The Yom Kippur War: A Case of Deception and Misperception

Before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the United States failed to anticipate that Egypt and Syria would attack Israel. Looking through the prism of Roberta Wohlstetter’s and Robert Jervis’s insights, the attack on Yom Kippur was a surprise because both American and Israeli leaders misperceived many of the “signals” and signs of attack from Egypt as simply noise; they failed to recognize the significance and urgency of those signals. Having ruled out the possibility of total war, American and Israeli leaders failed to foresee a limited war because the signals they were receiving did not fit into their preconceived frameworks.

To support this interpretation, we will first look at declassified CIA documents to determine what the US and Israel knew about Egypt’s actions and intentions before its surprise attack. Then we will explain Wohlstetter’s framework of signals versus noise and then Jervis’s framework of misperceptions. Following that, we will look at Kissinger’s misperceptions and how they led him to misinterpret Sadat’s intentions. Egypt was well aware of American misperceptions and was able to use this knowledge to exaggerate those erroneous beliefs. We will then apply the theory of misperceptions to what Israeli leaders and policy analysts had concluded about the possibility of war in the context of the 1973 war. Finally, we will draw some conclusions and suggest potential solutions to the problem.

Theoretical Framework: Wohlstetter

In her book, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*, Roberta Wohlstetter argues that people misinterpret “signals” as “noise.” Signals—the facts and intelligence that point toward a likely attack—must be perceived correctly, or they will be dismissed as unimportant, and an adversary’s intentions will remain misjudged. However, it is a human tendency to look for information that supports expectations about an enemy. If a leader is not alert for clues to support alternative hypotheses about plausible enemy actions precisely because they seem improbable, many signals will be disregarded as noise.¹

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The first step in properly distinguishing signals from noise is clear communication. Prior to the Japanese attack in Hawaii, US Army and Navy leaders monitoring the situation faced numerous obstacles in communicating with one another. For example, there was no formal mechanism by which either the Army or the Navy had to acknowledge receipt of any information. Moreover, leaders in Washington were not even necessarily unaware that the Army and Navy were not receiving identical information. In fact, Washington was not even distributing the same information within the same branch; Admiral Turner, for example, assumed that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel immediately exchanged any information that they received, though this was not the case. That the branches couldn’t be counted on to communicate effectively internally, never mind with other branches, was not without its consequence. In the months before Pearl Harbor, the Army tended to be “less interested in and less informed about foreign policy;” as a result, the Army’s judgment was sometimes not as sound as that of the Navy, since they were working on the basis of different information. The outcome could have been different had the two branches been communicating better between themselves.2

However, the Army and Navy are not the only ones to blame; Washington contributed to the problem as well. Although many of the facts regarding Japanese capabilities and intentions were known in Washington, the information was distributed piecemeal to the Army and Navy because the US wanted to remain secretive about the fact that they had cracked the Japanese diplomatic code.3 This was problematic, however, because leaders in Washington were not necessarily the most qualified to analyze and interpret the intelligence. In any case, as a result of this secrecy, reading and discussion of any intelligence gathered from certain sources meant that communication between the Army and the Navy would have been extremely limited. In the same way, the US and Israel did not facilitate adequate discussion of intelligence information, which helps explain why certain signals during the 1973 Yom Kippur War were being lost as noise.

Before the 1973 War, leaders within the State Department, White House, and the CIA did not share information about their own “back channel” negotiations with the Egyptians. This led to each agency having to piece all the facts together and develop their own view of the situation. In fact, Egypt became aware of this lack of communication, and Sadat discovered that nothing

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3 Ibid, pp. 167, 394.
fruitful would come of interacting with the State Department; nevertheless, he continued the charade while coming to rely more on Kissinger.  

Another issue in selecting which pieces of information should be categorized as signals relates to the problem of “scattered signals,” or signals that have no central focal point. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army and Navy were incapable of confirming the location of certain major Japanese vessels, such as carriers in the Pacific Ocean. The scattered intelligence regarding their whereabouts should have been seen as a “signal” that the Japanese were up to something contrary to their statements. The same can be said of the Egypt’s military preparations before the Yom Kippur War, such as when they stationed various troops around the borders to throw off the United States and Israel. When a nation is extremely secretive about the location of carriers, helicopters, or other highly powerful weapons, emitting only extremely “scattered” information, leaders should interpret this as a “signal” that the nation may be up to something that warrants closer attention. Kissinger, Meir, and other government officials should have re-evaluated statements released by Egypt and compared it to what their intelligence information was suggesting regarding Egyptian intentions.

Wohlstetter also highlights a misperception between “signals” and “noise” in her analysis regarding information released by third party nations. For example, in January of 1941, the Peruvian embassy reported to the United States that they believed the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor by air. The US, however, chose to disregard this statement. Similarly, with the situation in October of 1973, King Hussein of Jordan warned Kissinger that Egypt was planning a serious attack and, just like the intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor, the United States disregarded it. Therefore, it seems likely that the United States should pay closer attention to warnings from third party nations and regard them more as potential “signals” rather than as “noise.”

Finally, Wohlstetter argues that there were a few other reasons for missing signals, all of which can be traced back to the misperceptions of leaders during the Yom Kippur War. When Kissinger kept information to himself, hiding it from people within the State Department, the information was poorly handled. With no one seeing all the information at once, significant intelligence was lost as noise. In the case of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the expectation was that if Japan attacked, it would be against the Philippines, so all information was seen with that

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5 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 1973_05_11, “Arab Threats to Israel.”

6 Wohlstetter, p. 386.
assumption in mind. In this way, certain expectations of events directly cause misperceptions within a leadership. Because Kissinger and other American and Israeli leaders expected that Egypt and Syria would not attack until they possessed a stronger air force or tried another round of diplomacy, they incorrectly interpreted incoming information. In this way, the human tendency to interpret information according to a preconception causes many signals to be lost as noise, resulting in surprise regarding a nation’s attack.

Theoretical Framework: Jervis

In his essay, *The Theories of Misperception*, Robert Jervis lays out numerous hypotheses as to why policymakers and intelligence analysts misinterpret information. His fundamental hypothesis is that because of previous experiences, personal bias, and stereotypes, “decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and image.”7 All actors see what they expect to see rather than what is really before them.

When Henry Kissinger received ambiguous information from intelligence sources or personal conversations, he fit each piece into his personal hypothesis. His personal hypothesis, though, was compiled of numerous different factors, including his relations with others. Kissinger himself stated that “the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office.”8 He describes Golda Meir and other Israeli leaders as his personal friends, unintentionally influencing the perspective with which he viewed Israeli relations with the United States and the Middle East. While President Nixon did not place such an emphasis on protecting Israel, Kissinger was much more invested in the nation and its people. Jervis also highlights the impact of historical traumas, which Kissinger had experienced.9 The fact that Kissinger lost several members of his close family in the Holocaust could have been a strong factor that influenced him to protect and support Israel with as many US resources as possible. Throughout the period before the war, it is clear from the documents that Kissinger treated the Israelis as friends—especially the Israeli ambassadors in Washington—and the Arabs as hostile or, at best, only potentially friendly.

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8 Mingst, p. 207.
9 Mingst, p. 198.
Jervis also proposes that actors see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it actually is. Sadat’s motivations behind attacking Israel were not necessarily conventional and did not correspond to American and Israeli views of war. A limited war to shock Israel and restore Arab dignity and honor appeared rational to Sadat, but not to Israeli and American leaders who convinced themselves that Syria and Egypt had no military option. Kissinger, though, did not recognize this, and continued to believe that Egypt would continue to work solely through peace talks, when in reality, Sadat was preparing for war. From the Egyptian perspective, only after a limited war could Egypt disprove Israeli assumptions of its superiority and bring about a peaceful and also *honorable* solution to the problem.

**CIA Documents**

On 6 October 1973, six years after the Six Days War, Egypt and Syria launched a joint attack on Israel. Various CIA documents and excerpts from Kissinger’s memoirs show that he was aware of Egyptian public statements, conversations between different leaders and informants, and signs of Egyptian and Syrian mobilization in excess of the anticipated annual autumn maneuvers. In his biography, *Years of Upheaval*, Henry Kissinger stated that he genuinely believed that the Middle Eastern nations were on the brink of a diplomatic solution, and that an attack on Israel was unforeseeable. However, in examining a variety of sources, including the involved leaders’ biographies and the newly available CIA documents, it is clear that the United States possessed all information necessary to predict an attack on Israel.

The newly declassified set of CIA documents, including weekly memorandums, various pieces of satellite information, and international weapons’ transfers, bring together US assessments of Egypt’s and Syria’s threat to Israel. There are three key types of intelligence that, when combined, should have indicated to Henry Kissinger that Israel was on the brink of being attacked. The first is statements made by various leaders in the Middle East. In both public statements and private conversations, many people indicated to Kissinger and the US intelligence community that an attack was likely. The second type of intelligence information was satellite data that clearly showed military action on all fronts. Third, there was ample knowledge of weapons transfers within the Middle East and from the Soviet Union into Egypt and Syria.

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10 Mingst, p. 201.
Warnings from other leaders were coming in months before the attack. On 7 July, a memo\textsuperscript{12} to Kissinger from Helms included statements by King Hussein describing Syria as a serious threat to Israel. He said that an attack to reclaim the Golan Heights, originally planned for June, could occur at any time. Towards the end of August, the United States received numerous statements from Arab leaders\textsuperscript{13} that indicated that war could occur in the near term. Finally, less than a month later, in an interview with “Le Monde” Sadat criticized the Soviet Union for “failing to give Egypt up-to-date weaponry,” making it clear that Egypt was on the hunt for more advanced military hardware.\textsuperscript{14}

The second type of intelligence information, pieces of satellite data, describe type of intelligence information, pieces of satellite data, describes sightings of military action on both the Syrian and Egyptian sides. On 30 September 1973, less than a week prior to the attack, the CIA received data\textsuperscript{15} showing a clear build-up of forces in the Golan Heights area. On 5 October, only a day before the actual attack, the United States received verification\textsuperscript{16} that Egypt was conducting exercise and alert activities on a much larger scale than all of the previous ones. There were also numerous reports\textsuperscript{17} stating that military groups within the Arab world were moving weapons around. In \textit{Years of Upheaval}, Kissinger explains that while he possessed knowledge of planes being moved to Egypt and troops being moved to Syria, he still interpreted all Middle East action as “exercise measures.”\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, much of the information presented in the CIA documents details weapons’ transfers not only within the Middle East, but also from the Soviet Union to Egypt and Syria. During the first week of October, several pieces of intelligence data describe Syria as receiving highly technical attack weaponry. On 4 October 1973,\textsuperscript{19} Damascus received its third OSA-class guided missile patrol boat from the USSR, improving their coastal surveillance and patrol

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Central Intelligence Agency, White House, 1973_07_07, “Memo from Helms to Kissinger.”
\item \textsuperscript{13} Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 1973_08_24_A, “Demographic Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Dispute.”
\item \textsuperscript{14} Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 1973_09_18, “Continuing Strains in Soviet-Egyptian Relations.”
\item \textsuperscript{15} Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Secretary of State, 1973_09_30_A, “CIA Assessment of Purported Syrian Military Preparations.”
\item \textsuperscript{16} Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 1973_10_05_A, “Updates on Egypt, Syria, and Libya.”
\item \textsuperscript{17} Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Weekly Summaries, 1973_10_05_B, “USSR: Problems with Cairo and Damascus.”
\item \textsuperscript{18} Kissinger, 1982, p. 225.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 1973_10_04_B, “USSR-Syria Missile Transfers.”
\end{itemize}
capabilities. The next day, the United States confirmed that not only had Moscow sent Syria the KA-25 Hormone helicopter, but at least nine KA-25s had been assembled at a Syrian air base since early September. Additionally, the document states that Syria received 17 MI-8 helicopters, bringing the total number upwards of 50.

Kissinger’s Misperceptions

Henry Kissinger had additional information, separate from the intelligence within the CIA documents that is laid out in his book, *Years of Upheaval*. Every year since 1971, Sadat had publicly stated his full intention to go to war with Israel. In his memoirs, Kissinger states that he was aware of these intentions, yet dismissed these new threats of war as a bluff. Meanwhile, Egypt was watching Israeli and American actions closely, and, being aware of their misconceptions, acted in ways to mislead them. For example, in 1973, an American company signed an agreement to build an oil pipeline on the Gulf of Suez, suggesting that the Egyptian government did not expect any major conflicts to erupt in the area. Knowing this, Sadat was careful to limit the number of people who were aware of his intentions to go to war. In the meantime, all Egyptian and Syrian representatives at conferences (at the United Nations, among others) worked for a peaceful solution, since they did not know about the impending war. In these and other ways, Sadat added “noise” to the American and Israeli channels which they interpreted as “signals” for peace. Kissinger states that he knew of the Soviet presence steadily being eliminated from Egypt. Although this should have indicated to the United States that Egypt might attack, Kissinger chose to disregard this movement of personnel in the region as coincidence, or as unnecessary precautionary measures by the Soviets. Actually, Sadat recognized that he had to reduce Egypt’s reliance on the Soviet Union, primarily because the Soviet government’s primary objective was to preserve the detente with the United States. Meanwhile, Sadat felt that the attack would be a game-changer, ending the gridlock and helping Egypt gain much-needed financial support from other Arab nations. Simply put, it was a misalignment of fundamental objectives, since Egypt felt it was necessary to go to war (albeit a

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20 Central Intelligence Agency, 1973_10_05_A.
22 Heikal, pp. 17-18.
limited war), whereas the Soviets wanted to avoid it. Eliminating the Soviet presence also made it plausible for Sadat to invite the American government to support Egypt against Israel after the fighting began.

One of the crucial incorrect assumptions made by Henry Kissinger and the leaders of Israel was that Egypt would not attack as long as it lacked air superiority. With this in mind, even as intelligence information regarding the transfer of weapons to the region increased, policymakers and analysts were less likely to interpret the weapons movements as a significant signal. Sadat was aware that the Americans and the Israelis would fail to anticipate any attack from the Egyptians, particularly because they did not account for the possibility of a limited war. One of the more successful denial and deception efforts used by the Egyptian leadership was the mobilization of troops under the guise of regular autumn maneuvers. In the few days leading up to the war, the Egyptians were throwing up more smokescreens to lead the Americans and Israelis astray. For example, some of the Liberation 23 reservists were sent home, suggesting an end to the maneuvers, when in fact, they would return on 6 October 1973, ready for battle. At Sadat’s order, a newspaper that Israel was known for following closely (Al-Ahram) was made to contain two small news items that would further deceive the Americans and Israelis. The first news item was that the Sadat had “opened a list for those officers who wanted to go on the small pilgrimage (umra)”; the second was that the Minister of Defense was preparing to meet another minister for more talks on 8 October. Both contributed to the perception that Egypt was not preparing for any hostilities, though that turned out to be quite contrary to Egypt’s actual actions.

Kissinger and the governments of the United States and Israel all assumed that Sadat world would give diplomacy and the formation of a peaceful solution one more chance. They believed that at least one more set of meetings between all the key leaders would occur prior to any credible threat of an attack. Even on the morning of the 6 October strike, with Syrian and Egyptian troops attacking, Kissinger was still, “more than half convinced that Egyptian and Syrian actions grew out of a misunderstanding of Israeli intentions.” In fact, the Egyptians

24 Heikal, p. 20.
26 Heikal, p. 16.
27 Heikal, p. 32.
noticed that the Americans, eager to play the role of intermediary in the peace process, oversimplified the problem to one of Egyptian and Syrian sovereignty and Israeli security, a framework which could not account for any “irrational” reasons that would drive Egypt to attack (i.e., psychological and emotional factors such as needing to restore Egyptian honor in order to move forward in peace talks). More important than regaining territory was dealing a blow to the Israelis’ pride and arrogance.

In his memoirs, Kissinger admits to misperceiving much of the incoming information and “missing the essence of the issue” with regard to Egypt and Sadat’s intentions in attacking Israel. But how is it possible that with all of the information and intelligence he was provided, he, along with other government officials, did not perceive an attack on Israel as a likely outcome in the near future? Kissinger states that a major part of the problem is policymakers do not always fully understand their role. “Policymakers will never know all of the facts pertaining to a certain situation, but it is their job to ask the right questions. They cannot hide behind their analysts if they miss the essence of an issue.” He also blames Sadat for intentionally misdirecting the American understanding of the situation: “Sadat overwhelmed us with information and let us draw the wrong conclusion. 6 October was the culmination of a failure of political analysis on the part of its victims.”

**Israeli Misperceptions**

The United States was not alone in misperceiving Egypt’s ambitions. Israel’s huge intelligence failures put Israel’s security in jeopardy and inflicted very heavy casualties. The Agranat Commission, published in July 1974, was critical of the “conceptions” formed by Israel’s intelligence, declaring that the Chief of Intelligence, Major General Eliahu Zeira, had adopted a “concept with such inflexibility that it prevented him from maintaining the flexibility necessary to tackle the information.” This section explores some of the Israeli leaders’ common misperceptions.

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29 Heikal, p. 201.  
30 Ibid, 220.  
32 Ibid, p. 469.  
The overarching Israeli analysis concluded that even though Egypt had the capability to attack, it would not because it feared a counterattack by Israel’s air force. Israel clung to the idea that Egypt would not go to war until it had assured aerial capability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force. Moreover, Israeli officials concluded that if Egypt did not go to war, then Syria would not risk a war without Egypt. Thus, even though Israel gathered intelligence on the aircraft swaps in Egypt, analysts and policymakers chose to ignore the significance of the trade because they believed that Egypt would only go to war if it had a certain type of fighter-bomber that would be capable of limiting the Israeli counteroffensive.

Secondly, Israel defense forces were overconfident in their capacity to manage an attack with its standing army. They concluded that they could stop most of the Egyptian army without reserve forces. Major General Zeira also was convinced that Israeli intelligence would give advance warning regarding enemy intentions to launch an all-out war. At the same time, in the Spring of 1973, General Zeira became the Director of Military Intelligence, and he was already convinced that there was no situation in which Egypt would be able to mount an attack against Israel. In September, Israel began to receive information about a buildup of Syrian troops on the Golan Heights, which should have been regarded as a possible preparation for war. However, the reports were dismissed as noise, and the moves were explained simply as defense preparations and reinforcement of Syrian troops caused by the Syrians’ fear of an attack by Israel. This explanation for the Syrian move was repeated throughout the month.

Israeli policymakers and intelligence officials also believed that Sadat desired only to boost the Arab bargaining position. Hafez Ismail was to meet with Henry Kissinger on 19 May 1973. Israel felt that Egypt was particularly frustrated by the continued stalemate, especially related to the negotiations concerning its lost territory. Egyptian hopes of renewed Soviet support were also a source of disappointment, as the Soviets became wary of balancing its position between Egypt and the United States. Instead of picking up on various clues that Sadat was becoming restless about the deadlock, David Elazar, the Chief of State of the Israel Defense Forces, stressed that the Egyptian activity was merely meant to raise Sadat’s clout during the

36 Ibid, p. 87.
38 Heikal, p. 17.
negotiations between the superpowers and Israel. Thus, any military exercises held in Egypt were perceived as being part of Sadat’s tactic to create a menacing atmosphere before the talks and serve to increase his bargaining power.\textsuperscript{40}

Misperception is an easy trap and Israel fell into it. This turned out to be costly for Israel as they scrambled to prepare and defend themselves from the surprise Egyptian attack. Despite signals along the way, Israeli intelligence failed to use these signals to challenge their assumptions and concepts. When evidence appeared to be inconsistent with their conceptions, they did not question the established view or develop alternative perspectives but instead, tried to interpret and mold the evidence to fit it into their existing conceptions. In fact, signals were misperceived up through the very last moments: when the coordinated withdrawal of the families of Soviet personnel occurred two days before the attack because of warnings of an attack, Moshe Dayan took this as a positive sign for Israel, believing that it meant the isolation of Egypt and thus an even smaller chance of an attack.\textsuperscript{41}

**Conclusion**

It has been established that surprise attacks are often a result of leaders’ misperceptions of signals and noise. We have seen how, in the case of the 1973 War, both the US and Israel stuck to fundamentally incorrect assumptions that lead them to misinterpret and disregard critical data. Egypt was aware of this and further deceived them, which contributed to the element of surprise. While there may not be any “cure” for having rigid mental frameworks or making wrong assumptions, there are certain preventive measures that can be taken.

One key step is for leaders to realize that they will always possess a certain degree of bias. Jervis states that, “decision-makers must recognize that all interpretations are biased.”\textsuperscript{42} Organizational psychology research addresses “groupthink,” another form of bias, with a set of eight key symptoms to which leaders are susceptible. One of these symptoms, “illusion of invulnerability,” is the tendency for people to support the groups in which they participate. Because they implicitly believe themselves to be powerful and their views as being superior (creating a “we-they” sentiment), they tend to ignore possible negative outcomes related to any


\textsuperscript{41} Parker, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{42} Mingst, p. 193.
decisions they make. This relates back to the manner in which Kissinger (as well as Israeli leaders) assumed that Israel was invulnerable due to supposed superior weaponry and intelligence, especially with regard to air force capabilities. Another symptom of groupthink is “self-censorship,” where dissenting members do not voice any doubts or criticisms related to decisions. This can be because they may face pressure to conform, which contributes to decisions appearing to be more unanimous than they might otherwise be. Related to this are “collective rationalizations”—the tendency to try to explain away any negative or contradictory information. Whatever the case, this further highlights the importance of proper communication between all agents involved in the situation; it leads to a greater exploration of possibilities and leads to a higher quality decision. Leaders should try to retain an open mind and welcome a variety of viewpoints in order to come to the best possible decision.  

Unfortunately, it is human nature to be biased. It cannot be avoided, but it can be guarded against. If leaders make an effort to be conscious of their biases, they can make greater efforts to counter them. We have seen various issues related to decision-making. Wohlstetter, for example, highlights the poor communication of information between Washington, D.C., the Army, and the Navy during the attack on Pearl Harbor; better communication between all three groups would have challenged Washington’s assumptions and perhaps changed the entire outcome of the attack. Jervis also advocates making all “assumptions, beliefs, and predictions,” extremely explicit, as it underlines the fact that any prediction is resting on some assumption. For example, the US and Israel believed that Sadat would not wage a total war because they lacked the military capability to do so. However, that rests on the assumption that a state wages war to win the war. If they had considered that Egypt might have something else at stake, (such as its honor), then they might have discovered that “putting up a good fight,” rather than winning, was the Egyptian priority. If any of the safeguards suggested above could have been taken into consideration by the Nixon administration and the international community, Henry Kissinger’s individual misperceptions might have been challenged and overturned rather than accepted as the standard. His assumptions directed the shape and nature of negotiations. Had he been more attuned to Sadat’s objectives, then it is very possible that the Yom Kippur War may not have come as a surprise, and, indeed, it may even have been avoided.

44 Mingst, p. 194.
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