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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: October 20, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 4:00 - 5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OVPLeon Fuerth
Rick SaundersSTATEStrobe Talbott
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
James SteinbergDEFENSEJohn White
Walt SlocombeUSUNDavid Scheffer
Jim O'BrienJCSWesley Clark
John Walsh
John RobertiNSCJohn Feeley
Alexander Vershbow
Donald KerrickOMB

Gordon Adams

CIAGeorge Tenet
Dennis Blair~~SECRET~~

Classify by: Andrew Sens

Reason: 1.5 (g)

Declassify On: 10/27/05

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Summary of ConclusionsIFOR/Unresolved Issues

1. Deputies reviewed and discussed a list of questions and answers (prepared by JCS in coordination with State, OSD and NSC) that addressed nine areas of concern regarding the implementation force (IFOR): mission, non-compliance, election security, deployment, area of operations, timing, exit, Congressional strategy, and public outreach. Deputies agreed that:

- JCS/NSC should develop a notional timeline reflecting a sequence of actions and decisions to be taken by the NAC, UNSC and other organizations, and the time of Presidential or lower level decisions prior to deployment of the IFOR (Action: JCS/NSC);
- Deputies reaffirmed that IFOR will not provide for civil order, and State should prepare a paper addressing the outstanding issues of establishing a police force and the implications for a peace settlement if no viable police force exists (Action: State);
- State should prepare a paper on a possible IFOR role in implementing a settlement in Eastern Slavonia, including any limitations we want to seek to place on the mission (Action: State);
- Russian forces should not have a separate zone; this and other aspects of Russian participation will be addressed separately.
- The IFOR will create secure conditions for elections by completing its primary tasks; the OSCE should be solicited as the lead organization in the electoral component of the overall implementation effort, including the responsibility for an election security plan (Action: State);
- There should be indicators of seriousness in the framework agreement that the parties should commit to fulfill between initialing and signature of the peace agreement, but their fulfillment would not be a precondition for rapid deployment of IFOR;
- Until we have a final peace agreement and final implementation plan, we will preserve our flexibility on the exact duration

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of the IFOR's mission while continuing to use 12 months as the planning figure;

- Entities firing from one territory to another across the zone of separation is a violation of the peace agreement and the IFOR commander will judge when and what force will be used to enforce the settlement;
- IFOR forces should be authorized to stop deliberate violence to life and person against international civilian personnel and indigent population, and to act against gross humanitarian violations where NATO forces are present or have the means and opportunity to act;
- IFOR will not be responsible for investigating past incidents of attacks, atrocities, or human rights violations;
- IFOR will not provide protection for relief convoys and civilian movements;
- IFOR will not evict civilians from newly found homes nor bring prior residents back;
- Although IFOR will recognize the right of displaced civilians to return to their homes, it will not become involved and has no role in movement of refugee population;
- In the event of a major breakdown in compliance, and because this is a NATO-led operation, the NAC will ultimately define "total breakdown" based on the situation and the advice of military commanders;
- The IFOR commander will coordinate his actions with the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR) and can talk to the civilian heads of each entity concerning military matters.

2. Deputies agreed that the following unresolved issues required immediate resolution by Principals:

- Under what circumstances will the IFOR use force against the Federation, in keeping with the principle of impartiality adopted by NATO?
- Will IFOR pull out if the Serbs unilaterally withdraw "strategic consent?" Will IFOR use force to enforce Serb acceptance before pulling out as the option of last resort?

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- What does IFOR do about reported "over the horizon" violations of the peace agreement or gross violations of human rights?
- Should there be an IFOR symbolic presence on the external borders, particularly the inter-Serb border?
- Do we want a 20 km heavy-weapons-free zone and/or a 2 or 4 km all-weapons-free zone along the zone of separation?
- What is the nature of IFOR presence in Serb territory besides free access?
- What is an acceptable end state for the U.S. when IFOR leaves?

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