

13 August 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO : SR/COP
FROM : Acting Chief, SR/2
SUBJECT: Review of Dispatch of []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Subject operation has been reviewed by the undersigned in the following terms:

- a. Readiness of the agent for the mission.
- b. Motivation of the agent:
- c. Problem of contact with "JACK" in the target country.
- d. Operational security.
- e. Development of contacts and basic agent network in the target country.
- f. Exfiltration from the target area.
- g. Assessment of the drop zone.
- h. Soviet Reaction to the Candelmas flight.
- i. Relationship between the agent and []
- j. Emergency communications.

2. The following conclusions were reached on l.a. through l.j. above:

- a. The agent is a very serious young man who displayed a sincere interest in learning the details of his cover legend, methods of contact with "JACK", and the details of his exfiltration from the target country. He is, however, a slow learner, requiring long hours of study and painstaking review of his training assignments. Under the conditions of his accelerated training, considerable doubt existed in the writer's mind regarding his abilities to absorb detailed briefing in a short period of time. However, by the time of departure from the United States, it is the writer's opinion that the agent was reasonably well prepared for the primary mission and should be able to withstand routine questioning in the target area. Due to limitations of documentation, area knowledge, and the background of the agent,

neither the cover legend nor the agent's documentation will withstand detailed examination.

- b. The agent is motivated by (1) nationalism, (2) friendship for the agent currently in the area, (3) political affiliation with the Lithuanian Social Democrats, and (4) moral obligation to the United States, in that order. The agent's motivation is well established in his mind. The purposes of the mission are clear to him. He is well aware of the dangers and the unknown factors of the operation and is willing to risk them.
- c. The agent has been fully briefed on the possibility of "JACK" being under RIS control. He realizes that his primary mission is to determine the status of "JACK" and that he is to exfiltrate "JACK" once he learns that he is clean. The determination of "JACK's" status and the establishment of contact with him are recognized as the most difficult steps of the mission since little is known of this agent's specific location, and no detail is available on the two addresses which he has listed as letter drops. In addition, "JACK" has repeatedly indicated his inability (or fear) of traveling to Kaunas, the nearest and only available large population center where [] documentation is applicable.
- d. [] was partially trained in England for participation in the now defunct Cantrip Project. He trained and had social contact with the British agent, met members of the British Staff, and is familiar with BIS training and training areas. In addition to the British contacts, the fact that he is being considered for a mission to the target country is probably known to both Professor KAMINSKAS, World Head of the Lithuanian Social Democrats, and to the Chairman of the Committee for a Free Lithuania of NCFE, SIDZIKAUSKAS. According to [], neither KAMINSKAS nor SIDZIKAUSKAS is aware of the dispatch time or the targets of the mission.
- [] has also been closely associated with a member of the Agency Staff ([]), whom he may know under true name although he is not, apparently, aware of the name of the organization sponsoring his mission or the location of any U.S. intelligence offices in the greater Washington area. He is also aware of the true name of a staff member ([]), who participated in operational briefings on 8 and 10 August 1953. (The agent requested this contact on reading in a U.S. Lithuanian newspaper of [] arrival in the U.S.)

British and Swedish Intelligence have been informed of the

approximate date and area of dispatch, the former being aware that the mission involves a potential contact with "JACK." The latter fact may present certain security considerations should British Intelligence pass its knowledge along to the LRS members on their London Staff. However, with the exception of a possible leak to LRS, there appears to be nothing of such importance as to jeopardize the operation externally.

Should the agent be apprehended in the target country, he possibly will be able to identify one or two U.S. staff members by description and true name though not by telephone, home address, or office. Naturally, he has also come in contact with staff officers and instructors both in the United Kingdom and the United States, and although he may be able to provide general descriptions of these people, he knows no true names.

- e. [] has been and is deeply concerned with the "limitations" of his mission, i.e., determination of "JACK's" status, and, if clean, his exfiltration. Therefore, as a potential source of aid in an emergency and as a possible basis for a clandestine organization in the target country, he has been provided with the names and addresses of approximately twenty (20) potential contacts. With the exception of three (3) of these contacts, who were originally given to "JACK", none of them has any present or past intelligence connections with other CIA operations. In addition to these twenty (20) contacts, [] has approximately sixteen (16) close relatives residing in the Kaunas area. These relatives, however, most probably will not become involved unless contacted as a final emergency step after all other possibilities have been exhausted.

[] ability to develop and brief one or more of the above persons will largely depend on the internal situation, i.e., his ability to move freely, find a place to stay, and to locate and securely approach the individuals.

- f. [] has full confidence in his ability to exfiltrate himself from the target country. However, his decision to exfiltrate may be seriously influenced by conditions inside the country and the physical condition and available documentation of any accompanying exfiltrates. The writer has little doubt that, should [] have at least a 50-50 chance of exfiltrating with a companion, he will make the attempt this fall. Failing in this, he will make the attempt as soon as feasible in 1954.
- g. The agent indicated an outspoken lack of confidence in the air section's ability to drop him in a designated area with

complete precision. This was due to his knowledge (gained in England) of an error of approximately 65 miles made in a previous agent drop into the target country. The question of the drop zone was further complicated by conflicting viewpoints between an indigenous instructor and Branch case officers on the wisdom of agent drops close to population centers. However, by the time of his departure from the U.S., it is felt that [] had accepted as sound the reasons for the selection of the drop area. If this acceptance is further collaborated by the contact with [] in Germany, there is little doubt of his full confidence in the air section and the drop site.

- h. The mission is subject to cancellation due to adverse reaction in the target area to a black aircraft penetration scheduled for 12 August 1953, six to eight days prior to the AECAMP dispatch.
- i. One of the most serious considerations for this entire operation is the "unfortunate" relationship which developed between [] ([]), a Staff member of this Branch, and [].

This relationship, which took root in England during [] training and the assignment of [] on TDY, was allowed to continue on their return to the United States and developed into a serious emotional complex involving the possibility of marriage with the attendant security ramifications. However, while detailed questioning confirmed the seriousness of the relationship, it appears certain that [] while possibly aware of [] true name, possessed no information which could be a direct security hazard to the Branch or the mission.

It is realized that, in the event of capture, [] may possibly reveal the name of an American Staff officer who could be an RIS target on the basis of [] safety. This, however, while possible, is highly unlikely since the chances of [] being captured alive are negligible due to his fear of implicating his friends and family. In fact, the relationship may very well bolster his desire for unhesitating exfiltration from the target country.

- j. [] has been provided with S/W, a signal plan and code pads, and a radio transceiver with a power pack and generator. He has also been briefed on control and compromise indicators, been given VOA signals for confirmation of bona fides, and is in the possession of four letter drops outside the USSR. A weighing of the equipment, including clothing, pistol, etc., indicated a weight of 85 pounds of gear, exclusive of the

generator. Inasmuch as the drop zone was selected on the basis of rapid movement and involves initial travel in a deep swamp, there is currently doubt that the radio gear will be included in the drop. Without the generator there is reasonable doubt as to the value of the set, and the weight and training involved do not seem to justify the inclusion of this gear. The agent, in any event, will take in the signal plan and code books and, in emergency, will rely on S/W communication out of the target country and reception of blind broadcasts from the outside.

3. Miscellaneous:

- a. While [] appears ready to commit himself to the mission, he has been most concerned with the fact that no Lithuanian operations personnel were involved in planning his mission. He will have contact, under the supervision of [], with [] in Germany. [] feels that [] the operational contact, will support our views of the operation and that [] will undertake the mission. [] has been instructed to report fully significant items of these talks to Headquarters with the understanding that the operation is subject to cancellation on the basis of his reporting and recommendations.
- b. A collated, tabbed operational folder, recording the above facts as well as all other data in great detail, is available in this Branch.

4. Recommendations:

- a. That, dependent on the [] talks, the operation be allowed to proceed as planned.
- b. That, in the future, operations involving agents of known calibre for short training periods be so handled that operational briefing and cover legends will be initiated simultaneously with DCB training.

1 Attachment
Evaluation of [] by []