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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force  
14 November 1995

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** The Director of Central Intelligence

**FROM:** Acting Chief, Balkan Task Force

**SUBJECT:** Principals' Committee Meeting, 1745-1900 in OEOB.

**THIS MEETING**

1. A Principals' Committee meeting was called for tomorrow. While the agenda is still in influx, we figure the following items will be discussed:

- a possible US role for implementing an agreement in Eastern Slavonia;
- arm and train revisited and military stabilization in the post-Dayton environment;
- phasing of lift;
- deployment of the enabling forces;
- and an international police task force for Bosnia.

You don't have any formal responsibility for the meeting, but may want to comment on the environment faced by any implementation force in Sector East should that come up. We will give you the latest intelligence at the prebrief.

**BACKGROUND**

*Eastern Slavonia*

2. Since it appeared last weekend that a settlement had been reached in Eastern Slavonia, the question has arisen whether the US would have a role in implementing such an agreement. The Croats want the US to help implement such an agreement, and the Serbs want the Russians to participate in an implementation force. In the past week or so, there have been discussions of a possible joint Russia/US force. JCS has always taken the position that if the US helps to implement an Eastern Slavonia agreement, that its force requirements would be in addition to the troops in Bosnia.

3. At the Deputies' Committee Monday, they decided it was premature to decide about US participation. However, Sandy Berger tasked three papers to decide about a possible US deployment. We were tasked to look at the environment that an

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implementation force would likely see there. [See "Environment Like to Face International Force in Sector East" in SECTOR EAST.] OSD/JCS are to draft a paper about military options for implementation, and State is doing civilian papers. [Neither of those were available.]

#### *Arm and Train*

4. At the Deputies' Committee meeting, Admiral Owens made a plea for the Principals' to reconsider their earlier decision to support arm and train. He said the situation on the ground had changed to make reconsideration advisable. Owens said that anyone traveling down to the Hill was being killed on the issue of sending an impartial implementation force to Bosnia at the same time the US takes a pro-Bosnian position in arm and train. He also argued to give the Bosnians the same weapons as the Serbs, the latter at a severe manpower disadvantage, could be destabilizing. DAS Kornbloom argued, however, that it was critical that no news of these discussions leak because this would really muck up the negotiations in Dayton because the Bosnians are insisting on lift and train.

5. The Deputies did agree to send an arms assessment team out to Bosnia provided they go on a no commitment basis. There is a problem, however, that the team cannot finish its work soon enough to make input to such an important decision. Even if it left this week, it would be in country for two weeks, provide a preliminary findings paper a week later, and provide a briefing even a week later than that.

#### *Phasing of lift*

6. The Allies and Russians are extremely concerned about the lifting of the arms embargo at a time IFOR arrives in Bosnia. The Principals will be asked to consider an NSC paper [SEE MEETING PAPER] that would end the arms embargo at the time of an agreement entering into force, but no arms would be shipped the first 60 days. After 60 days small arms and non-lethal assistance would be provided, but larger equipment would not be allowed until after six months after agreement entering into force. Also, no training—except non-combat training—would be allowed inside Bosnia. After six months, the only limits on deliveries would be to keep them in compliance with limits set by arms control negotiations.

#### *Deployment of enabling forces*

7. Concern has been raised over the timing of the enabling forces. The President has ruled that no enabling forces would go to Bosnia until Congress has a chance to give its blessing to this mission. Enabling forces outside of Bosnia—such as to Croatia and Italy—would be permitted under this ruling. There is a concern that waiting until an agreement is signed and the Congress has its say will delay deploying the main force when

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a quick deployment is necessary. One scenario mentioned by NSC is whether the remaining UNPROFOR that are staying for IFOR could do the enabling.

*International Police Task Force*

8. The Bosnians proposed the other day to send international police volunteers, such as US and Mounties, to become a police force during the IFOR. At the DC yesterday, the Deputies were told Ambassador Galucci expected this proposal to be rejected, and the Deputies did exactly that without any debate, so it is not clear why this has resurfaced.

**PREPARING FOR THE MEETING**

9. At this point you do not have any responsibility for the meeting. My memorandum of the Wednesday DC will help put this meeting in context. We recommend you read our paper on the environment that an implementation force in Sector East would face, a paper tasked by the Deputies. [SECTOR EAST TAB] Also, we have put in this tab a paper on Russian intentions in Sector East, which concludes that the Russians probably want to play, and a US/UN NODIS on UN thinking on this sector. You should also review the NSC meeting paper on phased lifting of the arms embargo [MEETING PAPER TAB]. We have also included summaries of the dangers of implementing an agreement in Bosnia [THREATS TO IFOR TAB]. Also, there is a paper summarizing the ongoing Yugoslav support for the Bosnian Serb Army [VJ SUPPORT].

  
Ray Converse  
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