

HR

Security Information

NSA-75E

SECRET

SR/3

01. Aug. 1953

(11)

Chief, HR  
(Attn: Chief, HR)  
Chief of Base, Munich

MEMORANDUM/Operational  
SUBJECT: Report of meeting between ABRAMSKY and OSTROMSKI.

1. The attached report on a recent meeting between Prof. Nikola ABRAMSKY of the HR and Prof. OSTROMSKI of the HR was prepared by [ ] [ ]
2. Although in the body of the report there is an indication that efforts would be made to work out a platform of agreement, [ ] [ ] stated that he did not believe anything would develop and discuss even if further discussions would be held.

[ ] [ ]

Att: (1)

27 August 1953

Distribution:

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

Security Section Att: to 7521  
SE REPORT EGMA-7521/1  
31 AUG 53

On August 17 and 18 of this year, the organizational president Abramchik had two meetings with Ostrovskiy, who came with Zarechny to attend a meeting of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR. This was their first meeting in over thirty years. According to Abramchik, Ostrovskiy suggested to him, through Kabysh, that they meet to discuss mutual problems. Zarechny told me that the initiative was supposed to have been taken by Abramchik.

Ostrovskiy proposed to Abramchik that they discuss all possibilities of reconciling the BNR and the BTsR. His ideas on the subject were as follows: 1) The two groups would be merged into one, Ostrovskiy becoming president of the Belorussian government in exile. Abramchik, as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, would be in charge of ~~the~~ policy. 2) Or both Ostrovskiy and Abramchik would renounce all claims to the presidency and the entire Belorussian emigration would elect a new government. 3) To attempt to form some agency that would coordinate all of the activities of the BNR and the BTsR.

After six hours of discussion they concluded that it would be very difficult to put any solution into effect but that they would nonetheless try to act in accordance with this line.

It is typical that ~~in~~ in talking with Abramchik and with Kabysh ~~Ostrov-~~skiy was extremely frank and did not conceal his weaknesses and that he was unrestrained in his criticism of his ~~own~~ colleagues in the BTsR. Zarechny said the same thing to me the next day.

Although Abramchik and Ostrovskiy did not come to any definite agreement, they decided to maintain contact with each other and to try to agree on some platform.

On the 19th of August the Ukrainian journalist Kotorovich called me on the phone to say that Zarechny would like to make my acquaintance.

I met him in a restaurant, where we spent about two hours together. The first thing he asked me about was to lend him 50 marks, saying that he ~~was~~ was in difficult straits. I don't know whether he had any ulterior motive ~~in~~ in doing this.

In his specific proposals Zarechny persuaded me that we, former and future soldiers, must find a common language even if our politicians were unable to do so. He further convinced me that the BNR must accept Ostrovskiy's suggestions and to agree to his demands. As I mentioned earlier, he spoke very frankly and critically of his colleagues in the BTsR. For instance, he called Popko a moron and an illiterate. When I asked him why Popko was listed as Vice-Minister of Enlightenment in the last index of the BTsR "government", he replied that unfortunately Popko was ~~the~~ leader of the party which had ~~joined~~ united with them, and it was necessary to honor this fact. *o ABRAMCHIK, MYKILA*

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I replied that I was not any sort of leader or important figure in the BNR and that I would not be able to exert any sort of influence. He then asked me to put him in touch with Boris, and I promised to try.

He further told me, as if unwilling to do so, that a few days ago he had met some American officers and that he had been completely satisfied by the results of their discussion. He did not, of course, specify what they had talked about or what sort of officers they were.

In this latter connection, I should like to say that two weeks ago, in England, several people told me that when Carechny was in England he was supposed to have said that he was in contact with the same American officers that Nagulya was working with and that they kept him informed of everything. He is thus kept abreast of what Nagulya is doing.

We parted on rather friendly terms and he promised to see each other again. He gives the impression of being a rather smart and business-like person. He likes to drink, but he is no fool. He kept himself fortified with liquor during all of his conversation with me and contrived to have me pay for it. His Soviet upbringing and way of thinking is marked in him. He also said, in passing, that he prefers working for British intelligence rather than for American intelligence, because he thinks the former is more reliable. He also gave me to understand that, thanks to the English, he was able to live in an elegant house and had an income. He is also paid something by the Germans.

August 22, 1953

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