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PARTISAN CONTACTS of []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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Partisan Contacts of []

1 [] originally landed among the partisans of the ZALGIRIS Detachment located in the Kazlu Ruda Forest in the general area $54^{\circ}40' - 23^{\circ}09'$.^{1/} The ZALGIRIS Detachment is a subunit within the TAURAS District, the next highest partisan level.

2. The last known location of [] was with the VYTAUTAS Detachment (approx. $54^{\circ}30' - 23^{\circ}05'$).^{2/} It appears from his message of 18 April 1952 that [] moved into this partisan area about that time. The VYTAUTAS Detachment is under the leadership of KABELIS who commands approximately 15 active partisans.^{3/} The detachment is a sub-unit of the TAURAS District.^{4/} Besides contact with the ZALGIRIS Detachment the VYTAUTAS detachment was also in contact with the GELEZINIS VILKAS Detachment until the winter 1951/1952 when heavy snowfalls and increasing number of roundups prevented further liaison.^{5/} The GELEZINIS VILKAS Detachment is also within the TAURAS District partisan framework.

3. Contact between the VYTAUTAS Detachment and the TAURAS Commander, Demonas, was reestablished according to a message dated 13 October 1952 from []^{6/} Another message from [] dated 14 October 1952 indicated that Demonas was in contact with LLKS Headquarters and with leaders of the GELEZINIS VILKAS Detachment and the VYTAUTAS Detachment.^{7/} However, the message continued, because of heavy enemy sweeps in this general area Demonas was forced to sit in his bunker, making his contacts only slightly effective.

^{1/} Message No. 4 dated 26 June 1951.

^{2/} Message No. 29 dated 18 April 1952.

^{3/} Message No. 30 dated 21 April 1952.

^{4/} Message No. 42 dated 22 May 1952

^{5/} Message No. 43 dated 27 May 1952

^{6/} Message No. 76 dated 13 Oct. 1952.

^{7/} Message No. 78 dated 14 Oct. 1952.

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THE GENERAL DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (BDPS)

Introduction

1. After the end of the German Occupation and its replacement by the Russian Army, the various resistance movements (represented by the different groups which were known to have been active during the German occupation) coalesced in 1946 into one General Democratic Resistance Movement - the BDPS.¹ A "declaration" to that effect was signed by representatives of five separate resistance bodies which ceased their independent existence as of that time.²

2. The BDPS continued to exist from that date onward - passing through various phases of organizational struggles brought to a head by some of its integral parts, caused mainly by splits and sometimes violent quarrels over the conflicting claims of active as opposed to passive resistance. The first chairman of the BDPS in 1946 was Professor Markulis @ ERELIS. A man whose cryptonym was LOKYS was also associated with ERELIS. The third member of the BDPS leadership was a Zaskevicius, the son of General Zaskevicius, who used the cryptonym SHALLNA. A Lt. Colonel Vitkus, also known as Kasimieraitis, was the fourth leader.³ In addition to these four principals there were other members of the BDPS. Among those known were Antanas Miskinis (true name) and a (fau) Boruta (true name). These two were legally living city residents. It is believed that Miskinis later became a member of the Praesidium of the BDPS, but it is not known when.⁴

3. Markulis, Lokys, Zaskevicius and Vitkus carried on as the BDPS leadership until about 1947 (the exact formal organization structure, if any, is nebulous). Markulis was allegedly arrested in the latter part of 1947 or early

in 1948, and has not been heard from since that time. Lokys disappeared mysteriously never to reappear, Zaskevicus is rumored to have been arrested, and Vitkus was killed in June 1946 while en route to a partisan meeting.⁴

4. The liquidation of the Markulis @ ERELIS BDPS group left the Lithuanian resistance without any group which used the name "BDPS". However, the leadership of the Tauras partisan district, which had previously been subordinated to the ERELIS BDPS, came to the forefront as the "high command" of the resistance. Zveys, who was the Tauras district leader, became the BDPS chairman in fact, if not in name. Zveys never attempted to assume the "BDPS Chairman" title - he never signed any document as such - but he actually carried out many of the functions of the previous BDPS chairman. Associated with Zveys were Gediminas (cryptonym), Versaitis (true name) and Vabalis (true name). It was this group which sent Skrajunas to the West in December 1947. Maintaining contact with this group were Miskinis and Alekna who were city residents.⁵

5. Zveys was killed in the early part of 1948 and his deputy GEDIMINAS took over the leadership of the BDPS. He brought new members into the Praesidium, established contacts with the regional staffs of partisan groups and with other underground organizations. He thus became the leader of all the active and passive resistance in Lithuania united under the BDPS Praesidium.⁶ The leadership of GEDIMINAS, however, came to a sudden end in May 1948 when he was killed near Tauras in an encounter with a unit of the Soviet Security forces.⁷ After his death the remaining members of the BDPS Praesidium went into hiding and the center organization of the resistance for the time being, became disintegrated and inoperative.

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6. Slowly the BDPS members began to reorganize the Praesidium and to renew their contacts with other resistance groups, including the active partisan districts. In 1948 Arunas was commissioned by the Praesidium to establish contact with the Dainava partisans.⁸ Through another partisan group, the "ARAS", Arunas attempted to contact VANAGAS,⁹ the head of the Dainava partisans. At a meeting attended by a certain Major "LITAS"¹⁰ of the Dzukai partisan unit, Arunas requested assistance in contacting VANAGAS. He explained at that time that he knew VANAGAS personally.

7. In August 1948 Arunas was conducted to VANAGAS by ARAS, the chief of the ARAS partisans.¹¹ At this meeting Arunas explained to VANAGAS that the BDPS Praesidium had lost two successive leaders, Capt. Zveys and GEDIMINAS, and that the leadership was offered to Capt. ZEMAITIS¹² from whom the Praesidium never received an answer. Arunas also informed VANAGAS of the latest reorganization of the BDPS Praesidium and of its leadership, and conveyed to VANAGAS the Praesidium's proposal to arrange a meeting between VANAGAS and Professor Dramblys, Col. Ruginis and priest Azuolis.¹³

8. VANAGAS accepted the offer and disclosed that he kept contact with the Tauras region partisans,¹⁴ and indicated that he could, perhaps, help in bringing this group into the general scheme.¹⁵ After this first contact permanent contact with VANAGAS was established and further meetings later took place between VANAGAS on the one hand and Arunas and Azuelas on the other. It was made quite clear to both Vanagas and Litas that the BDPS Praesidium works for the unification, under its leadership, of all passive and active resistance.¹⁶

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9. Contact between the BDPS Praesidium and the Tauras region partisan was also established. The BDPS Praesidium was represented by Asuolas who outlined to the Tauras leaders the task and aims of the Praesidium.¹⁷

The Split of the Active Partisans from the BDPS

1. On 16 February 1949 the partisan leader Zemaitis convened a conference of various leaders of active partisans which took place in Zemaitija.¹⁸ Among others who attended this meeting was Vanagas, then the leader of Dainava District. As a result of this meeting the following declaration was issued:

- a. To change the name of the BDPS into LKKS (Lithuania Fight for Freedom)¹⁹.
- b. To appoint the leadership of the newly formed LKKS to be in supreme authority of the Resistance in Lithuania.
- c. For the purpose of the organized resistance Lithuania was to be divided into three military partisan areas: (1) South, (2) North East, (3) North-West.

2. This declaration was received by the BDPS Praesidium with vigorous protest against such arbitrary decision and accused the partisan leaders of a deliberate manipulation of the split. In order to maintain certain unification of purpose, the BDPS proposed to LKKS that this new name should be adopted, but for the active resistance only, and that BDPS should continue leading all the passive and active resistance in Lithuania through the Praesidium, which was to include representatives of the active partisans. This proposal was sent to Capt. Zemaitis through Vanagas, but no answer was given to it.²³

3. At the same time that the meeting of the partisans took place, 16 February 1949, another meeting had been arranged by Vanagas with BDPS representatives Ruginis and Asuolas. Since Vanagas had attended the meeting of

the partisans, Major Litas of the Dzukai partisans²⁰ took Vanagas' place and met with the BDPS leaders. The BDPS representatives at this meeting restated in writing their program²¹ and added that they would like to get representatives of the active partisans incorporated into the BDPS Praesidium. Litas took this program with him and promised to pass it to Vanagas who would forward it to Capt. Zemaitis. Although a letter from Vanagas to Prof. Dramblys was received by the BDPS head (via Arunas), no reply to the program was given.²²

4. In 1949, the BDPS Praesidium prepared to send a representative abroad. Vanagas and Litas, the two "friendly" partisan leaders were informed about the project with the proposal that a member of the active resistance join the BDPS representative. This offer, however, was rejected by the partisans. Arunas in his report assumes the reason the offer was rejected was the fact that the partisans had dispatched their own representative, RIMVYDAS, without the knowledge of the BDPS.²⁴

Present State of the BDPS

1. The BDPS group organized by Dramblys in 1948 maintained its general composition until 1952. Known to be directly associated with Dramblys in the Praesidium are Colonel Engenis, Brolis and others. General Gintautas, an aged, infirm Lithuanian army officer served as an inactive advisor to Dramblys. In addition, Dramblys has a number of other contacts or BDPS members whose identities are known to BROADWAY. The contact with the Dramblys complex in the past has been maintained through the two w/t operators attached to Dramblys.²⁵ BROADWAY envisaged that the w/t man sent with EDVARDAS would form a third radio channel.²⁶

2. According to a report with a date of information up to April 1952 the BDPS Praesidium maintained contact with groups organized according to particular professional spheres, e.g. among teachers, doctors, engineers, etc. These groups represent the passive resistance which is as active as circumstances permit. The contact which the BDPS maintains with some of these groups is through individual Praesidium members. With other groups, contact is maintained through intermediaries. Relations between separate groups of the passive resistance with the BDPS Praesidium are so controlled that the leaders of these groups know only one or other of the members of the BDPS Praesidium or an intermediary. No other details about the BDPS are known to members of the groups. ²⁷

3. Although the split between the active partisans and the BDPS Praesidium resulted in a disruption of the regular contacts between these two groups, the BDPS Praesidium nevertheless considered it essential to retain some contacts with remaining leaders of the active resistance groups. According to EDVARDAS, it was not possible, up to April 1952, to reestablish a close contact with the leadership of the LKS for about one year, because the LKS had been completely disorganized. Enemy measures, terrorism and betrayal had scattered the remnants of the LKS leadership. Individual groups had not maintained contact with each other, and had continued to operate independently. As a result the partisans are demoralized and it appears that its leaders are beginning to disagree among themselves, to suspect each other, and to betray each other to the enemy. ²⁸

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Footnotes

1. Source: ARUNAS as debriefed by TIRALLIRA and reported in Report No. 5 dated 12 January 1951, an attachment to OELA-204, dated 26 November 1952.
2. Source: *ibid.* The five groups were: the partisans, the Liberty Army - a military organization, the "Free Fighters", the "United Movement", the "Lithuanian Front".
3. Source: TIRALLIRA, reported in OELA-204, dated 26 November 1952.
4. *ibid.*
- 5, 6, 7. ARUNAS report attached to MOEA 8667 dated 4 March 1952.
8. *ibid.*
9. Source: *ibid.* VANAGAS is one of the members of the LLKS Praesidium reported by [] to have turned traitor - MUNI 2581. This may be the same partisan leader [] (Stan) want to meet according to [] messages 85 and 86, dated 26 November 1952. Stan never returned from this trip.
10. Source: *ibid.* LITAS is another member of the LLKS Praesidium reported by [] to have turned traitor - MUNI 2581.
11. Source: *ibid.* The "ARAS" and "LITAS" Partisan units were under the Dainava partisan region at that time. Source: *ibid.*, para 14.
12. Source: *ibid.* Zemaitis is probably the third member of the LLKS Praesidium turned traitor. See footnote 18.
13. Dramblys is still a member of the BDPS (LOND 6276 (IN 30369), dated 21 Jan. 1953). Ruginis may still be a member of the BDPS - was last known to be a member on 12 April 1952 when he signed EDVARDAS' documents (WELA 6674)
14. Source: *ibid.* The Tauras partisans were the most heavily hit group in the roundup reported by [] in MUNI 2581.
15. Source: *ibid.*
16. *ibid.*

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17. *ibid.* The aims as stated in the Arunas report are as follows:
 - a. To unite the active and passive resistance forces under one leadership yet administratively not to interfere with internal affairs of the individual partisans regions and groups.
 - b. To prevail upon all resistance forces to change the tactics they employ, learning more towards passive resistance as against active resistance.
18. *ibid.* According to a message from TEOFILIS, referred to in MUNI 1119, dated 16 March 1950, a former Lithuanian captain Zemaitis, leader of the Vakaru Sritis district partisans broke with the BDPS and declared himself general. Col. Sova, in the same cable, indicated that Capt. Zemaitis was a personal friend of his. Zemaitis was considered a brilliant artillery officer and a graduate from the French artillery school. His activity in Vakaru Sritis district in December 1947 was confirmed by Skrajunas.
19. *ibid.* There was no representation of the BDPS Praesidium at the conference and no consent was given by the BDPS for the change of name. As an excuse for changing the name, was given the fact that among members of BDPS was one traitor, Markulis * ERRELIS, although it was well known to the partisans that Markulis was isolated already long ago, when Zvejys was still alive and heading the BDPS. (Note: this is Arunas' comment).
20. *ibid* para. 17. See note 10.
21. *ibid* see note 17.
22. *ibid.*
23. *ibid*, para 19.
24. *ibid*, para 20.
25. Source: SMORZATO, Attachment to WELA-9893, dated 14 November 1952. According to the same source, when BROADWAY returned Arunas to Lithuania two w/t operators accompanied him. These were turned over to Dramblys. One of the two operators is in Kaunas (where Dramblys is); the other is in Vilnius. Dramblys has his own code book which he uses at times to encipher messages before giving them to the w/t man for transmission. The two w/t men were legalized through Dramblys. They are completely subordinate to Dramblys and were briefed that they were to be so before their dispatch. All traffic originates with Dramblys, no messages were ever received from the operators.
26. *ibid*, para 3b.
27. Source; EDVARDAS in WELA 8595 dated 4 June 1952.
28. *Ibid.*

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SUMMARY

A. Active Partisan Movement

1. The degree to which the active partisan movement was damaged during roundups reported by [] in MUNI 2581 has been extensive. As the attached diagram indicates, the entire southern partisan region, the "Nemunas", was completely wiped out. LITAS who at one time headed a partisan unit in this area and whose last known position was as a member of the LIKS must be presumed to have been familiar with every organized partisan unit under his command. His defection to the Soviets has presumably compromised every partisan unit in this area.

2. The North West partisan region, "Juros" must be considered compromised in view of the fact that both the Zemaicia and the Kestutis districts were named by [] as having been destroyed. Although no indications have been given that the North East region, "Kalnu" was affected by the latest roundups, that possibility cannot be precluded.

3. It must be presumed from the fact that three well known high ranking partisan leaders defected to the Soviets, that the entire partisan organization in Lithuania has been seriously damaged. The use of any part of that organization in support of future FI missions should be precluded.

B. Passive Resistance (BDPS)

1. From the attached background study of the BDPS it can be seen that throughout its existence, until the last reported date in April 1952, the Praesidium of the BDPS made a continuous effort to maintain contact with the

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active partisans. This contact was maintained at times through various leaders of the active partisan movement, particularly VANAGAS and LITAS, the two leaders who defected to the Soviets as reported by [] . Although there is no evidence to indicate direct contact between the BDPS and the active partisans during the last year or two, it is known that the effort to make contact, and the possibility that this effort succeeded, continued up to the time of EDVARDAS exfiltration in May or June 1952.

2. It can be established with some degree of certainty that meetings between VANAGAS, LITAS and other members of the active partisan leadership were held with Dramblys, Ruginis and other high ranking members of the BDPS Praesidium.

3. From the above it can be concluded that present members of the BDPS Praesidium are known personally to the partisan leaders who defected to the Soviets. It can also be assumed that before these partisan leaders defected to the Soviets their knowledge of the BDPS organization and possibly the location of its leaders was extensive. From this it must be presumed that if the BDPS leaders have not yet been arrested by the Soviets, their continued free existence is precarious.

C. Effect of Present Lithuanian Partisan Situation on []

1. In view of actions on the part of the Lithuanian partisans detrimental to the overall aims of Lithuanian resistance movements and contrary to the best interest of the Lithuanian people, the joint tasks of the []

[] were defined as follows:

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- a. Further clarification of the situation of the partisans;
- b. Attempt to modify their present tactics along the lines agreed upon by CIA/SIS and;
- c. The selection of representative partisan leaders for ex-filtration and indoctrination abroad in furtherance of our over-all aims.

2. From the analysis of present partisan situation it appears that the tasks outlined above are no longer valid as a basis for a joint CIA/SIS Lithuanian operation. The extent to which the active partisan movement has been depleted indicates that its potential strength to continue its adverse activities has become nebulous. It would therefore seem that the basic aim of CANTRIP, to reconcile the partisans, has no longer a basis in fact. The particular CIA interest in [] to reconnoiter [] present status and thereby give CIA an independent clean communications link with Lithuania, has been destroyed. The success of exfiltrating [] in view of his compromised position also appears doubtful. The positive intelligence gain which CIA would have in a joint CIA/SIS Lithuanian operation is therefore very slight, if at all existing.

3. Until the present situation developed it was planned to use a British asset as a reception for the [] team. Since the existence of any such assets are doubtful the [] would have to be sent "black", i.e. without a reception party. Even if the [] team will be received by British contacts in Latvia the possibility that this team can safely be channeled into Lithuania over clean assets appears slight.

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D. Future Course of Action Relating to []

1. The priority task with regard to any future planning for continued joint CIA/BIS activities is to give such a joint operation a new purpose based on a realistic assessment of the present Lithuanian resistance. The use of either the active or passive resistance in Lithuania in support of any joint operation should be precluded. This course leaves open only two means of infiltrating agents into Lithuania:

- a. in a black operation without reception;
- b. infiltration by means of other than the "Black" plane or boat, i.e. freighters going into Baltic ports, overland lines of transportation, etc.

2. The purpose of continued Lithuanian operations would be to reestablish support points independent from all resistance groups. A purpose for continued joint CIA/SIS operations can only be justified if SIS is in possession of such overt assets described in para 2b above. If SIS cannot make positive contributions in this field CIA should continue operations into Lithuania by itself.

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ARUNAS

ARUNAS is the individual who came out of Lithuania in 1950. He sent word to TIRRALIERA in Stockholm that he was in hiding in Poland. ARUNAS claimed to be a representative of the Lithuanian BDPS. Broadway succeeded in exfiltrating ARUNAS². Broadway debriefed him and infiltrated him into Lithuania in late 1950 with two w/t operators.¹

1. WASH 41280 (OUT 77346) , 16 May 1952.

2. WELW 5199, 3 October 1952/

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EDVARDAS

EDVARDAS is the individual who came out of Lithuania in May 1952.

1. He was exfiltrated by Broadway through the Kurzeme area.

EDVARDAS claims to come from the BDPS. His document of attestation states that Liudgaila was empowered by the BDPS Presidium of the country to represent the BDPS abroad and to confer with the appropriate organizations on matters affecting resistance in Lithuania. His document of attestation was signed by Dramblys and Ruginis (12 April 1952). EDVARDAS also brought out a document from the VKLT V (the group associated with Filstone). This document was addressed to Loxoraitis and stated that the VKLT V looked to Loxoraitis for guidance. It was signed by Alksnis, Bukas, Ramunas, and Balkonis and dated 23 December 1950. It was further dated 26 April 1952 and signed this date by Alksnis, alone. 2.

3. EDVARDAS was infiltrated on 23 October 1952

1. [] (IN 40228), 2 May 1952

2. WELW 5199, 3 October 1952.

3. [] (IN 47489), 24 October 1952)

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
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[] was dispatched on 18-19 April 1951 into the Kaunas area of Lithuania with [] .


[] sent his first message on 15 June 1951 and continued sending sporadically until November 1951 at which time he stopped sending. He reported again (w/t) for the first time since his silence in April 1952 with the excuse that his silence was due to a faulty generator. The last message received from [] to date was on 27 December 1952.

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- - - - = Contact between ZALGIRIS and VYTAUTAS
- + - + - = Contact between VYTAUTAS and GELEZINIS VILKAS
- - - - = Contact between VYTAUTAS and DEMONAS (13 Oct 52)
- • - • - = Contact between DEMONAS and LLKS (14 Oct. 1952)
- - - - = Contact between DEMONAS and GELEZINIS VILKAS (17 Oct. 1952)



- - - - = Contact between ZALGIRIS and VYTAUTAS
- + - + - = Contact between VYTAUTAS and GELEZINIS VILKAS
Unit, month 1951/52
- - - - - = Contact between VYTAUTAS and DEMONAS (13 Oct 52)
- • - • - = Contact between DEMONAS and LLKS (14 Oct. 1952)
- - - - - = Contact between DEMONAS and GELEZINIS VILKAS (17 Oct. 1952)
- • - • - = Contact between DEMONAS and VYTAUTAS (14 Oct. 1952)

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Source: ⁽¹⁾ Jack
(2) AT to WEL - 27230