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19 October 1995

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Associate Director of Central Intelligence for  
Military Support

**FROM:** Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

**SUBJECT:** Deputies' Committee Meeting, 19 October, Time TBD

**1. PURPOSE OF MEETING.** This Deputies' Committee meeting--by our count the 73rd meeting at the Deputies' level or higher in 1995--will focus on unresolved issues concerning the implementation force (IFOR). At the meeting Wednesday, there were discussions of some of the questions that need to be resolved first regarding IFOR mission, deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public outreach. [See **MEETING PAPER** tab for draft of the questions and also the **MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD** in the **WEDNESDAY DC** tab.]

**2. BACKGROUND.** Sandy Berger and the other Deputies are becoming increasingly apprehensive that a disconnect is developing between what NATO planners anticipate for IFOR and what is being negotiated. NATO planners seem to be taking a minimalist approach on the mission of the force while the US negotiators seem to be taking a broader approach to the mission which could even include some police functions.

**3.** Yesterday JCS briefed the President on IFOR. He was surprised to learn that the JCS thought the civilian structure needed to be in place when the troops arrive. The President indicated:

- He wants to avoid mission creep.
- He wants to maintain unity of command.
- He does not want IFOR to operate as a police force.

**4. YOUR ROLE.** You do not have any formal responsibilities for this meeting, but you might be asked to provide an intelligence update on the status of the cease-fire or the reports of the buildup near Sector East. [However, the Deputies have not asked for any at this week's meetings, seeming to assume that peace is at hand after the proximity talks.]

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## 5. POSSIBLE POINTS TO MAKE

- As of now, the cease-fire seems to be generally taking hold in Bosnia. There continue to be reports of some fighting in western Bosnia, but it is generally diminishing. One reason is both sides have worn down and need time for rest and refitting. [See Cease-fire Tab.]
- Meanwhile, Sector East in Croatia is looking increasingly ominous. Some international observers and the Krajina Serbs definitely think the Croats plan to move soon.
- Although reporting does not suggest an immediate attack, it is clear that the Croats are preparing for the offensive. For example, some HV troops have left Bosnia and returned to garrison, but this brings them nearer Sector East. Other troop movements have been observed.
- Although the timing of the attack remains uncertain, it is clearly going to happen. Tudjman reportedly promised Holbrooke he wouldn't attack before 1 December, but we could not rule out the Croats "finding" before then a pretext, some Serbian provocation, that they simply cannot resist. A military settlement offers the advantage of allowing the Croats to ethnically cleanse the area.
- Past demarches to Croatia concerning Sectors West and then later Sectors North and South have not succeeded. Because those demarches did not carry the threat of sanctions as previous demarches had, the Croats interpreted all sorts of green and amber lights, missing the red lights intended to be sent.
- Even the threat of sanctions might prove pointless; the Croats possibly think that presenting a fait accompli might discourage an ex post imposition of sanctions.
- Although many analysts doubt the Croats would move before 31 October to avoid jeopardizing the proximity talks, doing so might give him tactical surprise in Sector East, a goal which is probably more important to him than a settlement in Bosnia.
- Although Milosevic thus far has judged it is not in his interest to have the VJ intervene, this judgment could change as the result of an attack on Sector East. The VJ--despite shortcomings--has the resources to intervene with sizable forces and sustain them in combat.

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- Should such fighting break out after the IFOR arrives in Bosnia to monitor a peace agreement, this could endanger US troops, especially if the Yugoslav Army intervened in response.

Ray Converse