north and also a number of Finnic groups such as the Karelians and Mordvinians, whose members were undergoing a process of reidentification toward Russians during much of the Soviet period. It is also true that members who live outside their home republics are more likely to acculturate and assimilate through an intergenerational process of reidentification (Kaiser 1988, 1994). Although ethnic reidentification is a useful general indicator of national consciousness, this measure does have limits because it does not indicate the strength of national consciousness among the population that considered itself to be part of the nation (that is, those who did not reidentify).

Another way of assessing national consciousness is to study the behavior of individuals and to determine to what degree each member of the nation behaves in a way that is consonant with nationalism. Nationalism here is defined as both an ideology and a political strategy. In Nationalism and the State (1982, 3), John Breuilly states that the political doctrine of nationalism has three essential tenets:

- "There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character."
- "The interests and values of the nation take priority over all other interests and values."
- "The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty."

National consciousness as discussed above is addressed in Breuilly’s first tenet. Beyond this, the primacy of national identity and the political objective that this inspires (that is, the attainment of independence) are of crucial importance in understanding nationalism as a political and geographic action program. Applying this to the former USSR, it is relatively obvious at this point that ethnonational differences exist in the degree to which nationalism has become an activated strategy. The Baltic nations have clearly been most nationalistic; close to the entire membership turned out for independence rallies—indicating a high degree of national consciousness—and they were least willing to compromise on the question of political independence. The least nationalistic of the titular groups in the former Union republics are in Central Asia. For example, Tajikistan has erupted into civil war; the conflict is, at least in part, intranational and interethnic, indicating a low level of national consciousness and the continued primacy of subnational, localized ethnic identities. The degree of national solidarity is lowest in Central Asia, and the nationalized elites have had the most difficulty calling their groups to action.

As a final point regarding this factor, it is important to note that there is a lack of correspondence between the degree of national consciousness and the level of interethnic violence. For example, the Tajik civil war has resulted in much greater loss of life and dislocation than has the constitutional nationalism pursued by Estonians and Latvians.

Strength of Attachment to Place of Residence
A sense of homeland rises with national consciousness (Kaiser 1991, 1994). As an ethnonational community becomes more nationalistic, this sense of homeland becomes politicized and is converted into territorial nationalism. Nationalism is an explicitly geographic ideology and strategy, a political action program to make the borders of state and homeland congruent (Williams 1989; Gettner 1983).

Nationality policies in the USSR facilitated the development of a politicized sense of homeland. First, the federal structure helped give definite shape, size, and borders to homelands that for the masses of most groups were only vaguely perceived in the 1920s (see figure 7).

3 From a nationalist perspective, the ancestral homeland is the only place where the nation can survive and prosper in the future. If nationalists view the nation as a primordial organism, they also typically view it as an organism that can thrive only when rooted in the soil of the ancestral homeland.
Figure 7

Federal Structure of the USSR, 1989

Second, Korenizatsiya (indigenization) policies that targeted members of the titular nation for preferential treatment in their home republic clearly fostered a more ethnically exclusionary outlook regarding the appropriate status of the titular nation vis-à-vis all other nations in the republic. Most nationalists have come to view all their former republic as homeland, even while many nationalists lay claim to a more extensive homeland.

On the one hand, the federal structure reduced the ethnoterritorial conflict that might otherwise have occurred—it provided the political geographic structure for a relatively peaceful dissolution of the USSR. On the other hand, several of those national communities with units that were only autonomous have attempted to secede from the successor states in which their homelands are located. This has resulted in conflict escalation at the intrarepublic scale, which has been particularly severe in the Caucasus.

Territorial nationalism is strongest in the regions where nations are most fully formed. Again, Estonia and Latvia—with their exclusionary citizenship laws, constitutions, and so forth—may be seen as most nationalistic. The state-building project in these two republics is synonymous with the exclusion of ethnic others, particularly Russians, even though their policies have excluded the population arriving since World War II rather than all nontitular people.

Ethnic conflict is more likely where two or more nations feel a strong sense of homeland toward the same place, where both groups have become politicized, and where the power relationship between the two groups has shifted to favor one over the other. This is certainly true in the case of conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.

A final note under this factor: it has become increasingly apparent over the past few years that a Russian sense of national consciousness and sense of homeland are not well developed. Russians as the dominant group in the USSR experienced an overlapping sense of identity with the Soviet People idea, and with the entire USSR as the Russian homeland/Socialist fatherland. Also, because of the great geographic dispersal of the Russian population, a more localized, subnational identity is also apparent. Both of these detract from the strength of a Russian national identity and a sense of homeland. As a result, there has been a lively debate within the Russian community over the question: "What is Russia?".

**Ethnodemographic Trends**

Most nationalists view the ideal polity as an ethnically pure nation-state with all members of the nation in and no outsiders present and with political borders drawn on the basis of the (mythical) ancestral homeland, that is, the state ideally is viewed as the political geographic embodiment of the nation. However, none of the successor states encompasses one and only one nation (see tables 1 and 2):

- Armenia is ethnically homogeneous but has the highest percentage of members living outside a successor state.
- Almost all Estonians, Latvians, and Georgians are included in their respective states, but members of nontitular groups are also present.

Demographic dilution of the indigenous nation in its homeland, usually occurring as the result of the immigration of Russians, tended to exacerbate interethnic relations and was a catalyst for rising nationalism. Latvians and Estonians experienced the greatest demographic dilution in their homelands between 1960 and 1990, and the feared demographic Russification became the cornerstone of their nationalistic programs (Parming, 1980). Abkhazians similarly cited Georgian in-migration and Abkhazian dilution as a critical factor in the need for Abkhazia to be independent, and the Armenian declaration of independence in Nagorno-Karabakh was preceded by a decade of Azeri in-migration.

By way of contrast, Kyrgyzstan has about the same level of demographic dilution as Latvia, but this has not been a major issue in Kyrgyzstan. In the Central
### Table 1
National Composition of the Population, 1989
Population in thousands (and percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Nontitular</th>
<th>Of Nontitular: Russians</th>
<th>Indigenous Minorities</th>
<th>Neighbors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>119,866 (81.5)</td>
<td>27,156 (18.5)</td>
<td>11,356 (80.9)</td>
<td>47 (0.3)</td>
<td>1,282 (9.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>37,419 (72.7)</td>
<td>14,033 (27.3)</td>
<td>14,033 (72.7)</td>
<td>6,765 (24.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>279,05 (77.9)</td>
<td>2,247 (22.1)</td>
<td>1,342 (59.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>716 (31.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2,795 (64.5)</td>
<td>1,541 (35.5)</td>
<td>562 (36.5)</td>
<td>153 (10.0)</td>
<td>600 (39.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>14,142 (71.4)</td>
<td>5,668 (28.6)</td>
<td>1,653 (29.2)</td>
<td>412 (7.3)</td>
<td>2,067 (36.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6,535 (39.7)</td>
<td>9,930 (60.3)</td>
<td>6,228 (62.7)</td>
<td>1,123 (11.3)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2,230 (52.4)</td>
<td>2,028 (47.6)</td>
<td>917 (45.2)</td>
<td>695 (34.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3,172 (62.3)</td>
<td>1,920 (37.7)</td>
<td>388 (20.2)</td>
<td>1,282 (68.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>2,537 (72.0)</td>
<td>986 (28.0)</td>
<td>334 (33.9)</td>
<td>411 (41.7)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3,787 (70.1)</td>
<td>1,613 (29.9)</td>
<td>341 (21.1)</td>
<td>260 (16.1)</td>
<td>745 (46.2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>5,805 (82.7)</td>
<td>1,216 (17.3)</td>
<td>392 (32.3)</td>
<td>391 (32.1)</td>
<td>186 (15.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>3,084 (93.3)</td>
<td>221 (6.7)</td>
<td>52 (23.3)</td>
<td>86 (39.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2,924 (79.6)</td>
<td>751 (20.4)</td>
<td>344 (45.9)</td>
<td>325 (43.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1,388 (52.0)</td>
<td>1,279 (48.0)</td>
<td>906 (70.8)</td>
<td>158 (12.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>963 (61.5)</td>
<td>602 (38.3)</td>
<td>475 (78.8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Indigenous minorities include those ethnic national communities with autonomous territories in the Union republics of the former USSR. In addition, in Moldova the Gagauz are included, and in Ukraine the Crimean Tatars are included. The category "Neighbors" includes the members of the titular nations of the Union republics whose borders are adjacent to the republic in question.


Asian republics, demographic indigenization rather than greater demographic Russification has been the trend for most of the postwar period.

**Social Mobility and Relative Deprivation**

Ethnoterritorial conflict tends to be more violent in places where indigenous access to upward mobility is blocked by socially mobilized outsiders, creating a condition of "aspirational deprivation" (that is, where a group's rising aspirations go unfulfilled) (Gurr 1970). This is particularly apparent in Central Asia, where dramatic increases in the levels of indigenous educational attainment during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in equally dramatic increases in aspirations. These aspirations were not met due to economic stagnation and more recently economic depression in the region, resulting in rising unemployment, especially among the young educated members of the indigenous groups. Under these conditions, in-migrating "foreigners" tend to be blamed. Because Russians and other European groups occupy the higher status positions in Central Asia's urban/industrial sectors, this tendency is not unjustified. These socioeconomic conditions provided the catalyst for sporadic antiforeigner violence in Central Asia, often conducted by unemployed educated indigenous youths against a vulnerable population that was depicted as receiving preferential access to scarce economic goods such as housing, jobs, and food (for example, Meskhetian Turks in Uzbekistan, Armenians in Dushanbe). 4

4 Byron Weiner (1978) found these same conditions underlying the rise of indigenous nativism among India's so-called sons of the soil. Nativism is defined by Weiner as "intense opposition to minorities because of their foreign origin."
Table 2
Ethnodemographic Trends, 1959-89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In Georgia a slightly different interethnic dynamic regarding social mobility and relative deprivation developed. The Georgians in Abkhazia, who view this territory as part of their homeland, were angered by the preferential treatment accorded Abkhazians as part of the indigenization program. Abkhazians were only 17 percent of the population but, as the titular group in Abkhazia, had a much higher percent of slots in higher education, high status jobs, and political representation reserved for them. In Nagorno-Karabakh the demographic shift toward Azeris was coupled with Azeri challenges to Armenian privileges in the region. In both cases the Georgian and Azeri attempts to remove or reduce Abkhazian and Armenian privileges resulted in civil warfare, as Abkhazians and Armenians in Nagorna-Karabakh sought to secede.

It is also true, however, that the most socially mobilized titular nations, that is, the Estonians, Latvians, Georgians, and Armenians—are also among the most nationalistic. The Soviet case provides convincing evidence that socioeconomic development or modernization, and even the provision of indigenous privileges, did not solve the national problem.

Nearly all non-Russians have used the rhetoric of internal colonialism. The least developed, such as the Tajiks, charge that the USSR did not live up to its promise of interethnic and interregional equalization. The most developed, such as the Estonians, charge that they would be even more developed if they had their independence. This feeling of relative deprivation was a potent catalyst for rising territorial nationalism that ironically was perhaps most influential in the most developed republics because the message of external exploitation and domination interacted with the trend toward demographic dilution among nations with a highly developed national consciousness and a sense of homeland.
Reaction by Members of Nontitular Groups to Rising Territorial Nationalism

Acceptance and Accommodation
A certain segment of the nontitular population that was ethnically marginal was undergoing process of acculturation and assimilation either with the titular nation or with the local Russian population. For the most part, these were nontitular people who had lived outside their homelands for several generations and whose ancestors had moved from their homeland before nationalization processes had begun (Kaiser 1994). Of this acculturating/assimilating segment of the nontitular population, those who are becoming acculturated to the indigenous nation will accept, and even promote, the new ethnic reality if they are accepted by the titular nation. On the other hand, those undergoing a process of Russification may respond as the local Russian population does. Conversely, the process of Russification itself may be reversed. For example, children with Russian and Ukrainian parents who claimed to be Russians in the past may prefer to identify themselves as Ukrainians, particularly in states where titular nationalism is directed against the local Russians (for instance, in Latvia and Estonia).

Beyond this ethnically marginal population, there is also a segment of the nontitular population that has lived in the same republic and locality for generations and has developed a strong sense of homeland (see table 3). Several indicators of acceptance have become apparent, particularly for the Russians living in the non-Russian successor states. For example, a relatively high percentage of Russians favored the independence of the republics they lived in and voted for independence-oriented parties, and a relatively high percentage of Russians also identified Estonia as their homeland (Drobizheva 1991). Surveys of Russian interethnic attitudes tended to show a willingness to remain in the newly independent states, at least immediately after independence. It may appear counter-intuitive, but the Russian reaction to the new ethno-political realities in the successor states appears more accommodative than resistant thus far; this may reflect the limited degree of Russian national consciousness and nationalism. The republics where Russians comprised the highest proportion of nontitular population are those without violent ethnic conflict.

Table 3
Population Born in the Republic of Current Residence, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Titular</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Non-Russians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>87.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In successor states that have experienced violent conflict:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Ossetians</th>
<th>Abkhazians</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Azeris</th>
<th>Gagauz</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Uzbeks</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, acceptance and accommodation are also dependent on the behavior of the titular nationalists. In the case of Estonia, nationalists seeking to reduce the Russian presence have alienated Russians who had behaved as Estonian patriots. A similar situation occurred in Latvia. Under these conditions, Russians are unlikely to remain accommodative of titular nationalism. Russian opposition is on the rise in the Baltic states, as well as in Kazakhstan—two regions where Russian acceptance and accommodations were dominant through 1992.
Emigration

Nontitular outmigration occurs in regions of violent ethnic conflict such as the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and among nontitular populations without a strong sense of homeland. The first wave of nontitular emigration was primarily of those nonindigenous who had recently immigrated to the region. In the past two years, an increasing number of those nontitular members with deeper roots in the regions are leaving, particularly in areas of interethnic violence. This latter migration is referred to as refugee migration, and it had exceeded 3 million by early fall 1993. I will limit my remarks here because Dr. Schwartz will be providing the details of this aspect of ethnic conflict in the former USSR later.

Resistance

Separatism. This reaction is more likely in areas of nontitular concentration where the local population has developed a strong sense of homeland that is directly threatened by the territorial nationalism of the titular nation. The nontitular group or indigenous minority seeks to gain greater territorial autonomy as a way to minimize the impact of titular nation's nationalism. This nontitular reaction in turn has typically provoked a stronger counteraction on the part of the titular nation, leading to conflict escalation. Of course, early examples of this occurred in Transcaucasia (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia), and in Moldova (Trans-Dniestria and among the Gagauz).

Most autonomous units of the Soviet federation declared their sovereignty immediately following the declarations of sovereignty by the Union republics in 1990. But not all are equally separatist. Ethnic and regional variations again depend on the degree of national consciousness on the part of the indigenous minority, the history of majority-minority relations in the region, and the degree to which the territorial nationalism of the majority group is perceived as a threat to the future viability of the indigenous minority:

- Sovereignty declarations resulting in conflict escalation include: Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Trans-Dniestrian Republic, and the Gagauz Republic in Moldova.
- Russia narrowly averted conflict over Chechnya's declaration of independence in 1991; the North Caucasus is the most likely region in Russia to become the scene of conflict escalation in the future.5
- The Tatars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Tuvinis, and Buryats—more highly nationalized communities in Russia—have pressed for greater independence in a more confederal Russia. If they are unhappy with the new constitution being worked out, the potential exists for rising national separatism.6 Of course, this will, and indeed already has, provoked rising Russian territorial nationalism in the republic.
- Russians in Narva and Sillamae declared territorial autonomy but backed down when the Estonian Supreme Court declared these referendums illegal.
- Russians in Crimea have declared their autonomy and their intent to secede from Ukraine. This has been the site of rising interethnic tensions among Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars returning from exile in Central Asia.
- Russian nationalist parties in northern Kazakhstan have also proclaimed their goal of secession from Kazakhstan and merger with Russia, but thus far this objective is not shared by a majority of Russians in the region. This is in part because Kazakh territorial nationalism has been muted in the republic by moderate Kazakh political elites at least through 1992. It may also be true that the demographic status of two relatively equal communities has tended to dampen titular nationalism.

Political Opposition. Nontitular groups have also attempted to organize opposition political parties and/ or movements. For example, the Russian "international fronts" in the Baltic republics developed in opposition to the rise of titular "national front" movements. Nontitular groups and indigenous minorities have also boycotted referendums and elections. This

5 Conflict finally did erupt in December 1994.
6 The new Russian Constitution did represent a loss of autonomy for the non-Russian indigenous minorities.
type of resistance has typically not provoked the same level of titular reaction that territorial autonomy/independence movements have.

Conclusion

There are several important lessons that have been learned in the emergent territorial nationalism found in the former Soviet Union. Conflict escalation to violent confrontation is an interactive process. It has normally started with territorial nationalism of the titular nation, whose members attempt to establish their hegemony in their homeland. This in turn means that the rights and privileges of non titular peoples living in the emergent nationalism are seriously eroded or restricted, resulting in a reactive nationalism on the part of such nontitular nations. Indigenous minorities have tended to react by declaring their sovereignty over the geographic area perceived as their homeland, and this has frequently led to a strong reaction on the part of such titular nation. This pattern of conflict escalation revolving around territorial control is found in the Armenian-Azeri dispute, in Georgia, in the North Caucasus, in Ukraine (especially Crimea), and in Moldova.

In areas where the nontitular groups have not developed a strong sense of homeland with their local places of residence, resistance in the form of political opposition—as in the case of the Russians in the Baltic republics. Alternatively, emigration or even acceptance if the nontitular group has come to identify with the titular nation and its homeland are also reactions found among certain segments of the nontitular population. Conflict escalation to violent confrontation is not inevitable. Nontitular emigration is found among nonindigenous groups in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Acceptance is found most often among nontitular groups that are ethnically similar to the titular nation and whose members have lived outside their ancestral homeland for generations.

As a final comment, several analysts of ethnoterritorial conflict in the former USSR have argued that it was the federal structure, based as it was on ethnic homelands, that was the cause of the disintegration in the USSR and the cause of interethnic conflict today. They also state that the successor states are ethnically mixed and that ethnonational identity and territorial identity must be separated to avoid the kind of ethnoterritorial cleansing that has occurred in Yugoslavia and in Transcaucasia. As laudable as this sentiment may be, it does not accord with the reality of territorial nationalism in the region. National identity and territorial identity have been intimately interrelated, and a rising sense of national consciousness has coincided with a rising sense of exclusiveness toward the region identified as the national homeland. Attempts to decouple this geographic relationship between nation and homeland will fail and are likely to cause heightened interethnic tensions and conflicts in the region. A more informed approach to the problem of territorial nationalism should begin with an acknowledgement of the importance of homeland in the perceptions of nationalists and attempt to regulate interethnic tensions and conflicts that are likely to emerge as a consequence of these perceptions before these conflicts escalate to violent confrontation.

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7 See Hennayake (1992), who recently elaborated a theory of "interactive ethnonationalism."
References


Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Ronald Wixman

I would like to discuss the region from a slightly different perspective. I think it is a grave error to view the former Soviet Union as a unitary state. It never was. It might be useful, instead, to view the Soviet Union as a colonial empire that is now, as other colonial empires have, going through the various stages of decolonization. The former Soviet Union is the Russian empire, and the Russian empire is falling apart.

The situation is not unique, as evidenced by the situation of the Germans in Eastern Europe after World War I. After Germany lost its holdings and the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell apart, Germans were left in such places as Moravia, Slilesia, and the Banat. In fact, in the Banat, there were more Germans than Romanians or Serbs. In many areas, they were in the majority. But just as the Russians did in the outlying republics, the Germans went from having majority status to minority status.

The process of nativization of the republics has gone through phases. The initial stage was not to produce a Ukrainian Ukraine or an Uzbek Uzbekistan or an Estonian Estonia. Instead, the Russians co-opted the elites in the same way that the British co-opted the Rajas of India. The next generation is ambivalent, and after that a shift occurs in which many of these elites produced by the state, and for the state, turn on it. The Soviet Union went through this process of decolonization, when the native elite turned away from serving Moscow and decided to serve their own peoples' interests. This is what happened throughout Eastern Europe after World War I, when the co-opted elite turned against Austria, Hungary, and the Ottomans.

What does all this mean? We are seeing the newly created republics in borders that did not exist before. The borders of the Soviet republics were constructed specifically by the central government. Uzbekistan did not create its borders, Armenia did not create its, and you can be sure neither the Abkhaz nor the Georgians created Abkhazia. These were created in Moscow, by Moscow, and for Moscow. The policy toward Azer-bajians and the Azeri language was not created in Azerbaijan. It also came from Moscow. So, to speak of a federal structure is difficult. In the decolonization policy, the people of the former republics are saying, "our people, our language, and our culture are not dominant." As in all other colonial areas, what happens to those people who are not members of this majority? Should the leftover colonials learn the national language? Should the French in Algeria have learned Arabic? They did not have to become Muslim, but should they have sworn allegiance to Algeria rather than to France? Who comes to the United States and keeps their allegiance to their old country and cannot speak English?

The Russians are dealing with the issues of what they can and cannot keep and of what belongs and does not belong to the state. For example, Moscow claims the Black Sea Fleet because the government built it. Ukrainians say the fleet does not belong to Moscow because they believe they built it as much as the government did. When Russians say that the Crimea is Russian, Ukrainians say, "only because Moscow never let Ukrainians move there."

The West needs to see the former Soviet republics not only in the context of people finding a new nationalism but also in that of the people directing anger against the colonial state for having forbidden them their rights in their own territory.

Similarly, the minorities in these republics have found themselves in the same position that minorities have found themselves in all other newly independent former colonial states. The West has been viewing East Europeans and the former Soviet peoples in a different light than it has viewed everyone else in the world, and I think we should recognize this and change the view. The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have been suffering from a majority problem for many years, not so much a minority problem.
General Discussion

QUESTION: Dr. Wixman, if we accept your analogy that the disintegration of the Soviet Union can be compared with the disintegrations of previous empires, can we also look at the Russian federation now as an empire? Is there a possibility of the Russian federation also disintegrating like the Soviet Union?

DR. WIXMAN: For the most part, no. There are very few regions of the Russian federation within which the Russians are not the vast majority. Siberia and the Far East is now—whatever it was before—extremely Russian in makeup.

The Russian Federation is basically Russia. The biggest threat to Russia today in terms of its internal territorial integrity is not going to come from minorities. If I had to guess where a problem might arise, and I was just there for the sixth time in 10 years, it is in the Russian Far East. I think that the Russians are going to have more problems dealing with Russian territories that perceive themselves as different and that resent Muscovite rule than from the minorities themselves. There is a strong movement in the Far East for that.

DR. KAISER: I agree with parts of what Dr. Wixman has said. As I indicated in my presentation, a sense of national consciousness is something that typically precedes the drive for independence, and it is really absent for the most part in a lot of these smaller non-Russian groups to the east. One region that Dr. Wixman didn’t mention, which I think is critically important, is the North Caucasus. It is an area without a large Russian population. Russians are leaving that area too, setting up the conditions through which a rising call for independence may occur.

The Chechen republic, first of all, declared its independence from the Chechen Ingush ASSR and declared its independence from Russia. It is the only one that has actually declared its outright independence. At the same time, a lot of the North Caucasian peoples have joined together in a confederation. They are still a part of Russia but almost once removed in that sense.

The other thing we are seeing in Russia is not only the non-Russians asking for or demanding as much independence or autonomy as they can get but also Russians declaring their independence as republics. So a federation of maybe 88 republics may exist when everything is finished. Russian localism is, in part, a response and a reaction against minority nationalism, particularly among the nationally conscious groups like the Tatars, but it also may reflect a limited level of Russian nationalism itself that would be more centripetal in its orientation.

QUESTION: Of the 22 republics within the current Russian federation, one has seceded, several others have threatened to secede, and some are developing their own economic policies—in other words, economically seceding. Is the center giving power to the regions or are the regions taking power from the center? In the latter case, is it really a camouflage confederation?

DR. KAISER: This looks more to me like localism and regionalism than does territorial nationalism. It is similar to the previous disintegrative process, but it does not appear as though an impetus for outright independence exists to the same degree that it did at the level of the Union republics. I should add a caveat here: not all Union republics were equally secessionist, and the Central Asian republics were not necessarily all that proindependence when this process first began. It was the Baltic states that were pushing this forward, and a kind of diffusion occurred from there. Some of the republics even accepted independence as a fait accompli after August 1991.

In short, all the groups do not have to be nationalistic, but the wave of territorial nationalism that is needed to get the ball rolling toward the ultimate point of disintegration currently does not appear to exist within the Russian Federation.

DR. WIXMAN: The real issue within the Russian state—with the few exceptions of some of the nationalists on the periphery who are really inconsequential to
Russia anyway—is a question of decentralization versus centralization, more than of ethnicity.

QUESTION: To what extent will patterns of trade and commerce shift the regional identification of the Russians who live in the Far East from considering themselves to be Russians to considering themselves a part of the Pacific Rim or the Northeast Asian community? Will such patterns accelerate the trends that you are speaking of in terms of localization?

DR. KAISER: Dr. Wixman seems to see more of a potential for separatism in the Far East among the Russians themselves than I do. On the ethnic map of Russia, the Far East is overwhelmingly Russian and has been since about 1700. Even so, the region is sparsely populated; only about 25 million people live east of the Urals. I suppose a redirection or reorientation of the population could occur, because there is a great deal of localism there. Two different regional restructuring processes have been at work, however. First, the Russians themselves are reorganizing and directing their attention to the Pacific Rim and thinking more in local and economic terms; second, the non-Russian population is banding together in groups and organizing to try to gain political clout. Neither of these restructuring processes is on the same level as an independence movement and certainly not on that of a movement based on ethnonationalism. Instead, local Russian areas are demanding more autonomy within a more decentralized Russia and particularly seek greater control over the economic wealth that flows through their region. Because these Russians are not sacrificing for the good of Mother Russia and all Russians, one could probably question the level of their Russian national consciousness and their common sense of homeland, but this localism/regionalism is not on the same order of magnitude as separatist nationalism.

DR. WIXMAN: I think the movement for autonomy in the Russian Far East is greater than in even the ethnic regions. There is a strong anticoncenerstist feeling. There is no question that the population is Russian; they are just as Russian as anyone else. But who resides in the Russian Far East? The descendants of the people who fled to the Far East to escape central authority before the Soviets took over and of those people who were sent there after 1917. This is the group of people in the Russian empire who, more than anyone else, has had an antagonistic attitude toward Moscow for decades. They are located on the Pacific, so a strong movement exists toward stronger ties to Korea, Japan, the United States, and Canada.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the relation between ethnicity and environment?

DR. KAISER: At the beginning of the independence movements, a lot of national fronts—particularly in the Baltic states and in Belarus—began as environmental movements. Environmentalism and nationalism—especially national independence—were very closely tied, not only in the Baltic states but also in many of the European republics.

This should not be surprising because people considered their soil to be sacred—as the only place where their nation could survive and prosper—and they became angry when it was polluted by forces outside their control. Indeed, a lot of the region’s polluting industries were moved in at the behest of Moscow. Along with them came Russians, so the ethnic feature was added on top of the environmental one.

Since independence, environmentalism has often taken a back seat to nationalism and independence. For example, nationalists in Estonia who had lamented the fact that Russians had set up an oil shale mining operation there now say they need to keep that operation going so as not to rely on Russia for oil. The same thing occurred in Lithuania with the Ignalina nuclear plant. The Lithuanians have talked about adding a third unit to that nuclear facility—even though before independence it was a symbol of Soviet oppression and a symbol of the environmental degradation of the homeland. In Ukraine, there is even talk about keeping Chornoby1 (Chernoby1) in operation and maybe expanding it as well. In Armenia, a nuclear plant had been shut down by grassroots opposition because it was on a geologic faultline and has been damaged by earthquakes. Now the Armenians are considering reopening it because they need local
energy sources since the pipelines from Azerbaijan and Georgia have been cut. Environmentalism is on the back burner and has been decoupled from nationalism in these kinds of economic decision making processes. Environmentalism was promoted when it was useful to the nationalists and their struggle for independence, but it is now seen as competing with the nations’ efforts to be less dependent on external resources—especially those supplied by Russia.
Geographic Factors in Ethnic Conflict in Africa

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Introduction

Over the past decade, no geographic realm has suffered as severely from ethnic conflict as Africa. Entire countries have been devastated by years of ethnic strife. Millions of Africans have become displaced persons in their own countries or refugees in others. Hundreds of thousands are imperiled by hunger and starvation, and ruling regimes are in some instances preventing food and medicine from reaching the displaced.

This paper will focus on the geographic realm of Africa, not the entire African continent. Geographically defined, this realm extends from the zone of Islamic contact along the southern margins of the Sahara to the Cape of Good Hope. It includes nearly 50 countries, an area of more than 8 million square miles, and—as of midyear 1994—a population of 572 million.

Factors Aggravating Ethnic Divisiveness

The prevalence of ethnic conflict and dislocation in Africa must be seen against a background of: (1) rapid population growth, (2) a problem-ridden international and internal boundary framework, (3) rising religious fundamentalism, (4) persistent neocolonialism, (5) historic animosities, and (6) stagnant or deteriorating economies—factors that serve to aggravate existing divisions.

In rural as well as in urban areas, Africa’s high growth rates contribute to the ethnic tensions and conflicts that afflict the realm. As a world geographic realm, Africa presently exhibits the highest rates of natural population growth. This continues despite the AIDS pandemic in tropical Africa and the realm’s pernicious and debilitating plagues and diseases. Such population growth, attended by doubling times as low as 18 years, fills natural ethnic buffer zones, places further stress on already overexploited environments, and creates a growing urbanward flow.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s existing boundaries have contributed to, rather than mitigated, ethnic conflict in Africa. The framework of the continent’s international political boundaries, as has been said ad infinitum, is a troublesome legacy of the colonial period. This is more true in some areas (such as the Horn) than in others (the South), but overall, such boundaries still divide people of common origins; elsewhere they throw a girdle around peoples with adversarial histories. Many African states have sought to accommodate the latter by manipulating their internal borders.

Rising religious fundamentalism in Africa mirrors what is happening all over the world today, from Algeria to India to America. A number of African countries lie astride religious transition zones, including Nigeria and Sudan, and religious fervor is contributing to ethnic strife in these countries.

Neocolonialism remains a factor in Sub-Saharan Africa in various forms, ranging from outright interference in national affairs to economic intervention. French forces have acted in support of governments in countries plagued by ethnic strife; in effect, the French involved themselves in ethnic conflicts—recently in Burundi, earlier in Chad. US support for Zaire’s Mobutu has contributed to the continued comparative stability of that vast country; it undoubtedly has staved off ethnic strife there, and it has played a useful role—from the US viewpoint—in the war in neighboring Angola. Accusations of collaboration with “neocolonial” interests often stoke the fires of ethnic conflict.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies, in aggregate, are alone in showing an overall decline over the past decade. Declining living standards tend to exacerbate ethnic rivalries; in comparatively wealthy Europe, the
economic slowdown has also been attended by increasing ethnic strife. Even during the expansion of the 1980s, African economies lagged; with the world economy slowed down, African economies deteriorate. Economic growth provides opportunities and lessens frustrations. In Africa, the opposite situation prevails.

This is not the place to recapitulate the historical geography of black Africa, but its outlines—West Africa’s cultural flowering, that region’s ancient savanna states, the arrival and diffusion of Islam, the European colonial intervention, the imposition of the boundary framework, contrasting colonial policies and practices, and the rise of African nationalism—must be kept in mind, for they are etched on cultural landscapes, and they still influence interethnic relations today.

No African region has been immune from costly ethnic conflict. In West Africa, the most destructive conflict since the Biafra War has ravaged Liberia. In Equatorial Africa, southern Chad and the southern Sudan have been engulfed by war. In the Horn, Somalia has become synonymous with ethnic strife, and Ethiopia and Eritrea witnessed years of tribal fighting. In East Africa, Uganda has been a cauldron of ethnic conflict, and today Rwanda and Burundi continue to suffer. And in southern Africa, an uncertain truce has quieted decades of war in Angola, while ethnic strife is at least temporarily quiescent in South Africa.

This incomplete summary of current and recent ethnic conflict notwithstanding, some African countries have achieved ethnic accommodation against great odds. Africa is divided into more than 1,000 ethnolinguistic domains, creating cultural mosaics that make the former Yugoslavia look uncomplicated by comparison. Political geographers often point to India as miracle of multicultural stability, but Nigeria’s continuity may be a greater achievement still. Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia are other success stories.

A Typology of Ethnic Conflict in Africa

Ethnic conflict in Africa has variable roots, suggesting a typology that may help assess it. Along the Islamic/non-Islamic transition zone in the north, the ultimate cause of conflict often is religious, as is the case in Sudan today and has been in Chad. This should not imply that religion is the sole incentive, but it does dominate here. In the case of Sudan, fear of Khartoum’s imposition of sharia criminal law upon Christian and animist southerners is a catalyst for conflict. A second form of conflict may be designated as tribal and is exemplified by what is happening today in Liberia. With a population well under 3 million, Liberia incorporates more than a dozen major ethnic groups, including the Kpelle (about 20 percent of the population), Bassa (14 percent), Grebo (9 percent), Gio (8 percent), Kru (7 percent), and Mano (7 percent). In 1990 the country collapsed into civil war, in which tribal loyalties were paramount. Tens of thousands were killed, and nearly 1 million refugees streamed across Liberia’s borders.

A third kind of ethnic conflict has strategic origins: it may have started as a tribal struggle but has worsened by external interests. In early 1995, one of these conflicts had recently abated: the war between Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) forces in Angola. A fourth form of conflict may be categorized as reformist. This has its origins in the political transformation of a state. For example, in Kenya during the runup to independence, the Mau Mau rebellion was essentially a Kikuyu movement aimed not only against whites but also against “collaborators.” In fact, many more Africans than Europeans lost their lives during that period, and animosities between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu endured after independence. The first clashes in Liberia involved the ouster of the America-Liberian elite by the so-called aborigines, as the indigenous peoples of Liberia were called. In Zimbabwe, Mashona/Matabele conflict arose in similar context.

In Africa today, the geographic dimension of ethnic conflict is this: religious strife affects principally the northern cultural transition zone; reformist conflict prevails in the south; and tribal war not directly related to external influences afflicts the central zone, most severely in Rwanda and Liberia. Persistent strategic conflict has devastated Angola and, while quiescent at present, still looms in Mozambique.
The Environment as a Factor

It is drought that has been, and continues to be, Africa's greatest and most consequential environmental problem. The pulsations of the Sahara are now better understood than they were during the 1970s, when the word "sahel" became synonymous with environmental disaster. Not only did that desertification phase claim as many as a half million human (and countless animal) lives but it also caused ethnic strife in countries to the south. The geographer Thomas Bassett documented the results when cattle herders from the desiccated savannas took their livestock into farmlands in the Cote d'Ivoire, where crops were trampled and fighting broke out. Soon, the northerners were blaming the (then) Abidjan-based government for not supporting them effectively during the crisis, and North-South relations—always difficult in coastal West African countries—worsened.

In Ethiopia, several successive years of drought turned out to be a more formidable adversary to the Marxist regime in Addis Ababa than any insurrection was—when the crops failed and people streamed off the land, the insurgency became unstoppable. Now, with Eritrea an independent state, Ethiopia is landlocked—its political future far from certain. In addition, Eritrean ethnic unity is a myth; for example, the Afar (who extend into Djibouti and whose domain centers on the port of Assab) have a claim to nationhood that may well reemerge in the future. Environmental conditions also contributed to the downfall of the Barre regime in Somalia. Crop failures and famines in the south led to the movement of people and livestock across traditional clan-territorial boundaries, and in the ensuing clashes lay the origins of the weak government's collapse. The current conflict in Somalia, it should be noted, however, is not an "ethnic" conflict in the terms of this discussion; it is not religious, tribal, strategic, or reformist. The Somali nation's ethnic and religious uniformity does not extend to territorial unity: six major clans and hundreds of subclans occupy bounded and inviolable spaces not only in Somalia but also in eastern Ethiopia, eastern Kenya, and southern Djibouti. Significantly, the north, which suffered least from drought and resultant dislocation, has been virtually untouched by the problems of the south.

Although news media have paid comparatively little attention to it, searing, decadelong drought, the worst in living memory, has prevailed over interior southern Africa, affecting lives and economies from Malawi and Zambia to South Africa (Tanzania and southern Zaire also were affected). This drought, which came at a time when nearly 1 million refugees from Mozambique crossed into Malawi and when Angola was consumed by a civil war, contributed to food shortages and political unrest in Zambia; one is tempted to speculate that, without it, Kenneth Kaunda still would be President. Perhaps more important, the drought has done much damage in Zimbabwe, where small farmers on the African-owned lands suffered visibly while white owners of large estates fared better. As economic conditions worsened and the Mugabe government's popularity plummeted, the dormant land issue was revived—in the form of the 1992 Land Acquisition Bill. Zimbabwe's commercial farmers, who number almost 4,500 (nearly all white) still own 30 percent of all of Zimbabwe. They have sustained the agricultural economy, producing about 80 percent of the country's cash crops. The Zimbabwean Government wants to force the sale of half the whites' land for the purpose of resettling black farmer families. Although the program is opposed by Zimbabwe's donors and lenders, including Britain and the IMF, it is likely to proceed. All this is happening at a time when multiparty democracy is being forced on a government that controls 147 of the 150 seats in the parliament. The drought forces the land issue; the land issue will cause ethnic discord in a country long known for its successful transition.

In a realm where most of the population continues to live on and depend directly on the land, environmental swings soon lead to human dislocation, and dislocation translates into conflict—often ethnic conflict. As the growing rifts in the European Union remind us, intercultural harmony is easiest to generate when economic times are good. When livelihoods are threatened, the human reaction is to blame outsiders—that is, nonethnics, whether they be North African or Turkish immigrants or local minorities. In Europe, the problem is recession; in Africa, it is unpredictable, fluctuating environments.
Current Ethnic Conflicts

In Africa it often is difficult to distinguish ethnic conflict of the kind being discussed here from local or temporary strife resulting from political processes. The worldwide democratization movement is also affecting African countries, and frequently this has ethnic overtones because one-party rule tends to mean one-culture dominance and because military rule often (although not always) means the same. When multiparty politics reached Togo, there were deadly riots that might have led to ongoing ethnic strife, but that did not follow. In Ghana, the continued rule of strongman Jerry Rawlings is greased by comparatively strong economic growth, but ethnic issues are forcibly submerged. In Chad, seemingly always on the verge of civil war, successive coup attempts and French military involvement punctuate the apparently hopeless struggle toward representative government. Indeed, in 1994, full-scale ethnic conflict was in progress in several locations.

Liberia

ECOMOG, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force, has suppressed but not eliminated the carnage. What began as the ouster of the Americo-Liberian regime in Monrovia (and thus as a reformist conflict) evolved into an ethnic struggle involving supporters of the strongman, President Samuel Doe, and two rebels, Taylor and Johnson. Now a tribal conflict, the struggle has no end in sight, and the survival of Liberia as an entity is in doubt.

Sudan

The latest phase of four decades of regional conflict in the Sudan is more than 10 years old. It is classic religious-ethnic struggle on the northern perimeter of black Africa, but it is not simply a contest between north and south. Sudan has a complex ethnolinguistic mosaic. The northern provinces contain about 60 percent of the total population, and, while the north is overwhelmingly Muslim, only about two-thirds of the northerners speak Arabic as their native language. The Muslim but non-Arab northerners—including the Fur and Zaghawa in Darfur, the Nuba in South Kordofan, the Nubians of the far north, and others—have been propaganda targets of the (south based) Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). In the years leading up to and following the coup that ousted Nimeiri, conflict among non-Arab Northern ethnic groups, notably the Nuba and the Beni Amer in Red Sea Province, continued even as the larger war intensified.

The SPLM's military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army, began its war against "the North" in 1983, in opposition to the Nimeiri government, which in that year announced the imposition of the sharia law over all of Sudan. The North-South war has swept back and forth across the countryside, devastating infrastructure and livelihoods and seemingly incapable of resolution. In the southern provinces, too, joint opposition to Khartoum's rule was not enough to submerge ethnic conflicts. The schism between the Dinka-dominated faction, led by John Garang, and the mainly Nuer faction, a breakaway group led by Riek Mashar, has produced a three-way struggle. (The Dinka are from the west bank of the Nile, the Nuer, from the east, on the Ethiopian border). In mid-1992, a further power struggle produced still another split in the southern ranks.

In June 1992, the warring parties met but without a settlement. In 1994, the North appeared poised to overcome the divided Southern forces, and promises of freedom of belief and religious observance, made by the government in 1992 in Abuja during negotiations under Nigerian auspices, were no longer heard. The regime that took power in 1989 is intransigent and virulently anti-Christian and anti-Western; in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing, when the United States declared Sudan a "terrorist state," it expressed fears it shared with the southerners about to come under Khartoum's sharia heel. The human cost of the Sudan conflict is staggering: in 1994 there were an estimated 7 million malnourished and 3 million starvation-threatened refugees in Sudan. Both the Khartoum regime and the southern factions have impeded the flow of relief to these refugees on the grounds that such aid has "strategic" value.
**Djibouti and Somalia**

Although Djibouti and Somalia lie on the African continent, they are not, by regional definition, African states. The situation in Somalia has been summarized. In Djibouti, two dominant ethnic groups, the Afars (or Danakil) and the Issas, have a history of conflict. The Issas, who constitute about one-third of the total population of about 500,000, inhabit the southern third of the country. They spill over into Somalia (where they number about 60,000) and Ethiopia (some 250,000). In Djibouti, they constitute the majority. The Afars inhabit the northern two-thirds of Djibouti; they form about one-fifth of the total population. Their domain extends into Eritrea as well as Ethiopia, where they number some 600,000. Five other main ethnic groups make up the rest of the population.

Power in Djibouti has resided with the Issas, who dominate the armed forces. In 1991, a guerilla movement arose in Afar territory, culminating in December in the notorious Arhiba massacre in Djibouti City, when government troops killed numerous Afars. Although efforts were made (with French involvement) to defuse the situation, things remained violent and tense in 1993. Some observers suggest that the independence of Eritrea will impel a reorganized Ethiopia to involve itself in Djibouti’s affairs.

**Rwanda and Burundi**

This country lies between countries in which some of Africa’s bloodiest ethnic conflict has taken place, Uganda and Burundi. In Uganda, the Baganda were at the center of the strife; in Rwanda and Burundi, the long-term issue is between the Tutsi (Watusi) and the Hutu. During four months in 1972, more than 100,000 Hutus were killed by the minority Tutsi in Burundi. Ethnic strife in October 1993 and April 1994 added more than 600,000 to the death toll.

Historically, the Tutsi were smaller in number, but stronger in terms of power, than were the Hutu. The Tutsi, organized into kingdoms, acquired land and subjugated the Hutu. Social standing more than tribal origin distinguished Hutu from Tutsi. Repression, rebellion, and chaos followed independence, with the Hutu staking their claim to power and privilege and the Tutsi fighting to retain it. The conflict always had a lower profile in international affairs than the Amin episode and its excesses in Uganda, but its costs were nevertheless enormous.

The latest phase began in late 1990, when a contingent of Tutsi refugees in exile in Uganda invaded northern Rwanda. The (Hutu) Habyarimana government responded not only by sending a defending army but also by arresting and executing Tutsis in the country. The Tutsi force, under the banner of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, survived an early setback and moved toward the capital, Kigali. According to correspondents on the scene, external forces also played a role in the conflict. The French helped the Kigali government, and there were reports of Ugandan support for the rebels. French support was based, reportedly, on the Francophone nature of Rwanda’s upper crust; the Tutsi had been “anglicized” in Uganda, and there were French fears of Francophone loss in the event of Tutsi success.

All this became moot in April 1994 following the death of Rwanda’s President in a suspicious plane crash at Kigali Airport. Hutu militias embarked on an orgy of (apparently planned and premeditated) murder of Tutsis and “moderate” or “collaborationist” Hutus. The ensuing refugee flow carried as many as 2 million Rwandans into Zaire and Tanzania; as many as 600,000 were killed. In March 1995, Tutsi in Burundi attacked Hutu, and the cycle of violence returned to this country. No end to this tribal conflict is in sight.

**Angola**

The disastrous and continuing conflict in Angola was an ethnic conflict magnified by strategic forces, and in the aftermath of the Cold War it continued unabated. Dominant in the ethnic jigsaw of Angola have been the Mbundu in the east, the Ovimbundu of the center and west, the Bakongo of the north, and the Ovambo of the south. Luanda, the capital, lies in the Mbundu heartland. In the anticolonial struggle, each ethnic group formed its own movement: the Mbundu-dominated MPLA in the Luanda hinterland, the Bakongo-run FNLA, and Ovambo-Ovimbundu UNITA of the south. In the postindependence civil war, the FNLA was quickly ousted, and a prolonged
battle between the MPLA and UNITA began. Eventually this conflict became internationalized with Cuban troops in support of the MPLA and South African and other external assistance to UNITA. The role of Zaire in the issue was significant. After the FNLA went into oblivion, Zaire moved its support to UNITA; this was a natural move, given Mobutu’s dependence on the United States. Zaire’s taking sides in Angola’s civil war had the effect of creating behind-the-back security for Savimbi’s UNITA.

After the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the collapse of the MPLA’s sponsor—the Soviet Union—and the withdrawal of South African support for UNITA, mediation by Herman Cohen and his staff produced an agreement for a multiparty election in 1992. In that election, the Dos Santos-led MPLA was victorious, winning 128 seats in the legislature to 71 for UNITA. Neither Dos Santos nor Savimbi received 50 percent of the vote, however, creating the need for a presidential runoff election. Savimbi charged that the election had been fraudulent, and, on 30 October 1992, fighting broke out in Luanda and the civil war resumed.

Neither side appeared capable of vanquishing the other completely, at least not without external, massive help. The question arose whether it should be US policy to promote a partition of this large country; the latitudinal morphology of the territory might make such a solution the sole alternative to endless ethnic strife. In 1994, renewed international efforts to mediate the Angolan conflict again appeared to have success, and a government was installed in Luanda. But the fundamental divisions of Angola remain.

Other plural African societies, from Sierra Leone to South Africa, contend with potential ethnic conflict as a matter of course.

Nigeria

Nowhere are the risks as great, the stakes as high, or the divisions as deep as they are in Nigeria. Africa’s most populous country. Nigeria’s arid north lies deeply embedded in Islamic Africa, and its palm-fringed southern coastlines are part of Africa’s Christian and animist world. British colonialism threw a lasso around some 200 ethnolinguistic groups scattered across a wide range of environmental and cultural zones. The survival of Nigeria (despite a bitter war of secession) is an African achievement of notable proportions. Now Nigeria’s unity is threatened.

Nigeria’s population may number 100 million or more; the issue of census accuracy has roiled its politics for years. Among more than 200 ethnic groups, three are dominant: the Hausa-Fulani of the North, the Yoruba of the Southwest, and the Ibo (Igbo) of the Southeast. These major nations (for such they are) have considerable disdain for each other. Muslim Hausa say that Yoruba are godless and uncultured. Ibo describe the Hausa as backward and uneducated. To Northerners, the Ibo are money-mad merchants who will do anything for a price. Nigeria was born an uneasy federation with three states centered on these dominant nations; today it is a country of 30 states trying to emulate not Westminster’s system but Washington’s.

The religious composition of the Nigerian population is estimated as follows: Muslims, 50 million; Christians, 37 million; others (chiefly animists) 12 million. (The much disputed 1991 census of Nigeria did not require Nigerians to answer questions about religion.) A substantial number of Yoruba, perhaps 2 million, are Muslims, but Islam in Nigeria long has had a moderate tone. Some geographers have described the Yoruba as “middlemen” between Christian Easterners and the more dogmatic Muslim Northerners, defusing tensions that might have led to religious conflict.

Potential Ethnic Conflicts

Latent ethnic conflict exists in many African countries. In Southern Africa, Mozambique has just emerged from years of ethnic strife, but the situation remains fragile, and many thousands of refugees have not yet returned home. In Zaire, the inevitable political transition may yield an explosion of long-suppressed ethnic conflict. In long-stable Kenya, the risk of ethnic strife has risen in recent years, apparently stoked by official actions. In Chad, major conflict has recurred for decades and is likely to take place again.
The rise of religious fundamentalism—not just Islamic, but also Christian fundamentalism—threatens Nigeria's future. In the North, where Islam predominates, Christianity has footholds, and coexistence has been the rule. Despite sporadic skirmishes, tensions along religious lines have escalated in recent years. There are a growing number of Muslim preachers who advocate Islamic radicalism and who call for an "Islamic republic" in Nigeria. In 1991, a Muslim fundamentalist in Katsina whipped up anti-Christian fervor that spread to Bauchi State and led to the killing of more than 1,000 people in religious riots. In 1992, hundreds of Hausa Muslims were massacred by Christians in Kaduna State. Significantly, that conflict had ethnic as well as religious overtones—the Christians were Katafs.

In the southern states, Islamic radicalism is viewed with a growing concern. In 1986, General Babangida, the country's strongman president, allowed Nigeria to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the global association of Islamic countries; Christian leaders in the South were outraged and said so from pulpits. For the first time since the Biafra War, voices favoring secession are heard in the South, notably in the southeast, but also in Yorubaland.

Will things fall apart? The potential for conflict is greater today than it has been at any time since the Biafra War a quarter of a century ago. Frustration with incompetent and despotic military government is rife. Corruption is endemic. Infrastructure lies in ruins, from impassable roads to shuttered universities. Domination of national affairs by Muslims is becoming an issue in the South at a time when Muslim fundamentalism is on the rise.

Nigeria may dissolve into ethnic conflict much as Sudan has, but, to the world at large, this prospect is far more worrisome in Nigeria's case. Nigeria is an African cornerstone, a country well connected to the rest of the world, OPEC's fourth-largest oil producer, and a model of Christian-Islamic coexistence on Africa's troubled transition zone. The breakup of Nigeria would be a geopolitical catastrophe.

South Africa

In terms of international importance, regional impact, or virtually any other measure, the prospect of South Africa's collapse into ethnic conflict would be incomparable. South Africa's multicultural society is a microcosm of the world, with linkages to Europe, America, and Asia. It remains Africa's most powerful and productive economy. It is a land not only of great potential for the long term but also of great danger for the near future.

It may be inappropriate to place South Africa in a rubric of "potential" ethnic conflict. In fact, ethnic conflict has existed in South Africa for many decades, even centuries. Today, thousands are dying every year in ethnic strife as the apartheid system is dismantled. South Africans of all races are trying to achieve a transition that has been accomplished by revolution elsewhere; but some on several sides of this complicated process are, or appear to be, intent on promoting conflict.

Actual and potential ethnic conflict in South Africa exists at several levels: these may be categorized as intraethnic, interethnic, and interracial.

Violent conflict within ethnic sectors of the South African population rose with the political tide and with the approach of constitutional resolution. Although newspaper and television accounts sometimes give the impression that the Zulu nation (for such it is) largely supports Inkatha and opposes Mandela's African National Congress (ANC), the fact is that much of the deathly violence in Natal and on the Rand was between Zulu Inkatha supporters on the one hand and Zulu ANC members on the other. The Zulu nation is fragmented by a myriad of clan lineages and boundaries, and clan conflict has worsened severely as a direct result of the political contest.

Violent conflict between ethnic groups in the republic occurs in the squalid townships and sometimes on railroad cars taking people to and from work, but, in fact, South Africa has hitherto escaped widespread, regional strife of this kind. Undoubtedly some of the
ongoing Inkatha-ANC violence has ethnic overtones, but given the circumstances in the country, interethnic violence has been limited. This is undoubtedly due to the multiethnic, indeed multiracial, character of the ANC leadership. Just as Inkatha does not represent all (or even most) Zulu, so the ANC is not an all-Xhosa organization. Still, in the popular image, the Inkatha-ANC political struggle often is seen, in the final analysis, as a Zulu-Xhosa clash, a continuation of historic rivalries, and the preamble to another round between ancient adversaries.

This is not to suggest that interethnic conflict is not latent and potentially explosive. The assassination of Communist Party leader Chris Hani was done by a white killer, but what might have happened had the assassin been an African? So much now depends on the lives of Mandela and Buthelezi.

The ultimate question, of course, is whether ANC dominance of government will be followed by a struggle among the victors in which, for example, those supporting Winnie Mandela might play a crucial role. In Kenya, the ouster of the colonialists was followed by an interethnic struggle that relegated the Luo to lesser standing in the Kikuyu-dominated state. But that conflict claimed comparatively few lives, certainly as compared to what happened in Zimbabwe after its independence. There, the Mashona-dominated Mugabe regime ruthlessly suppressed the Nkomo-led Matabele in regional/ethnic conflict of enormous cost in lives and property. Since then, Bulawayo and Matabeleland have been the disadvantaged corners on Zimbabwe's map.

Observers argue that South Africa's considerable ethnic integration would be likely to mitigate such events; there is so much ethnic mixture, the argument goes, that regional conflict is unlikely. But in other countries, such mixture also has led to chronic strife (for example among Muslims and numerous Christian minorities in Nigeria's North). Much will depend on the political campaign now in progress and on the ANC's ability to avoid factionalization along ethnic lines.

The April 1994 elections that brought the ANC to power also produced a delicate regional balance. As early as February 1995, the Inkatha members of parliament grew restive under the new system and walked out of the assembly, underscoring the potential weaknesses of the system. The growing risk is that not only Inkatha but also other components of South Africa's polity will feel that the new order disadvantages them.

Should the South African transition collapse into violence, that conflict will resonate in the United States as perhaps no other could. The notion that economic sanctions would hasten the end of apartheid led to some voluntary and much involuntary adherence in this country; those who argued that they would lead to economic disaster that would doom a postapartheid transition were branded as racists. In the streets and on campuses, the prosanction movement generated marches and demonstrations. One must therefore contemplate the impact in this country of ethnic and/or racial conflict in South Africa: such conflict would resonate in the United States, possibly with the ferocity of Northern Ireland's conflict in Britain. Interracial conflict in Zimbabwe could be ignored; interethnic strife in Bosnia, complete with hundreds of thousands of casualties and concentration camp horrors, barely roils American society. But South Africa has the ingredients to force the issue: a growing link between the US black community and ANC leadership; a latent sympathy for the white plights in a revolution-torn South Africa on the part of political conservatives in this country; and the recent history of involvement, first by businesses adhering to the Sullivan principles, then by sanctions advocates in driving them out. For the United States, there is more at stake, perhaps, in South Africa's difficult transition than there is in the ethnic conflicts of all other African countries combined.
References

General


Other


Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Rex Honey

I think we need to keep the African experience, as with the former Soviet Union experience, in historical context. We need to look at precolonial Africa to understand the Africa of today. Much of the culture of contemporary Africa predates the colonial time. To take a word from social theory jargon, the cultures of Africa have been deeply sedimented within traditional structures that resist change. Nevertheless, existing structures, such as kinship and traditional social ties are being battered by the kind of changes that are now occurring.

This is not to suggest that, before the colonial period, there was an Africa that was stagnant. In the 19th century, the Islamic Jihad had an impact across the Sahelian region and penetrated south. Sub-Saharan Africa has traded with other areas, such as the Middle East and Europe, for a long time. Of course slave trade was a terrible aspect of that trade, but only part of it; there was trade before and considerable trade afterward. In addition, there have always been migrations of African peoples.

During the colonial period, there occurred the imposition of protostates and, eventually, the European nation-state model on Africa. I think it would be useful to consider how European states came about, the structure of these states, and the kinds of things that led to successful or unsuccessful states in Europe, and then to look at the African states to see how they compare. A very telling description of the evolution of the European national-state—and I will use that term instead of nation-state, because it is broader—is, that over the past millennium, successful states in Europe were those that were able to accumulate capital—that is to say, economic power—and to amass the power of coercion to defend themselves, conquer others, and maintain law and order.

The sad part of what has happened in Africa is that the imposition of this European national-state has come at a time when the technology for coercing is at the greatest it has ever been in history—both in terms of weapons and of the electronic media. As such, the ability of states to get from their people what they want has never been so high. The biggest difference between the bullies of Europe in earlier times and the bullies of Africa now is that those in Africa have a lot more power in terms of weapons and communication controls.

Another factor that is a legacy of the colonial time is the introduction and spread of Christianity. Christianity mainly came into Sub-Saharan Africa in the 19th century and spread north at the same time that Islam was spreading south. Colonial regimes impacted the current religious map because they often controlled where the missionaries were able to work. This was certainly the case in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, about 50 percent of the population is Muslim, about 40 percent is Christian, and 30 percent is animist, and I do mean those numbers—they total 120 percent. The indigenous cultures of Nigeria are still important in post-Cold War Africa. Cold War influences have also been important; Professor de Blij touched on some of that. Certainly, many Cold War battles were fought, and some are still being fought, in Africa. Angola, certainly, is an example. The impacts of the Cold War have damaged Africa tremendously.

The African economies have been very much transformed by the penetration of international capital, largely with alliances of convenience between the leaders of the African countries and the transnational companies that have invested in them. It is no accident that the wealth of Mobutu is purported to be about equal to Zaire's national debt.

The politics of many of the Sub-Saharan African countries is ethnic. The major prize within those countries is gaining control of the state, because control of the state is the source of wealth. A client-patron structure, which is a modification of traditional structures adapted to fit the current time, functions in many of these states. In many ways, the traditional leaders are stronger than they have ever been because the kinds of power they have access to are now much greater than those they formerly held.
Individuals often retain their allegiance to an ancestral group, but Americans probably misread what that allegiance is. My reading of Nigerians and of other West Africans is that it is not an ethnic allegiance—rather it is a more diverse allegiance to the ancestral place. The Yoruba of southwest Nigeria are clearly the major group, yet little Yoruba consciousness exists except for such cases as the recently aborted election, in which a Yoruba was elected president but not allowed to take office. The Yoruba fight among themselves as much as they fight with other groups, and the same thing holds true for the Ibo. They are only pulled together when they go up against the other groups.

In Nigeria, one major factor in modern political life has been the hegemony of the north. Every Nigerian president has been a general or a Muslim alhaji. In most cases, they have been both.

In Nigeria, there has been a politicization of ethnic identity and of ethnicity, even to the point of creating a new ethnic group. According to a Nigerian colleague of mine, the major ethnic group of the country, the Hausa-Fulani of the north, is something very new. Within Nigeria, there has recently been a reemergence of the national question: is Nigeria a given? Professor de Blij was right; Nigeria’s continued existence is in jeopardy.

The power of the state, of the current state, is extremely important. The state is the source of money; international money gets funneled into countries primarily through the state apparatus, as do the revenues from the country’s major source of income—the petroleum sector. The preeminence of the state in the formal economy has been important, and, in looking at how the economy works, we need to recognize that. The power of the state to coerce has also increased.

What are the prospects? Clearly, economic depression leads to violence; that occurs in a lot of places. Part of Africa’s problem is that, in immediate terms, much of Africa is not crucial to the West. South Africa is more crucial, given that country’s wealth. That is not to say that we should not pay attention but that we do not pay attention.

What can be done? We have to reconsider sovereignty and the relationships of what goes on in states. When I am optimistic, I look at the European Community as the model to address some problems that Africans face. In Europe there is a multitiered, flexible sovereignty that allows the movement of people and trade within the larger area but maintains local autonomy for cultural issues.

The colonial boundaries are a continuing problem. The peoples of Africa never chose what their boundaries should be—they were imposed by outsiders. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has a policy on boundaries that essentially says the boundaries are fixed and should not be reconsidered; what would happen if that policy got turned upside down? How can we formulate some kind of political process so that Africans can choose it without killing each other? That presents a problem in terms of self-determination; and without self-determination, how do ethnic groups have rights? If ethnic groups do not have rights, then conflict will occur in those groups, and it is in our interest to take a look at that and see what kinds of things can be done and how we can be involved. I do think that important questions remain in terms of what the United States can do alone, which is not much. I would echo Professor de Blij’s concern that inserting our forces over there may simply exacerbate the problem.

General Discussion

QUESTION: What type of a role do you see the United Nations playing in Rwanda and Liberia?

DR. DE BLIJ: The UN’s policy has been either to have a massive presence with a clear direction toward a particular goal or to have no presence at all. It is one of the tragedies of the New World Order that this conflict has to be allowed to run itself out as West Europeans are allowing it to do in Bosnia. Political scientists say that, when a situation like this occurs, an average

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* One who has made the hajj to Mecca.
ratio of 10 UN forces to 1 rebel force is needed to contain the anarchy; with the UN's current resources, that is not feasible. Furthermore, countries that participate in the UN peacekeeping operations, as in Somalia, and that experience casualties, will develop a great reluctance to participate in support of this kind of policing action.

Perhaps there ought to be standing regional forces in Africa, South America, and Central America for emergencies of this kind so that imperialist powers do not get involved in the kind of peacemaking that get soldiers killed. I am encouraged that ECOMOG, the West African force, has achieved as much as it has. I still believe that, with the UN's limitations, having standing regional forces is the way for regional problems to be solved. I am a great believer in UN intervention, but I am not sure that the United Nations has the resources to intervene at the level it should have.

DR. HONEY: I think what really needs to be done is to formulate a UN policy that provides a generic, rather than ad hoc, structure for intervening. I think the difficulty we have now is that we are building a house without a blueprint. Obviously, the world is not going to stop, but, if we really are going to have successful interventions, we need to figure out institutionally how they will work. Then I think we will have a chance of some successes.

QUESTION: You had mentioned the need for international intervention in South Africa—potential UN intervention. I know that, currently, we're talking about election monitors. Is that sufficient to tide South Africa over until the election and afterwards?

DR. DE BLIJ: In the case of South Africa, I think a massive intervention that might keep the peace there, should it be needed, would pay for itself for a century to come, whereas that might not be the case in, say Somalia or Rwanda.

DR. HONEY: I am more optimistic about South Africa's future than Professor de Blij. We do not have a crystal ball, but I have a hunch that pragmatism is going to prevail. Clearly the ANC leadership, despite its at least titular Marxist past, understands that it is going to have to run that economy well to be able to make it work. I think that there is going to be a tremendous effort by the leadership to hold things together. There are so many incentives in terms of the potential for South Africa that I think the possibility that people will actually get together and make things work is every bit as high as the possibility that we will have a conflagration.

DR. DE BLIJ: I think that Professor Honey might be right except for the effect of sanctions. Those of us who supported the sanctions helped create in South Africa an ungovernable minority of hundreds of thousands of young, uneducated Africans who said "liberation before education." These youths will now be Nelson Mandela's major problem and are the major source of violence in the townships. Those people are not retrievable. Unemployment in South Africa is 48 percent, not because there are not people to employ but because they have no skills to employ them with. These people are going to have a revolution of rising expectations, and, believe me, a revolution South Africa will get.

Another problem will be the integration of the armed forces.

QUESTION: Regarding your point that US forces should not be in Somalia, is that a reflection of what's happening now or would you never have sent them there in the first place?

DR. DE BLIJ: I never would have sent them in the first place. I thought our job was to feed people. It could have been done from the air. It could have been done with the help of the agencies already there. I think our tactics in Somalia were wrong. Frankly, it is going exactly the way I thought it would go. It is a quagmire, and it may, in fact, lead to a fragmented Somalia in the end, that is not what we had in mind. If feeding the population is the objective, it ought to be done from a distance. What is now happening—the policing action that you can see coming—builds resentment to the presence of a large foreign force and is not acceptable.
The Ethnic Challenge to National and International Order in South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean During the 1990s: Geographical Perspectives

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Introduction

As in so many other regions of the world, there is much ethnic diversity in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to the well-recognized Amerind, African, and Iberian elements, one finds representatives of nearly all major European ethnic groups as well as many Middle Eastern and East and South Asian groups. In contrast to many other areas of the world, most of these ethnic populations are immigrants to the region who lack longstanding historic associations with New World territory but who have generally been well integrated into the national cultures of the countries in which they reside. As such, most are not considered ethnic minorities but rather members of the national culture whose ancestors came from a non-Hispanic area. Two countries, Argentina and Peru, are currently governed by non-Hispanics, Carlos Saúl Menem, a Syrian-Argentine, and Alberto Fujimori, a Japanese-Peruvian, respectively, and members of these and other non-Iberian immigrant groups are locally important in politics, business, or industry. For example, the Bucaram, Nebot, and Saad families are important in Guayaquil, Ecuador, as are various families of Syrian and Lebanese descent in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and of Japanese descent in Brazil.

In general, Latin America is less prone to ethnic conflict than many other regions of the world. Conflicts within the region are more often related to class differences, declining standards of living, and unequal distribution of access to resources, employment opportunities, or political power than they are to purely ethnic factors. For example, the guerrilla insurgencies of Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in Peru, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, the civil war in El Salvador, and recent outbreaks of violence in Venezuela are largely nonethnic conflicts. Although these conflicts may involve disaffected members of nonruling ethnic groups, the root causes of the violence lie more in nonethnic issues. Frequently, ethnic groups are drawn unwillingly into political conflicts or are duped into participation by one side or the other, even though there is no explicitly "ethnic" agenda in the objectives of the opposing sides. Thus, the presence of minority ethnic groups on one side or the other of a Latin American political or armed conflict does not necessarily mean that it has its origin in ethnic issues.

Although Latin America is not an area in which ethnic conflict is likely to escalate to a level of international importance on a par with, for example, the Middle East, Africa, or the Balkan states, considerable tension does exist among ethnic groups in South America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. There have been frequent ethnic conflicts in the past, and the potential for future conflict, either armed or through political action, exists in several parts of the region. The most active conflicts at present, and probably for the remainder of the decade and longer, are in areas of traditional Indian occupation and involve encounters between Indians and the state.1

Indian Populations and the State

The regional bases of conflict between the Latin American states and their Indian populations may be divided conveniently into highland and lowland. In a

1 Indian is a very complex term as used in Latin America because it refers to cultural identity, not biological characteristics. Thus, Indians are people who self-identify as Indians and who retain distinctive characteristics of dress, language, economy, and beliefs that set them apart from the Hispanicized population of the country in which they reside. People who are born Indians may pass into the mestizo majority by learning Spanish, leaving their community of birth, and adopting other Hispanic cultural traits. This process has occurred since early colonial times and accounts for a large share of the mestizo population in many Latin American countries.
general sense, these two areas equate with the geographic concepts of core and periphery.²

Highland Indians
The highlands have been core areas since well before the Spanish conquest. Highland Indians are the modern descendants of the population of Indian states with relatively well-developed political organizations, such as the Aztec, Inca, and Maya who were the focus of Spanish colonization beginning in the 16th century. Spanish colonial interests focused their efforts in areas that possessed large numbers of Indians who were easily mobilized for employment in the mines and agricultural estates that supported the colonial economy. As a result of as much as 450 years of contact with and exposure to Hispanic culture, these Indians are heavily acculturated and have developed more or less stable relationships with the state and its representatives; nevertheless, they still retain strong Indian identity. In the highlands, clashes often center around a growing sense of “Indian consciousness,” which is expressed in demands by Indian communities for the state to grant greater collective rights to political and economic self-determination.

Core area Indians—often peasant farmers who work marginal lands—are very sensitive to change in the status of their land or any subsidies or other benefits they may receive from the state. When these issues affect mestizo peasant farmers and laborers, as they often do, Indians may unite across ethnic lines with them to defend their common interests. Core area Indians may unite with lowland Indians to promote ethnically related agendas such as the establishment of autonomous areas, bilingual education, or defense of Indian cultural heritage, as they have in Ecuador.

Guerrilla movements have taken advantage of indigenous hostility to national governments by recruiting Indians to their cause. However, leftist guerrilla organizations are often steeped in Marxist theory, which views ethnic issues as an extension of the class struggle. For this reason guerrilla groups normally do not include ethnic concerns in their programs, which limits their appeal to Indians. One recent example is Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, which has Indian members and which recruits in Indian communities but has no explicitly ethnic elements in its revolutionary agenda and has been guilty of mistreating Indians who are not cooperative. It may be that Sendero Luminoso has driven as many or more Indians to support the Peruvian Army as it recruited.

Where Indians make up a large share of the population they may work toward the establishment of regional or national political control. In Bolivia and Peru—where they account for more than 50 percent and as much as 25 percent of the population, respectively³—Indians represent a potentially crucial element in national politics if they can be induced to vote as a bloc. Moreover, they have the potential to create conflict if they are denied the right to vote or if their votes are negated by fraud and corruption. In Bolivia’s recent presidential election one non-Indian candidate ran a “pro-Indian” campaign, and the winning vice-presidential candidate was an Indian.

If political gains are not translated into achievement of Indian agendas such as access to land, employment, and some level of self-determination, more violent forms of conflict are possible.⁴ Exploitation and repression of highland Indians has triggered conflict in

³ These estimates of Indian population fall at the high end of a wide range. Because the identification of Indians is somewhat subjective, national policies such as those which favor integration of Indians into the national culture may influence estimates of Indian population. Another factor is that increasing numbers of Indians adopt mestizo culture and cease to self-identify with their cultural origins. Furthermore, many Latin American countries do not collect information on ethnic affiliation in their national censuses. Thus, estimates of the percentage of Indian population in Latin American countries varies greatly, depending on the source of the information.

⁴ The case of Guatemala is especially instructive as an example of how Indian demands for greater participation in the economic and political life of a country may be met with a violent reaction from the state. For details of this process, see the articles contained in Robert M. Carmack, ed., Harvest of Violence: The Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis, University of Oklahoma Press, 1988.
the past. Indians in Bolivia and Peru are likely to protest any attempt to reduce coca production in that country if they are not matched with the development of an alternative source of comparable income. Because most producers in both countries are Indian and because coca production and consumption are so strongly linked to Indian culture, the issue of reducing production may be seen as one more effort on the part of the white-mestizo state to keep Indians from full participation in the national economy. Nevertheless, the immediate prospects for large-scale violent ethnic conflict do not seem great in the Andean countries.

**Lowland Indians**

Lowland Indians, unlike their highland counterparts, have been little influenced by European culture. Contact between these indigenous groups and the state has been relatively recent. Most peripheral or lowland areas have been opened up for development—bringing military, colonists, and developers into direct confrontation with their long-term Indian occupants—only during the past half-century.

The incorporation of peripheral territories, formerly considered empty and useless, into the effective national territory of the Amazon states—Brazil, Suriname, Guyana, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia—has inevitably disrupted the cultures of the unacculturated or partially acculturated native inhabitants of the region. The unfortunate results of these contacts are well documented. They include: the spread of deadly diseases to highly susceptible populations, loss of land, forced acculturation to Western life styles, and incorporation into the cash-based economy. In addition, many Indians have been killed by the military, colonists, miners, and other intruders of their territory. In the 500 years since the arrival of Europeans in the Western Hemisphere, the number of Indians in the Amazon Basin has been reduced from an estimated 6-12 million to about 200,000. The process has nearly reached its conclusion, since few, if any, refuges remain where native peoples can avoid contact with bearers of national culture.

Despite the declining numbers of lowland Indians, contacts between them and outsiders have the potential to produce conflicts that can escalate to international levels. One excellent example is the August 1993 murder of a number of Yanomami Indians by Brazilian miners in the Brazil-Venezuela frontier area. This incident had international implications for several reasons. The Brazilian miners apparently attacked the Indians in Venezuelan territory, which makes the incident of interest to that state, and the Indians have close ties to cultural and environmental organizations in the United States and Europe as well as within Brazil, itself. Thus, the impact of this incident extended far beyond the rain forests of the upper Orinoco River, where it took place. It threatened to reinforce Brazil’s already negative image as a country that permits or even promotes environmentally destructive development, ignores or violates the boundaries of national parks and cultural or biological reserves, mistreats Indians, and has laws that favor concentration of wealth in the hands of a small elite while millions of poor barely survive in urban slums or on tiny farms.

These conflicts between native peoples and the state in Latin America have parallels in other parts of the world, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines in Southeast Asia. In these countries logging, mineral exploitation, resettlement programs, and land development have displaced or threaten to displace native populations with economies based on shifting agriculture or hunting and gathering. Some African ethnic conflicts have similar root causes, but longstanding disputes among ethnic groups are more often responsible for setting off hostilities.

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8 This incident illustrates the difficulty of preventing conflict between Indian groups and outsiders where valuable resources are at stake. The Indians live in isolated areas where both military and police protection is difficult to provide, even if the national government wishes to provide it, which is not always the case. And, because of certain taboos or customs of the Indians, it may be difficult for outsiders to assess exactly how serious a conflict may be. For example, the estimates of Yanomami killed in the August 1993 raid ranged from 20 to 73, with the final number probably lying closer to the lower end of the range. The Yanomami believe that mentioning the dead will bring back their spirits to haunt the living and their counting system does not extend beyond two; therefore, it is extremely difficult to get them to reveal basic numeric data on an incident such as the miners' raid.
Growing Indian Militancy

One response by South American Indians to threats of territorial invasion has been to organize into political action groups. Indians have been aided in this effort by Roman Catholic missionaries, anthropologists, environmental organizations, and others. Noteworthy among these groups is the Federation of Shuar Centers (Federación de Centros Shuar) in Ecuador, which was organized in 1964 at a time when development was first penetrating the local Indians' territory. This group provides a model that has been followed by many other Amazon Indian groups within Ecuador and elsewhere. The Shuar Federation has allied with other Indian organizations representing both lowland and highland groups, and it also works with labor unions, peasant farmer leagues, and other non-Indian groups to advance common interests.

The objectives of newly emerging Indian militancy have begun to extend beyond land, mineral, and biotic resource-related issues to broader policy areas. In Ecuador the Indian political action organizations are working hard to change the government policy of national integration aimed at eliminating ethnic differences and creating a unified mestizo national culture. The policy, grounded in the assumption that eventually all Indian peoples will be brought into the mestizo-based national culture and that ethnic minorities will cease to exist, is implemented through Spanish-language education, indoctrinating Indians in national history, and similar programs. The Indian organizations—which support the idea of a plurinational or multinational state that would accommodate the various Indian ethnic groups, Afro-Ecuadorians from the Pacific Coast, and the dominant mestizo national culture—are working toward a plurinational state that would grant a degree of political and cultural autonomy to Indian groups. Similar agendas exist in other Andean countries. For example, Peru recognizes Quechua as an official language, and Indians in Bolivia are increasing their influence on national government policy.

In Ecuador and other Andean countries, Indian interests clash with a number of national goals, both stated and implicit. Thus far, differences over these conflicting interests have generally been headed off by the national governments or resolved peacefully through the political process. However, as the Indian groups become more militant, they will demand to have an increasingly more active role in setting national policy with respect to land, resource use, and cultural preservation. The militancy of Indian organizations clearly sets the stage for potential conflict with the non-Indian groups who perceive that their interests may be undermined by granting greater autonomy to Indians.

Mexico's Indian Populations

Mexico has a history of ethnic conflict that began in the pre-Columbian past and continues to the present. Indians have been involved in the great revolutions of Mexican history. They were recruited by Padre Hidalgo at the beginning of the revolution against Spain in 1811 and followed Emiliano Zapata during the Revolution of 1910-17. Indian rebellions include the Caste Wars of the 19th century in Yucatán and the Cristero rebellion of 1926 in Michoacán, Jalisco, and Colima. The land reforms that followed the Revolution of 1910, along with close control by the ruling political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), have limited Indian protests during the latter half of the century. However, conflicts continue to occur on a local level, and some have involved the national government. Most of these conflicts are in the southern part of the country or the Yucatán Peninsula, where most of the traditional Indian communities are located.

As in South America, ethnic conflicts in Mexico have their roots in disputes over land, mineral resources, and cultural preservation policy. Despite the claim of the PRI to be a defender of the interests of the people, Indian concerns consistently take a back seat to
projects perceived to be of benefit to the government. Mexico's Indians are, at best, little better off economically than Indians in other Latin American countries, and they also encounter policies that promote adoption of mestizo culture. Government-sponsored development projects, expansion of the oil industry, relocation of mestizo settlers in Indian territories, and government ignorance of or attempts to suppress Indian culture are all factors that contribute to conflict between Indians and the state.

Other sources of potential conflict include land disputes between Indian communities and the presence of Guatemalan refugees. Most conflicts over land are highly localized and involve differences between neighboring towns over the boundaries of communal land holdings. Many of these disputes originated during the colonial period. The migration of refugees from the Guatemalan civil war into the Mexican state of Chiapas and their relocation to settlements in Yucatán is also problematic. Although some of these refugees have returned to Guatemala in response to government repatriation programs, several thousand others will probably remain in Mexico. It remains to be seen what sort of long-term relationships these people will work out with the Mexican Government and with neighboring Mexican Indian and mestizo communities.

The rebellion of the Zapatista National Liberation Army in January 1994 is an example of the influence of the factors noted above. Despite its rhetoric, the Mexican Government has done little to incorporate the Indians of Chiapas into the national economy. Land the Indians had traditionally considered to be theirs was claimed by mestizo farmers and ranchers and, in some cases, incorporated into large landholdings. Resettlement of Guatemalan refugees contributed to conflict, as did the Salinas de Gortari government's decision to eliminate the constitutional protections of ejido land. The final straw for the rebels was approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was seen by the Indians as setting the stage for further concentration of economic resources in the more developed northern regions of the country at the expense of Indian and peasant farmers in the south.

**Nonindigenous Flash Points: Afro-Americans/East Indians**

In the African-influenced areas, especially parts of Brazil and the Caribbean, there is also potential for racial or ethnic conflict, especially if a black consciousness movement should develop. The root causes of friction among members of African- and Asian-origin groups are quite different from those that involve American Indians and representatives of the Hispanic states.

Brazil, the Guianas, and the West Indies have large Afro-American populations. In Brazil, African minorities are not normally separated spatially from the main culture as are Indians. Rather, they live in the same cities and towns, and they usually share, to a greater or lesser extent, most elements of the common national culture. However, despite disclaimers about the absence of racial prejudice, clear differences exist in the social and economic attainment of blacks and whites in Brazil. So far, these differences have not resulted in racially based conflicts. Nevertheless, given the myth of racial equality, if a black consciousness movement should emerge in Brazil, it could provide a base for development of racial friction—although the potential for this to occur does not seem very great.

In some islands Afro-Americans are a single, dominant ethnic group; these areas have little potential for ethnic conflict. Suriname, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago have mixed populations comprised of Afro-Americans, East Indians, and—in Suriname—Javanese. Creoles—Afro-Americans and Mulattoes—and East Indians tend to belong to different political parties, to live in distinct areas, and to interact largely within their own communities. In Trinidad and the Guianas, where Afro-Americans and East Indians share national territories, conflict reflects, to a

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* Despite their location on the mainland, Guyana and Suriname are culturally and historically much more closely linked to the Caribbean than they are to their culturally Iberian South American neighbors.
The Impact of Resource Development

The expansion of national cultures from the core to peripheral areas is a direct product of the increased demand for land and resources, and this, in turn, often reflects national policies that govern the distribution of resources in the previously developed core areas. Colonization of the "empty" periphery often is viewed by national policymakers as a way of relieving pressure for redistribution of land in the older core, where a combination of concentration of land in the hands of the elite, rapid population increase in rural areas, degradation of peasant-controlled land through erosion and declining fertility, and lack of employment opportunities contributes to substantial land hunger. Moreover, wealthy and influential members of the ruling elites, along with members of the military or representatives of international enterprises, often promote colonization as a means of obtaining large blocks of land. Mineral resource development, especially that related to high-value commodities such as oil and gold, is another cause of conflict. Frequently, mineral resource development is linked to multinational enterprises such as oil companies or international mining concerns. These developments may also have international links through organizations such as OPEC, the Latin American Free Trade Association, or the Andean Pact.

Invariably, development of tropical lowland areas is seen as favorable to national and international interests, and maintenance of land in an "undeveloped" state is viewed as wasteful, even if it provides sustenance for native populations that have lived there for centuries or millennia. Conservation interests lobby for slow-growth or no-growth policies but to little avail. Even when areas are set aside in parks or reserves, effective provisions for protecting them are lacking, and the allocation of large blocks of land to Indian communities may create a backlash among landless or land hungry peasants and members of the urban working classes, who fail to understand the reasons for giving so much land to so few people. Often these protests are supported by members of the upper and middle classes who oppose the removal of large blocks of land from access for large-scale development.

As might be expected, governments have not attempted to solve the "Indian problem" by dealing with the root causes that are noted above. Rather, they have responded to pressure groups by passing legislation that is unenforced or by buying off the groups or their leaders in other ways. Examples are minimalist land reform legislation or creation of largely unprotected national parks, reserves, or dedicated Indian territories. If these time-tested Latin American strategies fail to work, heavier-handed approaches may be attempted, such as calling in the army or police; but these strategies are resorted to less and less because of their negative consequences, both internally and on the country's international standing. Mexico's relatively benign treatment of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, at least until February 1995, is a good example of how international opinion can affect government response to dissident groups.

In Brazil, the tendencies to expand development into the Amazon Basin have been stimulated by the government's expansionist development policies. Since colonial times Brazil has aggressively extended its political frontiers at the expense of all its neighbors. More recently, a national policy of building roads into the interior and clearing the tropical forest for farming and ranching, which was fostered in part by the geopolitical strategies of some military officers, has led to large-scale development of that country's Amazon lands. When Brazil builds road and colonizes near its political frontiers, it triggers a counterresponse by neighboring Amazon Basin countries such as Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela, which build roads of their own and encourage colonization of formerly undeveloped lowland tropical forests to counter what is seen as a possible Brazilian threat to national sovereignty. Ecuador has embarked upon a similar policy of settling its Amazon lowlands with highlanders in response to a longstanding border dispute with Peru. It remains to be seen how the flare-up of fighting in early 1995 will affect these policies.
certain extent, differences in urban settlement patterns, although a more fundamental cause of conflict is over which group will control the national government and gain the benefits that come from such control. East Indians and Afro-Americans are roughly equally represented in Trinidad—43 percent Afro-American, 40 percent East Indian. In Guyana the East Indians comprise 51 percent of the population and Creoles account for 44 percent; but, in Suriname, Creoles make up only 31 percent of the population while East Indians, Javanese, and Bush Negro account for 37 percent, 15 percent, and 10 percent, respectively.

Relations among East Indians and Creoles have been particularly tense in Guyana, where politics has been characterized by violence and conflict between members of political parties that are strongly linked to ethnic groups. Cheddi Jagan was elected President of Guyana in October 1992, ending more than 25 years of Creole domination of the government. The election was accompanied by riots and violent conflict among members of the two dominant political parties, but the situation seems to have stabilized since then. As long as Jagan remains in power, he may be able to limit ethnic conflict, especially if he is able to improve the country’s depressed economic conditions and bring better lives to both Creoles and East Indians. However, unless he is able to establish institutions that break down longstanding ethnic differences, hostilities may accompany the next election.

Other areas that might bear watching include Suriname and the longstanding international dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In the latter, racial and cultural differences and a history of conflict, combined with Dominican concerns about migration of land-hungry Haitians, has led to repeated expulsions of Haitian migrants. However, Haitians have been welcomed at times when Dominican workers were unable to meet the need for agricultural labor in the country. If large numbers of Haitians try to settle in Dominican territory, there is always the possibility of another violent response on the part of the Dominicans.

Conclusion

Probably the most common source of ethnic conflict between Indians and the state, whether located in the lowlands or highlands, is the dispute over control of territory and mineral or biotic resources. Ethnic group autonomy and greater participation in the political system are often secondary factors in ethnic conflict. The principal areas of current ethnic conflict are in the Amazon Basin and other lowland areas where native Indian populations confront expanding national states. These conflicts involve small numbers of people, but they are locally important and may have international implications when they occur in border areas or if they involve international environmental or cultural protection organizations or political or lending organizations such as agencies of the UN, the World Bank, and the Interamerican Development Bank. Such local conflicts may cause problems for governments in the affected countries, and they will undoubtedly affect the course of natural resources development.

Indian political action organizations are likely to become increasingly more powerful in national politics. They will receive help from international organizations with whom they share common interests. To the extent that national governments accommodate the demands of these organizations, they may reduce ethnic tensions. If ethnic interests are ignored, conflicts are likely to develop, as in Mexico in 1994.
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Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Mac Chapin

Although we all saw a good deal about Central America on television and in the newspapers during the 1980s, interest in the region has been eclipsed in recent years by events in Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and so forth. Central America is a relatively tiny area; it has less than 5 percent of the land surface of the United States and about one-tenth of its population. One of the big differences between this part of the world and the other regions that we have been discussing is that we are not going to find separatist indigenous groups in Latin America. Certainly, in Central America, there are no Indian groups that are going to attack the central governments.

I want to talk about the indigenous people who are, aside from a few isolated groups in Central America, virtually invisible. The region's indigenous peoples are located primarily in two regions, the Guatemalan highlands and the coastal regions adjacent the Caribbean Sea. Both locations are classic areas of refuge. Mayan Indians speaking 22 different languages inhabit the densely populated Guatemalan highlands. Numbering approximately 4.5 million people, they compose half the country's population and half the indigenous population of Central America. Virtually all the other Indians of the region are found stretched along the Caribbean coast between the southern portion of Toledo district in Belize and Panama.

At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, most of the 6 million Indians then living in Central America were located in population centers along the Pacific side of the region where there were much better soils, a more hospitable climate, and less rainfall. After the Spaniards arrived, approximately 80 percent of the population was killed off largely through diseases; demographically, the Indians are just now starting to recover.

Many of the region's Indian populations, who were not either assimilated or exterminated, moved to areas where the Spanish had no interest. Some groups moved to the highlands of Guatemala—where they did not even send priests for several centuries—and others migrated toward the Atlantic coast jungles.

The region has three countries of some importance from an ethnic standpoint: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The largest concentrations of Indians in Latin America are found in the Guatemalan highlands. The hatred between the country's Latinos and Mayan Indians is palpable. This intense ethnic hatred, which has grown over time, was most recently manifested in the extremely bloody civil war that reached intensity in the mid-1970s and that lasted until about 1983. During that period 100,000 Indians were killed. Scorched earth policies were practiced by a number of Guatemalan leaders. It was a war of extermination.

The Guatemalan Government used the military against the ethnic population.

The situation in El Salvador is similar to that in Guatemala. El Salvador currently has an Indian population of about 500,000. Over the centuries, there have been a series of attempts to eliminate the Indian populations. In the 1880s the last communal territories were abolished by decree and the Indians were displaced. The last ethnic war in El Salvador was in 1932 when, within the space of about a week, the military marched out and killed about 35,000 Indians. It consciously searched out people who were dressed like Indians, who looked like Indians, and who spoke an Indian language. There have been no ethnic conflicts in El Salvador since that time. The conflict has really shifted; the rural poor have become the surrogates for the ethnic population. An extension of the same battle, it is essentially over land and resources. During the 1980s the target was principally peasants—in contrast to the Indians, who were organized.

During the Nicaraguan civil war, the Mosquito Indians who inhabit the Atlantic coast region with its forestry and offshore marine resources were forcibly relocated. Since the end of the war they have returned to their homes but have been in the middle of attempts by multinationals to cut down the coastal forests.
I would like to reiterate a point that Professor Elbow made, which is that virtually all the conflicts today in Central America and also in South America are over land and resources. Indian populations inhabit rich forested areas, and there is a push—not necessarily by the state but often by a combination of corrupt and greedy government officials, landless peasants, and multinationals—to resettle the Indians and to take resources away from them.

In Central America the problem areas will be the lowlands. An examination of the remaining forestry resources of the region shows the correspondence between the forests and the lands currently inhabited by the region's Indian populations. Although there are incipient indigenous group organizations throughout the areas, they are not strong enough to present any real opposition to outside forces. These organizations will need to be nurtured if they are going to be helpful in protecting the region's remaining natural endowment.

General Discussion

QUESTION: Would either of you like to comment on the possibility of racial strife in Cuba?

MR. CHAPIN: I don't think that's an issue.

DR. ELBOW: Most of the whites are living in Miami. What's left, from my understanding, is a fairly predominantly mulatto and black population.

QUESTION: Would either or both speakers comment further on the role of nonstate actors such as NGOs and industry in conflicts in the region? I'm thinking in particular of attempts to develop oil in Ecuador.

DR. ELBOW: Yes, I am quite familiar with the case of Ecuador. Both industry—in particular, but not exclusively, the oil industry—and NGOs are active. They are engaged in a sort of holy war, if you want to think of it that way, over the Amazon. The NGOs are trying to preserve what's left of the resources, and the oil companies and the government are attempting to mine them.

Ecuador has, according to the latest reports, something on the order of about 20 years worth of oil left, and, as far as I can determine, industry and government are trying to get it out in 15 years. The government has allowed the oil companies to move into areas that are supposedly reserved for Indians and are not supposed to be exploited. The oil companies can pretty much go wherever they want to. Now, because of bad press, the government and the oil companies as well have had to do a little bit to clean up their act. So pollution has perhaps been reduced, but the real problem is that where oil companies go, others follow. The development of roads by the oil companies has led to the opening up of the region to colonization. When oil companies clear a little stretch of road that is 10 meters or more wide, the colonists come in and take out the rest.

MR. CHAPIN: Initially, when the oil development started down in the Amazon area, CONOCO and an Indian group was involved. Then the National Resources Defense Counsel and others became engaged. The theory behind the outside involvement was that negative publicity would pressure CONOCO to act responsibly. A lot of NGOs then got involved, Indian groups protested CONOCO actions, and CONOCO pulled out. When CONOCO left, a number of small wildcat groups, who could not be pressured on anything, went in and started taking it over. So that is the current situation.

QUESTION: The UN working group on the rights of indigenous people has been developing a declaration that will eventually work its way up in the UN system. This declaration addresses the issue of rights and control of resources by indigenous peoples. Do you see much of a chance for this declaration being passed by the UN, and, if so, how would that impact upon the relationship between indigenous peoples and the state? Would it tend to lessen friction or increase it?

MR. CHAPIN: I don't think it will have much effect at all simply because any resolution passed by the UN has no legal status in any of these countries. If
anything, it antagonizes the government. Most of these governments have laws that any subsurface minerals belong to the state.

DR. WIXMAN: In the former Soviet Union, there is a very interesting movement that I think parallels something happening in the United States in the environmental movement. The preservation of indigenous people, such as the native American and, in the case of the former Soviet Union, the native Siberian, are portrayed as synonymous with the preservation of the natural environments. Indigenous people who no one had ever heard of or cared about have become a political symbol. Do you see a movement of this type taking place in Latin America among any of the young people in which the survival of a particular indigenous group symbolizes either the survival of the country as a whole or of its environment? Are there young Central Americans, let us say among students in universities, that are beginning to hold up the Indian as the symbol of the preservation?

MR. CHAPIN: Yes, especially in Mexico but also in other places to some extent.

DR. ELBOW: It is occurring in Ecuador. One of the things that I think is an interesting, unexplored topic, is what causes a green movement to develop in certain countries and not in others. Why Costa Rica? Why now an emerging green movement in Ecuador, for example?

QUESTION: Professor Elbow, you had mentioned, in general, that there was not much in the way of evidence for the ethnic conflict in South American. You touched on two countries, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, where there are mixtures of ethnic groups and a lot of conflicts. The Trinidadian press is quite concerned with the general upswing in violence. Is it your impression that this is due largely to this ethnic interaction or to the economic downturn, or is it a combination of both?

DR. ELBOW: I suspect it's a combination of both. Trinidad had, 10 years ago, the highest per capita income in Latin America. In addition, local political parties have been built essentially upon an ethnic base. Ethnicity is used, or perhaps exploited, as a political tool. That is also true in Guyana.

QUESTION: What are the sources of support for reform in Central and South America?

DR. ELBOW: That is a difficult question. To the extent that reform is taking place, it comes from a combination of groups and institutions. In the Guatemalan case, it has been a cooperative movement with inputs from the Catholic Church, the Peace Corps, and NGOs. Benefits from these efforts include: leadership training, education, the breaking down of linguistic barriers so that the Indians can communicate with each other in Spanish, and the development of Indian self-awareness and a sense of Pan-Indian identity. Ironically, often, it is when it looks like the Indians are going to begin to have some political power and to make some impact, that the tendency for a backlash begins. In some cases the army has stepped in and countered the development. If you look at Ecuador, you can see this sort of scenario developing. In 1991 the Indians had a big sit-in in the National Cathedral. In 1992 they had demonstrations against the 500th anniversary of Columbus's landing. Ecuador is not Guatemala, however. It does not have the same history of violence that Guatemala has, but I could still imagine the government getting to the point where it feels so squeezed that the military steps in and says it has had enough.
Ethnicity and Nationality in the Middle East

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The Middle East, with its immense petroleum reserves and unique role as a crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa, is a region of manifest global importance. It is also a region of inherent instability. Tension, if not open conflict, between states and among groups within states is a persisting reality. Add extreme disparity between wealth and poverty, numerous disputed boundaries, the problems created by frustrated Palestinian and Kurdish political-territorial aspirations, the spreading influence of Islamic fundamentalism, and the prevalence of nondemocratic governments and it is no wonder that the Middle East is perceived universally to be a region of contention and danger.

The Mirage of Arab Unity

It is ironic that a region blessed with a high degree of cultural unity should exhibit so much evidence of discord. Arabic is the official language of no less than 18 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Moreover, with the exception of Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon, Sunni Muslims are the majority religious group in each of these countries. This remarkable degree of linguistic and religious commonality might have inspired a pervasive feeling of unity. In fact, the 18 Arab countries have seldom been able to function as a geopolitical bloc, and rivalry among prospective Pan-Arab leaders has produced and doubtless will continue to produce tension in the region.

Attempts to merge various of the Arab states—for example, Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic during 1958-61—have been sporadic and ephemeral. Nor has any of the great cities of the region—Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad—been able to function as a Pan-Arab capital. Why there are 18 Arab countries rather than one continues to be a perplexing question for the people and contending monarchs and dictators of the region. At the end of the Cold War—as was the case at the end of the two world wars—most of the countries of the Arab realm are anachronistic and, for the most part, are arbitrary units of former empires. Nevertheless, jealousy or suspicion of neighboring states plus the ambition of state leaders has fostered keen feelings of nationalism even in countries that had only provincial or mandate status before their independence.

"Turkistan"

A similar perplexing question must now be posed in regard to Pan-Turkish aspirations. Before the breakup of the USSR, the world had only one Turkish state—or two if we include the dubious "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." With the independence of the former Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Uzbekistan, there are five additional ones. To date, concern about the character of this enlarged realm and indeed of a "Turkistan" that might include other Turkish-speaking peoples has centered on practical issues such as what alphabet should be used, economic reforms, and the efficacy of secular or religious forms of government. The present and potential influence of Russia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China in this vast area has invited considerable speculation. It is possible that developments in "Turkistan" will be influenced by more specific ethnic interests. For example, it is easy to imagine Azeri-speakers from Iran serving as volunteers in the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Conflict in Persian-speaking Tajikistan has already encouraged participation by the well-armed Tajiks of northern Afghanistan. Conflict elsewhere in Central Asia could encourage participation by Turkmen from Iran and Kazakhs and Uzbeks from Afghanistan or even from China. The fact that the Turkish- and Persian-speaking countries of the former Soviet Union all have substantial minority groups complicates the picture considerably. From an American or European perspective, Turkey's aspiration to be a Western-oriented role model for Central Asia has obvious appeal.
It must be remembered that this aspiration derives from awareness of linguistic affiliation rather than any realistic assessment of Turkey's political influence or economic power.

“Nations” in the Middle Eastern Context

“Nation-states,” although often alluded to, are rarely found in the modern world. Perhaps only Iceland can be regarded as a perfect example. In the Middle East, Tunisia (minus its several communities of Berber speakers) is an approximate example. Most Middle Eastern countries include more than one linguistic or religious group and so can be described as multination states. For example:

- Syria has Kurdish and other non-Arab ethnic minorities, and—besides its Sunni Muslim majority—has significant Christian, Druze, and Alawite religious groups.
- Iran has both Shia and Sunni Muslims and a number of non-Persian linguistic groups, including Azeri, Arabs, Kurds, Baluchi, Luri, Basseri, Bakhtiari, and Turkmen.
- Lebanon has six major religious groups—Maronite, Greek Catholic, and Greek Orthodox Christians; Sunni and Shia Muslims; and Druze.
- Egypt has a large population (about 10 million) of Coptic Christians.
- Turkey has several million Kurds and many smaller minority groups, including Arabs, Laz, Greeks, Tatars, and Circassians.

The idea that the Arabic or Turkish languages might be the basis of a multistate nation has already been alluded to and dismissed as having only tentative or hypothetical meaning. “Arabistan” and “Turkistan” are debatable concepts rather than geopolitical realities. The same can probably be said of the idea of a “multistate nation of Islam.” More important in the context of the Middle East are nonstate nations, of which Palestine and Kurdistan are the most conspicuous examples. Finally, the linguistic complexity of Afghanistan and the religious complexity of Lebanon are so striking that these countries might be described as nonnation states.

Significant Minorities

In addition to the major groupings that create the impression of a three-part linguistic division (Arabic, Turkish, Persian) or a two-part religious division (Sunni and Shia Islam), the Middle East has numerous minority groups, and some of these have political agenda that are in conflict with national policies. The tension between substate identity and national affiliation, evident in most of the world, has several clear manifestations in the Middle East.

Minority—or otherwise unempowered—groups that have expressed separatist ideals or at least a desire for an enhanced degree of national recognition include Uzbeks and Tajiks in Afghanistan; Baluchi in Iran; Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon; Christians in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq; and Arabs in Israel and Israeli-occupied territory. Each of these groups has aspirations that are in conflict with policies formulated by ruling groups in the respective countries. The region's most serious conflict along these lines is in southern Sudan where Arab or Arabized Muslims have been fighting linguistically diverse Christians and animists for several decades.

The largest minority group within the Arabic realm is not politically significant. About 40 percent of the people or Morocco and about 20 percent of the people of Algeria speak Berber rather than or in addition to Arabic. However, the scattered distribution of these people, mainly in mountain areas, the numerous dialects they speak, and the lack of any written or standardized form of their language have precluded the development of any separatist movement among Berbers.

Some other minority groups are too weak numerically to pose a threat to national authorities or compel recognition of their linguistic or religious identity. The Assyrians (Aramaic-speaking Christians) of northern
Iraq exemplify this situation, in spite of claims made on behalf of autonomy for them by Assyrian immigrant groups in the United States. Nor have the Arabs of southeastern Turkey or in the Khuzistan Province of Iran posed a serious threat to Turkish or Iranian authority. Indeed, when the Iraqis invaded Iran in 1980 they expected the Arabic-speakers of Khuzistan to welcome liberation from Iranian rule. Instead, as Shiites, the Arabs in this part of Iran had good reason to see benefit in the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini and danger for them in the Sunni or secular bias of the government of Saddam Husayn. The same religious bond explains why the Azeri of northern Iran rejected the prospect of merger with the neighboring Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan during World War II.

The Problem of Kurdistan

Estimates of the number of Kurds vary widely, from less than 15 million to more than 30 million. In the negotiations that accompanied the division of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, various prospects were suggested for the Kurds, ranging from local autonomy to independence. In fact, they became a shadow nation in northwestern Iran, northern Iraq, and southeastern Turkey. During World War II, when Soviet troops occupied northern Iran, Kurds enjoyed some autonomy and, under the Mahabad Republic of 1946, even a brief period of nominal independence. In 1974, after several years of civil war, Kurds in northern Iraq were granted a high degree of autonomy, including recognition of the coequal status of Kurdish and Arabic as official languages of the region. Most of the provisions of this agreement were never implemented, and Kurdish autonomy became a dead issue when the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980. In Turkey, Kurds, often called “Mountain Turks,” have sought to achieve recognition and hence to resist assimilation. Kurdish nationalism in Turkey developed in response to denial of such recognition and the enforcement of laws inspired by Article 57 of the Turkish constitution, which forbids “activities that aim at destroying the ethnic unity of the Turkish people.” In response to the Gulf war and some pressure from the European Community, the Turkish Government is now entertaining thoughts of at least qualified recognition of the Kurdish people and the lifting of some of the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language.

Kurds have adopted different strategies for promotion of their cause, depending on opportunities available in the countries where they reside. They have seldom expressed enthusiasm for the benefits of Iranian, Iraqi, or Turkish citizenship. It is Kurdish citizenship that they desire or at least autonomy as a transitional stage en route to independence. The frustration of Kurdish nationalism has been a consequence of its collision with Iranian, Iraqi, and Turkish nationalism. The location of the Kirkuk oilfield in northern Iraq is an additional complication. Kurdish successional aims in Iraq have been supported by Iran and, to a lesser extent, by Turkey, while Kurdish nationalism in both these countries has been suppressed. Because assimilation is rejected by Kurdish leaders, Kurdistan is and doubtless will remain a nonstate nation.

Kurdish nationalism is an even more intractable problem than Palestinian nationalism. Although the latter problem has a large international dimension, it relates essentially to the relationship between two nonassimilable peoples: Arabs and Jews. The nonstate status of Kurdistan derives from a more complicated relationship among Kurds and Arabs, Turks, and Iranians. In each case they have been or can be regarded as candidates for absorption. Although autonomy may be a realizable aspiration, independence within a territory relinquished by three states is difficult to imagine. Kurdistan is best described, therefore, as a cultural geographic reality that happens coincidentally to be a political geographic impossibility.

Lebanon in Retrospect

The disastrous conflict in Lebanon offers a useful focus for examination of the circumstances that can transform instability, present in many Middle Eastern countries, into warfare. For three decades Lebanon seemed to be functioning not only as a plural society but, more remarkably, also as the world’s only pluralistic theocracy. We now know that it was only an unsuccessful experiment.
Lebanon was created by the French as a homeland for Christian Arabs, especially the Maronites. The French began to treat the Maronites as protégés early in the 19th century when Paris was competing with London for economic and political influence in the Middle East. In 1860 the French intervened militarily to protect their clients during a Muslim-Christian civil war. After that intervention the Maronite area enjoyed privileged status as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. The dismemberment of the Empire after World War I permitted the French to exercise direct control over this district and also over the much larger adjacent territory of Syria. The French desire to create a state for their Christian protégés posed an interesting dilemma. The territory occupied predominantly by Maronites (roughly the northwestern quarter of modern Lebanon) would have been too small to be an effective state. Therefore, they added land from their Syrian mandate and announced the birth of a “Greater Lebanon,” three times the size of the Maronite area. This larger territory included a substantial number of Sunni and Shia Muslims, non-Maronite Christians, and Druze.

A French-sponsored census of 1932 suggested that Christians formed a slight majority of the population of Greater Lebanon and that Maronites, with about 30 percent of the total, were the largest specific group. This was Lebanon’s only formal census, and a vast array of subsequent problems can be traced to doubts about its accuracy. Suggestions that a new census should be made were checked by insistence that Maronites and other Christians “temporarily living abroad” should also be counted. Because the number of Christian Lebanese abroad could be ascertained only by those remaining in Lebanon, that prospect was never accepted by Muslims. The absence of believable data on the size of religious groups in a country where citizenship was defined by religion and political power, and even minor government positions, were allocated on the basis of religious affiliation inhibited the development of any collective sense of national identity.

The list of problems inspired by the census controversy is long and melancholy. For example, the tendency of each religious group to try to get more than its dubious “official” share of government largess encouraged persistent tension. Moreover, because the Lebanese who found employment abroad and sent remittances from abroad were almost exclusively Christians, the country soon developed a pattern of extreme disparity in standards of living. The deeply rural Shia areas of southwestern and northeastern Lebanon were conspicuously backward. Even in the more prosperous Christian districts, democracy was compromised by nepotism and the inability of elected leaders to think of national rather than sectarian interests.

If Lebanon had been able to remain aloof from the Arab-Israeli conflict, its tensions and ambiguities might have been countered by faith that the country was somehow better off than its neighbors. When Palestinian refugees acquired sufficient strength in Lebanon to wage their battle from Lebanon, the tottering Humpty Dumpty created by the French could not remain on the wall. The reason why the country disintegrated so rapidly can be explained not only by its inherent cultural problems but also by the ineffectiveness of the small national army, which consisted mainly of Christian officers and Muslim enlisted men. Caught in the crossfire of Palestinians already in Lebanon, Israelis who felt free to attack them anywhere in Lebanon, and Syrian “deterrent” forces that occupied the eastern half of Lebanon, it is no wonder that the Lebanese Army went AWOL. With its departure the Lebanese Government, no longer able to protect its citizens, could not prevent the proliferation of divisive militias and the beginning of a civil war—immensely complicated by foreign interventions—that led to the de facto partition of Lebanon into areas controlled by Maronites, Shiites, Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians.

The Middle East in the Coming Decade

Scholars devoted to the Middle East have often been able to offer convincing retrospective explanations of developments in this complex and troubled region. Examples of successful prediction are more difficult to find. Within the past two decades, surprising events, such as the collapse of the regime of the Shah, the
subsequent revolutionary rule of Ayatollah Khomeini, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, have had a profound effect on the entire region. Uncertainty is a certainty in Middle Eastern studies. This a priori generalization is sustained by another equally obvious generalization. Each of the dictators and monarchs is mortal, and we can only speculate on what their departure might mean for the region. Taking account of the many disputed boundaries in the region (for example, Iraq-Iran, Israel-Syria, Libya-Chad, Morocco-Algeria) invites additional speculation.

The diffusion within the region of various expressions of Islamic fundamentalism is a cause of further and more serious uncertainty. Islamic fundamentalism can result in persecution of heterodox Muslim groups, such as the Druze, Alawites, Yezidis, and Bahais, and can exacerbate the tension between Sunni and Shia Muslims and among Muslims who might be labeled variously as worldly or other-worldly, pro-Western or anti-Western, and moderate or radical. At present, Iran is the principal exporter and coordinator of movements designed to subvert and eventually supplant secular authority. This movement has crossed the region's Sunni-Shia faultline, now presents a serious threat to the Governments of Egypt and Algeria, and is a potential threat elsewhere. Even Turkey, officially secular since the time of Ataturk, has experienced unrest inspired by Islamic zealots. Because it is military rather than civil authority that is most likely to be effective in blocking revolutionary religious movements, Islamic fundamentalism acts both directly and indirectly in the frustration or delay of democratic development in the region. The thinly disguised Army coup of January 1993 in Algeria is a good illustration of this principle.

In spite of this recitation of circumstances that make prediction hazardous in the Middle East, it is possible to point to some happy and unhappy constants regarding minority groups. For example, it is safe to assume that the Arabization of the Berber areas of North Africa will continue without interruption. As a result of improvements in communication and education, mountain and desert peoples who now speak only Berber will become bilingual and eventually speak only Arabic. This process of gradual, voluntary assimilation should also result in the Arabization of the speakers of several languages in the Sahelian zone. On the other hand, some numerically small groups, defined by either language or religion, may avoid or be able to resist assimilation, especially if they have low national visibility. The non-Iranian linguistic groups in the Zagros Mountains may exemplify this prospect. Christians will doubtless survive and even prosper in countries that are able to resist the pressures of Islamic fundamentalism. Lebanon, Syria, and possibly Iraq could exemplify this prospect. The alternative situation, in which non-Muslims are threatened, would occur inevitably in any country that is captured by Islamic fundamentalists.

Finally, it is probably safe to assume that the problem of Palestine is not likely to be solved completely within the coming decade. The various ideas that have been entertained for solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem seem without exception to have inherent contradictions. Trading land for peace presupposes Israeli willingness to trade enough land to satisfy Palestinian aspirations. This unrealistic formula also presupposes that Jewish settlers in potential Palestinian territory could be persuaded to leave. Again, Palestinians may be willing to accept autonomy rather than independence, but only if this is a transitional rather than a permanent arrangement. Thoughts of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation are also being entertained, but this prospect merely defers questions about the character and area of the Palestinian part of the union. Because it is not likely that Arabs will ever be able to live contentedly in a Jewish state or Jews in an Arab state and no realistic proposal has been advanced that could result in the separation of the two peoples, the Arab-Israeli problem probably will be with us for many years.

The problem of Kurdistan also seems to be intractable and so can be regarded as a constant in the Middle Eastern cultural-political equation. If the area now occupied by Kurds were to become an independent state, it would be no less viable than many of the existing states in the region. It would have abundant
land suitable for cereal farming and horticulture, a rich petroleum field, several cities, and a population of 15-30 million. None of these observations distracts attention from a reality that precludes any prospect for the creation of an independent Kurdistan because a Kurdish state could come into being only if Iraq, Turkey, and Iran were to display unprecedented cooperation and generosity.

These speculative remarks reinforce a comment made at the beginning of this review: the Middle East is and will continue to be an area of contention and danger. As the only superpower and, indeed, the only external power capable of influencing events in the region, the United States has an unavoidable responsibility. At the least, we might hope that our experience since 1776 could be a source of illumination for those Middle Easterners—the vast majority of them—who have never known democracy. Other hopes can be entertained. By encouraging government reforms, discouraging excessive military expenditures, exposing human rights abuses, seeking by diplomatic means to promote peaceful settlement of border disputes, and organizing boycotts when such are required to prevent or punish reckless national behavior, the United States could expect to play a constructive role in the Middle East. We also need to recognize that the United States has been, and will continue to be, viewed with suspicion and even contempt as a new colonial power, well aware of the natural resources and strategic position of the region but incapable of understanding the aspirations and frustrations of its “difficult people.”
The primary source of information on all aspects of the geography of the Middle East is the *Tubinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients* (Wiesbaden, 1968-1993). The several hundred sheets of this serial publication and its many supplementary monographs include a wealth of information on most of the linguistic and religious groups in the region.

The coverage of the Middle East in *Atlas Narodov Mira* (Moscow, 1964) was remarkably explicit at that time and is still useful as a source of information on the location of linguistically defined groups.

The *Middle East Journal* and *Asian Bulletin* are good sources for information on recent events.


The London-based Minority Rights Group has issued several reports on Middle Eastern topics. No one volume deals adequately with ethnicity and nationality in the Middle East. However, Carleton Coon's *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East* (New York, 1951) is still useful and stimulating in spite of its early postcolonial date.
Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Mildred Berman

In contrast to some areas we have talked about, the Middle East is relatively small in terms of total population. It contains some 300 million people—only about 6 percent of the world's population—although it certainly takes up a disproportionate share of the headlines.

This is an area with a long cultural history. Three of the world's most influential religions have come from here. It has been an area of the first domestication of crops, first settlement, first cities, and so on.

In addition, this is a place through which tribes as well as empires have moved, changed, and reinvented themselves. This means, then, that the areal extent of the region keeps shifting like the sands. We have heard the area called the Near East, the Hither East, and Southwest Asia. The terms Near East and Hither East included the Balkans because they were part of the Ottoman Empire. Today, the term Middle East is common, but during World War II the Middle East Command went as far south as Kenya.

One of the terms that geographers and anthropologists use when discussing this region is "mosaic." It is a very poetic term and appropriate because of the wonderful mosaic floors left by the Romans and the mosaic work on the mosques throughout much of the area. But a mosaic implies symmetry, and, as you have just heard from Professor Mikesell, the intense variety of people here is not very symmetrical. In talking about mosaics, I recently read something very interesting. After Jerusalem was retaken by the Saracens under Saladin in the 12th century, many tiles of the Dome of the Rock had to be replaced because they had begun to fall off. The people who put the tiles back were not Muslim artisans, but Armenian Christians; one of the great monuments in the Muslim world was repaired by laborers from another religion.

I would like to comment on two of the issues that Professor Mikesell addressed: the Kurdish situation and Lebanon.

The outlook for Kurds achieving a state is grim. Professor Mikesell says it is impossible, and maybe it is. But in this region we can never say never, as evidenced by the recent gasp-provoking handshake between PLO Chief Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on the lawn of the White House. In the past, some outside assistance has gone to the Kurds in an effort to destabilize the regime in Iraq. During the 1970s, for instance, Israel and the United States sent in arms to shore up the Kurdish cause, but, as we all know, this did not work. Since the Persian Gulf war, there has been a fair amount of pressure brought to bear on Turkey in the hope that it might promote some Kurdish autonomy in the area, but this does not seem to be working. The tragedy is that, with so many other things going on in this part of the world, the Kurdish cause is definitely on the back burner.

Regarding Lebanon, that country—a very unsuccessful experiment as Professor Mikesell has so rightly described—was programmed for failure from the beginning. The separation of Lebanon from Syria overlooked the fact that members of the country's 17 individual sects had loyalties not only to their religious groups but also to tribes and villages as well. This has continued until the present time. Lebanon then has had no real political control over its many peoples.

The country began to unravel in the 1970s with the establishment of individual fiefdoms and, again, with the PLO ministate, which was destroyed by the 1982 incursion of the Israel Defense Forces. Today, the infrastructure in Beirut and Southern Lebanon is in shambles. It is uncertain whether the country will ever reemerge as a banking center, tourist attraction, or an air transport hub.

The Syrian Army presence remains a real danger; there are 40,000 Syrian troops in the country, and they show no sign of moving. The Christians are very much concerned about what may happen if the Syrians move to annex Lebanon. They fear that this will be bad for them, and many Muslims in the area also fear the repressiveness of the Syrian regime.
Finally, the major concern the Lebanese currently have is the 300,000 Palestinian refugees who are in the southern part of their country. They would like to see them moved out. This is another of the destabilizing aspects of the human geography of the Middle East.

**General Discussion**

**QUESTION:** I'd like to focus the Kurdish question on Turkey. What do you think the prospects are for Turks—who seem adamantly opposed to any kind of acknowledgment of the Kurds at all—to ever try to solve the Kurdish problem politically or socially rather than just militarily? Is this insurgency ever going to end?

**DR. MIKESELL:** The recent statements from Prime Minister Ciller simply reinforce what has been said before. When asked about this, she said, "Why is there a problem? The Kurds have the same rights as all other Turkish citizens." In other words, the Turks are quite emphatic in the idea that, although they recognize they have minorities, they cannot have minority citizenship.

There is a Kurdish party represented in the parliament in Ankara. When the delegates arrived and wanted to use the Kurdish language, however, they were accused of treason and violation of law.

The Turks see themselves as living in a unitary state, a nation-state. They know a lot of diversity exists in the country, but they have not allowed allow citizenship to be defined in reference to anything other than Turkish identity.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that there will be an alienation of those Kurds who have been integrated into Turkish society, particularly within the military and the intelligence services?

**DR. MIKESELL:** Turkey has used military conscription as a way of promoting national identity, and, when a Kurd is drafted into the army, he gets shipped away from Kurdistan. The Turks have used military service and crash programs in literacy to try to Turkify the non-Turkish population. It would be very difficult to find out how much assimilation has taken place, however, because Turks are so sensitive to this issue. Regardless, I can't imagine an assimilated Kurd who has changed his name and who knows Turkish going back to being a Kurdish nationalist.
Ethnicity Theory and Ethnic Conflict
In China: The New Politics of Difference

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The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to family and clan with the result that in China there have been familism and clanism but no real nationalism. Foreign observers say that the Chinese are like a sheet of loose sand...The unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and has not extended to the nation...

Sun Yat-sen, Three People’s Principles (1924:2,5)

Introduction: The Disuniting of China

In his recent statement to the United Nations, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey V. Kozyrev declared that the threat of ethnic violence today is "no less serious than the threat of nuclear war was yesterday." Although most people would agree that this is certainly true for the troubled regions of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and much of the Americas, few would acknowledge that China is also faced with such a threat. While the former Soviet Union, in particular, is seen to be riddled with ethnic and nationalist strife, China is still regarded as a relatively peaceful monolith that is dominated by a militaristic centralized power structure intent on maintaining its control at all costs. This paper will not dispute that received wisdom. Rather, it will seek to demonstrate why we continue to see China in this way and to attempt to illustrate some of the potential faultlines in the system, should it ever begin to come apart at the seams. The real subject, it seems to me, when we examine China in this regard, is "which seams."

With the rise of a unipolar world led by the United States, the question of China’s domestic integrity becomes paramount (Garver 1992). However, geopolitical strategists and scholars may be tempted to abandon their interest in the minorities of China—key players in the border disputes between the two former neighboring adversaries—who were often only of interest as potential irritants to Sino-Soviet relations.

China now shares a much reduced border with Russia and is instead faced with several new nations with much less political clout. This may lead scholars to disregard the ethnics within and without China as no longer of strategic or political interest.

What are the pressures within China for ethnic conflict, and why have they changed with the demise of the USSR? How do we begin to conceive of China as something more than a monocultural society with a 6,000-year written history? Do the politics of difference make a difference for the average Chinese citizen? This paper will seek to address these questions as I outline what I see to be some of the ethnic “contours of power” (Yang 1989) within Chinese society. Although Sovietologists could never have predicted the rapid events that dismantled the USSR at the beginning of this decade, and I do not envision the immediate dissolution of China, attention to the preexisting faultlines within these superpowers might yield significant insight into the political maps that characterize their present and possible futures. (See figure 8.)

Ethnic Faultlines

The Rise of Southern Nationalisms

There is a new feeling in China, reflected by the popular saying: “Northerners love (ai) the nation; Southerners sell (mai) the nation.” Accompanying the dramatic economic explosion in southern China, Southerners and others have begun to assert their cultural and political differences. Recent studies by
Figure 8
Segmental Oppositional Hierarchy
Edward Friedman (1993), Emily Honig (1991), and others have demonstrated a new rising importance of the politics of ethnic and cultural difference within China proper. Not only have the “official” minorities in China begun to more strongly assert their identities, pressuring the government for further recognition, autonomy, and special privileges, but also different groups from within the so-called “Han” majority have begun to rediscover, reinvent, and reassert their ethnic differences.

In the south especially, there has been a recent rewriting of history, illustrated by a newfound interest in the southern Chu Kingdom as key to southern success. Edward Friedman reports the establishment of museums throughout southern China dedicated to the glorious history of the southern Kingdom of Chu, as manifested in both the Warring States period, 475-221 BC and the Three Kingdoms 220-265 AD. Many Southerners now see the early Chu as essential to Chinese culture and as distinct from the less important northern dynasties. In a significant departure from traditional Chinese historiography, southern scholars are beginning to argue that by the 6th century BC the bronze cultures of the Chu spread north and influenced the development of Chinese civilization, not the other way around. This argument supports a reevaluation of the importance of the south to China’s past, as well as economic and geopolitical future (Friedman 1993).

Rising consciousness of the southern Chu, or Cantonese, is paralleled by reassertions of identity among the Hakka people, the southern Fujianese Min or Hokkien, the Swatow, and a host of other peoples empowered by economic success and embittered at age-old restraints placed on them from the north. Many people are beginning to note the southern leanings and origins of central party political figures, and it is not unusual to hear reports that so-and-so is a Hakka and therefore has acted in a certain way. Leading figures considered to be Hakka or part Hakka include Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Ye Jianing—father of Guangdong’s previous governor. It is now widely known that all members of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) southern bases in the 1920s and 1930s were Hakka, as were their leaders. Mao successfully mobilized Hakka hatred against other Southerners and their landlords. People now often praise Zhou Enlai by stressing his southern Jiangnan linkages. And even Jiang Jieshi—Chiang Kai-shek—was praised as a Southerner who knew how to get money out of the United States.

Liao Ping-hui (1993), a Taiwanese sociologist, reports that Taiwan is also experiencing a dramatic reassertion of the gaoshan “aboriginal” peoples to their indigenous rights and claims. Age-old Taiwanese/Mainlander ethnic cleavages (Hill Gates 1981) have given way to a predominance of Taiwanese language and political figures in everyday life as well as a host of other groups maneuvering along traditional cultural and linguistic grounds for political power.

The assertions of the politics of difference within the majority Han society militate against traditional assumptions about the “homogeneous” Chinese, the monoculturalism of China, and the predominance of a 91-percent Han majority nationality. Local differences are now becoming recognized as “ethnic,” (Honig 1992), whereas previously most China scholars dismissed them as merely “regional.” This semantic shift, from “regional” to “ethnic” reflects a new salience placed upon the politics of difference in the People’s Republic.

Traditional China studies emphasized “China” as one civilization, one country, and one culture. Rarely was there serious attention paid to cultural and political difference in China studies unless it concerned the “exotic” minority border peoples, almost always regarded as marginal to power and politics in the People’s Republic. Most studies dealt only with ethnic differences as related to the 55 official minority nationalities of China. While two recent collections in Daedalus and two new edited volumes on Chinese national identity have begun to address this issue, most of them approach the issues of cultural identity from the other direction, that is, asking what binds the Chinese together—Confucianism, Communism, state-authoritarianism, familism, or language—rather than what might be pulling them apart. Conflicts with China’s long divisiveness over cultural, linguistic, and
historical power lines are noted in Frank Dikötter’s recent book, The Discourse of Race in Modern China.

During the Qing, interethnic conflicts (fenlei xiedou) or “armed battles to separate types (lei),” became common between Han and Muslims; Hakka (a minority group of southeast China) and Hoklo (Hokkien-speaking Chinese); and Hakka and Punti (native Cantonese). Ethnic feuds strove to “clear the boundaries” by ejecting exogenous groups from their respective territories. Such ethnic clashes could be extremely violent: a major conflict between the Hakka and Punti in 1856-67 took a toll of 100,000 victims. The reformers’ interpretation of racial war was based on lineage feuds. This vision was sustained by the semantic similarity between zu as lineage and zu as race. “Race,” as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, would create nationhood. On the basis of internal conflicts between lineages, the reformers constructed a representation of external conflicts between races (Dikötter, 1992: 70-71).

In an articulated hierarchy of escalating opposition, interlineage conflicts became the model for anti-foreignism—“us” against “them,” our race against theirs. It is this awareness of internal conflict, lineage, ethnic, and racial difference that drives a deep-seated anxiety about the possibility of China breaking up. The Chinese, in my opinion, never take China for granted, culturally, politically, or otherwise. This is because most Chinese are all too aware of how easily and naturally China could break into its constituent parts. It was widely believed for a short period following the Tiananmen crackdown that the Beijing-based forces were more loyal to their city’s residents and would refuse to obey the command, while other armies, such as the Wuhan-based military district, were loyal to Deng Xiao-ping. At one point, heavy gunfire was widely reported to be heard on the outskirts of the city. It was thought to be between the various military forces converging on the city. These deep-seated fears reflected a concern that China was on the verge of spiraling into a civil disunion reminiscent of the warlord era, when local militarists commanded personal armies and built up cultural, linguistic, and regional political power bases.

The “Official” Minority Nationalities and Ethnic Separatism
China is a multinational, multiethnic nation with 55 “official” minority nationality groups, identified mainly in the 1950s, that now total more than 92 million in population (see Dreyer 1976). This includes 10 Muslim nationalities—with a total population of at least 20 million—located primarily on China’s borders with Russia and the new mainly Muslim Central Asian States. In the south, there are nearly 12 million Austro-Malay-speaking Zhuang people on the Vietnam border and more than 24 separate minority groups in Yunnan Province alone, where cross-border relations with Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand have increased dramatically in the past few years. The state has assigned levels of minority autonomous administration. There are five autonomous regions, scores of autonomous districts, and hundreds of autonomous counties and villages. Autonomous here primarily means that there is more local control over the administration of such things as resources, taxes, birth planning, education, and legal jurisdiction. It does not mean that control is in minority hands. Although most minority regions and districts have minority government leaders, the Communist Party in all these areas is dominated by the Han majority, reflecting China’s active watch over these so-called autonomous areas.

The recent detonation of two bombs in a Kashgar Hotel in southern Xinjiang that killed at least six people convinced Beijing that its fears were well founded regarding Uighur separatism and the increasing influence from the newly independent Turkic states on its borders. The longstanding struggles of Tibetan independence movements are also well documented (see Goldstein 1990). This supports the 1970s prediction by Victor Louis, understood to be a Soviet intelligence operative, who wrote in The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire that China would fall apart due to the “national aspirations of the Manchu, Mongols, Uighurs, Tibetans, and other non-Chinese peoples” (cited in Friedman 1993: 270).
Until now, most China scholars have dismissed the possibility as remote, and the violent incidents on the margins of China’s great landmass were not considered a serious threat to the monolith. The Uighur, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Mongols, and even the Tibetans are still felt to be insignificant minorities: politically and militarily inept, internationally isolated, and expected to go the way of the Manchu and others who have been thought to be long assimilated into the Chinese mainstream. Although I am not predicting or advocating the dissolution of China along the lines that Victor Louis predicted, in this paper I argue that recent events among the Uighur in Kashgar are related to the Hakka in Canton and explain why these linkages have generally been ignored by China scholarship.

I suggest that we need new ways of thinking about ethnic and regional identity that often leads to local conflict along unexpected lines. What is going on in southern China is linked to the rise of local ethnic nationalisms—the rise of the Cantonese, the assertion of the Hakka, and the galloping economy of the southern Fujianese—to traditional nationalisms on China’s borders as well as global trends that have affected China domestically and internationally. My research parallels work in contemporary anthropological and ethnographic theory, which rejects notions of homogenized cultures and posits the existence of multiple identities and shifting associations.

Despite the frequent wishing away of ethnic and nationalist loyalties, we are witnessing the rise of ethnic nationalisms that define the arenas of conflict across the globe. This flies in the face of earlier predictions by both modernization theorists and even Marxist ideologues that ethnic identities would fade in favor of individual, secularized, economic-based behaviors. "Tribalism," thought to be a thing of the past, is now the watchword of the 1990s. Most people are surprised at the viciousness with which people, who were long thought to be assimilated, modernized, and secularized, are assaulting and "cleansing" others in the name of primordialized self-identity, self-determination, and ethnic nationalism. What is going on here?

National identities, although imagined, are never arbitrary but arise in particular sociopolitical contexts in relational opposition to specific others. To follow Ben Anderson (1983), it is the feeling of "otherness" one experiences while in exile or, I would add, while being incorporated and dominated into a nation-state that may more than anything lead to a strong sense of ethnicity. To follow Dorine Kondo (1989:43), the notion of relational identity stresses "multiplicity, contextuality, complexity, power, irony, and resistance." It is the articulation of the multiplicities of these identities, within the context of where they have been expressed, that these identities become salient.

Nationalism is not just an idea but also a certain style of representation that is now most often defined by interactions within or resistance to the nation-state. As Hobsbawm argues, "Nationalism is a political program . . . Without this programme, realized or not, 'nationalism' is a meaningless term," (Anthropology Today 1992:4). Nationalism is not arbitrary, but neither is there any core content to it. It has no essential essence. It is not shifted and redefined.

I began to think much more about the nature of what relational and oppositional identity means (see Gladney 1991) after interviewing Turkistani refugees and emigres in Turkey. It convinced me that much of what I had been reading in Foreign Affairs and other journals about the resurgence of "tribalisms" in Central Asia now that the Soviets have withdrawn was very wrong. I became convinced that these people were profoundly different than they were before their domination by the centralizing states of Soviet and Chinese Central Asia and that their multifaceted identities are anything but tribal.

Han Nationalism and the Rise of the Chinese Nation-State

As yet, no larger studies of the creation of Han nationalism have emerged—mainly because it is assumed by sinologists trained in the dominant tradition that "Han" is generally equal to "Chinese"—a tradition created and maintained by the current regime in power. Studies of Chinese nationalism have generally ignored the issue of the creation of the Han majority in favor of the larger question of Chinese identity. Few have questioned how the Han became the 94-percent majority of China. Perhaps, the traditional Confucian
preoccupation with order and harmony in a society held tenuously together by proper relationships may be one reason why these categories have never been challenged. The very Confucian practice of the “rectification of names” (zheng ming) is of primary concern to the Chinese ethnographers; once the Han and all the minority nationalities have been identified or named, order is restored, and all is well in the world. I would argue that it is the anxiety about differences within Chinese society, not the affection shared within, that has managed to hold China together.

The notion of “Han ren” (Han person) has existed for many centuries as those descendants of the Han dynasty, which had its beginnings in the Wei River valley. However, I submit that the notion of “Han zu” or “Han min” (Han nationality) is an entirely modern phenomenon—it arises with the shift from empire to nation, as argued above. While the concept of a Han person certainly existed, the notion of a unified Han nationality that makes up 94 percent of China’s population gained its greatest popularity under Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun was most certainly influenced by strong currents of Japanese nationalism during his long-term stay in Japan. Sun argued that the ruler-subject relation that had persisted throughout China’s dynastic history would need to be fundamentally transformed if a true nationalist movement were to sweep China and engender support among all its peoples. More practically, Dr. Sun needed a way to mobilize all Chinese against the imperial rule of the Qing, a dynasty founded by a northeastern people who became known as the Manchu. By invoking the argument that the majority of the people in China were Han, Sun effectively found a symbolic metaphorical opposition to the Manchu to which the vast majority of peoples in China would easily rally.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen advocated the idea that there were “Five Peoples of China” (wuzu gonghe): the Han, the Man (Manchu), the Meng (Mongolian), the Zang (Tibetan), and the Hui—a term that included all Muslims in China who are now divided into the Uighur, Kazakh, Hui, and so forth. This recognition of the Five Peoples of China served as the main platform for his Nationalist revolution, which overthrew the Qing empire and established the first “People’s Republic.” One must have peoples if there is to be a people’s revolution. The critical link between Sun Yat-sen’s Five Peoples policy and his desire to unify all of China is made crystal clear from his discussion of nationalism—the first of his Three People’s Principles (Sanmin Zhuyi). It is here that Sun argued the Chinese were a disconnected, loose sheet of sand, with no sense of the nation.

It is also not at all surprising that Dr. Sun should turn to the use of the all-embracing idea of the Han as the national group, which included all the regional peoples and Sino-linguistic speech communities. Sun Yat-sen was Cantonese, raised as an overseas Chinese in Hawaii. As one who spoke little Mandarin, and with few connections in northern China, he would have easily aroused traditional northern suspicions of southern radical movements extending back to the Song dynasty (10th century) that were, of course, well known to him. This recurring historical pattern and the traditional antipathy between the Cantonese and northern peoples would have posed an enormous barrier to his promotion of a nationalist movement. Dr. Sun found a way to rise above deeply embedded north-south ethnocentrisms. The use and perhaps invention of the term “Han minzu” was a brilliant attempt to mobilize other non-Cantonese, especially northern Mandarin speakers, and the powerful Zhejiang and Shanghainese merchants into one overarching national group against the Manchu and other foreigners during the unstable period following the Unequal Treaties. The Han were seen to stand in opposition to the “Others” on their borders—the Manchu, Tibetan, Mongol, and Hui, as well as the Western imperialists. By distinguishing these “Others” in their midst, the nationalists cultivated the imagined identity of the “we” Han, as opposed to the “they” minorities and foreigners. In Ben Anderson’s terms, Dr. Sun was engaged in “stretching the short, tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.”

The Communists stretched this skin even further, following the Soviet model and identifying not five, but 55, nationality groups, with the Han in the 91-percent majority. My argument is that both for the nationalists and the Communists, it was not only the political
necessity of enlisting the support of the ethnics on their borders that led them to recognize minority nationalities but also the desire to unify the nation against the outsiders in order to overcome internal difference. Now that there is no longer an external threat, it is this internal difference that will most pull them apart.

The best analogy here is that of Europe and the Roman Empire. Lucien Pye (1993) has recently observed that “China today is what Europe would have been if the unity of the Roman Empire had lasted until now and there had not been the separate emergence of the separate entities of England, France, Germany, and the like.” China is a multilingual nation with large populations that can be divided among the six major language groups. Linguists such as John DeFrancis and Jerry Norman have demonstrated that there is as much diversity “among the Chinese dialects as... among the Romance languages...” To take an extreme example, there is probably as much difference between the dialects of Peking and Chaozhou as there is between Italian and French; the Hainan Min dialects are as different from the Xian dialect as Spanish is from Rumanian,” (Norman 1988). Much like Latin in the Middle Ages, China’s diverse language groups all are served with one standard writing system, Chinese ideographs that vary in some styles, such as Cantonese, although the speech communities are mutually exclusive. What holds these diverse communities together is oppositional hierarchy. The politics of difference, until now, have not reached to this level.

Ethnic and Oppositional Identity

It is oppositional hierarchy, the shifting nature of identity, that now enlivens Chinese cultural nationalism. This relates to the popular Arab Bedouin proverb:

Me against my brother, my brother and I against our cousin, our cousin and us against you.

As the great Central Asianist Bartold once said: “When you ask a Turkestani what his identity is, he will answer that he is first of all a Muslim, then an inhabitant of such or such city or village... or, if he is a nomad, member of such or such tribe.” But as Nazif Shahrani pointed out, later Muslim travelers noted that the only reason the Central Asians first told Bartold they were Muslims was because they perceived him as a European Christian and part of the Czarist colonial project. In similar fashion, Hakka have always told anthropologists that they are Han persons, but, among themselves, they and most Southerners believe they are Tang persons.

By looking at ethnic identity and conflict in relational terms, one can immediately understand why a person from a certain lineage in southern China can be Toisan, Cantonese, Southern, Han, and a Chinese citizen, all at once or selectively, depending on to whom they are talking—foreigner, non-Han, Northerner, non-Cantonese, or non-Toisan Cantonese. It is finding out when and how one assumes these different identities that is key here, not what any one identity will be in some essentialized permanent form that exists outside of historical contingency.

Sir Edmund Leach (1954) was the first anthropologist to argue that ethnic identity is formed as the result of power oppositions; the Kachin in Highland Burma only acted ethnically when in opposition to the Shans. Evans-Pritchard’s (1940) classic study of the Nuer determined the unique expansive-contractive nature of hierarchical segmentary lineages among nomadic societies that lack a distinct leader. When the Nuer were confronted with an outside power, they unified and organized to a high degree of political complexity in order to respond to the challenge. When the threat subsided, they diversified and atomized.

Ethnic identities are often seen to coalesce and crystallize in the face of higher order oppositions. These ethnic identities form and reform according to articulated hierarchies of interaction with the particular oppositional power in question (see diagrams). In From Empire to Nation, Rupert Emerson (1960) provides a perceptive definition of the nation as “the largest community, which when the chips are down, effectively commands men’s loyalty” (cited in Connor 1984). Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon proposed: “A ‘nation’ has been cynically but not inaptly defined as a society united by a common error as to its origin and a common aversion to its neighbors.”
Now that the global map is most defined by the nation-state, the peoples within must define themselves vis-à-vis the nation-state. E. K. Francis, in his *Interethnic Relations* (1978), argued that the rise of ethnic identities and interethnic conflict was a phenomenon tied most directly to the nation-state. It is the nation-state that takes upon itself the task of legislating identity. Empires were consumed more with ruling, rather than legislating and identifying the peoples under their spheres of influence. In the modern era, it is often the nation-state apparatus itself with which ethnic groups find themselves in opposition. By agreeing to articulate their identities along the contours shaped by ethnic identification policies and censuses, ethnic groups demonstrate their desire to form coalitions at the highest possible level in order to interact as a powerful collectivity with the state apparatus.

These ethnic identities are “imagined” in Ben Anderson’s (1983) terms, but they are never arbitrary. They form according to cultural, historical, and political power oppositions and alliances. What we are witnessing today with the end of the Cold War is the moving down of oppositional alliances to levels that now emphasize the importance of the politics of difference below the level of the Han. The opposition to the West, to imperialism, and to the Japanese is no longer a motivating force binding China together.

**Ethnic Nationalism in China: Some Policy Considerations**

The increasing importance of playing the politics of difference for personal and corporate gain out of response to stigmatized identities, or just out of a renewed sense of the meaningfulness of one’s history in China, has important implications for how we understand ethnic identity and the potential for conflict. Although this paper does not predict ethnic conflict along any predetermined lines, the argument here is to suggest the importance of certain faultlines, should fragmentation, most important at the center of the state’s power structure, occur. The Uighur will never become independent as long as Beijing is in firm control, but Beijing is increasingly dependent on Canton, and, if Canton should make a move, many Uighur would be only too glad to take advantage of the situation. Analysis and policy decisions regarding ethnic conflict in China should consider several issues, which follow.

Cultural nationalism and ethnic difference should be taken seriously. This is true not only among the “official” minority nationalities, who are stigmatized or empowered because of that designation, but also among at least two other kinds of groups: applicant groups and sub-Han groups.

Applicant groups are seeking or have sought to be recognized as “official” minority nationalities. Many of these groups were not recognized in the 1940s and 1950s during the nationality identification programs, and some have sought, indeed militated for and politically organized around, nationality recognition. There are at least 15 groups who have applied and are under consideration for nationality recognition by the State Commission for Nationalities (guojia minzu shiwu weiyuanhui). These groups include the Chinese Jews (you tai ren), Khmer, Sherpas, Ku Cong, Deng (a Tibetan sub-group), Chuanqing, and several others (see Heberer 1990). Some 900,000 people in Guizhou Province alone applied for minority recognition in the early 1980s, and the 1982 census reported that 799,705 “unidentified” people remained in China. Of interest are the Chinese Jews, once thought to be extinct but now claiming a membership of 8,000 and under consideration for rapid recognition due to China’s official diplomatic ties to and improving relations with Israel. Although this group is certainly not militant, it stands to benefit considerably from recognition, perhaps leading to local-level rivalries with other groups, particularly with Hui Muslims, to whom many of the Chinese Jews formerly belonged. Another group, the Ku Cong, presently classified as a branch of the Lahu nationality in Yunnan and known as the Yellow Lahu, are worth noting because one of their members, Wang Zhengcun, was elected leader of the Tiananmen Square Nationalities Institute’s student democratic group and was sought and arrested as number 3 on the most wanted list. He has long been known as a “Ku Cong” nationalist, seeking recognition of his people, illustrating the importance of this issue for political activism (see Gladney 1990).
As noted above, other groups to watch outside the official nationalities are particularly those so-called “sub-Han” groups that have maintained local, linguistic, and ethnic ties throughout the CCP period, despite lack of recognition. Especially important are those with outside transnational links or large populations outside the China mainland, such as the Hakka in Taiwan and Hong Kong; the Swatow in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Indonesia; and the Min-speaking (Hokkien, Fujianese) populations in Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Although other local level ethnic differences are important in regional and ethnic politics throughout China, it is these groups that have the economic and international clout to make a difference in the domestic scene. This again does not suggest that any one of these groups alone is sufficient to destabilize a region of China or engage in strong political activism. Instead, I am arguing that, as Rupert noted above, when the “chips are down” these are the kinds of groups best positioned to exploit their cultural and political resources.

Close attention should be paid to debates in the Chinese community within and outside China regarding the construction of Chineseness, or Chinese national identity. Like Sun Yat-sen’s own historic formulation, the outcome of these debates may determine the direction of public policy, whether it be pluralist, federalist, monoethnic, or even racist. At the same time, studies of “sub-Han” national identity and cultural difference have become popular in the mainland, with Xu Jiejun’s (1985) series of publications, New Explorations in the Han Nationality’s History and Culture, being just the beginning of this important trend (first begun perhaps with Fan Wenlan’s 1957 collection). Xu, a historian and political scientist at the Guangxi Institute of Nationalities in Nanning, has effectively used the Han categorization as a “nationality” (minzu) as a means to study cultural difference within the Han.

Study of minority nationalities in China should focus not only on their traits, population, history, and culture but, more important, also on their interconnectedness—the articulation of their identity across regional and national boundaries. In the international sphere, this has certainly been important for Tibetan Muslim—especially the Uighur, Kazakh, Tajik, and Hui; Korean (the most educated and economically advanced nationality in China); and Mongol groups. Domestically, it has been important for their establishing national networks, often through state institutions such as the Nationalities Institutes, Islamic and Buddhist Associations, and regional Nationality Commissions. It has also been important for the reawakening of national consciousness, such as among the Manchu, who have established three new autonomous counties in the northeast during the past 10 years.

Population politics should be watched closely. As China more severely enforces its one-child policy, minority recognition will become more important as a means to having more children. In the past, China has been rather reluctant to enforce restriction on minority births in rural areas; minorities were “encouraged” to limit births to one more child than the Han in their area, but in general they had as many as they wanted. Now the government is attempting to enforce this policy despite strong opposition. Minorities are reluctant to adhere to increasingly applied birth planning policies. For example, the requirement to limit births to three among minorities led to riots among Uighurs and Mongols in 1989 and 1990. Chinese often redefine themselves as minorities. Children of mixed marriages are almost always opting for minority identity, and minorities are increasingly preferred as potential marriage partners. This has led to a phenomenal population growth of 35 percent between 1982 and 1990 among minorities, while the Han population only grew by 10 percent. Some groups grew dramatically—the Manchu grew by 114 percent, the Tujia by 140 percent, the Hui by 40 percent, and the Uighur by 40 percent. The Gelao—a Yunnan minority—grew by an incredible 714 percent. The vast majority of these increases are due to redefining and reregistration of people who were previously classified as Han (see Gladney 1991: 240 ff.; Banister 1987).

The administration of minority privileges should be watched. Both the extent of the privileges—such as tax breaks, birth planning, educational incentives, and economic development investment—and the extent they have among the majority population should be considered. In any society affirmative action programs
often alienate the majority, and in China this has led to resentment and ethnic conflict in some areas. This is particularly true for groups such as the Hui, Manchu, She, and Zhuang, who closely resemble the Han majority in their areas. It has led to accusations that these groups are faking ethnic identity in order to have more children or receive special government assistance (see my discussion of the “two-child Hui” Muslims, Gladney: The Journal of Asian Studies).

Popular culture should be monitored as an indication of the rising importance of ethnic or cultural difference. In Beijing, whereas only a few years ago Southerners and southern accents were pilloried and stigmatized by many “crosstalk” comedians and entertainers, Cantonese terms and accents are now highly valued and affected. Canton, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong songs, movies, clothing styles, and entertainers are extremely popular throughout China, even though they are frequently not understood. At the same time, “ethnic art” that exoticizes, romanticizes, and often eroticizes the minorities in Yunnan and Tibet, is extremely popular inside and outside China, leading to the founding of the Yunnan Art School (see Gladney: Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia).

The ethnic makeup of “floating populations” and other labor groups should be examined, particularly as it relates to large migrations of peoples and the growth of ethnic economic niches. Dorothy Solinger in a series of articles has documented the rising prominence of “floating” migrant populations but has not analyzed why it is that most of the groups are members of certain ethnic sub-Han communities. For example, almost all shoe repair in China is dominated by Zhejiangese from a certain county; child care workers and domestics in Beijing almost all come from one part of Anhui; the Subei people dominate specific “unclean” occupations in Shanghai (see Honig 1991); Cantonese now contract almost all of their agricultural labor to Hunanese peasants; and, until recently, the Uighur dominated the moneychanging black market.

The Taiwan aboriginal movement should be monitored as to its impact on Republic of China policy and its coverage in the People’s Republic of China media. The outcome over this debate about indigenous peoples’ land rights, their desire for native language training, and the need for cultural preservation will have serious repercussions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The military has been drastically overhauled since questions were raised about regional loyalty during the Tiananmen incident. Further attention should be paid to the origins and cultures of the officers in charge and of the forces under their commands. China’s military districts occupy important macro-regions that William Skinner (1965) once argued were entirely separate focuses around which the rest of China moved. Although China, unlike the USSR, has not employed many “official” minorities in the military, many commanders and their forces may have significant local and regional attachments. Military researchers have tended to dismiss these local and regional differences because of certain assumptions about Han and Chinese identity. The ethnic and cultural makeup of the military may not have much influence on military decision making, nonetheless, it may effect the relationship with the local populations, as we saw briefly in Beijing.

In the mid-1980s, political scientists initiated a series of studies and conferences under the rubric of “bringing the state back in” (see Skocpol 1985), leading to a stronger consideration of the role of the state in defining state-society relations. This was an added corrective to earlier, particularist studies, which emphasized microeconomic and community or individual-actor-based approaches. However, in both approaches culture as a political force was somehow lost. As a political and cultural anthropologist, I am arguing for the necessity of bringing culture back into the debate, not as a determining force in social relations but as an important factor in understanding the options available to political actors in the field of social relations.
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Geographic and Ethnographic Identifying Key Issues in Ethnic Relations

Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia

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Geographic/Ethnographic Overview

Few regions of the world present so wide a range of natural environments and sociocultural adaptations as does Southeast Asia. The enduring geographic and ethnographic diversity of the region has been compounded in recent decades by the forces of nationalism, impact of ideology, intervention of external powers, and differential pace of development in the 10 nations of the region. In brief, Southeast Asia today provides an extraordinary range of economies, societies, cultures, and geographical regimes. Per capita income ranges from $17,000 per year in Brunei to $120 per year in Laos. The stability and technological sophistication of Singapore, the newly industrialized status of Thailand, and the burgeoning agroindustrial base of Malaysia contrast strongly with the stark reality of brutal military rule in Burma, the current attempt at national reconciliation in Cambodia, and the efforts to emerge from a subsistence economy in Laos.

In the brief time allotted to me here, I wish to discuss the past, present, and prospective dangers posed by ethnic tensions in a region that, in the past decade, has evidenced an average rate of economic growth (7 percent) higher than any other on the globe. Although poverty and lack of human and natural resources may contribute to ethnic tensions, so also may the rise of a middle class and the perception of the monopolization of power by discrete minorities in the most economically successful of Southeast Asian states.

Identifying Key Issues in Ethnic Relations

For purposes of this discussion, I will focus on four key aspects of ethnic tension in the Southeast Asian region. The first factor relates to environmental issues and the competition for agricultural land in highland regions. The second factor is centered on religious affiliation, identification, and proselytization. The third factor focuses on tensions in the border regions of Southeast Asia. The fourth aspect relates to vestigial ideological conflicts in this region often articulated in terms of ethnic interest.

Highland-Lowland Ecological Distinctions and Ethnic Tensions

From the perspective of precolonial India and early China, Southeast Asia was a frontier region, inhabited by exotic races and peoples. Relatively low in population in comparison to India and China in prehistoric as well as more recent times, Southeast Asia yielded valuable tribute and trade products such as aromatic sandalwood, exotic bird of paradise feathers, and much coveted rhinoceros horn (Hickey, 1982; 33-34).

From late neolithic times to the present, the geographical distinction between the alluvial plains and mountain hinterlands tended to define interethnic relations in the area and from the earliest articulation of state society—perhaps in the second century AD—to the present a sharp division between lowland and highland populations has obtained in Southeast Asia. Plains dwellers adapted and refined wet-rice cultivation, producing surpluses and articulating stratified societies well over 2,500 years ago. Early kingdoms in Southeast Asia such as Oc-eo in Vietnam and Funan in Cambodia further articulated the development of culture to the level of the state. Kingdoms in the region from Myanmar (Burma) to Cambodia soon adopted the religion and the buttressing ideology of Hinduism, which was brought in the wake of Hindu trade missions to the wealthy frontier states in "the lands below the wind" in Southeast Asia (Reid; 1988).
In contrast to the largely homogeneous lowland irrigated-rice-tilling peoples, the mountain inhabitants were fragmented into many small tribal groups. A stability of economy and polity naturally emerges from irrigated rice agriculture. By contrast, shifting cultivation in the mountains normally dictated the cyclical mobility of tribal peoples, offering as well opportunities for new migrating groups to till Southeast Asian fields in the wake of the unyielding expansion of Han populations in southern China. The different languages, religions, socioeconomic adaptations, and political loyalties of the lowlanders and highlanders engendered tension and conflict even in precolonial times.

Presently the frontier of the Southeast Asian mountain hinterland seems to be in the final stages of closing. Until three decades ago, highland slash-and-burn cultivators could always count on another forest or an additional mountain swidden field to provide subsistence sustenance in the wake of the exhaustion of old farming plots. Today, throughout Southeast Asia, population expansion, commercial exploitation of timber and mineral reserves, and initiatives to conserve the rainforest constrain—if not absolutely deny—the traditional exploitation of the highland farming environment by minority tribal peoples. In the past lowlanders were content to conduct barter trade with upland tribal societies, secure in the knowledge that the only constraint on the expansion of their irrigated plains was the lack of available labor. Today the plains have in many areas reached their absolute carrying capacity. For the lowland rural poor and landless laborers, survival strategies include migration to urban areas or colonization of upland regions that have been the historic preserve of minority cultivators. With each passing decade the pressure on tribal peoples to permanently settle, abandon their claims to wide expanses of land, and assimilate to national culture have intensified. Government population-transfer programs lend the legitimacy of state planning to the shift of lowland populations to the uplands. Highlander perceptions of second-class citizenship status (if such citizenship is recognized at all) clearly pose the threat of conflict. The role of major powers in the highlands of Southeast Asia in the recent past clearly deserves at least passing mention in the context of this conference. Colonial divide-and-rule policies, perhaps refined earlier in other parts of the world, oftentimes were articulated by the English in Burma, the Dutch in Indonesia, and the French in Indochina in maintaining the social and political control of majority lowland peoples. Highland minorities oftentimes were given strategically crucial roles to play in colonial armed forces. Often such tribal groups were the first to be weaned from traditional religion by Christian missionaries dispatched with official sanction from the metropole.

No discussion of ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia could proceed without direct reference to the conflict in Indochina. In Laos the highland-lowland geographic division took on special significance. Here the handful of French-trained Hmong soldiers were subsequently nurtured by American operatives as the core cadre of a large, secret army based at Long Chieng (Hamilton-Merritt; 1993). For nearly 15 years this superbly motivated, well-armed, amply supplied, and professionally advised force struck as guerrilla units along the Ho Chi Minh trail, fought a rear guard action to try to hold territory in northern Laos, and assisted in the rescue of downed US airmen. The "secret army" consisted of not only Hmong but also of Mien and Lahu peoples of the high mountains of northern Laos. In the end their loyalty was not reciprocated. Some 250,000 highlanders who were abandoned in the spring of 1975 eventually fled their native Laos, while untold numbers fell victim to ethnic reprisal inside Laos. Over the past 17 years, at least 100,000 highland Laotians who qualified as political refugees have resettled in the United States. In Laos, low-intensity conflict has persisted to the present, pitting highland rebels against the central government.

Highland-lowland geographic distinctions articulated in conflicts over land, political control, and ideology are amply demonstrated by the example of Laos. The fundamental question for the future is the role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral lending agencies, and national aid programs will play toward ameliorating these conflicts. In the past, national intelligence agencies have oftentimes purposefully aggravated extant tensions, the better to win
the loyalty, allegiance, and cooperation of ethnic groups whose interests were perceived as similar to those of the funding agency. But, as the recent example of Afghanistan indicates, it is often easier to inflame ethnic, religious, and tribal passions than to control them.

Religious Tensions
Southeast Asia has generally been regarded as a region of religious tolerance. Indonesia, the nation with the largest Muslim population, is located here, as are the majority of the world’s Theravada Buddhists. Major Christian communities are found here as well not only in the Philippines but also as minorities in almost all the nation-states of the region. In the cities, Chinese—Southeast Asians worship at Buddhist, Confucian/Taoist, and—increasingly—at Christian sanctuaries. In the recent past, ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts have sometimes been bound as one.

The most gruesome expression of intracommunal conflict since the close of the colonial era in Southeast Asia transpired in Indonesia—largely on Java and Bali—in the wake of an abortive Communist coup in 1965. As the Indonesian Army moved to seize power from President Soekarno, a massive slaughter of Communist and Communist-affiliated intellectuals, peasants, and workers was sanctioned (Hefner, 1990: 193-215). The victims were depicted as godless traitors. The executioners were largely drawn from fanatic Muslim youth groups. The rhetoric was that of national salvation through righteous retribution. The reaction of the Western world to these events was generally one of unrestrained approval. In the context of the Cold War, the destruction of the largest Communist party outside the Eastern Bloc was deemed to be a major victory for the West. The conflict with the Communists was carefully couched in religious terms in Indonesia to generate maximum support for the new regime.

A little noted but clearly significant element in the Southeast Asian religious landscape is the rapid spread of Christianity in recent years. The traditionally animist highlanders across much of the region have opted for Christian conversion as a means of maintaining their distinct identity in the face of Buddhist or Muslim lowland pressures to assimilate. As Christianity advances, both in the mountains and also in distinct urban and lowland mainstream communities, the potential for tension rises. Such tension may be based on longstanding differences between the established religion in the lowlands and the new world religious affiliation in the highlands. Such tension may also result from newly acquired skills in literacy, enhanced ethnic consciousness, and strengthened resistance in the face of perceived lowland cultural assimilation policies.

Tensions in Malaysia and Indonesia between Muslim majority populations and Christian minorities has led to violence in the past and may do so in the future. In Indonesia tensions between Christians and Muslims have been rising, especially in light of the ongoing advance of Christianity in remote outer island regions and in parts of Java formerly inclined towards pre-Hindu religious affiliation. Similarly, in Malaysia the underlying tensions between Christian and Confucian Chinese and Muslim Malays has erupted in significant violence in the recent past (1969) and could certainly do so in the future. In Vietnam largely clandestine foreign missionary operations are underway in many parts of the country. These could engender internal conflicts and ignite ethnic and nationalist passions in ways unintended by their proponents. Highland Burmese rebels, especially in Karen and Lahu regions, have, since independence, always manipulated their Christian affiliation as one of the several aspects of regional independence threatened by Burmese nationalism as defined in Rangoon. In Thailand, the relatively small highland population—about 9 percent of the country—is increasingly constrained from practicing shifting cultivation. Pressure on the land has led to accelerated conversions among groups such as the Karen and the Akha in recent years. Such affiliation may indeed strengthen the will, resolve, and capability of formerly isolated peoples to resist incursions upon land and culture. As the case of Burma indicates, ethnic conflict can result if the relations between minority and majority communities fail to be negotiated with tact and understanding.

Border Regions
In a region as diverse as Southeast Asia, subprovincial district borders are often isomorphic with linguistic
and cultural distinctions. National borders inevitably demarcate major ethnic distinctions marked by unique linguistic, religious, and historical traditions. Of course there is no reason why the existence of national distinctions as demarcated by the borders of neighboring states should necessarily induce conflict. Yet if a closer look at a few key border regions should at least occasion cause for reflection.

**Indonesia—Papua New Guinea.** Indonesia, fourth-most-populous nation on earth, presents a generally positive example of national integration in a multiethnic, geographically fragmented state. Indonesian nationalists in this century have successfully promulgated a national language, wrested independence from an intransigent Dutch metropole, welded a disparate archipelago of 5,000 inhabited islands into a coherent national entity, and confronted and contained a host of regional insurrections and irredentist rebellions. Nevertheless, several problem regions continue to trouble policymakers in Jakarta.

The Indonesian state extends deep into the cultural heartland of Melanesia on the island of New Guinea. Here a low-level transnational conflict has festered for years. The issue is not one of border demarcation. It relates, more specifically, to the future of the indigenous Melanesian population of the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya—population, 1.6 million. This area was not ceded to Indonesia by the Netherlands at the transfer of sovereignty in 1949. Indeed, only after Indonesia threatened to invade in 1962 did US pressure and UN administrative machinery facilitate Dutch withdrawal in 1963. Since that time the local population has become increasingly marginalized in Irian urban areas as thousands of entrepreneurial migrants from central Indonesia have poured into the resource-rich province. The languages and cultures of the indigenous population are distinct from those of central Indonesia. Rebel forces have frequently found refuge across the border in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Both Indonesia and the PNG national government have worked hard to minimize border incidents. Still, this border area could pose serious problems in the future, problems that arise from fundamentally distinct perceptions of interest of the indigenous Irianese population on the one hand and the government in far-off Jakarta on the other.

A subtext on the Irian border problem is that of East Timor. The world was shocked to learn of the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre there in 1991. There is every indication that during the 1975-80 period when Cambodia was wracked by the autogenocidal policies of the Khmer Rouge violations of human rights on an equal scale were underway in East Timor. The armed Timorese independence movement has been largely quashed. The aspirations, identity, and yearning for dignity and self-governance of the people of East Timor clearly remain strong. Hopefully the current international pressure being brought on Indonesia may result in a reasonable compromise, perhaps facilitating the establishment of the region as an autonomous area within the Indonesian Republic. Administrative precedents for such action—Aceh in northernmost Sumatra, Yogyakarta in central Java—have worked reasonably well. If the current military repression continues, rebel forces there may in the future successfully regroup.

The case of East Timor is a clear example of selective Western interest in human rights abuses (Dunn; 1983). The Indonesian invasion of the area occurred shortly after the fall of Saigon. Jakarta was concerned that the leftist Fretilin independence forces would prove to be a major security risk to the republic. Washington assisted the Indonesian military with significant equipment sales—OH-10 Bronco aircraft directed specifically toward the counterinsurgency requirements of the Indonesian armed forces in Timor.

**China-Vietnam.** The China-Vietnam border witnessed a major military conflict in early 1979. The history of Vietnam is essentially that of a relatively small country defending national territory against an aggressive colossus to the north. The wars with France and the United States are fundamentally subtexts on the unique cultural and politicomilitary relationship between China and Vietnam. Because both states are currently ideologically consistent, ancient animosities and contemporary trade and territorial disputes—the Spratly and Paracel Islands—most probably will remain muted in the near future. Chinese military expansion and internal armament procurement are of concern throughout Southeast Asia. This is particularly true in Vietnam, where disputes over the South China Sea islands have broken out in fierce, if abbreviated, conflict in the recent past.
Cambodia-Vietnam. Cambodia remains a cause for major concern. Once the greatest of precolonial nation-states in Southeast Asia, the kingdom of the Khmer has been in decline for many centuries, victimized by cohesive and stronger Thai and Vietnamese forces and by an unusually fractious elite. The enmity expressed by Cambodians toward their Vietnamese neighbors courses deep and is widely shared among the populace. The Cambodians feel that Vietnam is determined to swallow up what remains of their culture and country—much as ancient Vietnam destroyed the coastal kingdom of Champa in 1471 (Tarling, 1992: 156). In the past Cambodian demagogues have manipulated such sentiments to their own ends. Anti-Vietnamese pogroms have facilitated the careers of Lon Nol and Pol Pot; anti-Vietnamese rhetoric has been consistently employed during the recent UN-supervised election campaign. At present, it seems as if the long internal nightmare of Cambodia is coming to an end. If things go wrong, however, violence directed against the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia and along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border could again arise.

Laos-China. A final border area of some interest is that which divides Laos and China. At present this area is calm and hopefully will remain so. During the Indochina conflict, China, the USSR, and the Pathet Lao worked closely together. Despite the efforts of the United States, aided by its tribal allies in the mountains of Xieng Khuang and Nam Tha in northern Laos, Communist forces consistently advanced, supplied overland by Chinese trucks. After 1975 Laos quickly was drawn into Vietnam’s political orbit. As a satellite state hosting some 40,000 Vietnamese troops, Laos after 1979 expressed the same hostility towards China as did Vietnam. Vietnam responded by arming and training highland rebels. Indeed, many tribal guerrillas who formerly had fought for the United States now rallied to a cause supported by Beijing. China’s support for such movements has ceased, and currently significant efforts are underway to develop a trade and communications infrastructure that will link southwest China to the sea through Laos and Vietnam. Tribal rebels these days operate, as far as is known, without the support of any major government, financed by opium sales and by fund transfers from relatives in the United States. If the Vientiane government demonstrates interest in assuring development equity for the highlands, respects minority cultural rights, and assures land title to upland farmers, the Laos-China border area may become a new development growth pole in the future. Failure to carefully negotiate the mutual interests of the government in Vientiane and minority highlands in the north could ignite further conflict between the lowland Lao and the Hmong, Mien, and Lao in this sensitive border region.

Ideological Conflicts

Of the five Leninist regimes current functioning in today’s world—China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam—two are situated in Southeast Asia. Whatever the threat of the expansion of Communism may have been in the past, it is certainly clear that this threat does not exist in Southeast Asia today. Laos, a workers’ state with precious few industrial workers, generates most of its meager foreign income by selling electricity to Thailand. Overseeing the poorest, least developed, most remote country in Southeast Asia, the present and previous Lao administrations have experienced considerable difficulty in governing their highly diverse populations, much less in interfering in the affairs of other nations. Vietnam is clearly in the process of reintegrating itself into the East Asian economy. Vietnam is receiving considerable foreign investment, manages its infrastructure with demonstrable talent in the face of meager resources, and shows every indication of an economic recovery from the policy disasters of 15 years ago (Jamieson, 1993: 373). In sum, the end of ideology as a factor in national conflict can clearly be perceived in Southeast Asia today. But this situation hardly portends “the end of history,” about which so much has been written in recent years. Indeed, it is the burden of history, and not of ideology, which has driven the ethnic enmities, national disputes, and international conflicts that have beset this region during the current century.

Conclusion

Given the expanse and complexity of the Southeast Asian geographical region it would be impossible to recount all the past, present, and possible ethnic distinctions, rivalries, and disputes in this region. I have mentioned a few areas of concern and noted that
Although it would be easy to suggest that the Government of the United States follow a strict policy of non-involvement in overseas ethnic disputes, such is not my view. If the United States were to be totally uninvolved, then major rescue operations such as that in Somalia or refugee efforts such as that on the Thailand-Cambodia border in 1979 would have been of no concern to the American public. Given the uniquely threatening nature of ethnic disputes and controversies, there is no choice but to actively monitor and to intervene positively where necessary. Intervention in the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic conflict should never be justified. Intervention, as we have seen in the recent case of Congressional action on East Timor, can serve as a wake-up call to governments that once could cavalierly dismiss overseas concerns about internal repression as the remonstrations of the political periphery. The nature of such positive intervention might take the form of channeling foreign aid to rural regions with wide disparities in household income or constraining trade opportunities for governments deemed repressive and insensitive to ethnic minority demands. Support could be provided for indigenous NGOs equipped to mediate disputes and negotiate issues that obtain between opposing groups. The most important contribution developed countries can make to the amelioration of tension between ethnic groups is to address issues of social inequality, which so often are the root cause of conflicts and clashes. If a mountain tribal people is awarded rights to permanent agricultural land, if schools are built for minority children and clinics are built to address urgent health needs, and if roadways are constructed to facilitate commerce, then the root cause of resentment and rebellion will be effectively addressed. Resources that once were invested in heavy armaments might in the present circumstance best be invested in the tasks of reducing infant mortality, enhancing family incomes, and facilitating equity in national development in Southeast Asia. With resources currently at hand, the tragedies of the past need not necessarily serve as prologue for the future.

Understanding the past role of intelligence agencies in directly influencing the ethnic conflicts during the
Cold War will undoubtedly be of some help in formulating future policies and plans. Until recently, access to sensitive records on such subjects was extremely restricted. Next year information on developments over the past 30 years in Indochina and Indonesia should be much more readily available. A clear vision of the future will most probably be enhanced by an objective and unbiased understanding of the recent past. Perhaps before long we shall learn much more about the role of foreign intelligence agencies in the generation of clandestine tribal armies in northern Laos, in the overthrow of the Cambodian monarchy in 1970, and in the assumption of power of a Western-oriented military regime in Indonesia. As events have often proven, the short run triumphs of political tacticians can sometimes result in the ruin of long-term strategic plans (i.e. Iran). Scholarly investigation of the past may prove to be of more than passing utility in charting the future.
References


Summary of Discussion

General Discussion

DR. WIXMAN: I would like to make two comments. First, I think that we need to keep in mind that our analysis is colored by our own Anglo-American or Western ethnic perspective and that it affects the way in which we perceive the rest of the world geopolitically. Second, with regard to the hierarchical context that Dr. Gladney discussed, I think one has to recognize that context is key to our understanding on the international and political level as well. When people ask someone if they are Uzbek, the answer is yes. When they ask them if they are Central Asian, the answer is yes. When they ask them if they are Muslim, the answer is yes. It all depends on the set of circumstances, the context. In one case, these groups will fight each other; and in another, they will fight together against the "outsider." I think one of the problems in making foreign policy is that often we focus on the local level and miss the bigger picture. One issue that we need to take into account when making foreign policy is that, although two groups may hate each other, if we get involved, they may be drawn together against us.

DR. GLADNEY: Yes, the old proverb that I referred to earlier, "You and I against each other, you and me against my brother, my brother and I against our cousins, our cousins and I against you," articulates such a hierarchy. I am very uncomfortable with this whole discourse on tribalism. The notion of the tribe was basically refuted 60 years ago. Now, suddenly, it is back. A simplistic interpretation of the notion can lead to misunderstanding. For example, many assume that the Soviet Union somehow held back these ethnic tensions, and now, with the Soviets out, these tensions have bubbled to the surface. In fact, in many cases—such as the Tajik versus the Uzbek or the Uzbek versus the Uighur—the Soviets created the divisions and ethnic conflicts between groups who are essentially very similar peoples. Scholars and analysts need to look at the historical processes and historical contingencies. As anthropologists, we are always looking in terms of context—when, where, why, and how—and are not drawing these broad generalities.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the issues of the potential for the rise of Southern Chinese nationalism?

DR. GLADNEY: There is the potential for an enormous shift of focus in terms of our understanding of China as Hong Kong becomes the issue of the late 1990s. I am not saying Cantonese separatism is going to pull China apart, but I am saying that a strong feeling of difference exists in the south, and the politics of difference are becoming very important for China's domestic future. We have tended to focus on border minorities, yet, when I travel in China, I find that the Chinese are not worried about the Tibetans or the Uighurs—they are concerned that the Cantonese are getting rich and that they can buy their country three times over, and they are worried about those people who are poor and who keep coming into our city taking all their jobs—this whole issue of floating population. The government can no longer say, "Hey, keep these differences at bay because we have the Soviets, the Americans, or the Japanese to worry about." I predict that these local level conflicts will become more important.

QUESTION: I'm puzzled by two seemingly contradictory trends in China. One is an increased economy and international trade, which appears to imply peaceful pursuits, and the other is an increased military, including substantial offensive capabilities. How do these fit together?

DR. GLADNEY: It is a very complex situation, and, in my opinion, the whole issue has to be framed in terms of this post–Cold War society. China no longer sees itself in opposition to the Soviets. It is interested much more in microlevel issues. The economic aspects of this drive a lot of these issues, particularly China's relationship with the Middle East in terms of exporting military hardware. But I think also the issue is a feeling of internal insecurity. During the Tiananmen Square incident, there was a rumor that the military was not obeying the leadership's orders to crack down on protesters. Since then, and I referred to this in my paper, the government has reorganized the military, fired generals, and tried to put more loyal people in their places.
However, many of them have regional loyalties that Beijing can no longer trust. The economic discrepancies between the south and east, on the one hand, and the north and west, on the other, are extraordinary. You have the Fourth World and First World side by side in one country. The people in the south are becoming very tired of carrying the north. I think Hong Kong may be an issue. I think, in some ways, a military buildup may be also for domestic concerns. I do not think people have focused on that issue.

COMMENT: Dr. Crystal, when you spoke of Cambodia, you focused mostly on the anti-Vietnamese sentiment. What are your thoughts on the country's other ethnic problems?

DR. CRYSTAL: The animosity toward the Vietnamese remains the most significant source of ethnic tension. Hopefully, this tortured land will have some time to reconstitute its policy. The Vietnamese have withdrawn, the United States seems to have played a benign role during this recent election, and the UN peacekeeping force was a success—despite the prediction of most everyone. Hopefully, we can look forward to a time when these inflamed ethnic passions will subside.
Evolving Ethnicity in South Asia
With Particular Reference to India

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Introduction

The following survey of evolving South Asian ethnicity generally supports the position of Paul Brass (1991, p. 8), who asserts that:

... ethnicity and nationalism are not 'givens' but are social and political constructions. They are creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups, as well as for themselves. [Further] ethnicity and nationalism are modern phenomena inseparably connected with the modern centralizing state.

I would attach more importance than Brass does, however, to the so-called primordial loyalties that inhere in one's birth. While these may not be immutable givens, they do represent a reservoir of cultural identifiers from which elites can draw as they assess specific political situations and make a calculus of the costs and benefits of seeking to elicit particular types of support. Among these identifiers are caste, religion, sect (which may be locally important, but which I cannot explore in this brief paper), language, dialect (also not discussed), and regional loyalty. Birth within a particular group does matter. Cultural norms may be plastic, but they are not putty, to be molded at will. They are potent and they tend to endure. Hence, politicians can go only so far in reshaping ethnic identities.

I would also stress more than Brass and other political commentators do the importance of geographic arenas. I repeatedly refer in this paper to changes in political boundaries and show that the political actors thrown together within the administrative limits of any newly reconfigured country or state adjust their ethnic agendas accordingly. They base them not only on their own social and economic interests seen in isolation but also on their perceptions of the interests of others in the same arena with whom they must compete for limited political assets. Ethnic groups have sought to advance their interests by a wide variety of means. These include the formation and support of political parties and other organizations; selective support for nonethnic political parties and sympathetic candidates; discriminatory legislation when an ethnic group controls the government at a particular level; and, when the group is out of power, propaganda, strikes, demonstrations, economic boycotts, and so forth. Groups may also deliberately resort to the use of force, even to the point of large-scale insurrection.

More often, however, violence occurs when confrontations with other groups or with the government get out of control. Violence has, in fact, at times marked virtually every type of ethnic movement discussed in this paper and has repeatedly affected every major region and virtually every state of India, as well as the other countries of South Asia (figure 9).

The Government of India has responded to the political demands of ethnic groups in ways no less varied than those used by the groups themselves. On numerous occasions, as in regard to state reorganization and the demand for quotas, it has bowed to organized public pressures. At the other extreme, it has often resorted to the use of substantial force, especially in dealing with secessionist movements in its border regions, whether they be of tribals in the northeast or Sikhs or Kashmiris in the northwest. Between these extremes, numerous options existed. At times the government successfully co-opted the leadership of specific groups, made expedient compromises with them, or acquiesced in their control over local polities, provided they did not transcend certain limits. Alternatively, the central government has used its substantial control over fiscal resources and other economic levers to gain favor or punish dissent; it has also interfered in numerous ways in local politics—a cause of particular alienation in the case of Kashmir—declaring certain groups and activities illegal, jailing dissidents, and frequently suspending the elected.
Figure 9
Ethnic Violence in India, 1972-1990

Months of Ethnic Violence as a Percentage of Total Number of Months

Percent

--- State or union territory boundary

35
20
10
5
0
legislative assembly and imposing President's or Governor's Rule.

The potential for serious and enduring damage to existing polities from ethnically rooted violence, both intranationally and internationally, is great and appears to be increasing. From 1972 to 1980, India experienced serious ethnic violence in 67 percent of all months, and South Asia as a whole experienced such violence in 95 percent of all months. For the period 1981 to 1990, the figures rose to 94 percent and 100 percent for India and South Asia, respectively. From an ethnic perspective, South Asia is arguably the most complex and one of the most turbulent regions of our planet. Its political map is far from frozen. One may safely anticipate a number of changes in the foreseeable future, many of which will be driven by agendas of specific ethnic groups. Whatever these changes may be, they will, in turn, surely give rise to new manipulations of ethnic identities to suit the needs of new situations.

This presentation considers the various historical processes that have shaped ethnic identities in South Asia, concentrating, because of limitations of time and space, on India and on the postindependence period. It also discusses specific bases for establishing ethnic identities and the periods, situations, and locales in which they assumed importance. It also notes the means by which ethnic groups seek to advance their interests and by which governments respond to such efforts. I shall not, however, strive for completeness—the topic is simply too vast. Omitted from consideration here is any discussion of ethnic relations in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Even for India, I shall do no more than touch lightly on the two most troublesome contemporary ethnic problems: the Sikh struggle for an independent Khalistan and the complex struggle in Kashmir being waged simultaneously by forces seeking independence, on the one hand, or merger with Pakistan on the other. Virtually all the empirical data that I shall be presenting are drawn from the updated 1992 edition of the Historical Atlas of South Asia, which synthesizes information from a multitude of sources, only a small part of which are noted in the bibliography accompanying this paper. Although the interpretations of those data are my own, I doubt that any are wholly original.

Processes of Ethnic Identity Formulation

Birth into a particular group still matters far more in South Asia than it does in areas of other major civilizations. One is expected to be "true to one's salt"; one's essence and traditions are all determined by birth.

Jati, which generally connotes caste, translates literally as birth. One is born into a particular caste in accordance with one's karma—the net merit or demerit of actions performed in previous existences. If one properly follows in the present life the forms of behavior appropriate to caste status, one may aspire to rebirth in a higher caste. This axiomatic belief forms the essence of Hindu dharma, which may be translated either as duty or religion. These observations are made with specific reference to Hinduism but are equally applicable to Buddhism and Jainism. The behavioral norms on which they are based have strongly influenced communities of other coexisting faiths of South Asia as well, even Muslims, for whom the very notion of caste is theoretically anathema. For example, few Indian Muslims, before the creation of Pakistan, would have hesitated to identify the social group to which they belonged by a name that would conjure up in the minds of their non-Muslim neighbors a particular caste-defined set of roles and a specific genre de vie.

For most South Asians and for most of the region's history, caste was the principal referent of one's place in society. The vast majority of the population lived in villages in which their appropriate social and economic roles were rooted primarily in caste. Social and intellectual horizons in such a setting were typically very limited, and political action, such as it was, was generally confined to a narrow spatial arena. Affairs of state were the domain of small classes of elite. Although the encompassing sacred realm of Bharat, or India, found a place in the consciousness of Hindus, communal activities at an all-India level were nonexistent. At a regional level, devotion to the cult of a particular deity or to a saintly figure and participation in major fairs and pilgrimages did provide some feeling
of community, but the sensed bonds of religion, I would argue, were generally weaker, at least among Hindus, than were those of caste.

The unification of India under the British and the accelerating expansion, thereafter, of the transportation and communications network, literacy, the press, and notions of democratic governance brought about a number of important changes in the way that people saw themselves and in their patterns of interaction. While identification with and loyalty to one's caste remained important, other social attributes became increasingly salient as wider arenas of economic and political interaction were established. New, more-or-less Westernized commercial and bureaucratic elites came into being. Although they were mainly Hindu, these new elites drew also from other religious communities and from many linguistic regions. In some situations, especially after the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, they formed the nucleus for an emerging PanIndian, nontraditional, nationalism. In other contexts, however, socially and culturally defined groups vied with one another for privilege and power. Thus, in addition to their caste and religious identities, many Indians became increasingly aware of regional attachments that were previously only dimly sensed within areas dominated by a particular language or dialect. The range of politically relevant primordial loyalties—those that form the basis for what we now recognize as ethnicity—was expanded accordingly. In a sense, then, we may say that one's identity—or jati—today means much more than caste alone.

The British rulers recognized the latent potential for disunity inherent in the social and cultural complexity of the subcontinent, and they responded fitfully and often grudgingly to Indian demands for greater control over their own destinies. In each of a series of major constitutional reforms, such as the Indian Councils Act of 1909 and the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, they acknowledged the claims of specific minorities to separate electorates to guarantee some semblance of fair representation in the evolving legislative apparatus. At first only the Muslim population was accorded special recognition. Subsequently, concomitant with an expanding franchise, elected seats were reserved also for Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Scheduled Castes as well as for such special interests as Indian commerce and industry, European commerce, landholders, labor, and even women. Whether the course adopted was an attempt to gradually establish a liberal representative democracy or a cynical policy of "divide and conquer" depends on whose version of history one chooses to believe. In any event, a policy of recognizing the en bloc claims of particular constituencies to a share of the political pie was set firmly in place, thereby reinforcing ethnic sensitivities.

The establishment of quotas remains a part of the political modus operandi to this day, although the rules for fixing quotas varied from one context to another. Some quotas are in strict proportion to population. Depressed groups—officially designated "Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes"—are guaranteed certain numbers of seats in national and state legislatures, of positions in various lower and middle levels of government employment, and of acceptances to institutions of higher education. Rules of this type are institutionalized in the Constitutions of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Other informal quotas for places on party tickets, for participation in state and provincial ministries, or for a share of the economic largess over which certain agencies of government have control, are more flexible and situation-specific. These informal quotas are often determined by deals made by party bosses in response to promises of support or various pressures by specific groups. Institutionalized religious quotas are presently unthinkable within the secular democracy of India, but the Muslim voting bloc—roughly one-ninth of the total Indian electorate and much more than that in several regions—retains an informal claim to a share of power. In Pakistan the small Ahmadiya sect, which the Constitution has declared to be outside the pale of Islam, has been allotted reserved seats in both the national and provincial legislatures, as have other minorities and women.

Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups, some ascending and others descending in the local
social hierarchy, has been abundantly documented. So too has been the frequent creation of new groups through fission of older ones and the less common amalgamation or fusion of groups when that suited a particular purpose. While these processes have operated since ancient times, the pace of change has accelerated greatly over the past century. Many new forms of identity have been socially, and often deliberately, constructed in response to the evolving corporate agendas of would-be players on the political stage. The institutionalization of democracy and the attendant politicization of more and more previously inert groups underlie these changes. Clever politicians have recognized that "pushing the right buttons" to elicit some sort of ethnically rooted response—whether based on religion, language, caste, tribal affiliation, or regional sentiment—was the most efficacious way of attracting a following and attaining power. Temporary alliances of convenience with others playing the same game were often established. This strategy was especially common in regions where few persons held deep ideological convictions.

Types of Ethnic Identity in the 20th Century

Emergent Nationalism
Two political parties acted as the vehicle for the expression of emergent Nationalism during the pre-independence period. The creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was an outcome of a newly nascent Indian nationalism. The Congress quickly became the principal Pan-Indian vehicle for the freedom struggle. When the Muslim League came into being in 1906, however, it embarked on a more parochial course. It set its agenda as much by its perceptions of the likely effects of Congress activities on the welfare of India's Muslim community as on its views of the British raj. Not surprisingly, the League vacillated between periods of cooperation with the Congress and periods of fierce opposition to it. As powers were devolved toward the provinces, the importance of success in electoral contests gradually widened the rift between the two parties. Yet it was not until 1940 that the die was irrevocably cast in favor of establishing a separate state for India's Muslim community. The requisite ethnic rationale invented for that state was Muhammad Ali Jinnah's "two-nation" theory. It was the idea that India's population consisted essentially of a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation whose core identities and goals were so fundamentally different that there was no hope that they could coexist within a single independent state without serious adverse consequences for the Muslim minority. In 1947, Jinnah's dream of an independent Pakistan was fulfilled. At the same time, the Congress dream of a secular, all-embracing Indian nation was shattered.

Partition and the massive population transfers that followed still left roughly a third of South Asia's Muslims in India; this concentration continues to provide a basis for ethnic tensions. The more than 100 million Muslims in India today constitute by far the world's largest ethnic minority. Few parts of the country are without a significant Muslim presence. Within the Indian-held portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, Muslims form a substantial majority. The dispute over Kashmir has been the cause of two wars between India and Pakistan, and the area also figured prominently in the war that led to the independence of Bangladesh. Within Kashmir a bitter multisided insurrection is now in progress as some separatists seek an independent state and others union with Pakistan. Sustained Indo-Pakistani enmity periodically makes life precarious for India's Muslims despite the country's constitutional commitment to a secular state with religious liberty for all.

Muslims, of course, are not the only significant religious minority in India. Five of India's 25 states have Sikh, Christian, or animistic majorities (figure 10), and, with the exception of the mainly tribal state of Arunachal Pradesh in the far northeast, all have been scenes of bitter ethnic struggles in the postindependence period. The most intense of these struggles is that of Punjab's Sikhs for an independent Khalistan, waged intermittently since 1981. The present period is one of relative quiescence, but the problem remains unresolved. I shall defer till later discussion of the ethnic struggles of several tribal regions.
Figure 10
Distribution of Non-Hindus in India, 1981

[Map showing distribution of Non-Hindus in India, 1981]

Leading Religion in Area of Non-Hindu Majority

- ANIMIST
- BUDDHIST
- CHRISTIAN
- MUSLIM
- SIKH

Areas in which non-Hindus comprise 25-50% of population

State or union territory boundary

Figures in each state or union territory indicate non-Hindu proportion of total population as of 1981
Linguistic Affiliation as an Organizing Principle

Language, formerly of relatively little political importance, has since 1947 emerged as a potent political force in Hindu-majority areas despite the lingering role of religion as an aspect of ethnicity in postpartition. As a matter of organizational convenience, the Congress Party, beginning with Bihar in 1908, began to organize itself into linguistic provinces, even though most of the provinces of British India and several of the larger princely states were multilingual entities. It was not until 1920, however, that the Congress Party established linguistic units throughout British India and made the creation of linguistic administrative provinces a plank in its platform for political reform. As Congress saw it, the arbitrariness of the political map that resulted from the unplanned history of British territorial acquisition in India was an affront to the natural aspirations of India’s major linguistic groups. In any event, the call for linguistic provinces was overshadowed as an issue by the more inclusive agenda of Gandhi’s noncooperation movement. Conceivably, an unstated motive in the Congress Party’s call for linguistic provinces was to divert popular attention away from communally based politics.

The first postindependence demand for a linguistic state came from Telugu speakers, the largest among several major minorities in the then Tamil-dominated state of Madras. The demands persisted, and Congress conceded by establishing the new Telugu-speaking state of Andhra in 1954. This opened the floodgates to calls for additional states based on linguistic criteria. The government then established a States Reorganization Commission to study the problem, and ultimately the States Reorganization Act of 1956 led to a radical redrawing of the political map. The 1956 Act, however, failed to divide the essentially bilingual state of Bombay and the putatively bilingual state of Punjab. These intentional departures from the new linguistic state norms were short lived. Bombay was partitioned in 1960 to form the Marathi-speaking state of Maharashtra and the Gujarati-speaking state of Gujarat. In 1966, Punjab was also partitioned, allegedly on a linguistic basis, but in actuality on communal grounds; when the government acceded to the Sikh demands for a reconfigured Punjab, the reduced area of the new state was one in which Sikhs became an absolute majority. Figure 11 reveals the extensive changes wrought by linguistic reorganization over the period 1951-72.

The government’s conciliatory attitude in regard to linguistic reorganization did not mollify linguistic groups sufficiently to guarantee their loyalty to the Union government. Within Madras, in particular, a demand arose for an independent Dravidian nation—sometimes dubbed “Dravidistan”—to comprise the four new linguistic states in which Dravidian languages were spoken. As matters transpired, the three other Dravidian states of South India showed relatively little enthusiasm for a Tamil-led Dravidian nation, and the movement lost its momentum. But one lasting outcome was the rise to power of the Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a Tamilian ethnic party established in 1949. Alone or at the head of a multiparty coalition, the DMK has ruled Madras, or Tamil Nadu as it was renamed in 1969, for all but six years since it first came to power in 1967. Arguably, the prudent willingness of the Congress Party to allow ethnically minded Tamil politicians to enjoy the rewards of power did as much as the lack of separatist ardor in neighboring Dravidian states to blunt secessionist demands. Had the movement succeeded, it would almost certainly have led to the Balkanization of India.

Demands for reorganizing the political map of independent India were not all rooted in linguistic consciousness. Several newly created linguistic states contained regions that lagged notably behind others in levels of economic and social development. As a rule, areas that had formed a part of British India were generally more advanced than those previously ruled by the less progressive princes, such as the Nizam of Hyderabad. Regions lagging behind the political core areas of the states to which they were joined soon sensed that the state was not doing enough to rectify the ill-effects of past neglect. This, in turn, led to several demands for separation, fueled by local politicians who sought to harness local discontent as the vehicle for furthering their own political ambitions. To what extent those politicians and their followers were
Figure 11
Linguistic Minorities in India

Linguistic Minorities as a Percentage of State or Union Territory Population

Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>90</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
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Uncensured Areas and Sikkim

--- State or union territory boundary
able to construct a regional sense of ethnicity cannot readily be determined, but none of these attempts to achieve a separate state succeeded.

Another outcome of states reorganization was the escalation of what have been called “nativistic” movements. In such movements the dominant linguistic group of a particular state, styling themselves as “sons of the soil,” sought, by a combination of legal measures, intimidation, and violence, to limit the opportunities of immigrant groups from other states—and sometimes of indigenous Muslims as well—and, in some instances, to create legal obstacles to their settlement. The strongest of these movements were in Assam and Maharashtra.

Tribal and Caste-Based Ethnicity
A number of tribal groups who aspired either to statehood within the Indian union or to full independence were disregarded in the initial phase of the linguistic reorganization. In the mineral-rich Chhota Nagpur, in the northeast of peninsular India, tribals had established a forerunner of the present-day Jharkhand Party as early as 1939. The party has campaigned intermittently for a tribal state since the parliamentary elections of 1957. Other groups, most notably the Nagas and later the Mios along India's northeastern borders, resorted to armed rebellion. Many among these frontier tribals were Christians, almost all spoke languages unrelated to the major languages of the states in which they lived, and very few had reason to feel a deep sense of loyalty to India. Their struggles were at times abetted by foreign Christian groups as well as by Pakistan and China, all of which provided them with moral and/or material support.

The Indian Government's attitude in dealing with tribal demands was generally less conciliatory than it was in respect to other ethnic groups. Ultimately, however, through a combination of military suppression, co-optation of compliant leaders, and other tactics, accommodations were reached with elements of each of the rebellious frontier groups, and many new, tribally dominated administrative units—either union territories or fullfledged states—were established. The much more numerous, but also more pacific, tribal groups, however, continue to find their political aspirations frustrated.

The role of caste in the postindependence period has changed considerably. In the past, power at the local level was typically shared by the dominant landholding group and the ritually supreme Brahmans. Each group legitimized the role of the other in its appropriate sphere. With the coming of democracy, however, numbers, rather than ritual ascendancy or other claims to elite status, became increasingly important determinants of power. Throughout India, at all levels of government and across the political spectrum, parties appealed to particular types of caste constituencies to gain support. Local magnates—believed to control large “vote banks” of their caste followers—offered their support to specific parties in return for a place on the ballot. Single castes rarely composed an absolute majority of the electorate; alliances among various caste groups were therefore common.

Anti-Brahmanism had become a potent political force in some regions even in the preindependence period. The appeal of Charan Singh to a wide spectrum of middle-level peasant castes over much of the Hindi-speaking area of India was a key factor in catapulting the Janata Party to power in 1978, following the period of emergency rule initiated by Indira Gandhi in 1975. The desire for empowerment among middle-level groups found expression during the period of Janata rule in the creation of the Mandal Commission, which drew up a report in 1982 suggesting a new set of quotas for the numerically strong so-called Other Backward Castes (OBCs) similar to those that the Constitution already guaranteed to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Although the Janata Party did not remain in power long enough to implement the provisions of the Commission’s report, the decision to do so by a new National Front government in 1990 touched off a wave of violent protest over large parts of India and contributed to the government’s collapse shortly thereafter.

Below the OBCs in India's social hierarchy are the Scheduled Castes, formerly untouchables, who compose roughly a sixth of the nation's total population. Their struggle for equality before the law and for humane treatment by traditionally superior groups has
been a difficult one, reminiscent in many ways of the American civil rights movement in respect to blacks. In some parts of India, especially Bihar, the peasantry—for whom the Scheduled Castes mainly work as landless laborers—have responded with incredible brutality to attempts by Scheduled Castes to better their lot. In other areas, most notably Maharashtra, large numbers of the group have adopted a new ethnic identity by conversion to Buddhism, employing a social dynamic comparable to that of the Black Muslim movement among blacks in America. Other Harijans have been converting to Islam.

**Hindu Nationalism**

Hindu ethnicity sank roots even before the turn of the present century. Within the Congress Party there emerged the powerful conservative voice of a Marathi Brahman, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who perceived in the increasing Westernization of India’s elite the seeds of the destruction of Hindu culture. He sought, sometimes violently, to oppose the British presence. No less conservative in some respects, but far more tolerant of non-Hindu perspectives, was Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi’s commitment to nonviolence and his fruitful collaboration with the liberal and secular-minded Jawaharlal Nehru lessened the following for Tilak’s brand of Hindu nationalism for decades but could hardly extinguish its appeal. Even before Tilak’s death in 1920, Hindu nationalism was institutionalized in various guises, beginning with the Hindu Mahasabha, founded in 1907 in part as a reaction to the creation of the Muslim League. Although never posing a serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was particularly influential in the period before and just after partition in fomenting anti-Muslim activities and in giving credibility to Jinnah’s aforementioned two-nation theory. Also noteworthy is the militant and fascist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Association), one of whose members assassinated Gandhi in 1948. Founded in 1925, it remains a potent force, especially in Maharashtra, the region of its inception.

Despite their high visibility and local prominence, no Hindu nationalist party in the postindependence period even came close to gaining control over any state legislature, not to mention Parliament, until 1990. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, however, gained heightened respectability by being admitted into the hodgepodge anti-Congress Janata coalition that swept to power in 1977. The period 1990-91 witnessed a dramatic rise in the strength of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), successor to the Jan Sangh. This was especially marked in India’s conservative Hindi heartland.

Some observers of the Indian political scene anticipate that the BJP will be able to form the next government, either alone or at the head of a new anti-Congress coalition. The changed fortunes of the Hindu nationalists may be attributed to a variety of factors. Among them are the termination of the Nehru family dynasty, the decline in public confidence in the long-ruling and increasingly corrupt and scandal-ridden Congress Party, and the failure of any other ideologically based party to win the allegiance of a major segment of disenchanted Congress supporters. No less important has been the BJP’s ability to project the sense that it stands for the true India. It appeals mainly to the landed, albeit nonelite, segments of the rural population and to the lower middle class of the urban population. Neither of these groups has previously enjoyed a large share of political power over any sustained period. Implicit in the appeal of the BJP is a certain rejection of Western influences, along with a generous dose of anti-Islamic sentiment vis-a-vis both Pakistan’s and India’s own Muslim population.

The BJP’s cynical exploitation of popular Hindu emotional sentiment in regard to the controversial destruction of a 16th-century mosque allegedly built over the site of Lord Rama’s birth put the BJP at the center of public attention and was instrumental in bringing on the most serious wave of Hindu-Muslim communal violence since the period of partition. This led to the dismissal of BJP ministries in four states in December 1992 and their replacement by President’s Rule. (This is shown on figure 12.) Some commentators argue that the BJP leadership is more representative of the true India than was the Congress Party—as well as less corrupt—and anticipate that, once in power, the party will act with a considerable degree of responsibility and will restore stability to the nation. I am inclined to doubt that assessment.
Figure 12
Proportion of India's Population in States Governed by Ethnic Parties, 1965-1993

For purposes of this graph, regional parties are considered as ethnic and the Union Territories of Delhi, Goa, Pondicherry, etc., are treated as States.

The number of States or Union Territories governed by ethnic parties is noted for each year.

Figures for each year are as of the month of March.
Postscript
In legislative assembly elections held in November 1993, the BJP suffered dramatic losses in three of five states in which it was formerly the ruling party, including Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state. On the other hand, it bettered its formerly dominant position in Rajasthan and won a smashing victory in Delhi. To a considerable extent, BJP losses were reflected in Congress gains. Whether, as some observers suggest, the 1993 elections signal that the BJP tide has crested and begun to fall remains to be seen.
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Reprint Corporation, 1969. (Original edition, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, 1915). Although its anthropometrically based views on Indian races are antiquated, its maps of caste distributions and discussion of how castes are regarded, often stereotypically, by Indians themselves are useful.


Schwartzberg, Joseph E. "The Distribution of Selected Castes in the North Indian Plain," *The Geographical Review,* vol. 55, no. 4, 1965, pp. 477-95 plus a large folded insert. Based on extensive field research, this work employs a combination of maps and graphs to indicate, at various scales, how castes are distributed over a large part of northern India.


K. S. Singh. *The People of India: An Introduction.* Calcutta: Anthropological Survey of India, 1992. This is the largely methodological introductory volume to the Anthropological Survey's massive People of India Project, begun in 1985 and destined to provide "a brief, descriptive anthropological profile of all the (4,635!) communities of India, studying the impact on them of change and the development process and the linkages that bring them together."

K. S. Singh, ed., *Tribal Movements in India* (two volumes). New Delhi: Manohar, 1982. Presents papers given at a seminar organized by the Anthropological Survey of India at which 36 ongoing tribal movements were identified. Fourteen of these, all in the northeast, are treated in volume one and the remainder, from other regions, in volume two.


Sophier, David E., ed., *An Exploration of India.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1980. Includes, inter alia a critical overview of Indian regions by Bharat L. Bhatt, a valuable study of linguistic boundaries by Charles J. Bennett, and a highly original overview of the regional patterning of culture in India by the editor.

Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Robert Stoddard

I am going to try to achieve two things: first, integrate content with what Alex Murphy said yesterday about general principles through an illustration in South Asia, using Sri Lanka as an example and, second, build upon what Dr. Schwartzberg has said about the background of ethnic diversity in South Asia, but giving a slightly different prediction about India's political future.

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is primarily between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the mostly Sinhalese government. The Tamils want greater political control over their lives; therefore, they seek greater autonomy or even sovereignty over a specific territory. My comments pertain to the controversy over the delineation of such an area, a territory I will call "the Tamil region."

At first glance, it would seem that a map showing the spatial distribution of people according to their ethnicity would provide a fairly objective method for drawing boundaries. However, even so-called objective regionalization depends upon agreement about, at least, four conditions which involve fundamental geographic issues. These are:

• The definition of the pertinent population. What constitutes membership in the ethnic group being regionalized is illustrated in Sri Lanka by the uncertain status of those classified as Indian Tamils. Because the Indian Tamils have an uncertain citizenship status, have been less politically active, and generally belong to a lower caste than the Sri Lankan Tamils, they are usually omitted from the population that defines the Tamil region. But such an omission is not universally accepted and, as I will presently show, the inclusion of Indian Tamils can make a difference.

• The definition of ethnic territory. Territorial belongingness is normally based upon the existence of a demographic majority. But in a census unit where no group exceeds 50 percent, a case can be made for defining territorial belongingness to the group having only a plurality. In most administrative subdivisions of Sri Lanka, one or another of the ethnic groups has a very large majority, so the potential for this kind of controversy is limited to only a few areas. But these few areas are the critical places of conflict and are where "ethnic cleansing" is most likely to occur. Even though intense fighting has taken place in the Tamil heartland of Jaffna, some of the severest suffering by noncombatants has occurred in the peripheral or frontier areas, where no ethnic group possesses a majority.

• The size of the areal units. The real crux of the territorial problem is one of scale because the homogeneity of a region depends upon the size of the areal unit that is being clustered to form a regional whole.

• The decision about the necessity for regional contiguity. There is a strong argument for avoiding ethnic enclaves in any administrative unit. In the Sri Lankan situation, it is difficult to achieve complete contiguity because of the spatial distributions of the ethnic populations.

Let us examine this regionalization task—that is, the objective delineation of a Tamil region—by looking at the distributions of ethnic populations at three areal scales.

On the provincial level, eight of the nine Sri Lankan provinces have large majorities consisting of only a single ethnic group. Furthermore, their geographic arrangement does not violate the goal of contiguity (figure 13). In the Eastern Province, however, the largest group has only a plurality. Sri Lankan Tamils, who have the plurality in this province, insist that it should be part of their region of control, even though it differs a little bit from the traditional historical lands. The government disagrees.

If we look at the district level, the complexity of the territorial issue is even more evident. In over half the 24 districts, the majority ethnic group exceeds 80 percent of the population. In only three districts does the
Figure 13

Ethnic Composition in Sri Lanka, 1981

By Province

By District

By Division

- Sinhalese Majority
- Sinhalese Plurality
- Sri Lankan Tamil Majority
- Sri Lankan Tamil Plurality
- Indian Tamil Majority
- Indian Tamil Plurality
- Moor Majority
- Moor Plurality
percentage drop below 50 percent. However, the location—and here we come into the geographic aspects that were emphasized by Dr. Murphy—of these three districts complicates the task of regionalization. Two of the plurality districts—Trincomalee and Amparai—are in Eastern Province and present the same definitional problem as produced by the larger provincial units. The third district, Nuwara Eliya, is located in the center of the country, where it is surrounded by Sinhalese majority districts. Furthermore, the ethnic population that holds the plurality is the Indian Tamil community. Therefore, if a definition of “Tamil population” were to be expanded to combine both the Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils, the resulting different ethnic map would produce a Tamil region having a non-contiguous exclave.

Minor civil divisions below the district level are too small for political autonomy. That does not mean, however, that these units cannot be used as a basis for a regionalization scheme. However, the spatial fragmentation of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the peripheral zone persists at this scale. In the Trincomalee District, the population residing along a narrow coastal sliver forms a plurality consisting of a third ethnic group—the Moors. The geometric complexity of ethnic concentrations is partially solved if the Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils are considered as members of the same ethnic category because the plurality population of this coastal strip shifts to being Tamil. Although such a redefinition of the Tamil population tends to solve some of the problems of contiguity along the east coast, as noted above, it complicates the regionalization task in the central part of the country.

Thus, it is evident that a major contributor to ethnic conflicts is the distributional pattern of contending populations. Also, this Sri Lankan situation reinforces the generalization made yesterday: the areas where atrocities are most likely to occur, and from which most refugees would originate, are the zones of ethnic transition between the regional core areas of the differing ethnic groups.

Now, let me shift to the second topic which concerns India, where I would like to deal with a nonterritorial conflict. My own interests have usually focused upon ethnoregionalism more than on the nonspatial interclass struggles for power. However, interclass strategies have real implications for the Hindu nationalist movement.

It is critical to note that we are dealing with two major perspectives on Indian nationalism, the secular and the Hindu. Indian secular nationalism is well illustrated by the leadership of Nehru, who expounded, practiced, and institutionalized the pluralistic society. From this perspective, the Indian nation-state is based upon a syncretic view of Indian culture and a federal system of government. All religions, all jatis, all languages, and all people within the territory of this country have equal opportunity under the law, according to the Constitution. The laws of the land accommodate both the wishes of the majority, as expressed by free and democratic elections, and the rights of the minorities.

In contrast, Hindu nationalists believe that the nation should be based not only on common culture but also upon the religion of Hinduism. The more extreme forms want to rule India as a Hindu state and rid the country of all non-Hindu persons and influences. The more benign forms of Hindu nationalism seek unity among the various castes and languages in India through the common heritage of living within a “Hinduized” land.

From the perspective of the Hindu nationalists, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs already share a more or less similar sacred geography. Because of their origins, their holy lands are within the same Hinduized land. The Jews and the Parsis came from foreign areas, but, because these communities are small, they have not been a particular problem. On the other hand, Hindus view Christians and Muslims—with their doctrinaire ideas—as a problem. The nonacceptance of Muslims is especially strong because:

- Muslims are associated with the invasions from circa 1000 to later than 1500.
Some Muslim leaders, insisting that Muslims belong to a separate nation, carved Pakistan from a “part of India.”

The Indian Muslim population is large enough to make a significant difference.

If the BJP were to gain national power, it is difficult to predict whether stability would be restored to the nation. But we can predict that, if the right wing of the Hindu nationalists should gain power, there would most likely be mass, even widespread, conflicts in areas where significant Muslim populations now live. A plausible scenario would be massive outmigrations similar to those that occurred during partition. A worst case scenario would be another war between India and Pakistan—this time with nuclear weapons.

In spite of several conditions that can lead to conflict, there are strong reasons for believing that India will not erupt into major ethnic wars, with the possible exception of Kashmir. Other than Kashmir, there is strong evidence that India is not as ethnically volatile as many other regions in the world. First, note that the population of India exceeds all of Africa, all of Latin America, or all of Europe, none of which is in a single nation-state or single country. All these other regions are splintered into many states, and the people within each show little evidence of uniting politically. In contrast, even with all the diversity among the people of India, the nation has remained together for almost half a century. Furthermore, this has been accomplished within a mostly democratic environment again, something that has not been achieved in Third World countries in Africa or in Latin America. It also contrasts with the situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where ethnic feelings were suppressed by dictatorial governments. That success provides a basis for predicting that ethnic conflicts will not be more severe in India than elsewhere.

A second reason for predicting fewer ethnic conflicts within India than in many other major world regions is based on the Indic culture. Maybe India’s success is just a happenstance of outstanding secular leadership at the time of, and immediately after, independence and, therefore, will dissipate with time. Yet, secular nationalism does seem to have a firm foundation, namely the Indic culture, which has nurtured tolerance and has accommodated differences through the ages. The eclectic and nonideological nature of Hinduism and the other indigenous religions of South Asia certainly provides a deeply ingrained cultural propensity for the acceptance of differences. It is true that throughout most of history the people of the subcontinent did not live in a single political unit and that the various regional states did engage in fighting, but most conflicts did not result from the kind of major ideological crusade that separates people for centuries and produces long-lasting hatreds.

Certainly it is in the best interest of the United States, as the leader of the democratic world, to support the forces of pluralism in South Asia.

General Discussion

DR. GLADNEY: I am always, and I think everybody is, amazed that India is still together. You mentioned the term success in that regard. I wonder if you could talk a little bit more about why this is a success, particularly considering the poverty of India, the civil strife, the Hindu-Muslim clashes, and the separatists like the Kashmiris. Why is it that keeping the country together is successful?

DR. STODDARD: Maybe the term “success” is a little bit strong, especially if we define a successful state as one that eliminates poverty, as well as reducing civil strife. And, I do not deny that the Hindu-Muslim clashes are just as worrisome in India as religious conflicts in Northern Ireland, in the Caucasus, or in Lebanon. Furthermore, half a century may be too short a time to declare full success. Moreover, the durability of India as a state may partly reflect the lack of a highly politicized populace. After all, the 67 percent of the population that resides in rural areas live a life that is pretty much circumscribed by their local environment. Although there is a rising politicization, as expressed by the percentage of people who have voted in the recent elections, the stability of a peasant agrarian economy or agrarian society probably goes a long way toward explaining the relative success.
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: The Indian Government has been willing to pull back. This has not happened yet in Kashmir and Punjab, however.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the Kashmir situation?

DR. SCHWARTZBERG: I plan to work on Kashmir during the coming year. The people in Kashmir are alienated to a degree that will preclude their reconciliation with India. I cannot predict exactly the shape of the future of Kashmir, but I will predict that there will be a significant change in the situation there.

I am more optimistic in the case of Punjab, a richer area and strategically much more important. There seem to be signs that India has the Punjab situation under control. However, the raid on the Golden Temple will not soon be forgotten, nor the many other human rights abuses that the Indian Government has committed in the name of quelling that insurrection. I believe, however, that the prospects for reconciliation exist, and many people who know Punjab better than I do say that, even at the worst of times, the majority of Sikhs were always moderate and that the extremists never represented the Sikh rank and file.

One fundamental difference between Kashmir and the Punjab is that the dissociation of Punjab from India would probably let loose an unstoppable Balkanization of India, while dissociation of Kashmir would not necessarily result in such an outcome.
The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic Overview

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Introduction

Following the breakup of the former Soviet Union, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan strongly criticized US intelligence estimates that, he alleged, had ignored Soviet demographic and health statistics. Moynihan argued that any society that exhibited the symptoms of the USSR—which included rising overall mortality and a high incidence of alcoholism—could not be a legitimate economic or military threat to the United States. The criticism is unfair in one sense, since it does not require national health or sobriety to launch missiles. Nevertheless, Moynihan's observation about the role of demographic statistics in intelligence analysis is insightful.

States sometimes go to great lengths to disguise data about their economies and societies, usually with the motive of misleading their enemies (and perhaps their own citizens as well). More commonly, however, accurate data are elusive because they are difficult and expensive to collect, analyze, and interpret. I once spent several months visiting and collecting data from remote family planning clinics in Chile, and I was struck with how different the situation at the clinics was compared with the official reports in Santiago. My experience is highly typical, I think, and is shared by most who have done field research.

Demographic data are almost always the best data that are available for a society. This is not to say that they are good; indeed, they are often very poor. I am only here advancing a comparative judgment. Governments collecting demographic data (whether censuses, vital registers, or surveys) can call upon an impressive body of international experience and knowledge concerning the planning, execution, interpretation, and adjustment of demographic data. Most such data, moreover, are not seen as threatening by governments. Certainly there are cases where certain population information is viewed as terribly dangerous (Lebanon or Iraq's religious compositions, for example), but, even when this is the case, other demographic data unrelated to policymakers' phobias may be unaffected. Finally, censuses have to be conducted openly. Information about their quality and the nature of their biases is widely circulated in the demographic community, and sometimes "corrections" are advanced by demographers outside the country. The only effective way to keep demographic data secret is not to collect them.

Demographic Indicators of Instability

Consider also that certain demographic trends correlate highly with socioeconomic variables; were it not for this fact, demographic transition would be an arcane model of little interest to any but abstract theorists. Thus, it requires only a small logical step to see that socioeconomic data and trends (perhaps closely guarded or disguised) are imbedded in demographic data that are open and aboveboard. Hungary offers an interesting example. As a former Warsaw Pact member, Hungary was quite guarded in releasing social and economic data, but its population data are among the best in the world.

I do not mean to imply either that censuses ought to replace electronic surveillance in the intelligence kit bag or that demographic data can entirely compensate for a lack of socioeconomic data. My point is that population data are a rich vein that is not mined sufficiently and that academic researchers and intelligence analysts have the opportunity to use census data in creative ways that give new insight into societal trends. Perhaps because the data are easy to come by, their value is not fully appreciated.

A comprehensive case for the value of the demographic perspective in assessing intelligence issues would require more space than I have available. I hope a few aspects of the "correlation" I mentioned earlier will suffice.
A society whose fertility begins to fall rapidly is undergoing a profound transformation. Most basically, it has begun to trust the permanence of lowered infant and childhood mortality, something that is hard to perceive at the family level, and something that may require denial of firmly embedded beliefs. The society has otherwise begun to change its traditional way of life by moving away from rural, agrarian values and to embrace the smaller family norms associated with urbanization and economic development.

Rostow's term "takeoff," which used to describe a stage in economic development, has been largely discredited by other economists (although it is not clear whether this is because Rostow was overall simplistic or because he went to work for US President Johnson). "Takeoff," however, seems appropriate to describe certain changes in fertility and growth that change the "momentum of growth" from positive to negative. Brazil and Mexico are both at that point now, and, while any number of observers of different stripe continue to focus attention on the problems of severe poverty that haunt sectors or regions of both countries, the demographic picture is reasonably optimistic. Rely on the pessimistic reports if you will, but the economic transformation of both societies is inherent in their current demographic profiles.

Infant mortality data offer a measure of societal well-being that is highly sensitive to change. Public health authorities argue that the infant mortality rate is the best measure of the health of a society, and, even if this is hyperbole, surely there is a high correlation between such mortality and the prosperity of a society. Overall mortality is also a valuable indicator. Mortality remained constant in Eastern Europe from the mid-1960s until the late 1980s—and actually increased in the USSR during the same period—while mortality was falling in virtually all other countries. There is, indeed, good reason to suspect that these mortality trends have real meaning, just as Moynihan pointed out.

Within the context of this discussion, demographic data should be considered as analogous to an air photo in which "signatures" of various kinds indicate a dangerous ground truth. My initial investigations into this area have led me to some hypotheses about demographic processes that correlate strongly with societal troubles. It is important at the onset to understand that such correlation is modest at best with general population growth. That, of course, is why so many extreme neo-Malthusians insist very loudly that you believe them; the ideology is strong, but the evidence is weak. I will limit my remarks here to a single case of ethnic strife, that of Sri Lanka’s two postwar insurgencies.1

The Youth Bulge in Sri Lanka

As Professor Stoddard implied, if you look at the historical or cultural context of the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, a complex situation emerges. Indeed, political scientists and analysts in the State Department and elsewhere have accounted for this in many ways. Many cite ancient animosities between Tamils and Sinhalese.

The demographic data suggest another reason behind the conflict, however. Figure 14 shows the age structure of the two ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. Using Dallass Fernando’s method of looking at the Sri Lankan population by revenue district, we are able to break down ethnic group data to determine age structure of the populations. This graph reflects two distinct demographic transitions—a leading transition for the Sinhalese, who predominantly live in the country’s wet zone, and a lagging one for the Tamils, who live in the dry zone. It reveals a correlation between the incidents of conflict between the two ethnic groups and the proportion of each population that is youthful (ages 15 to 24)—those who are in demand of land, jobs, higher education, opportunity, and other kinds of resources in the society.

When the British left Sri Lanka, they left these resources largely under Tamil control. After all, the Sinhalese had resisted British penetration, while the Tamils had worked in the civil service not only in Sri Lanka but elsewhere in the empire as well.

1 See Population Geography, June 1984, pp. 1-11.
Figure 14
Sri Lanka: Youth Bulge

Percentage of total population, age 15-24

Sinhalese insurgency

Major anti-Tamil rioting in Colombo
Peak of Tamil insurgency, September 85

23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16

Critical level*

Sri Lanka total
Sinhalese
Tamil

*The critical level is the point at which youths make up 20 percent or more of the population.
When the proportion of the Sinhalese population who were young adults reached 20 percent of the total population—what we term a youth bulge—the Sinhalese insurgency of 1970 occurred. Although other factors, which I do not mean to diminish, were behind the uprising, it is more than coincidental that the peak in that age group took place as conflict broke out. Indeed, a former US Ambassador to Sri Lanka told me that all the insurgents in the rebellion were under 24 years old.

The Tamil population shows a similar story. At the time of the Sinhalese insurgency, the percent of the Tamil population that was age 15 to 24 was low and, thereby, caused no problem. In response to the Sinhalese insurgency, the government made changes in the allocation of resources, jobs, land, and higher educational opportunities. So by the time the Tamil youth bulge occurred, numerous institutions and laws were in place that favored the Sinhalese rather than the Tamils. As such, the outbreak of a much more serious episode of violence took place coincident with the rise of the Tamil youth bulge. This bulge, incidentally, has lasted such a long time that it has become entrenched in the society. Even when it goes away—probably by 1995—its effects are going to linger because of its longevity.

Let me switch the venue to the case of India. My graduate student, Joan Butler-Qazi, meticulously went through numerous Indian newspapers and other publications and came up with measures of violence for each of the country’s districts. Then she correlated these measures of violence with the size of the 15-to-24 age cohort in 1981. The correlation for India as a whole was an R squared of 0.77. Here, the overall demographic variable is driving ethnic conflict generally.

Conclusion

We have also examined the youth bulge situation more broadly, not only as it relates to ethnic conflict. For South Korea, for example, we predicted flatly that youth riots would taper off and eventually disappear as a result of the shrinking of a youth bulge. Finally, one tremendous advantage in using demographic variables for analyzing conflicts, including ethnic ones, is that often the data are quite easy to come by.

1 The publication of this research is forthcoming.
Ethnic Conflict and Population Displacement

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Historical Review of Postwar Refugee Populations

In large measure, today's so-called ethnically driven refugee populations are the extension of territorial conflicts that were waged immediately before or just after World War I. To one degree or another, that war partially resulted from particular territorial tensions released by the collapse of former empires. The same ethnic or territorial zones were then, again, suspended by the onset of World War II; which was another ethnic conflict that eventually found most of the world's peoples fighting either for or against what often became known as ethnic virtue. During the war, however, the battle focused not on the individual ethnic groups that had been fighting one another for generations but on larger, national, territorial campaigns.

When World War II ended, the focus quickly switched to the emerging superpowers—two foes who were able to stifle domestic ethnic conflicts by squaring off powerful armies against one another. Internal ethnic conflicts were squelched in order to amplify national unity and the projecting of a front.

Also following World War II, it was believed that the world's refugee problem would soon disappear. Motivated at the time by both geopolitical and humanitarian concerns, the predominant powers—principally the victorious West—sought to accommodate the needs of the many and diverse dislocated groups. Several local, regional, national, and international refugee relief and repatriation/resettlement agencies—many associated with the United Nations—were established to deal with the day-to-day needs of the then-homeless peoples and political refugees. These also promoted the eventual settlement of those peoples to either historical or new homelands. The postwar New World Order architects, who were also the founders of the United Nations, generally perceived that these displaced peoples and the refugees were a problem but did not see them as a symptom of the international geopolitical restructuring that they had themselves engineered.

The common view of the various organizations that came into being after World War II was that they would provide for the security and welfare of the uprooted only until the needs of the displaced were accommodated. It was fully believed after the war that agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would only exist for a short period because they would soon get everyone resettled and all problems would go away. Obviously, this proved to be erroneous.

The Current Picture

Recently, another empire, the former Soviet Union, has collapsed, and, once again, the world is experiencing a wave of territorial/ethnic tensions. To one degree or another, almost all these tensions are expressions of dormant territorial hatreds that in some locales date back centuries. They have been inactive for decades because the two major superpowers have muffled them and/or used them to their own respective needs.

Today, there are far more displaced peoples than there were at the end of World War II, and they are found on more continents. Forced migrations have increasingly come to dominate the patterns and processes involved in international population movements. Ironically and tragically, however, a majority of these people, despite their refugee-like experience, do not find themselves protected or cared for by national or international refugee relief agencies because they still do not fall under the legalistic, post—World War II definition of "refugee."

As officially defined, refugees are persons who have crossed a recognized political border and who have then registered with an official group, which most often is the UNHCR. If a person does not do that, the international community does not recognize him or her as a refugee. Today, many, even in the United Nations, argue that this definition has become increasingly blurred. Indeed, the distinction between who is
and who is not a refugee is probably irrelevant, given the ever-expanding number of groups worldwide who are just as persecuted and uprooted as official refugees.

The problem of accurate accounting of refugees goes way beyond the definitional problem, however. Every day, we hear new figures about how many refugees are here or there. Refugee statistics are fraught with untruths and inaccuracies. Do not believe any of the figures you hear; they are all made up. Most of these figures are from thirdhand or fourthhand sources, many of whom are unreliable. There are vested groups—including the refugees themselves—who want those figures either inflated or deflated for their particular interests. The numbers only provide a relative approximation of how many are in one region vis-à-vis another, and they change dramatically over time.

Today, official recognized bona fide refugees—those who register with the UN after crossing an international border—number over 17 million. Broken down regionally, they include:

- In Africa, 5.7 million. This is so far below the actual number; it is not even close. Africa is one of the worst regions.
- In Europe and North America, 3.4 million. Of course, this does not include what is going on in Georgia.
- In Latin America, 107,700, primarily in Central America.
- In East Asia and the Pacific, 399,000.
- In the Middle East, 5.5 million.
- In South and Central Asia, 2.3 million.

More important than these numbers, however, are the 50 million internally displaced people who are not recognized as refugees. These are the people who have never had any form of internationally recognized status and who are probably never going to attain nationhood. They are not counted. They are the majority of displaced peoples in the world. They do not consider themselves to be part of any country and have no sense of belonging to an individual, extant country. That is the case whether we are talking about Georgia or Burma or Afghanistan.

Meeting Refugee Needs

In terms of who attends to refugees, it is quite telling to look at where the money comes from to support refugee aid. In absolute terms, the United States devotes the most money, while the European Community as a whole devotes the second-largest amount. I think a better way to look at this, however, is on a per capita basis. North European countries—notably, Norway—give a disproportionate amount of money to the care and treatment of refugees. Using this criteria, the United States falls to about 10th or 11th place.

There are strings attached to all this money. When a country donates money to the UN, it always attaches a string dictating where its aid can go. Aid from the United States and the European Community always goes to countries and regions where strong trade alliances exist with the donor.

In any case, the people with the power and the money are in the United States and Europe; they do not give money to Africa until conditions there get out of control. And often, the humanitarian situation in Africa is muted because many of those affected are not, by definition, real refugees because they have not crossed any international borders. As far as the displaced are concerned, however, when they leave their tribal or clan homeland, they have crossed a border; they do not need to go any farther than that. (Indeed, many Africans do not recognize international borders on their continent except as lines on the map.) As such, money is not earmarked for most African areas until conditions flare up to the extent that they become of international concern. This usually occurs only after the situation has already spiraled out of control.
Forced Migration and Ethnicity

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Introduction

The main reason for deciding to speak on forced migration and ethnicity is because I recently addressed that topic at a conference—organized by the International Geographical Union's Commission on Population Geography in Ljubljana, Slovenia—which focused on the topic of ethnicity and geography. Obviously this is a topic that is of current concern not just in the United States but also in other areas of the world; indeed, one of the major causal factors—and consequences—of forced migration in the world today is ethnic conflict. When I found out that Dr. Kenzer was going to speak on a similar topic, I thought I would attempt to organize my comments today more broadly in order to address also some related humanitarian issues; after all, this session is titled, "Perspectives on Demographic and Humanitarian Issues." I think my role here today, therefore, will be to highlight a few of these perspectives, some of which have already been mentioned and others of which may be new.

When dealing with the topic of forced migration—particularly in trying to understand its ethnic components—three themes come to mind. These are somewhat in line with what the current administration probably considers its priorities:

- **Human rights.** From a global perspective, human rights with respect to migration are severely limited because little freedom of movement exists on an international scale. Both refugee movement and "free," or economic, migration are heavily controlled by increasingly stringent regimes and quotas.

- **Democracy.** We have heard about a lot of geographic concepts—such as national territoriality, regionalism, homeland, and frontier—at this conference. It is instructive to see how these might manifest themselves in terms of democratic principles, particularly concerning the right of self-determination in a world where the traditional state system is admittedly breaking up (if not down). Where do you draw boundaries? Which people get to determine on which territory lies the future of their own ethnic communities? Another factor to consider is access to power; when people are eliminated from access to power, it often is a causal factor of warfare, which tends to produce forced migrations.

- **Conflict resolution.** I think Wade Hinkle yesterday raised a good point. Hindsight is 20/20, and geographers have been strong in terms of trying to understand regions and relationships between ethnicity and territoriality, but geographic knowledge is not necessarily sufficient in terms of trying to come to a resolution of some conflict that has already begun. Most geographic analysis has not been predictive in terms of where conflict will break out. I think that geography and geographers can best contribute to an understanding of ethnic conflict by focusing not on conflict resolution but on preventing conflict exacerbation.

Typology of Forced Migration

My office director, Bill Wood, has developed a typology of forced migration that we have applied to different regions to help understand different causal components of forced migration (see figure 15). It is not necessarily important in this model to draw distinctions between refugees, forced migrants, and internally displaced persons, although when it comes to providing humanitarian aid or support, refugees are favored over both internally displaced persons and illegal immigrants, who tend to "disappear" and are not accorded rights in the countries in which they live.

There is also an ethnic component to each of the three subsets shown on figure 15. It is strongest in the category of political instability and civil unrest—largely governmental persecution. That is because this persecution is often directed toward a particular ethnic group or may have consequences for specific ethnic groups. Ethnicity is a factor when looking at forced
FORCED MIGRATION FLOWS: Subnational Causal Factors & International Migration Categories

migration, not just at the source but also at the destination as well. Whether a group is territorially concentrated or not, if its members move from one territory into another, they are changing the ethnic balance in two regions; it is a source-and-destination dynamic.

During periods of economic decline, a high percentage of forcibly displaced persons are members of certain ethnic groups that are underprivileged or in the worst poverty-stricken regions. These are also often the first ones who are susceptible to famine or ecological disasters. So the way to look at the ethnic dimension of people who have fled and need to be supported—whether they be forcibly displaced refugees or internally displaced persons or illegal migrants—is in a typology such as that in figure 15, in which an ethnic component can be identified in each of the three subsets.

Forced migration has traditionally been thought of as a process that produces refugees, who are defined as such because they cross international boundaries. It is quite clear, and every speaker has touched on the facts that increasing mobility and decentralization, devolution of political power, the breakdown of one-party state systems, and the rise of territoriality—be it regional or national—make it incumbent on us to increasingly think of forced migration processes at the intrastate level. It is a question of scale, I think, in terms of how we do our analysis.

From the humanitarian perspective, the different categories and classifications for migrants not only tend to lose their importance but also can often infringe upon the civil rights of certain groups that are mobile. In many cases, those accorded refugee status are privileged forced migrants. The new restrictive definitions and laws being imposed in Europe, for instance, have produced an upsurge in illegal migrants—many of whom are disenfranchised in the country in which they reside—most of whom are not counted. There are reports out of Bosnia that tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims are still moving into the rest of Europe. Now that the European refugee regime has become stricter, however, they have found ways to enter as illegal immigrants and never get counted.

Another important point to raise, which Dr. Kenzer touched on earlier, is that internally displaced people are not being accorded sufficient attention by the international community. With regard to humanitarian concerns, the internally displaced are often the most problematic. In these cases, many of the geographic concepts mentioned at this conference can be applied: the question of core and periphery relations, for instance—most of the internally displaced are located at the peripheries of states and are often the first to cross borders and become refugees.

**Crossing Boundaries**

In fact, many refugees were first internally displaced people before crossing an international border. What made them refugees is that they managed to cross such a border and were thereby accorded official refugee status. Many internally displaced people can be considered to function as refugees, particularly because internecine conflict often leads to situations where borders within states begin to function more as international borders. Look at the situation in the Caucasus or with Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan, where the internal borders are functioning virtually as international ones with regard to population movements. In many cases, therefore, whether someone being forced to move is called an internally displaced person or a refugee is a moot point in terms of how the international community needs to support them or deliver aid to them.

We should also be thinking more about the changing nature of political boundaries. The international community is increasingly recognizing that the sacrosanct nature of these boundaries is not as strong as it once was. Although many members of the international community considered Serb and Croat discussions about territorial exchanges to be an anathema, there is nothing sacrosanct about these boundaries just because they have been in existence and have been fairly permanent for so long. We are definitely seeing grudging change in this direction. At the same time, we should not underestimate the state boundaries in
Africa, for instance. While they might not necessarily have a great deal of meaning to the local peoples, they have a tremendous impact in terms of how the international community officially views various populations.

Ethnicity and Identity

Another concept related to forced migrations, which Dr. Knight referred to yesterday, is the primacy of identity and the inability of people to adjust quickly their primary identity. It is important to understand in this context the role of a catalyst or a trigger that might cause a nation either to latch more strongly onto a specific identity or to change its primary identity.

Ethnicity in most of the world, in fact, is quite dormant most of the time; it is only once ethnic forces are activated that they become politicized and can lead to conflict. We can try to understand ethnicity and the relationships between ethnic groups and regions, but that alone has little predictive value. That is why when addressing policy options—trying to be proactive as opposed to reactive—it is not enough to know a region and the nature of its ethnic groups. What might be a passive ethnicity can very quickly become activated if something is denied a particular group or if a group perceives a threat to its territorial homeland, language, culture, or religion. The interrelationship between ethnicity and territory is quite complex.

I want to mention, briefly, the factor of warfare. Warfare is quite obviously the major cause of forced migrations in terms of generating ethnic populations on the move, and national territoriality is frequently the underlying cause of much of this fighting. What is important to understand about situations where territoriality acts as a catalyst to politicize ethnicity is that, even in warfare situations that are not based on ethnic conflict, groups are often dislocated because of their ethnicity. Warfare leads to ethnic-selective dislocations when a particular region that has been overrun has a concentration of one ethnic group or contains groups that are economically vulnerable or culturally isolated. So that even when the cause of a conflict is not rooted in ethnicity, it can result in ethnic “modification” of a region by selectivity of the forced migrants.

Geography of Refugee Populations

What can probably be agreed upon in trying to understand ethnic conflict is the importance of scale and of having the appropriate approach to investigate events at the substate or intrastate level. I want to briefly present a few maps here to show how different scales might operate in terms of attempting to understand the ethnic components of forced migration.

Africa is the most turbulent continent in terms of numbers of refugees (see figure 16). Most African refugees tend to be the economically deprived and, as a result, they do not move far across neighboring borders. The African continent is also where the largest number of internally displaced peoples exists; when they cannot cross the border, they tend to congregate along the fringes of states, often beyond the limits of central authorities. In Africa, there are three or four times as many displaced persons as refugees.

In the former Soviet Union, there is a combination of short- and long-distance migration (see figure 17). Most of this movement is based on national conflict in the non-Slavic south. The economically able groups can move farther, often before the outbreak of violence.

Bringing it down to a larger scale, within the states of Tajikistan and Georgia, for example, one gets below the ethnic and into the various historical and factional clan conflicts that are at the basis of groups attempting to reestablish historical regions by pushing people off territory and back from whence they came (see figure 18).
REFUGEE FLOWS FROM COUNTRIES WITH HIGH LEVELS OF FORCED MIGRATION: AFRICA

South Atlantic Ocean

Forced Migration/1993 Population (%):

- 20%
- 10% - 19%
- 1% - 9%

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
OTHER LINE OF SEPARATION
Figure 17

Map A: The Caucasus

Map B: Central Asia


Over 100,000 refugees
10,000 to 100,000 refugees
1,000 to 10,000 refugees

*The boundary between Ingushetia and Chechnya has not been determined.
Tajikistan: Major Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons, December 1992

Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

Primary Location of Internally-Displaced Tajiks*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dushanbe City</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan-Tyube Region</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garm Region</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamir Mountain Region</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

Let me conclude by noting one of the main problems of the international response to forced migrations with ethnic components. That is, that migration regimes are set up on a bilateral basis that impinge on multilateral responses to regional problems. Individual states are setting laws while the responses to refugee-producing crises—often related to ethnic conflict—are multilateral.

Further, the UN is increasingly finding it difficult to intervene in many countries; they do not have the full mandate to deal with the internally displaced. In conclusion, it is difficult for policymakers to do more than react to the latest refugee crises. By attempting to mitigate refugee flows by tailoring policies to react to events at local and regional levels, it will be easier to respond to, if not predict, ethnic conflict that disrupts the entire state. If that is done, governments will be able at least to reduce the trauma of forced migrants and refugees, if not eliminate the cause of their movement altogether.
Summary of Discussion

General Discussion

DR. WIXMAN: While we often hear about high birth-rates being major causes of nationalism, the reverse—that is, where low fertility is one of the primary reasons for rises in nationalism—is also important. In the former Soviet Union, for example, the rapid rise in Russian nationalism was very much tied to a sense of rapidly declining fertility. In Germany, the lowering of the birthrate is also one of the primary factors in the rise of the German national consciousness. Are there people doing work on the correlation between declining fertilities and the rise of ethnic national consciousness?

DR. FULLER: Yes, exactly along the lines you say and for exactly the reasons that you say. In fact, I can say that the people that are sponsoring this conference have published a paper along exactly those lines.

QUESTION: Why does the United States distinguish between ethnic and political refugees in the way they are treated?

DR. SCHWARTZ: Frankly, in part to keep out people from coming in who are seen as potentially draining to the economy. This is a complicated issue, however.

DR. DE BLIJ: The distinction between refugees is a holdover from the Communist period. The current definition of refugees is related to the political system they leave when they come here.

DR. SCHWARTZ: The definitions come from the 1951 UN convention and the 1967 protocol. The 1951 convention was based on the post-World War II refugee regime, while the 1967 protocol was attached onto that in order to deal with peoples from other areas of the world. Dr Kenzer, do you want to elaborate on that?

DR. KENZER: You can sum it up in one word, politics. How can you say that Cubans are refugees and Haitians are not? It's a political issue. People do not want to hear that underlying our definitions for entry are issues of race and other things.

DR. SCHWARTZ: There is still the distinction between economic migrants and political refugees. The United States does not have a category of an economic refugee.

DR. DE BLIJ: We do not. It's irrelevant. The definition of a refugee is someone from a Communist country.

DR. KENZER: The distinction is becoming an important issue. We are going to see refugees being cast in a different light; all emphasis is going to be on Central Americans and people beyond.

DR. SCHWARTZ: A good test case would be Nicaragua, from where we once accepted political refugees but after the government changed, the departees became economic migrants.

DR. DE BLIJ: We also do not accept people from Communist China, but we do take people from Communist Cuba.

QUESTION: We do accept Chinese refugees; they are the ones who are allowed to have only one child.

DR. DE BLIJ: You are right.
Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative Examination

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The conventional political map of the world displays 170 political geographic features that properly are termed sovereign states. They constitute the habitual framework for contemplating international affairs. Unfortunately, the conventional map can be a most misleading instrument in presenting the political geography of the world. The map depicts relative sizes and shapes of countries and the locations of their capital cities, but these are among their least significant qualities. Indeed, it should be noted that traditional political maps of the world typically distort the size of states because their customary Mercator projection creates great area disparities between tropical and polar regions. Although Greenland is about one-seventh the size of South America, it actually appears larger on most political maps.

Among features of a state critical to governmental functioning that are ignored on political maps are:

- The territory really under effective control of the state’s government.
- The area of the state actually settled and productive.
- The degree of centralization of governmental decisionmaking and authority within the state.
- The dependence of the given state upon another state.
- Whether the state is a nation-state or a multination state. The last-named is the most pivotal.

Nations

A key element in understanding the modern world is to appreciate the fact that occupying space concurrently with states are more than 250 mutually exclusive nations, and these have few outer limits that are coextensive with state boundaries. The term nation is a useful generalizing concept that can be applied to a variety of human groupings. At the simplest level, nations may be viewed as collective, subjective states of mind in which individuals habitually segregate other persons into “our folks” and “foreigners.” Many of the world’s ills are the result of conflicting national identities. However, nations can also be appreciated for some positive effects, including providing legitimacy to governmental actions and facilitating economic interdependence through a climate of trust.

The concept of nation is questioned by some because of the great diversity of circumstances the notion embraces, with resulting difficulties in definition and measurement. Unfortunately, although most national groups share a number of elements in common, each nation, like each state (and virtually every other phenomenon studied by geography), ultimately is a unique entity. Questionnaires and other techniques that may effectively identify members of a nation in one region may prove inappropriate or erroneous when applied to groups in another area. The great diversity among nations does not make the concept any the less useful, however. Although some individuals may have a problem with the subjective quality of the abstraction, this does not mean that idea is erroneous or that nations do not exist because they cannot be measured.

The advantage of thinking in terms of nations rather than the more diffuse “ethnic groups” is the political dimension inherent in the concept. The most important common denominators distinguishing nations from tribes, castes, and other human groupings are collective self-awareness and a consensual political agenda. Members of a nation are conscious of that identity, and most believe that their interests are best served by having a state of their own.

Numerous ethnic groups throughout the world do not satisfy these two criteria. Although anthropologists and other social scientists may identify common elements that stamp a given population group as distinctive from its neighbors, a lack of group awareness of individuals beyond extended kinship patterns or
shared religious beliefs and the absence of common political goals makes it more appropriate to designate such groups by the more neutral term peoples. Nations may be viewed as peoples who have become group conscious and politically activated. The process is a continuing one and now is occurring among Quechua-speakers of the Oriente of Peru, galvanized by the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas.

The commonly accepted starting point for the appearance of nations is the French Revolution. The inhabitants of France not only transformed their state at the end of the 18th century, but also in a sense they became Frenchmen for the first time. Before that time few associated themselves with the Kingdom of France. Their identities were with family and locality and, at a higher level, with their true Christian faith. Following the Revolution they increasingly gained a sense of personal participation in a greater cultural-political organism. They were manipulated by the Jacobins, dedicated believers in “the people,” who denigrated traditional Catholicism and enthusiastically preached a new form of belonging that celebrated the interests of the “masses.” This revolutionary system of beliefs took hold because traditional religion no longer was able to meet spiritual needs in the challenges of a rapidly changing society. Urbanization and industrialization presented difficult problems for individuals for whom traditional religious establishments had no answers.

From the beginning, language proved a critical element in national identity. To be French meant sharing French culture, and this meant particularly the French language. Among proposals voiced in France’s revolutionary parliament was expulsion of all Alsatians across the country’s “natural border” of the Rhine because they were “foreigners”; their vernacular was German, not French.

The new ideas proved exciting and satisfying, and Napoleon’s troops spread them across the territory they conquered. However, talk of “liberty, equality, and brotherhood” by enthusiastic French soldiers did not co-opt civilians speaking German, Italian, and other languages into becoming part of the new French nation. Although large numbers readily accepted the secular ideas of their occupiers, each linguistic group evolved a separate national identity. Language still plays a fundamental role in the identity of virtually all nations. Linguistic homogeneity is a characteristic of every national group, with the notable exception of the Swiss, and even there group tensions exist, particularly between the Italian-Swiss and the German-Swiss. One of the most common causes of ethnic tensions within a state is a group’s opposition to perceived threats to its language. Attempts by Magyars to impose Hungarian as a uniform language throughout their kingdom in the 1870s stimulated Croatian-speakers to become the nation of Croats. A century later, Croatian intellectuals again used a linguistic threat as a national rallying symbol, decrying the degrading of the Croatian literary language by attempts of the Yugoslav regime to blend it with Serbian vocabulary and usage to form an “artificial” Serbo-Croatian statewide language.

Religious tradition also plays a role in the identities of most nations. The militancy of the Croatians about their literary language was a symptom of deeper divisions among the South Slavs based upon their differing religious heritages. Croatian culture has been bound up for more than a millennium with the Roman Catholic world, while Serbian traditions stem from Eastern Orthodox inheritance. It should be stressed that religious dimensions of modern national identities need not derive from active worship but generally come from the shared values, customs, and images accumulating in a society from a common religious legacy. Avowedly atheistic members of the League of Yugoslav Communists, although speaking a common Serbo-Croatian language, remained always partitioned into distinctive bodies of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, separated from each other by their respective religious cultures. A similar cultural disparity separates English-speaking Roman Catholic partisans of the Irish Revolutionary Army from Protestant supporters of the Ulster Defence Association.

Thus, although a common language appears to be a major element of national identity, in itself it does not provide a sufficient base for identification with a nation. The French nation never managed to incorporate the adjacent French-speaking Belgian Walloons or the Swiss francophones of Geneva. Closer to home, although virtually all citizens of the United States and
two-thirds of Canadians exclusively speak English, they remain separate nations. There are 20 different nations in Latin America who speak Spanish and at least 17 different Arabic-speaking nations in the Middle East and North Africa.

Since language appears to be an essential but not decisive element in national identity, the question remains of what distinguishes Americans from Canadians, Germans from Austrians, or Uruguayans from Argentines. Certainly a key element is an association with a particular “homeland.” This is the hallowed land of forefathers, whose legacy of monuments and structures are encountered every day. A number of otherwise homogeneous and exclusive peoples have failed to forge themselves into nations because they lack distinctive territories of their own, including Gypsies in Europe and Parsees in India.

Homeland is a key part of what the French political geographer Jean Gottman termed the “iconography” of nations. He included in the concept the sum total of “icons” shared by a given group, including their national symbols, perceptions of history, traditional myths, poetry, pastimes, and a host of other elements that otherwise can be termed little more than “trivia.” To be a Canadian is to love ice hockey, to be sentimental about the song “O Canada,” and to resist the “colossus of the south.” Americans share George Washington’s mythic cherry tree and contact football. The traditions of Islam and the values of Buddhism are foreign to both groups, however much a minority of their individuals may treasure them.

Iconographies are the products of inherited traditions, indoctrination in the education process, and mass media. They also are subject to change. Bing Crosby was once a significant element in the American iconography; his place has been taken by Elvis Presley and Garth Brooks.

Americans have difficulty in contemplating the notion of nationhood. Unlike Europeans, most of whom dwell within 100 miles of an international border, few Americans ever face challenges to their national identities. Also, our society is a multicultural one, something increasingly celebrated. Our principal ethnic minorities, Hispanics and African Americans, although manifesting characteristics that distinguish themselves from other Americans, have not forged separate nations as major minorities have done in most other countries. This is primarily because they are dispersed throughout the United States and thus lack a specific homeland in which they are a majority. Although Hispanic Americans have the potential to become a separate nation within this country through retention of their distinctive Spanish language, their religious traditions, and for many their association with Mexico, it should be noted that separatists among African Americans have always faced difficulties in attempting to mobilize political sentiments because their group shares with all other Americans a common language and religious-derived values and traditions, in addition to their scattered location.

Part of the American iconography in recent years has been an increasing distrust by many of anything that smacks of “nationalism.” This properly should not be seen as the same as “national identity.” Nationalism refers to active political movements that play upon national group values, symbols, and prejudices. National identity is a passive shared state of mind that most individuals would consider a natural way of looking at things. When asked about their own national identity, many highly educated Americans would profess a lack of such. However, they cannot escape the fact that they are members of the American nation, living in a world of Babe Ruth, “we the people,” and “liberty and equality for all.” Accustomed to life in a successful melting pot, Americans cannot understand why Serbs, Croats, and Muslims cannot be just Yugoslavs or why Europe has had such difficulty uniting, now that 1992 has passed. However, it is ironic that some of the most avowedly nonnationalists or antinationalists in America opposed the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) because it will export “our” jobs to “those” Mexicans.

Part of the minimal active awareness of national identity of Americans is the lack of a long history of English-speaking settlement in North America. Discounting the structures of Native Americans who
established impressive civilizations long before the advent of Europeans to the New World, the oldest buildings Americans see in their homeland are less than four centuries old, and on the West Coast they are barely 150 years old. In contrast, Europeans daily walk past cathedrals erected 10 centuries or more ago. European perceptions are of a national continuity with the forebears who constructed those buildings, even though the national identities to which they adhere are products primarily of the 19th century.

Overlapping Patterns of States and Nations

Lack of coincidence between the patterns of states and nations is a principal driving force in world affairs. Present configurations are a consequence of historical processes and events unique to each area. In many cases, including that of the Japanese and the Portuguese, the nation is clearly a product of an ancient state and coincides closely with it. In other instances, such as that of the Croatians or Belarusians, the nation emerged despite strong efforts at suppression by state authorities.

Although the vast majority of states feature single dominant nations, most also contain inconvenient other national groups. In many cases this asymmetry is the result of past state-building when petty units were melded together with no thought given to cultural characteristics of inhabitants. A degree of homogeneity resulted from imposition of the ruler’s religion, although language resisted assimilation. In other instances, the intermixture of groups in frontier zones between culture areas made impossible the drawing of boundary lines between new nation-states that did not include minorities. Thus, all the states formed in the East European “shatter zone” after World War I encompassed minorities approaching 20 percent or more. Similarly, no ideal line could be drawn between Muslims and Hindus when independence came to India and Pakistan and tragedy resulted—and continues in Kashmir—when a line was established.

In surveying minority nations, a meaningful distinction rests between those that are self-contained and those that are “irredentist.” The latter term is derived from an appellation applied by Italians to their “unreadied” fellow nationals who lived outside the Kingdom of Italy. The concept has become a universal one applied to members of nations living outside the boundaries of a state dominated by people like themselves. Irredentist minorities pose particular problems to world peace because their causes may elicit active support from adjacent states governed by members of their nations.

World Patterns of Nations and States

The pattern of nation-and-state combinations differs from region to region around the world. Only a few states may be classed as pure nation-states lacking minority nations that seek autonomy or separation. Interestingly, France, which often is held out as the archetype of the nation-state, is not one of these. It embraces at least four minority nations that increasingly seek recognition of their distinctive status and territories: the Corsicans, Bretons, Basques, and Occitanians.

More than three-quarters of the states of Europe are multinational, although this percentage has decreased in recent years with the divisions of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. However, newly independent Macedonia must deal with a 20-percent minority of Albanians, and Slovakia must accommodate 10 percent of its citizens who are Magyars and 7 percent who are Ruthenians.

The former Soviet Union held the dubious distinction of being the most diverse state in the world, with at least 30 groups that could be termed nations and more than 70 other peoples inhabiting its land space. The dominant Russians numbered barely half its total population. Despite the USSR’s fragmentation, few of the Soviet successor countries can be termed nation-states, as witnessed by Azerbaijan’s problems with Armenians and Georgia’s difficulties with Abkhazians and Ossetes.

Despite the seeming homogeneity in religion and language of the Middle East and North Africa, virtually none of the region’s states are without minority problems. Several, including Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, and
Iraq, have endured violent ethnic strife in recent years. African states likewise are diverse, with clashes occurring particularly along the Sahelian fault zone between Arabic and Sub-Saharan cultures. For a variety of reasons, few nations have emerged south of the Sahara. Extreme tribal and linguistic diversity characterizes most Sub-Saharan states. Nigeria contains more than 300 distinctive groups and Zaire more than 200.

Diversity also characterizes the states of South Asia. India long has encountered secessionist movements in its northeastern and northwestern wings, and it has mounting troubles with its Sikh and Dravidian minorities. Pakistan already has lost Bangladesh and faces severe problems with Pathans, Sindhis, and Baluchis. Even a tiny state like Bhutan must contend with an 18 percent regional minority of Nepalese.

Although the states of mainland and insular Southeast Asia are typified by well-developed dominant nations, each contains numerous minorities, some of which now are evolving into true minority nations. Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines endure continuing strife in their outer areas. In contrast, East Asian states are remarkably homogeneous and calm, with the notable exception of China. Although 92 percent of its population may be considered members of the Chinese nation, the remaining 8 percent dominate more than 60 percent of its total territory.

The Anglo-American, Latin-American, and Australasian states are notable for minimal minority problems. The chief exception is Quebeçois separatism in Canada. The indigenous population in many states of Latin America shows signs of restiveness, however, particularly in the Andean region and in Central America.

Factors Aggravating or Ameliorating Ethnic Conflict

The currently escalating frictions among nations within states can be ascribed to a number of factors, including the increasing media avenues for promoting nationalist views and the post-Cold War drying up of superpower funds that often were used by client states to appease or suppress troublesome minorities.

Although a number of political geographers have addressed questions of ethnicity, they have not come up with a viable theory that would allow identification of what circumstances escalate diversity into conflict or prediction of when and where such conflict is likely to occur. This is not to say that they have not developed interesting insights. One of the more useful theoretical concepts that have been developed in recent years is that of “core-periphery” relationships. In many states the capital city and its surrounding area dominate the economy, politics, and culture of a country. The American geographer Mark Jefferson observed this recurring regularity at the turn of the century and called it “The Law of the Primate City.”

In core-periphery theory, the metropolitan center exploits peripheral areas, a high proportion of which differ from the dominant area in ethnicity and standard of living. Although attractive for its seeming universality, core-periphery theory proves to be of little use as a guide to specific problems. While its premise fits many states, it runs counter to the situation in many others. Thus, the peripheral areas of Catalonia and the Basque region long have dominated the economy of Spain, and living standards in Alsace-Lorraine are higher than in most of the rest of France.

Ethnic conflict is unpredictable. Each state situation constitutes a unique combination of differing groups, inherited traditions, and external circumstances.

The unpredictability of conflict perhaps is best seen in the internecine struggle in Somalia. Of all the states of Sub-Saharan Africa, internal strife would seem least likely to occur in that country due to its homogeneity in language and religion. However, Somalia’s unique clan system has much in common with national diversity in Europe and elsewhere, and warfare between clans came on the heels of the failure of a highly centralized, despotic regime.

Despite the seeming impossibility of formulating a viable theory to examine potentials for ethnic conflict,
a generalized framework is feasible. First, it is important
to distinguish between unstable group circum-
stances and triggering actions that lead to strife.
Almost by definition, the presence of a minority
nation constitutes an unstable situation. Identifying
the presence of such nations is an essential first step.
Next, it is important to consider possible elements that
can set off conflict. Regimes control volatile internal
situations through a variety of devices, ranging from
totalitarian suppression to meaningful autonomy. No
matter how successful a policy may be, even in the
long term, it will not satisfy all individuals. Extremists
for a national cause can find ways to manipulate group
opinion that is disaffected for any reason. A dramatic
change of circumstances can provide the extremists
with strong levers. We recently witnessed the mobil-
ization of latent national antagonisms in Yugoslavia,
despite more than four decades of universal indoctri-
nation of the population in the slogan of “brotherhood
and unity.” A disastrously deteriorating economy, a
model of political change presented by a collapsing
Soviet Union, and unwise actions by a federal army
attempting to suppress autonomy allowed nationalist
true believers to mobilize their nations. Once ignited,
national passions fed upon themselves, each group’s
reactions engendering counteractions from the others.
Virtually nobody remains a “Yugoslav” any more.

Some Suggestions for American Policy in Dealing
With Ethnic Conflict Abroad

Political geography has evolved some truisms over the
years that are useful for considering ethnic conflict.
Among them are the following:

• The present configuration of states is far from ideal
and embodies tensions that have the potential to
result in fragmentations and shifts of territory.
Attempts to preserve the existing status quo in the
name of peace can well exacerbate unstable situa-
tions and even hasten conflict. It is unfortunate that
the United States Government tacitly supported the
Serbian-dominated regime’s attempt to maintain
intact the Yugoslav state in the face of escalating
national minority demands for secession. A firm
statement to the Yugoslav Government that the use
of force to maintain unity was intolerable to the
United States might have obviated the current
conflicts in that tortured land and allowed a peaceful
transition to separate states.

• Maintenance of an unsatisfactory ethnic status quo
is generally futile for a country and certainly can be
costly in terms of transfer payments and policing.
Although the United States sided with Gorbachev in
attempting to preserve the Soviet Union intact, Rus-
sia’s loss of its Central Asian territories was of long-
term benefit to the Russian people in stemming the
outflow of funds to a region that has grave social
and economic problems.

• Gains or losses of territory generally affect only the
local inhabitants of the areas involved, with little
impact upon the overall economy and standards of
living. Although difficult to believe, even the United
States could cede Texas or California to Mexico and
still maintain much the same well-being of its
remaining inhabitants, whether or not NAFTA came
into existence.

• Small independent states can flourish if they are
willing to yield economic sovereignty to a broader
common market. The inhabitants of 999-square-
mile Luxembourg have done quite well for them-
selves as part of Benelux and now the European
Community. Communist Albania, in contrast, com-
mited economic suicide by cutting ties to all neigh-
bors and potential partners.

• Allowing national groups to form states of their own
does not inherently result in more intense national-
isms and potentials for greater international strife
but, on the contrary, can have a sobering effect.
Latvians and Slovaks are having second thoughts
about their national quests for independence as they
must now assume full responsibility for maintaining
themselves.

Above all, it is important to perceive states in terms of
their total political geography. More specifically, it is
the ethnic content of a state that is important, not its
external boundaries. This was a principal fallacy of
geopolitical thinking, which laid stress upon the
geometry of states, their positions, sizes, and
“resources,” rather than upon their degrees of unity
and the abilities of their governments to elicit support
from inhabitants for “my country, right or wrong.”
References


References (continued)


Summary of Discussion

General Discussion

QUESTION: Do you think that political arrangements have very little to do with the consolidation of nationalism of our nation states?

DR. POULSEN: Geographers are concerned with things that give character to territory; we look at nations as one of the critical components of such.

The way governments adjust their institutional arrangements to accommodate the national diversity is a question more properly in the province of a political scientist. Nevertheless, many geographers will agree that one of the most important characteristics of territory is the prevailing national identity in that territory.

One cannot understand this section of the United States without knowing that English is the common language and that Americans share a lot of common images and values that help make the country go. Where you have diversity within the state, serious problems exist. I made a particular point of distinguishing between nations and other groups; the caste system in India, for instance, is a very fundamental part of understanding India and really does not fit into this otherwise useful framework.

DR. HONEY: I would suggest that our notion of the nation-state is really oversimplified and that we would be better off if we adopted Tilly’s definition of the national state. There are few really national states, as you pointed out, and, where the countries are very strong, there are more national states than nation-states. They clearly are very important actors and, in most states, they are not forcing people into a single form. Clearly, that is the case in the United States, in Britain, and in France. National identity is important, but it is not necessarily an identity that requires everybody to be the same. As we look at the newer states of the world, the states that have been created after World War II, virtually none of them come anything close to the nation-state. They are national states.

DR. POULSEN: Well, we obviously differ on this. One of the fundamental facts is that the world is partitioned into states, and this cannot be ignored. The states are very significant in determining what is produced, how people do things, and the like. But at the same level, we have, in fact, national identities so that within a state there may be two quite different simultaneously operating systems based upon this identity.

If we go the way of the anthropologist and look at every single grouping of people—and this is certainly a valid way of looking at things—we do not get to some of the big problems that generate conflict. The interrelationships between nations within states and also of national interests between states are the key ingredients in conflict.
Patterns, Trends, and Regional Comparisons

Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Marvin W. Mikesell

In discussing nations and states, there are various terms that we can use:

• **Nation-state.** An example is Iceland.

• **Multinational state.** There are many examples; India would fit very well.

• **Multistate nation.** "Germania," "Francophonia," and many others fit that category.

• **Nonstate nations.** In this group we have Khalistan, Kurdistan, Palestine, and others.

• **Nonnation states.** Two unhappy examples would be Lebanon and Afghanistan; a happy example is the Vatican.

It struck me that in all the presentations thus far we have been dealing with pathology rather than any kind of medicine or cure. In fact, in some cases, death certificates have even been written, but we have had very little in the way of looking for good examples of where accommodation has occurred rather than conflict. Part of the problem is that countries just do not learn from other countries on issues of minority rights, human rights, and questions of culture and nationality. This is surprising because legal codes are borrowed; entire constitutions are virtually plagiarized from one country to another. Yet it is rare to find one country saying to another country, “You seem to have a nice situation here; maybe we can learn from you.”

An interesting case would be Estonia. The Estonians are making terrible blunders in dealing with their Russian population. All they have to do is go to Helsinki and examine what Finland has done with its Swedish minority; it has anticipated their needs and, in a sense, treated a 10-percent minority as though it were a 49-percent one. Finland has bilingual signs even where they are not needed for any functional reason. Now, if you tell an Estonian, “For Heaven's sake, get on a boat and go to Helsinki and learn something,” he would say, “Well, it's a totally different situation. These Russians are occupiers. They’re colonists.”

We also have examples of states that denounce mistreatment of minorities in neighboring states while seeming to be surprisingly indifferent to parallel circumstances within their own borders. Until quite recently, for example, the Turkish press bitterly denounced the treatment of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. They were denied recognition and forced to change their names. If a Bulgarian Turk tried to register a child or get a driver’s license, he would immediately be told he must have a Bulgarian name. This effectively was nonrecognition of a minority that composed about 10 percent of Bulgaria’s population, and the Turks were furious about this. At the same time, the Turks were treating their country’s minority Kurds exactly the same way: not recognizing their language, refusing to register names, not even allowing music with Kurdish lyrics on the radio.

That is the problem: we do not have transfer of wisdom. We do not have people going into Finland from Bulgaria, Turkey, Sri Lanka, etc. to study what happened there since 1918. They could learn from it.

Discussant: Mildred Berman

One of the references to which I immediately turned when I was invited to come to this conference was Isaiah Bowman’s *The New World*. That book has a very fine analysis of what led up to the ethnic problems that resulted in World War I, plus a lot of good maps. Bowman says, “But the world’s people are fundamentally unlike, and the road to success passes through a wilderness of experiment.” I think that is what we have been hearing these two days.

I would like to address population, particularly fertility. Indonesia recently has been successful in cutting its fertility rate down to a little more than two children per woman. The Indonesians could get it down to
replacement level soon. This is encouraging, because Indonesia is the world's most populous Islamic nation. It is not a highly industrialized state, but the government keeps pushing the idea publicly that small families are happy families. I think that is worth considering in many parts of the world that are growing rapidly.

General Discussion

DR. WIXMAN: In light of a comment made by Professor Mikesell, I agree that, in terms of conflict resolution, the example of Finland is superb. Why did the Finns give such rights to the Swedes? Because they had been under Russian rule. A little earlier in history, when Russia took Finland from Sweden, it was anti-Swedishism that became the symbolism in pro-Russianism.

What we need to look at in terms of conflict resolution is how reconciliation can take place. The reason Armenians still hate Turks is that there has never been reconciliation. Similarly there will be no ability for Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims to live together until reconciliation occurs.

DR. MIKESELL: Another example of a government maintaining a keen awareness of minority-group needs would be that of the Netherlands. About 10 percent of the country's population is Frisian, but only 10 percent of the Frisians vote for the Frisian National Party. There is a Frisian academy; there are chairs in the language in Dutch universities. It is almost as though the government has said to the Frisians, "You are recognized. We would be pleased if you would engage in activities to promote your identity. We'll even subsidize it."

Also, Switzerland recognized its Romansche-speakers before they clamored for recognition. This is partly because Mussolini considered Romansche to be an Italian dialect, and that frightened the Swiss. But we have so few other examples of that happening. I would say that treating a 10-percent minority as though it were a 49-percent minority works, but it requires extraordinary sophistication on behalf of the majority side.

There are four core-applied questions that come to mind:

- Under what circumstances do ethnic groups become politicized in the first place?
- Under what circumstances do politicized groups come into conflict?
- What circumstances aggravate or ameliorate conflict?
- What are the implications of conflict for national/international order?

Those are, it seems to me, the strongest set of applied questions we should deal with. If there is a message related to those questions, each one of which could be addressed at some length, it seems to me, it is that we are not living in a simple world. I will avoid the ugly term complexification, but it seems to me that what continues to come across is that context matters, and context is a complicated array of things that come together.

If there is a value to geography, it is not that it studies a particular thing but that it tries to look at how things come together and interact with core concepts like territory, location, and environment. The key advantage of a geographical perspective is its ability to try to think about the relationships among and between phenomena in places. This is where political science and geography really come together. Politics and power are expressed territorially, and looking at the relationships among and between the territorial units and the expression of powers is critical to understanding the circumstances that lead to each of those four applied questions that I noted.

DR. DE BLIJ: The examples that Dr. Mikesell mentioned of countries that were gracious to their minorities were also countries that were relatively well off at the time they made those concessions.

When Germany was thriving, the Turkish minority was welcome. When Germany had an economic recession, the Turkish minority became disliked.
There is some relationship to the well-being of a state that has chances of overcoming ethnic disrepair and the economic downturn that might presage it. This relates a little bit also to what Dr. Fuller said earlier. It might also mean that we ought to think twice before we use sanctions and economic destruction to achieve our aims in a foreign country. I still feel that, had sanctions not been imposed on South Africa, the democratization process might have taken longer but would have cost far fewer lives and have had a more satisfactory outcome.

DR. MIKESELL: I would say of all national policies, the one that is most likely to result in violence is non-recognition; to say simply, "You don't exist. Your language is merely a dialect. Your religion is a heterodoxy." It drives people crazy to be told that they do not exist. It hardly seems conceivable that Mussolini's policy toward South Tyrol would be the model that the world wants to emulate and, yet, this indeed is happening all the time. It is the redundancy of this pathology that I find so depressing.

QUESTION: If this policy of nonrecognition is a key aggravating factor, can you identify the flip side of that? Can you put a name on a key ameliorating factor that is helping to contain that?

DR. MIKESELL: That would involve cases where there seems to be accommodation, such as the extraordinary examples of Finland, where a minority group was made a partner from the beginning. In this case, the Finns anticipated the needs of the Swedish minority, rather than waiting until the Swedes were shouting and demonstrating. Unfortunately, there are very few examples of this enlightened policy.
US Policy Perspectives: A Conceptual Approach

Jon Gundersen
US Department of State

Americans are uncomfortable with ethnic politics. Why shy away from distinction based on race, religion, or nationality—at least in our public rhetoric. During the Cold War, ethnic conflicts were understandably ignored by Western policymakers. Forty plus years of finely crafted and cleared NATO talking points provided all the answers we seemed to need in a bipolar world. In a brave new Europe, without an identifiable enemy, we now have to think for a living.

The ethnic killing fields of Bosnia confronted the West with a number of options—all of them unattractive. Compassion fatigue set in when our initial attempts to draw up convoluted ethnic maps were rejected and scenes of starving babies became all to commonplace on CNN. Was this fratricide not a uniquely Balkan curse, Europeans silently wondered? Could we not quarantine the carriers? This approach, of course, provided a convenient rationale for Western noninvolvement. It is also proved to be wishful and dangerous thinking.

Setting aside the humanitarian rationale, there is a compelling strategic argument for Western engagement. The nations of the East already perceive themselves in a political, economic, and security vacuum. Without a sense of being part of a larger community—governed by accepted rules of behavior—neo-Communist and ethnic nationalists may once again set the rules. Already the unprecedented flows of refugees from the East have spilled over even to prosperous avenues of Paris and Frankfurt. Xenophobia and ethnic politics have become forces to be reckoned with throughout the West.

Ethnic conflict will be on the international agenda for the foreseeable future. This paper traces the historic and philosophical reasons why Americans have been so ill prepared to confront the issue and then suggests a conceptual framework to deal with ethnic conflict in Europe. First, it argues that we should look at the ethnic issue through the prism of individual and human rights, not group entitlements. Second, it calls for a Europe that is both more united and more autonomous. More autonomous in the sense that decisions are made—on a practical, not ideological basis—at the lowest possible administrative level. At the same time, autonomy can lead to anarchy and increased ethnic strife unless guided by universal, shared values. Therefore, the paper suggests ways to create civil societies in the East and to integrate these societies into a democratic family of nations.

Ethnic Issues in Bipolar World

Since the end of World War II, we viewed our policy in Europe through the optics of the Cold War. The policy of containment—with NATO as its operative manifestation—aimed at providing collective defense against a real Soviet threat. In this regard, the policy was extraordinarily successful. We deployed our forces and accomplished our mission without a shot being fired. In the process, we helped build viable democracies and, ultimately, witnessed the systematic and systemic defeat of our main adversary.

In a bipolar world, however, other issues, such as ethnic conflicts, were largely ignored by Western policymakers. In the West, the emphasis was on centrally organized solutions to security and economic problems; for example, NATO and the EC. While these organizations have fulfilled their primary Cold War missions of uniting Western Europe, they have tended to avoid, perhaps understandably, issues such as national identity, regional autonomy, and ethnic conflict. Few commentators were prepared, for example, for the anti-Brussels backlash following Maastrict. In the East, more ominously, long-simmering ethnic disputes remained submerged or suppressed by totalitarian regimes controlled by Moscow. There was no chance to resolve differences in an open and evolutionary manner. Moreover, generations of Western diplomats, scholars, and journalists working out of Moscow—and Belgrade—rarely journeyed to the provinces. If they did, they were greeted by party loyalists who owed their positions to the central authorities. In a sense, we tacitly accepted the Leninist imposed view of the new man shorn of ethnic identity.
The Return, Not the End, of History

Western policymakers were thus ill prepared to anticipate the breakup of the Soviet empire or the disintegration of Yugoslavia. We believed that a democratic Soviet Union could solve the messy nationality problems ignored or suppressed by czars and commissars for centuries. In August 1990, in his famous "Chicken Kiev" speech, President Bush cast his lot with the central authorities in Moscow, deriding "suicidal nationalism" and averring that "democracy does not mean independence." Three weeks later Ukraine declared its independence; five months later the Soviet Union collapsed. Later in that same year, Secretary of State Baker declared a "one Yugoslavia" policy, thereby, according to many, encouraging Milosovic to pursue a "one Serbia" policy. By the end of the year, the world had become all too familiar with the term "ethnic cleansing." Far from witnessing the "end of history," we are witnessing the "return of history," which all too often in Europe has been characterized by ethnic strife.

Russians: "Can't Live With Them, Can't Live Without Them"

We are also witnessing the geopolitical legacy of Stalin's ethnic policies. By removing ethnic minorities from their homelands and often replacing them with ethnic Russians, Stalin laid the basis for today's seemingly irreconcilable tendencies of independence and interdependence. The former Soviet Republics all have economic and blood ties to their Russian big brothers. And they all resent it.

Group Versus Individual Rights

In addition to these historic reasons, Americans have another, perhaps more fundamental, reason for our inability to come to terms with ethnic conflict in Europe: we hold the individual, not the group, supreme. European nations have long recognized and promoted the concept of "group and ethnic rights," even if Europeans have as much difficulty in defining these rights as they have in coming up with an all-European recipe for sausage.

Americans intuitively approach this subject from a different perspective. Group rights, in our view, serve to delineate and emphasize differences among people and tend to separate rather than unite. From the time of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, we have held that individual rights are primary and not subordinated to the rights of a particular group, some of whom may also belong to national minorities. Even in a politically correct age, many Americans are uncomfortable with distinctions based on race, religion, and nationality.

American Ideals and European Solutions

In practical terms, what principles guide the American policymaker in addressing the issue of ethnic conflict in Europe? Is the concept of individual rights applicable to ethnic and minority issues Europe? Or is it too anachronistic and too American for dealing with 21st-century Europe? Can we respect the right of individual and group self-determination and, at the same time, defend the territorial integrity of existing nation-states? In other words, are the Helsinki Final Act principles valid or even reconcilable in formulating our policy toward ethnic conflict? In a changing Europe, we will be increasingly confronted with uncomfortable choices. Without a conceptual context, we will be forced to rely on ad hoc solutions.

It is perhaps easier to begin to answer some of these questions by identifying what should not be our policy. Many Europeans and Americans are ill at ease in this brave new world. They view the alleged stability of Cold War Europe with some nostalgia; some even seek solutions in monolithic ethnically pure states. Both of these remedies are false and dangerous. The Cold War resulted in the systematic suppression of the most basic human and national rights in much of Europe and a massive misuse of scarce resources. Solutions based on ethnic purity violate the most basic tenets of Judeo-Christian beliefs. They are particularly
repugnant to a pluralistic society such as the United States. Ultimately, instability is not caused by democratically expressed claims by individuals and national communities but by the denial of these claims.

The above solutions should be categorically rejected. Other policy prescriptions offer more traditional solutions. In the name of stability, the Realpolitik school calls for working within the existing state system. The so-called Sonnenfeld Doctrine of the mid-1970s, in effect, accepted the status quo in Europe; that is, spheres of American and Soviet influence. The proponents of this school emphasize Principles 3 and 4 of the Helsinki Final Act, respectively the inviolability of frontiers and respect for territorial integrity. What they fail to recall is that the Helsinki Final Act is a carefully balanced document based on centuries of sad European history. Using time-honored Jesuitical logic, the Helsinki drafters declared that “all principles are equal.” The first Helsinki principle, for example, notes that “frontiers can be changed by peaceful means and agreement. Thus the United States recognized the peaceful unification of Germany in 1990 and the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Wilsonian model, on the other hand, stresses the promotion of ethnic rights through national self-determination. It has certain academic allure. However, as much as European statesmen paid lipservice to this ideal at Versailles, it was more honored in the breech than the observance in the interwar period. Moreover, carried to its discouragingly logical conclusion, this model, like Russian nesting dolls, might well lead to a state structure composed of increasingly small (and untenable) states—Yugoslavia divided into five or six states; Bosnia divided into three states; or the Soviet Union divided into 15 states, Russia (or Georgia) divided into x states, ad infinitum.

From Marx to Milosovic

For many the collapse of the Soviet Union represented the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy. Marxist-Leninism had been thoroughly discredited as a method of organizing society. Moreover, for the first time in over 400 years, no major power sought hegemony in Eastern Europe. With visions of a new Marshall Plan, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union understandable, if naively, believed that the West would willingly open its doors—and coffers—to their former adversaries. Despite rhetorical sympathy, this has not been the case. Perhaps it was inevitable, but new (and age-old) problems—ethnic strife, ultranationalism, and massive migration—quickly replaced Soviet Communism as the primary threats to Europe. When the walls came down in the East, economic and other barriers were erected in the West. European governments, beset by recession, worried more about halting the westward flow of goods and people than about integrating the economies of the East into the European Community.

Adrift between East and West, the countries of the former Warsaw Pact perceive themselves in a political, economic, and security vacuum. And demagogues, often seeking ethnic scapegoats, plow fertile fields of public discontent. Without a sense of being part of a larger community—governed by accepted rules of behavior—neo-Communist and ethnic nationalist may once again set the rules.

The Nation-State and Ethnic Rights

What type of state structure can best protect the ethnic groups of Europe? The European nation-state has been both the traditional protector and persecutor of indigenous ethnic groups. Historically, both Germany and Russia have assumed a special responsibility for their ethnic counterparts wherever they might live. (Even today, Germany grants automatic citizenship to all ethnic Germans.) These same nation-states, however, have a melancholy history regarding the treatment of other minority ethnic and religious groups. By the same token, the decline of the nation-state, particularly in the East, can also lead to increased ethnic tensions, as we have witnessed in the former Yugoslavia. If the traditional nation-state system has often
failed to protect ethnic minorities, the collapse of the
nation-state has not offered an appealing alternative.

Can Europe’s ethnic problems be solved by redrawing
state frontiers? National and ethnic identities existed
for centuries before state borders were drawn and
redrawn, usually by outside interests. What year
would we use to define the nation-state structure in
magic formula. While we should not encourage that
ethnic conflict be solved by changing national bound-
daries, we should not exclude that these boundaries can
be changed by peaceful means. As in the case of a
reunified Germany, border changes can be counten-
nanced by the international community if they are
accepted by all interested parties and accompanied by
guarantees protecting individual rights and minority
communities.

A Kinder and Gentler Europe

Is there an ideal—or even preferable—state structure
for Europe today? Perhaps this is the wrong question.
We should rather ask how Europe can best accommo-
date individual rights, as well as national and ethnic
pluralism? Clearly, there are no simple answers. How-
ever, we might begin by contemplating a Europe that
is both more united and less centralized. While the
nation-state remains the most significant unit in
Europe today, its political role is increasingly being
supplemented by both supranational and subnational
units. This development is fraught not only with dan-
gers but also with opportunities for a kinder and gen-
tler Continent.

A Europe, which respects individual and ethnic rights,
can only be achieved on a democratic basis if there is
grass roots involvement in the process. Logically,
decisions are best made at the lowest possible level.
Europeans have dubbed this concept—in the best
Brussels bureaucratese—“subsidiarity”; Americans
might call it “federalism.” This very American
approach can lead to practical, not ideological, solu-
tions to local problems from garbage collection to
minority rights, from electing regional governments to
establishing native-language schools.

Autonomy can lead to anarchy, however, unless it is
accompanied by rules of the road to guide the devel-
opment of a civil society in the East. Without an active
partnership with the West, it is doubtful whether this
model can flourish in nations unaccustomed to unre-
strained democracy. Thus, the process of devolution
of power, particularly in the East, could exacerbate
ethnic tensions and ultimately threaten democracy
unless it is guided by institutions based on shared val-
ues. The only appropriate Western response is to inte-
grate the countries east of the Oder-Niesse line to the
family of democratic nations. This must be done in the
political sphere by supporting Eastern reform and
reformers, in the economic sphere by opening Western
markets to Eastern goods and in the strategic sphere
by opening Eastern Europe and eventually nations of
the former Soviet Union into Western security struc-
tures.

NATO: A New Mission

The security of Europe is indivisible. Ethnic conflict,
ultranationalism, or massive flows of refugees any-
where threaten stability everywhere, including the
most advanced West European democracies. What
happens in Central and Eastern Europe also has a
direct bearing on the fate of the Newly Independent
States (NIS)—and vice versa. Without the successful
expansion of the democratic community of nations to
the East, the stability of Europe cannot be guaranteed.
A stable security framework, in the view of many
Eastern democrats, is a precondition for building
democracies and strong economies in their part of the
world. While this argument can easily be turned
around—building viable economies is the best way to
ensure security—there is no doubt that this perception
is widely shared.

Three times in this century the United States has been
drawn into European wars (two hot, one cold). We
have learned through painful history that the United
States cannot remain indifferent to threats to European
stability. The ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
should serve as a poignant reminder that Europe is
still a dangerous place and that only one institution has the operational capabilities and habits of cooperation to preserve peace and stability on the Continent in the post–Cold War era: NATO.

To accomplish this mission, however, NATO must transform itself from an Alliance based on collective defense against an identifiable threat into an Alliance committed to projecting democracy, stability, and crisis management throughout the Continent. This cannot be done without engaging the nations to the East. The real and potential hotspots in Europe all lie in this area. If NATO does not deal with these nations, it will become increasingly irrelevant—a closed, chummy club without a mission or a message. Any new security structure, therefore, must be inclusive rather than exclusive; it should not lead to the redivision of Europe into blocs.

Over time, therefore, NATO must be open to new members, largely to the East but also to include the neutral and nonaligned states of Europe. This approach—which has been called the “Partnership for Peace” program—would provide a framework within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) for enhanced political and military cooperation. Under this rubric the militaries of East and West would plan, train, and exercise together. Active cooperation in this partnership could lay the foundation for full NATO membership. In short, future expansion should be evolutionary, inclusive, and aimed at enhancing the stability of Europe.

Trade, Not Aid

While the Soviet empire was fragmenting, West European officials smugly maintained that they had resolved their remaining differences at Maastricht. A united and prosperous European Community, they believed, could be protected from the economic and political instability in the East. The euphoria was short lived. Many Europeans now conclude the Maastricht Treaty was drafted “too soon and too quickly.” Faced with depressed economies and weak governments, European polities, like their American brethren, seek national solutions to global problems. Western Europe threatens to define itself and its world role narrowly. Neither parochial nor EC-only solutions, however, address the unavoidable fact that the West cannot insulate itself from economic decline, ethnic strife, and political instability in the East. Their fates are intertwined. Ethnic minorities have perhaps most at stake in a stable and prosperous Europe. In times of recession, populist leaders seek scapegoats, most often ethnic minorities. Such conditions create economic refugees throughout Europe.

While Europeans must ultimately determine their own economic architecture, Americans have a large stake in the outcome. A successful Uruguay Round of the world trade talks, to a large degree, hinges on the amenable conclusion of inter-European and US-EC negotiations. It is in our mutual interest, therefore, to decrease trade barriers and to increase market access to our respective markets.

European economic integration is of particular interest to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS. Without an outlet for their products, many of the leaders of these countries will be tempted to return to the false stability and the failed statist policies of the past. Just as in the security field, American policymakers should seek to extend the zone of economic prosperity eastward. We should encourage the expansion of the EC eastward. We should welcome the greater integration of the former East Bloc into the global trading system. We should lower or eliminate inefficient subsidies. In short, trade, not aid, is the best guarantee for a prosperous Europe.

CSCE: Conscience of Europe

The CSCE has recently been called the conscience of Europe. European statesmen from Vaclav Havel to Margaret Thatcher to Andrey Sakharov have credited the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the founding document of CSCE, for providing the intellectual basis for the demise of Communism. The CSCE has not always received such good press. In 1975 the Soviet leadership believed that the Final Act legitimized the Soviet presence in Europe; that is, a sphere of influence.
American critics, including Ronald Reagan, concurred; the West had sold out to Moscow.

However, the leaders who founded the CSCE, perhaps unknowingly, began a process that would ultimately lead to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. By acknowledging that certain principles are inherent and universal, Moscow, in effect, acknowledged limits to its power. It did not have the sovereign right to transgress the Helsinki principles either in its colonies or even in Mother Russia. Of course, this did not prevent successive Soviet leaders from ignoring these principles; they did, however, lose their intellectual cover. The CSCE, with its broad definition of security founded on human rights and democracy and its inclusive membership, helped win the Cold War.

The CSCE can now help win the peace in Europe by establishing human rights norms, protecting ethnic minorities, and pursuing low-intensity conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities. Helsinki’s broad definition of security also encompasses the conciliation and crisis management. To cope with existing and potential crises, largely fueled by ethnic conflicts, the CSCE has deployed monitor missions to Kosovo, Serbia proper, and Macedonia to prevent a spillover from the Bosnian tragedy. It has also deployed or is considering deploying missions to Georgia, Estonia, and Moldova in the former Soviet Union. It has brought the parties of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute to the table.

We should build on these quiet successes. For instance, the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities now has the authority to provide “early warning” and, as appropriate, “early action” to national minority issues, which have “the potential to develop into a conflict.” The CSCE can play a role that neither NATO, the EC, nor any other European institution can play in preventing Bosnia-like conflicts and, ultimately, in integrating Eastern Europe and the NIS into a new Europe.

Conclusion

The United States is a nation of idea—not of blood, birth or creed. It has largely avoided ethnic strife because it has not attempted to build a state based on ethnic, racial, or religious homogeneity. If human rights and fundamental freedoms belong to the individual, then group or collective rights can best be addressed through the protection of individual rights. As long as ethnicity is seen as the only basis for sorting out human relations or creating nations, we will have ethnic conflict in Europe. Group rights can have no meaning if the basic human rights are ignored by ethnic zealots.

The best way to address ethnic conflict in Europe is through a united, but decentralized, Europe governed by mutually accepted rules of behavior. The integration of Western Europe into institutions—NATO, the EC, and the CSCE—founded on fundamental human rights, has gone a long way to eliminating territorial disputes, irredentist claims, and ethnic grievances among and within its member states. We must now find creative ways to use these institutions to deal with emerging ethnic—and other subregional—tensions before they erupt into shooting conflicts. We must avoid the situation where every crisis presents a choice between inaction and military intervention. We must now extend these habits of cooperation to the East.
Ethnic Conflict and US Policy

Wade Hinkle
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning Department of Defense

My task in the next eight minutes is to discuss ethnic and national conflict and the US policy response to it. Let me tell you what a difficult task it will be; it took more than eight minutes for the conference coordinators to describe to me what it was they wanted me to cover. Nevertheless, let me take a shot at it.

Clearly, the last four years have been an exciting time to be a planner in defense and national security strategy. I subscribe to what Dr. Gundersen said about the end of the Cold War being, in a military sense, the end of a very comfortable period of time, when the universe and its problems were well understood and well bounded. I think, however, that we have made some progress in the last four years in thinking through these issues in the perspective of US national security. I also think that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin made a good start in his conceptualization of this problem by talking about what he called the four dangers to US national security in the post–Cold War era:

- **The new nuclear danger.** Partly an artifact of the Cold War, this involves the security of the 30,000 to 45,000 nuclear weapons that were present on former Soviet territory when the Soviet Union broke up. Also it involves the possibility of weapons of mass destruction proliferating throughout the world.

- **The danger to democracy.** This is the possibility of a failure of reform in the former Soviet Union.

- **The new economic danger.** The Clinton Administration believes that, without a robust and growing economy in the United States, the United States will not be strong domestically and will be unable to be an effective actor internationally. This danger also involves an understanding that the notion of economic prosperity abroad is an important component of US national security.

- **Ethnic and national conflict.** Mr. Aspin clearly sees this as one of the principal challenges to US national security in the post–Cold War era.

The United States is in the process of making substantial reductions to its military forces and military budget. By the time the reductions envisioned in the Clinton defense program have been implemented, we will have eliminated over 1 million people in uniform and another quarter of a million civilians from the Defense Department. We will have eliminated one-quarter to one-third of our military forces, and defense spending by the end of 1997 will be down to below 3.5 percent of gross domestic product—the lowest level since 1939.

From the perspective of the defense planner, one of the main concerns in making reductions of that scale is the possibility that ethnic and national conflict may occur in ways that will challenge American and defense interests. Some debate has occurred in my field of conflict studies, about whether the demise of the Cold War has increased or decreased the possibility of ethnic and national conflict.

George Kohn’s database on conflict shows that there have been about three large-scale ethnic and national conflicts per year since 1945. This rate did not tail off as a result of the end of the Cold War. In terms of non-state conflict, there have been about nine serious ethnically motivated coup attempts each year since 1987.

But whether ethnic and national conflict is increasing or simply remaining at high levels, it clearly poses a danger not only to participants and nearby neighbors but also to us. This is either because the conflict is occurring in critical areas—as with the case in the Persian Gulf—or because some of the participants are gaining access to increasingly deadlier and more

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1 Dr. Hinkle has since left the government and is now a member of the Institute for Defense Analyses.
far-reaching weapons and technology. So the Defense Department, and the US Government in general, has quite an interest in this phenomenon and is trying to understand it and construct a strategy to address it.

In attempting to grapple with this issue, initial thinking on a Clinton national security strategy has focused on three elements:

- **Engagement.** The United States is committed to remaining engaged in international affairs.

- **Prevention.** We want to prevent or contain the effects of ethnic conflict. We want to use all the elements of national power, development assistance, and trade assistance to prevent conflict, and, if that does not work, we want to act early to keep the conflict small.

- **Partnership.** We want to expand the core group of like-minded democratic countries that we forged during the Cold War and have this group work as a partnership to either prevent or to contain conflict. We need to work together in a variety of multilateral and bilateral ways to marshal all those resources together as a partnership for addressing the issue.

The government needs much more analysis to understand in a robust way the phenomenon of ethnic and national conflict. We need academic researchers to turn toward applied robust, rigorous, and predictive research that we can bring inside the government in testable ways and see if we can motivate policy. We are not interested in sponsoring more original research; as Dr. Ted Gurr wrote in his book on conflict a few years ago, there are 686 books on the theory of conflict—we do not want a 687th. What we want are robust, testable, applied research and models that we can bring inside the government. We take this problem seriously. It is a critical issue of US national security.

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2 In July 1994, the Clinton Administration published its first comprehensive national security strategy, which used as its conceptual framework the elements of "engagement" and "enlargement."
Summary of Discussion

General Discussion

QUESTION: When there was a bipolar world, it was fairly easy to identify the strategic interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. How would the United States feel in regard to Russia resolving ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union.

DR. GUNDERSEN: We view the issue of conflict and peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union from the outlook of preventive diplomacy. We do not want to see a reenactment of the old view that there is a sphere of influence of Russia over the Soviet Union. As long as Russia's involvement in its former periphery is mandated by an international body—be it the UN or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—and as long as certain rules are followed and the interests of all the parties are taken into account, we are not, in principal, opposed to Russian involvement.

We also want to contain any ethnic difficulties before they spill over. In Tajikistan, more people are being killed every day than in Bosnia. We do not hear about it because CNN is not there, but certainly there are Iranian, Chinese, Turkish, and Russian interests in Tajikistan, so we cannot ignore the situation there. I think we should be a little more involved in preventive diplomacy there. We have limited funds, however, so it is difficult going between ends and means.

DR. HINKLE: My field is microstates, and I can tell you it worked pretty well in Grenada. But I take your point. That is why I think that the emphasis really should be on prevention, not intervention. That way, you can act more effectively at lower cost and not be in the position where you are dealing with intervention.

Imagine if Saddam Husayn had actually succeeded. Twenty years from now, he would have effective control of 45 percent of the world's oil reserves and would be industriously working to build nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. If we had the foresight in 1958 to act to facilitate a democratic transition in Iraq, however, we would not have needed the level of resources we used in Desert Storm, and the world might be a happier place. Even in Grenada, if we just had the foresight to spend a couple hundred thousand dollars to preempt the revolution of 1979, we would have saved 108 American casualties in 1983.

QUESTION: In your studies of conflict resolution, can you give us some examples of effective outside intervention into situations of aggressive ethnic nationalism. The only good example I can think of is the tremendous commitment that was necessary to stop Nazi Germany, an aggressive ethnic nationalistic state. These kinds of examples are important as we think about getting into the situation in Bosnia.

DR. GUNDERSEN: We view the issue of conflict and peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union from the outlook of preventive diplomacy. We do not want to see a reenactment of the old view that there is a sphere of influence of Russia over the Soviet Union. As long as Russia's involvement in its former periphery is mandated by an international body—be it the UN or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—and as long as certain rules are followed and the interests of all the parties are taken into account, we are not, in principal, opposed to Russian involvement.

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Concluding Comments: Implications for the United States and the International Community: Problems and Prospects

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During the past two days we have heard a number of formal presentations about ethnic conflict and nationalism in various world regions. These examinations of ethnic and cultural composition and conflict, as well as the panel discussions, illustrate the ways geographers look at the world and how they envision contemporary and future worlds. In summarizing the conference, I would like to make the following observations:

- We live in two different worlds. First, I would like to thank those individuals for organizing a conference devoted specifically to ethnic conflict, nationalism, and changing world order and for inviting academic geographers to share with members of the Intelligence Community what they know—and do not know—about the current political world. I see this conference as serving many useful purposes, one being that while “we live in two different houses,” we share much in common, especially our interests in being able to understand what is happening around the world—whether in regard to ethnic conflict, nationalism, or emerging democracies. It is important that the avenues of communication and information sharing between those in the university and government intelligence communities remain open.

- How do we look at the world? How we look at the world reflects our backgrounds as well as our day-by-day work experiences and assignments. These experiences are of utmost importance in helping us and others see how we look at our culture vis-a-vis others.

The Dynamic Political World

What Is the State of the World Political Map?
At any time it is useful to remember the state of the world, or, better stated, the world political map. That map reflects constant dynamism in name changes—border adjustments, political realignments, as well as flashpoints and conflict. There are a wide variety of states with varying degrees of stability and instability. It is important to keep in mind that world order and disorder can be viewed in a variety of contexts. While the term new political order may be in vogue this year, there is not just one order, but many. At various times and places on the world map, order or disorder can be observed at local, regional, and macroregional levels.

We Live in Shared/Divided Spaces
All humans live to some degree in “bounded spaces.” Some of those may be spaces defined by majority populations, others defined by outside powers. Within those bounded spaces, we often find people of varying ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial, or other heritages. The distribution of various groups often overlap. Those groups may live in harmony—sharing the same work, play, worship, and family spaces or they may be divided.

We Live in Local and Global Worlds
The world political map is much more complicated than the standard reference maps that depict close to 200 political states. There are many scales at which groups and communities interact. Some interactions are local, others are global. It is important that those of us who analyze political development acknowledge these complexities.

Are We “Prisoners” of Our Maps?
In listening to the presenters the past several days and in the discussions among panel members and the audience, it seems that we may, in fact, be “prisoners” of our maps, especially the familiar political map of the world—which simplifies political space and reinforces the status quo. Do we still use time-honored Mercator projections, which distort the spaces in the high latitudes? Are the maps we use Europe centered, as if subtly conveying the notion that Europe is the most important region of the world? How do we look at polar areas, with maps that have such areas at the “top” and “bottom”? How do we look at the Pacific Rim countries, with maps splitting the Pacific Ocean...
at the left and right sides? Or do we have maps with the Pacific Ocean in the middle and the Asian and American landmasses at the left and right. Perhaps one of our difficulties is using old maps with old boundaries and names, which tend to convey messages of stability at global and regional levels. Do we regularly in our research, classroom, and lectures utilize maps that portray boundary stability, ethnic harmony or complexity, or gradations of tyranny and democracy? Powerful messages are conveyed through maps and projections. As an instructor, I am reminded how more valuable the maps are in the State of the World Atlases—including the specialized ones on women, military, and environment—than are those in our textbooks and frequently used atlases. We would do well to develop other innovative maps for various users.

Which Way Are We Looking as We Approach the Next Century?

At this time it is useful to think about how we approach the study of the future. Are we looking backwards as we look ahead or do we look ahead without the burden of hindsight? The question might be similar to that raised above about map projections. Are we too frozen in our thinking to look at the dynamics occurring around us? Certainly the next 10 to 20 years will call for looking at the world differently than the past 10 to 20 years. Will we try to use models, theories, and policies from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s—many of which did not help us then—for the future? Or will we be willing to realize the need for working constantly with alternative systems and models that may be completely non-Western in logic, purpose, and design? The true test will be whether scholars, and those communities that rely on scholarly inquiry, will be able to be imaginative and creative in exploring the purposes and cross-purposes of what is being observed, written, and practiced.

Major Issues Meriting Attention

As a geographer interested in global politics, I identify six major areas that I think will be important within the next 20 years. They are the environment, religion, secularization, sports, territory, and information/communication.

How “Green” Is Your Thinking?

Environmental questions are being raised in all areas of human livelihood. This includes making decisions about where crops will be grown as well as where industries will locate. Although there is much support for environmental thinking and policies, progress is not attained easily, in part because many people have difficulty seeing the need to incorporate green thinking into education, religion, politics, and economies. A true test is whether those who teach political geography will successfully incorporate green thinking into spheres traditionally excluded from such thought.

Religion as if Politics Mattered

As the events of the past couple decades have demonstrated, religion is an important element in our examination of foreign affairs. It is not only the rise of Islamic fundamentalism—again, a Western label—in the Middle East that illustrates the significance of this issue but also militancy in the name of religion in Ireland, Israel/Palestine, India, and Pakistan. Evangelical groups and liberation theologians have confronted the politics in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In South Africa as well as in former Eastern Europe, the church at times has been active in pushing for political reforms. In many countries, those seeking political office are courted and supported by certain religious groups. The importance of religion as a component in the politics in many states and regions cannot be overlooked. Leaders often look to the state-church or to important church leaders for support and encouragement. To dismiss the growing importance of religion in emerging democracies, the blurring of church-state separateness in others, and the importance of the spiritual dimension in human life is to neglect an important component of raison d’etre in many societies. Academics and policymakers would be wise to devote as much time to studying a society’s religion as they do its economy in order to understand the decisions and actions of leaders, political parties, and citizen groups.

The Rise of Secularization

The rise of secularization in the world is not questioned. I do not see this emergence as a corollary to what I stated about religion above. But I observe there is a growth of a secular society, including emphasis on
consumerism and, especially, American products; the demise of traditional institutions, including political ideology; and the rise of a “here and now” mentality that stresses individualism, the appearance of wealth, and a veneer of globalism in foods, clothing, music, and lifestyles. Secularization on the rise leads to a decline in traditional institutions, be they family and community, formal political parties, the role of the church, the functions of schools, or the importance of collective memories.

Sports and Society: The New Ball Game
One of the emerging forms of social identity in many countries is sports. Sports not only represent outlets for a public’s need for entertainment but also something deeper about society’s need for identity and representation. What started out during pretelevision days as teams of athletes who were paid to entertain local or regional audiences has now changed into national teams that somehow stand for and represent a city, a region, or even the state itself. As audiences follow favorite teams, more and more teams have been created, further increasing local identity, regionalism, and national pride—all in the name of “friendly” competition. Nevertheless, more than one local conflict has emerged between fans of one national team fighting fans of another. The political geographer or policy consultant interested in understanding the secularization of society would be wise to ferret out the role sports play in the political identity of a group or society.

Land: Yours or Mine
Land or territory was historically associated with the definition of the state. This raison d’être was important in conveying to those within the state that certain spaces gave the state and people identity. Those spaces were to be protected from outsiders, should they decide to enter. The past several centuries of Europeanizing the world conveys strongly the importance of land, territory, ownership, governance, and protection. Those spaces “on the ground” and on the map further gave legitimacy to strongly held views about ownership, symbolism, and identity.

While many of the bounded spaces on the planet may seem static, there are dynamics linked to some spaces; that dynamism is associated with groups within those defined spaces who want their own spaces; in short, their own places to govern themselves. Those who support self-determination claim that they cannot be represented by majority populations in the bounded spaces who have little interest in minority group concerns. Those minorities may be religious, ethnic, or linguistic. These “stateless” peoples believe that they have a legal claim to govern themselves; in some cases, they present historical claims to spaces that were previously taken from them by outsiders.

It is not only the territory that is in question but also what is in and on that land. The land may contain places of historical settlements, ceremonial and burial grounds, and sites of sacred rivers, mountains, or forests. These places may be an important part of the unwritten histories of minority and disenfranchised groups. The importance of land is not to be diminished as we approach the next century. It seems very likely that there will be emerging claims to counterclaims to land and water spaces by competing groups now living in the same spaces. National and international courts seem likely to be involved in the litigation efforts by unrepresented and underrepresented groups.

Information and Communication
Whether scholars and government offices and officers are or will be able to understand the role of the United States in the world community of states during the next few decades rests in large part on how much they understand about information and communications. These two areas of postindustrial society were not key 20 to 40 years ago but are becoming more important each day. In the same way that leaders and practitioners will need to know the role of environment, religion, and secularization, so they will need to grasp the realities of global information and communication. I have identified several crucial issues that relate to those with interests in ethnicity, conflict, social change, and political decisionmaking:

- **The information blizzard.** How do we decide what is important and what is not? With the volumes of information that cross our desks, deciding what is most and least important is crucial. One might well expect the information load to increase at least
50 percent within the next decade as more information is generated and stored but not necessarily analyzed or understood. Sometimes, I think “we don’t know what we don’t know.” Such information gaps are especially apparent when working with new democracies, new ideologies, and problems related to human welfare.

- **How do we communicate?** How we communicate is always a problem and will remain so far among those who attempt to understand global political changes. The introduction of faster and cheaper modes of communication—modems, FAX machines and e-mail—literally place more locations on the planet within easy reach of others that are connected. It is important to know from where the information comes and its credibility.

- **CNN and photographs.** CNN, out of Atlanta, is replacing the standard news organizations and sources. This “global newspaper of the air” reaches all parts of the world. What viewers see are CNN’s views of the world. Literally, we could say that “We are watching CNN and CNN is watching us.” The second part of this instant television of the world is the growing importance of images conveyed to global audiences by CNN and other television networks. Photos are replacing words and speeches as the important elements in many international policy decisions.

- **Surveys and polls.** One of the consequences of the information revolution is the increased use of polls and surveys at local, regional, and global levels. Those groups surveyed may have narrow or broad support among a state’s population; for this reason, the geographic results of surveys and polls take on added meaning. The use of these surveys, whether designed and conducted fairly or manipulated, can form an important weapon on the part of the state to conduct specific policies in certain regions and with certain groups.

**Learning About Conflict and Cooperation**

Much of the discussion during the past few days has focused on ethnic conflict within states and regions. As we have learned, there are multiple causes of local and regional conflict, and conflict assumes different forms in different locations and political settings. There is no question that the geographies and politics of conflict—especially ethnic and racial conflict—will assume center stage in many regions during the next few decades.

While we spend time and energy studying the causes and geographies of conflict, we also would be wise to investigate conflict resolution. That is, what are the alternatives to keep conflict? What are useful local and regional strategies that governments and other institutions—including religious, educational, and volunteer ones—might implement to conflict situations from emerging. Or, once conflict has surfaced, what can be done to lessen or resolve the conflict or prevent it from spreading. Much of the conflict resolution literature focuses on information—who knows what about another group. Understanding conflict and conflict resolution is best not left only to experts in the government or universities who study cultural, politics, and social change. It also must be an integral part of the educational system in early and middle school years. Just as one learns to hate and practice discrimination, so one can learn strategies to reduce conflict, hatred, and discrimination and see the benefits of reconciliation.

**Looking Ahead**

In closing, I think it is important to train and retrain professionals for the future geopolitical worlds of the next 25 to 50 years. This entails an understanding and appreciation of the new global diversities that the planet’s leaders and citizens will face. There are not one or two best solutions to problems, but potentially a host of alternatives. Somehow it is important to develop familiarity with various models and methodologies ranging from scenario writing to complex mathematical computer gaming. Specialists need to be constantly investigating creative alternatives to existing or anticipated problems. Being bold, creative, and imaginative are more important than being bound by disciplinary strategems, traditional solutions, and regimented ideologies and philosophies.
Finally, there is much discussion these days about inventing and reinventing institutions. These terms potentially could usher in new thinking in universities, governments, and the private sector. The major issues of the next 25 to 50 years will call for specialists trained differently than in the past and today. Already I have indicated that information, communication, environment, religion, conflict, and secularization need to be pervasive threads in learning and practice. Rather than delegating “x” subject to one discipline and “y” to another, those are best examined in transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary contexts. To accomplish this will most likely call for an overhaul of many of the ways we learn, conduct business, and solve problems. This is a challenge best met by transdisciplinarians and by specialists who look both backward and forward and have both local and global outlooks.
Summary of Discussion

Discussant: Rex Honey

I would like us to be able to understand history but not be trapped by it. One of the things that makes resolving some problems in Africa more likely than in Bosnia is that the Africans do not have the kind of written history that dates back several hundred years. As such, they cannot pinpoint who the villains were: the names of the groups have changed.

We need to understand that oppressed people have legitimate grievances, and we need to make sure that we do not support oppressive regimes. With the Cold War over, the latter may not be as likely as it has been in the past. But we need to be a part of a forward-looking movement that will establish institutions to help prevent problems and to respond to existing ones.

In addition, we need to support human rights globally, not just in terms of individual rights but also in terms of cultural rights. This includes being able to study in your own language rather than in an alien one. If people see themselves as being treated justly, then existing problems will be lessened, and we will be able to prosper along with the people with whom we share this globe.

Discussant: Harm J. de Blij

I was born in the Netherlands, and I'm interested in the news of the day from there. Today, the news from Holland had two items relevant to our discussion.

First, Curacao is considering holding a vote on whether to reenter the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a province or a colony. Things are not going well economically in Curacao, and the island is seriously considering becoming the Martinique of the Netherlands' empire.

Second, the Province of Zeeland discovered about a month ago that in 1648, when the seven states of the Netherlands signed a peace agreement with Spain, it did not sign the agreement. Although Zeeland is now planning to sign the agreement and is inviting Spain to the signatory ceremony, the issue of paying the reparations that were not made three centuries ago has also been raised. Reparations are a serious issue because it is the objective of certain ethnic groups to raise the issue of who did wrong to whom and who should pay for that wrong.

I would also like to make an observation on environmental change as it relates to changes in the sociopolitical sphere. Although many people are sceptical of interlinkages, I want to suggest seriously that many of the problems that we are seeing in the world today, such as fragmentation, dislocation, migration, sunbelt movements, and other locational changes, are in part an instinctive human reaction to environmental change. I would refer you to a book by Jean Grove called The Little Ice Age. It may be that our behavior, including ethnic strife, has something to do with the deteriorating environments in which relations among groups are being played out.

General Discussion

DR. WIXMAN: An interesting point that came out particularly in this last session is that we talk about voluntarism on the part of the peoples involved.

The falling apart of the Soviet Union will probably be followed by a restructuring, and what Estonians, Kazakhs, and Ukrainians can do voluntarily through mutual respect and independence is probably a lot better than the situation when the Soviet Union was dominated by the center.

I think one of the keys to future stability is not to oppose the secessionist movements but to allow such movement. This almost invariably leads to better relations between the seceder and the parent state.

DR. DE BLIJ: But the problem with that is, "where does the secessionist sequence end?"

DR. WIXMAN: True.

DR. DE BLIJ: Someone today talked about the necessity of providing recognition. Well, the problem in the case of Bosnia was that recognition was given
prematurely. This then precipitated a concern on the part of Serbs who did not want to be a part of an independent state in which, they felt, their human rights would be threatened.

Take the case of Georgia. Georgia, which seceded from Russia, is now trying to stop Abkhazia from seceding. Where does it all end? This trouble comes with every secession. Unless there is some way in which that can be codified and stratified, it will be chaos.

DR. HONEY: I agree with you. Virtually no state in Africa has an order that was determined by African peoples. Why should the peoples of Africa not have the same kind of self-determination that at least some non-Africans have enjoyed in other places?

DR. WIXMAN: But what often happens when the secessionist movement is denied? Are we going to dictate that people live together in shotgun wedding relationships? Should we say to Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, "You must live together," when we would not do that ourselves? I agree that there are perils of secessionism, but the peril of not doing it, I think, is equally dangerous. Do we tell Moldova that it cannot become independent from the Soviet Union because 12 percent of its population would be unhappy? Do we tell Georgia that it should not secede because 100,000 out of 6 million people will be unhappy? I think countries need to be prepared for independence; not leap into it, but the lack of preparation is the problem.

DR. DE BLIJ: May I make one other point? That relates to the issue of boundaries. In 1992 the United States went to the Baltic states and talked about solving problems within existing borders. When this occurred, I cringed; just as pipelines and roads can be moved, boundaries, which are here to serve us, can be moved. If it is time to move them, let them be moved.

You are never going to have total agreement on moving boundaries. In fact, hundreds of thousands of casualties occurred when Pakistan was separated from India. Nevertheless, this action probably saved millions of lives. All countries and all people should be able to argue about moving their boundaries.

DR. MURPHY: Dr. de Blij's last comment, in a sense, touched on a point I wanted to make. When we think about the issue of potential fragmentation, what are we thinking about in terms of the units we end up with? I think our tendency is to think about conventional units of sovereign states.

One of the most remarkable things Dr. Williams alluded to yesterday was that, in Western Europe, the major threats are not seen as the regional secessionist movements. Why is that the case? It could well have something to do with the changing nature of sovereignty in Europe. It could also have to do with the fact that it is possible for someone in a region within a state to feel multiple layers of identity, some of which are attached to being a European.

DR. HINKLE: We seem to be, in one sense, moving toward an international norm of the rule of law in governing intrastate relations, individual human rights, and collective group rights. It is going to be hard to reconcile that with the proposition that you cannot allow norms of international behavior to stand in the way of a rational adjustment of international boundaries just because it seems to balance out in terms of demographics or some other factor.

DR. DE BLIJ: But we are trapped in such a boundary in South Africa. In that country, partition, even some sort of a temporary confederal arrangement, might ease the fears that are presently ripping the place apart. What is so great about keeping South Africa in one piece? It has no history of integration. It has always been a divided country.

DR. HONEY: Dr. Gundersen said we should not ask for redrawn boundaries because such change would have to be agreed upon by all parties. Well, if it is democratic, what does that mean? Democratic can mean 50 percent plus one.

DR. GUNDERSEN: I would just refer to the facts of the last two years. In alluding to the statement by former Secretary of State Baker on Yugoslavia and the statement by former President Bush on Kiev, I was saying that the United States was trapped in a certain east-west bipolar context.
Today, we have 53 states in Europe; there were 32 in 1991. That is a major change. It is the largest change in Europe since 1917 or 1648, depending on how you look at it. It has been done largely without violence and largely within a relatively democratic context, and it has been agreed to by those states. The United States has recognized those states: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and the other states that have emerged from the former Soviet Union, as well as those from Yugoslavia.

So it is possible to reconcile the idea of accepting the concept of territorial integrity and that of peaceful changes of borders. It is difficult, but I do not see any major intellectual pitfall. I think US policy has certainly evolved over the last two years on this quest.

DR. SCHWARTZBERG: One of the things that I think we can do is to try to empower the only international organization that ought to have universal legitimacy—the United Nations. One of the UN’s major organs, the Trusteeship Council, has virtually nothing to do any longer. There is no reason why the Council should not be transformed into a Human Rights Council and be run by a high commissioner for human rights, who would have greatly expanded powers.

While very few nations are not guilty of some excesses in regard to human rights, some are much worse than others, and those are the ones that have to be tackled first. We need an agency with legitimacy to do that.

The UN can do that. It will make mistakes to be sure, but we should get behind the UN and give it power to address global problems. Global problems require global solutions. The UN ought to be the global instrument.