

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

EEI

NO.

DATE

11 Oct. 1951

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. <i>EEI</i>	<i>J</i>			<i>JWF</i>	<i>[For your consumption only. JW.]</i>
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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

11 Oct 51

SECRET

MEMORANDUM: EE []

SUBJECT: COMMENTS: COUNTRY ANNEX (LATVIA) TO X-DAY PLAN

If it is decided by the appropriate authorities to include Latvian independence as an announced aim of World War III I would suggest:

- 1.) That 1 statement (the President) or at the most 2 (President and nearest military commander) would suffice.
- 2.) The message(s) should be much shorter, less rhetorical, and more quotable.
- 3.) The position of the Latvians as our allies should be a main point instead of parenthetical (i.e. President's speech). The suggestion that the Latvians take it easy and not invite premature reprisals (statement by Commander-in-Chief, Europe) should be a main point and if possible coupled with a more specific and constructive suggestion, such as awaiting signal of leaders, pamphlets of instruction, etc.
- 4.) I don't think the Latvians would need to be told how good they are and we are and how bad the Russians and that the recordings, speeches, etc., as they now stand are somewhat cumbersome and irrelevant.

[]
Chief, EE-II

Attachment: 1

EE-II/EFO'M/EH/amw

11 October 1951

Distribution: 1,2--Addressee

3,4--EE-II

5,6--SD/RE

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FROM:

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. C-PL/PS			9/13/51	[]	initial green copy
2. CPL		SEP 14 1951		[]	for signature
3. C-EE/pon			17 180 51	[]	<p>1. Appendices 2, 3 & 4 seem to me → much too detailed and too long. I urge they be greatly shortened & condensed into one Appendix.</p> <p>2. I personally see no psycho- logical advantage to be gained from the contemplated - or suggested statement by the Sec'y. of the Defense. I recommend deleting this statement entirely. []</p>
4. EE-2 ^{am}			20 Sept	[]	
5. CPL				[]	
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CAH 406

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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FROM:

CPL

NO.

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
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
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13 September 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, EE

SUBJECT: Country Annex (Latvia) to X-Day Plan

1. Attached is the suggested overt country annex (Latvia) to the X-Day Plan.
2. Covert annexes to overt X-Day Plans are to be incorporated in the "crash" planning effort of OPC under Part III of the CIA/OPC Strategic Plan. In this instance, it would be incorporated in the pertinent country plan and reflected in the EE Division Plan.
3. Accordingly, your comments on this overt annex are requested, in order that Plans Division can properly coordinate this planning with other agencies concerned.


Acting Chief, Plans Division

PL/PS/FRZ:blr

Distribution:

CEE (attachment: Country Annex to X-Day Plan)
CPL
CMC Chrono.
CMC X-Day Plan
Reg. (2)

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ANNEX XXVI (LATVIA) to X-DAY PLAN

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

a. In June, 1940, the USSR, despite peace, non-aggression, conciliation and mutual assistance pacts with Latvia, accused that nation of military conspiracy with Estonia and Lithuania against Russia. The following day the Red Army occupied the country, arrested and deported members of the government and leading non-Communist figures, and began the familiar program of Communization, purges and deportations. Rigged elections were held, and in July Latvia "requested", and was granted, admission to the USSR as a Soviet Socialist Republic. (See Appendix 1, Background).

b. U.S. assistance to Latvia during the period in which the latter established her independence was limited to distribution of food by the American Relief Association and sale to Latvia of a certain amount of A.E.F. stores. (See Appendix 2, U.S. Policy Toward Latvia 1917-1921) However, U.S.-Latvian relations thenceforth were close, stimulated by the presence here of large numbers of Latvian-Americans and by the fact that the Prime Minister of Latvia from 1918 to 1940, Mr. Karl Ulmanis, had spent five years in the U.S. following the unsuccessful revolution of 1905 against Russia. Rotary Clubs, YMCA's, YWCA's, more than 1,000 4-H Clubs and a Society of Friends of America appeared in Latvia. A Ford assembly plant was built in Riga, a shipping line to the U.S. chartered in 1938, and a Latvian-American Chamber of Commerce established in New York. (See Appendix 3, U.S. Policy Toward Latvia, 1922-1950).

c. The U.S. has never recognized the Soviet seizure of Latvia, and continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the former Latvian government, which has a functioning Legation in Washington. (See Appendix

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4, Positive U.S. Policy Toward Latvia 1919-1950). The Voice of America instituted daily programs in Latvian on June 3, 1951.

d. Assumption: ~~That~~ the USSR may itself or through one of its satellites, at an unknown day in the future (X-Day), start a general war.

2. MISSION.

To secure the maximum support of the Latvian people for the U.S. and its allies, in the form of defection, sabotage, underground resistance and eventual open rebellion, by announcing immediately upon the outbreak of general war the following policy with respect to Latvia:

"Among the war objectives of the United States is a free, independent Latvia, with a government self-determined by its own people and its sovereignty restored over the whole of the territory ruthlessly seized in 1940 by the Soviet Communists, in flagrant defiance of all moral and international law."

3. TASKS.

a. The Department of State will:

(1) Clear, translate into Latvian, record and appropriately distribute under properly classified sealed instructions the attached statements by the President (Appendix 5), Secretary of State (Appendix 6), Secretary of Defense (Appendix 7) and Commander-in-Chief ~~of~~ Europe (Appendix 8) ^e

(2) Maintain an historical policy file with respect to Latvia, in order this this annex and its appendices may be reviewed annually or as dictated by the international situation, and, if necessary, revised accordingly.

b. The Department of Defense will:

(1) Distribute sealed, classified instructions and transcriptions

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-3-

supplied by the State Department to the services as appropriate.

(2) Prepare such appendices to this annex as lie within the special scope of its psychological warfare responsibilities.

c. The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare such appendices to this annex as lie withⁱⁿ the special scope of its psychological warfare responsibilities.

x. All departments and agencies deriving psychological warfare guidance from the Psychological Strategy Board will implement this annex, via all feasible media, immediately upon the outbreak of general war.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. See Par 4. a., X-Day Plan.

5. COMMUNICATIONS. See Par 5, X-Day Plan.

Appendix 1, Background

2, U.S. Policy Toward Latvia 1917-1921

3, U.S. Policy Toward Latvia 1922-1950

4, Positive U.S. Policy Toward Latvia 1919-1950

5, Statement by the President

6, Statement by the Secretary of State

7, Statement by the Secretary of Defense

8, Statement by Commander-In-Chief Europe

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APPENDIX I TO ANNEX XXVI (LATVIA) TO I-NAV PLAN

BACKGROUND

The Letts, an Indo-European race which is neither Slav nor Teutonic and speaking a language closely akin to Sanskrit, inhabit the districts of Courland and Livonia on the Baltic, south of Estonia and north of Lithuania. Conquered by the Germans in the 14th Century, they came under the Poles in the 16th, the Swedes in the 17th, and the Russians in the 18th and 19th. Remarkably homogenous racially despite these successive occupations, they numbered two million in 1939, were 56% Protestant, principally Lutheran, 24% Roman Catholic, and 9% Greek Orthodox, the latter church allied at that time with Constantinople.

Latvia revolted unsuccessfully against Czarist Russia in 1904-5, but having little more liking for Germany (the landlord class in Latvia, the "Balts", were of German descent), supported Russia in World War I. After Russian resistance ceased, Latvian units continued fighting anyone who opposed Baltic independence -- Germans in the west, Bolsheviks in the east, and White Russians within Latvia.

Latvia declared her independence from Russia on 18 November 1917, taking advantage of the confusion attendant upon the Bolshevik coup, and deriving her inspiration from Woodrow Wilson, with the rallying-cry, "The great word of liberation has sounded: self-determination of nations!" In 1918, she protested those features of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (in which the Bolsheviks relinquished Russian claims to the Baltic provinces) which agreed to their occupation by Germany.

As the Germans withdrew from Latvia at the official end of World War I, the Bolsheviks advanced, held back only by a volunteer army of Letts, Balts, Germans and White Russians. Riga was given up to the Reds in January, 1919; in April, the Balts, who felt that they were insufficiently represented in the provisional government, overthrew it. Prompt and forceful intercession by the chief of the American Mission to the Baltic Provinces, however, led to the liberalization of the succeeding cabinet, and in May Riga was retaken and the Reds expelled from eastern Courland. In June, clashes in Livonia between German elements in the Latvian Army and the Estonian Army -- which included a Lettish brigade which favored the overthrown Latvian cabinet -- led to further intervention by the allied missions, a coalition cabinet, and an armistice which provided for the eventual evacuation of all German troops from Latvia.

Peace negotiations between the three Baltic Republics and Russia began during the fall of 1919, were delayed by U.S. insistence that a non-Bolshevik government could not arrive at an agreement with a Bolshevik government, and were consummated during the summer of 1920. The Allied Powers recognized Latvia *de jure* on 26 January 1921 (Great Britain had extended *de facto* recognition 11 November 1918); she was admitted to the

League of Nations in September, 1921, and the U.S. formally recognized the three Baltic Republics on 28 July 1922.

The treaty of peace between Latvia and Russia was most explicit on the subject of Latvian independence. Article 2 of the treaty was as follows:

By virtue of the principle proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of the Russian Soviets, which establishes the right of self-determination for all nations, even to the point of total separation from the States with which they have been incorporated, and in view of the desire expressed by the Latvian people to possess an independent national existence, Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence, self-subsistency and sovereignty of the Latvian State and voluntarily and forever renounces all sovereign rights over the Latvian people and territory which formerly belonged to Russia under the then existing constitutional law as well as under international treaties, which, in the sense here indicated, shall in the future cease to be valid. The previous status of subjection of Latvia to Russia shall not entail any obligation towards Russia on the part of the Latvian people or territory. ^{1/}

Latvia also concluded with Russia, in addition to the normal commercial treaties, an agreement concerning settlement of frontier disputes (1926), a non-aggression treaty (1932), a convention relation to conciliation procedure (1933), and a mutual assistance pact (1939). Both were parties to the Briand-Kellogg pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, and on 28 March 1939, the Soviet government in a note to the Latvian Republic expressed its "spirit of sincere benevolence toward the Latvian people", and its interest in preserving for Latvia its independent existence as a state and its political and economic independence. On 1 September 1939 Latvia declared its complete neutrality in the war which was to become World War II.

Nevertheless, under heavy pressure from Moscow,^{2/} Latvia was forced to conclude, in October, 1939, a "mutual assistance pact" with the USSR, which granted Soviet naval, air and coast artillery bases, with their garrisons, on Latvian soil. The Soviet attack on Finland, coupled with a further declaration of amity for the Baltic republics by Molotov, the following March, impelled the Latvian government, in May, 1940, to confer extraordinary emergency powers upon its envoys in London and Washington.

^{1/} Latvian-Russian Relations, Washington, 1944, pg 70.

^{2/} Stalin to Munters, Latvian Foreign Minister: "I tell you frankly: a division of spheres of interest has already taken place. When I said that we have to observe our peace treaty also with Germany: as far as Germany is concerned we could occupy you. ... The territory having a Russian minority could be taken away from you, but we do not raise that question." (Latvian-Russian Relations, Washington, 1944 ... pg 193)

On June 15th, the USSR accused Lithuania of military conspiracy with Latvia and Estonia against Russia, and occupied the country. On June 16th, ultimatums with substantially the same charges were served on Latvia and Estonia, and both countries were invaded and occupied June 17th, without being afforded the opportunity for replies. New governments were formed, rigged elections held, and in July, the Baltic republics "requested", and were granted, admission to the USSR as Soviet Socialist Republics.

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX XVII (LATVIA) TO X-DAY PLAN

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATVIA 1917-1921

U.S. national policy toward Latvia from 1917 through 1921 was largely negative. President Wilson, in his Fourteen Points, did not mention the Baltic republics, nor did he, in that document, reiterate the principle of self-determination of nations which served as Latvia's rallying-cry. The latter was included in a speech in Washington, D. C., 27 May 1916, in which he said:

"We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. . . . Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon."

The first enunciation of policy with reference to the Baltic states was contained in an exchange of memoranda with Great Britain. The British Embassy sent the Department of State a memorandum dated October 31, 1918, regarding the advisability of taking precautionary measures of a military character with regard to small states on the western borders of Russia.^{1/} The Secretary of State replied, on December 3, 1918, that he believed "the situation in these border states should be considered in connection with the general problem of the occupied territory of Russia."^{2/}

On March 7, 1919, the Acting Secretary of State sent a telegram to the U.S. Commission to Negotiate Peace, in Paris, as follows:

"1020. For Lansing.

"Lettish National League of America, which is seeking to promote trade relations between U.S. and Baltic provinces, has sent representative to London to confer with President Lettish National Council, which has received informal recognition by British Foreign Office. Lettish National League requests this representative be furnished with letter by Department stating that U.S. is not opposed to activities of League along the lines indicated. I recommend that Department be authorized to issue such letters in appropriate cases in its discretion, as informal recognition of Baltic Governments by other Associated Governments and lack of recognition by U.S. may otherwise react to our commercial disadvantage by creating in those countries the erroneous impression that our attitude toward them is an unfriendly one."^{3/}

1/ Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. II pg 839

2/ IBID., pg 856

3/ Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pg 672

Mr. Lansing answered this on March 12, 1919, as follows:

"My feeling is Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should receive all proper economic assistance from the U.S. I approve your recommendation that in appropriate cases letters should be issued in the sense of your telegram. ... A mission including necessary experts will leave here about week for Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsingfors, Reval to investigate economic military situation and the question of credits. ... Chief of this mission is Lieutenant Colonel (Warwick) Greene ... 1/

The first positive, albeit informal and unofficial, statement of U.S. policy made directly to the Latvian government was contained in a letter of 1 May 1919, from Colonel Greene to ex-Prime Minister Needra, who was trying to form a second new government after the Balt coup d'etat of April. In this letter, Colonel Greene made the following points:

"1. America does not wish to interfere or intervene in the internal politics of Latvia, except as they affect the carrying out of the terms of the armistice.

"2. American sympathies are with the people of Latvia in their efforts toward self-determination and in their struggle against the destructive force of Bolshevism." 2/

Colonel Greene went on to urge a coalition government sufficiently stable to "(a) prevent civil war; (b) provide the necessary administrative machinery for American food distribution; (c) permit the provisional relaxation of the blockade so that commerce and industry may revive; ...". (The British and French blockade of the Baltic, to prevent munitions from reaching the Reds, was still operative.) Largely as a result of Colonel Greene's efforts, a coalition government was achieved and the American Relief Administration commenced distribution of food.

Officially, however, the U.S. continued to refuse encouragement to the Baltic republics. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at the Quai d'Orsay on 9 May 1919, Mr. Balfour raised the specific question of aid to Estonia against the Bolsheviks, stating that the British Government had extended de facto recognition.

"Mr. Lansing pointed out that at the bottom of the whole question lay a very important principle of policy. The recognition of de facto Governments in territories formerly Russian, constituted in a measure a dissection of Russia which the United States of America had carefully avoided, except in the case of Finland and Poland. In the case of Poland Russia herself had acquiesced." 3/

Mr. Balfour withdrew his suggestion of recognition, but pressed the issue of aid.

1/ Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, pp. 673-4

2/ The Baltic Provinces: Report of the Mission to Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania etc., (S. Doc. 105, 66th Cong., 1st sess.)

3/ Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. IV, p. 688

Apart from the American Relief Administrations' distribution of food in connection with its general program of feeding Germany and the eastern European countries, America's only help to the Baltic republics consisted of A.R.F. stores furnished under the authority of an act of Congress, and supplied on contracts entered into by the Liquidation Board with co-partnerships representing the respective governments, the co-partnerships paying for the supplies with promissory notes of the governments concerned, with interest at 5% and transportation furnished by the purchasers. The Latvian contract provided for clothing, equipment and food in the amount of \$2,960,346.00, motor equipment at \$510,905.50, and engineers' supplies at \$119,873.45, with miscellaneous items bringing the total to the neighborhood of \$4,000,000.00

Behind the scenes, on 25 May 1919, the heads of the governments of the four principal allied powers and a representative of the Japanese government sent a dispatch to Admiral Kolchak, head of the White Russian government, outlining conditions under which they would continue their aid in opposition to the Bolsheviks. One of these conditions was as follows:

"Fifthly, that if a solution of the relations between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaucasian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and cooperation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments."^{1/}

Admiral Kolchak replied, in part, "... the Government assures from this moment the autonomy of the various nationalities. It goes without saying that the limits and the methods of this autonomy will be settled separately for each nationality."^{2/}

In June, 1919, President Wilson informed Vance McCormick, Chairman of the War Trade Board, that while he desired the maximum of autonomy and self-government for the Baltic Provinces, he did not understand at that time that any commitment had been made as to their independence, but that on the contrary the sovereignty of Russia remained unimpaired. On this basis, the State Department addressed a letter to the Lithuanian National Council in New York, the essential part of which follows:

"As you are aware, the Government of the United States is traditionally sympathetic with the national aspirations of dependent peoples. On the other hand, it has been thought unwise and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly, constitutional government in Russia the principle of Russian unity as a whole."^{3/}

The Versailles Treaty, signed 28 June 1919, mentioned the Baltic provinces in only one paragraph, as follows:

1/ Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. VI, p. 36

2/ Ibid., p. 321

3/ Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p 723

(Article 423) " ... In order to insure the restoration of peace and good government in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, all German troops at present in the said territories shall return to within the frontiers of Germany as soon as the Governments of the principal allied and associated powers shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of those territories. These troops shall abstain from all requisitions and seizures and from any other coercive measures, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany, and shall in no way interfere with such measures for national defense as may be adopted by the Provisional Governments. No other German troops shall, pending the evacuation or after, the evacuation is complete, be admitted to the said territories."^{1/}

That the U.S. conception of autonomy did not go as far as independence was officially brought home to a Baltic delegation which appeared before the Commissioner's Plenipotentiary in Paris on 2 July, to which Secretary of State Lansing briefly outlined U.S. policy regarding Russia and the small states on its border which desired independence. This was the same as stated to a Ukrainian delegation on 30 June, "that the United States was not in favor of independence for the Ukrainians but that it was in favor of a single Russia, in which the various portions should have a certain degree of autonomy."^{2/}

A telegram of 17 August 1919 to President Wilson from Prime Minister Ulmanis of Latvia, referring to a request for assistance made through Colonel Greene five weeks earlier, and asking for money, arms, food, clothing, ammunition and equipment to continue the fight against the Bolsheviks, went unanswered. The Greene Mission, one of whose members, Colonel Dawley, had been acting as military governor of Riga, was renamed a Commission, then withdrawn, and in October Mr. John A. Gade was appointed Commissioner of the U.S. for the Baltic Provinces of Russia. Mr. Gade's status as a special representative of the State Department gave him no power to commit the U.S. or to represent it in any diplomatic capacity; he was to serve simply as an observer.

On 23 October 1919, the acting Secretary of State cabled the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain as follows:

" ... Russian Embassy here informs Department ... (of) a message from the British Government in which it was pointed out that the Bolsheviks had offered the Baltic nationalities recognition of their independence as the price of peace with them and that as they were about to accede it would be well for Kolchak to recognize their independence with a view to detaching them from the Bolshevik bargain. Kolchak declined the proposal pointing out that he could not outbid the Bolsheviks who had nothing to lose.

"The Russian Ambassador suggested as a wiser measure a communication to the Baltic Governments pointing out that Allied support was predicated on resistance to the Bolsheviks and would be withdrawn if they made peace. The Department suggested to him that the Baltic Governments had not had our support, the policy of the United States having been rather to sustain the principle of Russian unity at least

1/ The Baltic Provinces (S. Doc. 105, 66th Cong., 1st sess.)

2/ Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol. XI, p. 255

until union or separation could be legally decided upon. The practical course would therefore be to make representations in London as Great Britain has been foremost in supporting the Baltic separatist movements and was, therefore, in the best position by threatening to terminate that support to influence their course of action with respect to the Bolsheviki. ...^{1/}

On 27 October 1919, Prime Minister Ullanis again appealed to the U.S., through Colonel Thos. W. Hollyday, military observer of the Gade Commission. Pointing out that Latvia, which had been fighting the Bolsheviki for 11 months, had now been attacked from the rear by Russo-German troops attempting to make their way from Lithuania to Estonia, he asked for arms, ammunition, credits and food, and requested a reply by 3 November "in order to take steps dependent on answer". This appeal, seconded by the U.S. Minister in Denmark, also went unacknowledged.

The first step dependent upon that answer was a meeting between delegates of the Baltic republics to formulate conditions of an armistice with the Soviet Government. At this meeting, on 13 November 1919, Mr. Gade was requested to transmit the following official communication to the U.S. Government and the Peace Commission in Paris:

"The Foreign Minister of Estonia has been instructed by the assembled delegates of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to inform you, (that) in case an armistice is found possible, they will find it necessary to establish a neutral zone between their republics and Soviet Russia (and) under the administration of a third state. The Peace Conference is hereby requested to nominate such a third state which will charge itself with the organization and control of the zone in question, thus making possible further negotiations."^{2/}

This request also went unanswered, unless another of the Allies rose to the occasion.

On 17 November 1919, from Riga, Mr. Gade again cabled the Secretary of State, through the Commission to Negotiate Peace, as follows:

"Bermontt defeated and retreating; Bausk reported taken by Lett troops and Bermontt willing to negotiate for withdrawal to Germany. Russian contingent willing to join other (White) Russian forces. ... Bermontt defeat due partly to loss of morale, as well as well-planned and conducted Lett campaign. Lett losses only 600, Bermontt about 2,000, no prisoners taken except Russians, which were well treated and some 600 sent to Northwestern Corps. Letts have captured considerable war material and greatly elated temporary success eastern Latvia front against Bolsheviki. Foreign Minister stated Latvia would not conclude treaty with Bolsheviki if it is contrary to the wishes of Allies and requested me to inquire America's point of view in this matter."^{3/}

- 1/ Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 728
- 2/ Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 741
- 3/ Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 741

There was an answer to this cable, on 21 November, as follows:

"Department does not desire you to make known to the Foreign Minister of Latvia in any formal way its point of view with respect to peace with the Bolsheviks as this might imply an obligation on our part to Latvia in case it should shape its policy accordingly. You are aware of the attitude of reserve which we have adopted with respect to the Baltic independence movements.

"In discussing the matter informally and personally with the Foreign Minister of Latvia you may, however, make plain to him what should be obvious, namely, that this Government could not do otherwise than advise against any attempt at a compromise with the Bolsheviks. The experience of this Government has convinced it that it is not practicable for non-Bolshevik governments to deal with the Bolsheviks.

"The ultimate purpose of the latter is to overturn all non-Bolshevik governments and seeming compromises which they may make with these are presumably but temporary and tactical expedients.

"LANSING"

The U.S. had withdrawn support of the Provisional Government in Northern Russia and withdrawn its troops from Murmansk in October, 1919; on the Petrograd front, Yudenitch was defeated and withdrew into Estonia in November, and both the Kolchak forces in Siberia and the Denikin forces in Southern Russia collapsed in December. Semanoff survived in Eastern Siberia until November, but was repudiated by the U.S. in July. Denikin managed to hold on in the Crimea and handed over to Wrangel in April; the latter evacuated the last Russian territory held by the anti-Bolsheviks in November, 1920. Yet despite the fact that the most effective resistance to the Bolsheviks at this time was that of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the U.S. continued to refuse them her support, and clung to the idea of an eventual democratic Russia in which they could be incorporated.

On 29 January 1920, Commissioner Gade cabled the Secretary of State as follows:

"I am requested by Latvian Foreign Minister to inquire officially of my Government if Latvia will in the least degree jeopardize American sympathy or possible future economic assistance if she now instructs Latvian delegates in Moscow to attempt (to) make amistices with the Bolsheviks. ...Latvia wishing undertake nothing contrary to our wishes, but is unable any longer to continue struggle and province entirely liberated. ..."

Estonia signed a peace treaty with Soviet Russia on 2 February, and on 4 February Secretary Lansing replied to Mr. Gade's cable as follows:

"You may informally bring to the attention of the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the United States cannot give assurance of such economic and military assistance as would be

implied by its advising the Latvian authorities to refuse to conclude an armistice with Bolshevik Russia."^{1/}

The armistice was signed on 20 February 1920, and on 18 March Mr. Gade cabled the State Department as follows:

"Foreign Minister begs my own and colleagues support in arranging the proposed peace negotiations between Bolsheviks and Latvia in one of Allied capitals and an agreement with League of Nations."^{2/}

Secretary of State Colby replied on 21 March:

"Department prefers that you should not participate in any conference with your colleagues looking to an arrangement for peace negotiations between Bolsheviks and Latvia."^{3/}

On 10 August 1920, in reply to a query from the Italian Ambassador in the U.S. as to the views of the American government with respect to the Soviet advance into Poland, Secretary of State Colby replied, in part, as follows:

"...The distressing character of Russia's transition has many historical parallels, and the United States is confident that restored, free and united Russia will again take a leading place in the world, joining with the other free nations in upholding peace and orderly justice.

"Until that time shall arrive the United States feels that friendship and honor require that Russia's interests must be generously protected, and that, as far as possible, all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance. By this feeling of friendship and honorable obligation to the great nation whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice contributed so much to the successful termination of the war, the Government of the United States was guided in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council on October 15, 1919, and in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia. The same spirit was manifested in the note of this Government of March 24, 1920, in which it was stated, with reference to certain proposed settlements in the Near East, that 'no final decision should or can be made without the consent of Russia.'

"To summarize the position of this Government, I would say, therefore, in response to Your Excellency's inquiry, that it would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Allied and Associated Powers, that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia

1/ Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. III, p. 646

2/ Ibid., p. 648

3/ Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. III, p. 648

shall be respected. These boundaries would properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian State...."^{1/}

Latvia's independence was recognized by the Soviet Government in the treaty of peace signed on 11 August 1920, in which Russia also agreed to advance Latvia 4,000,000 gold roubles; return postal, telegraph, marine and railway material, release Latvia from responsibility for Russian debts, grant timber concessions, and conclude commercial, transit and consular conventions.

On 23 August, Acting Secretary of State Davis wrote to the Lithuanian representative in the U.S., with reference to the Colby letter to the Italian Ambassador, in part as follows:

"However, some comments have appeared in the public press which interpret this statement of friendly purpose towards Russia as a rebuff to the non-Russian peoples along the border, who aspire to a fuller and freer national life.

"This Government has held constantly for the belief that Russia - the Russia of 1917 - must herself be a party to any readjustments of her frontiers. The American people sympathize with the desire of the non-Russian people along the border for the largest possible measure of self-government, but it believes that any attempt to reach a permanent settlement of the complicated problems involved, without the consultation and cordial consent of a government generally recognized as representing the great Russian people, will be futile. Unless all parties in interest can reach an amicable agreement among themselves there is no hope for permanent tranquility."^{2/}

On 14 October 1920, the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a note to the U.S. Secretary of State, praised the moral support of the U.S. for smaller nations during the war, emphasized that the Baltic states were linked no more closely with Russia than Poland, Finland and Armenia, and asked that the United States "grant Latvia the same principles of justice as were already granted Poland, Finland and Armenia."^{3/} This note was not answered by the U.S.

In 1921, following recognition of Latvia by the principal Allied Powers, excepting the U.S., and Latvia's admission to the League of Nations, the American Commissioner in Riga, Evan E. Young, strongly recommended recognition of Latvia by the U.S. No action was taken, however, until 25 July 1922, when Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes cabled Mr. Young as follows:

- 1/ Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. III, pp. 463-468
- 2/ Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. III, p. 659
- 3/ Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. III, p. 665-6

"Advise Foreign Offices of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as nearly at the same time as possible on the morning of July 28 that the United States extends to each full recognition. The fact will be communicated to the press at Washington for publication in the morning papers of July 28 and the following statement will be made:

"The Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been recognized either de jure or de facto by the principal Governments of Europe and have entered into treaty relations with their neighbors.

"In extending to them recognition on its part, the Government of the United States takes cognizance of the actual existence of these Governments during a considerable period of time and of the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability.

"The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by an indigencus population." 1/

1/ Ibid., 1922, Vol. II, pp. 373-4

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATVIA 1922-1950

Following recognition, Latvia and the U.S. signed treaties of extradition, of friendship, commerce and consular rights, and of arbitration and conciliation, and an accord relative to the debts contracted by Latvia during the war.

Cultural relations with the U.S. were stimulated by the presence here of substantial numbers of Latvian-Americans, and by the fact that the Prime Minister of Latvia from 1918 to 1940, with the exception of three months in 1919, Mr. Karl Ulmanis, had taken refuge in the U.S. after the 1905 revolution, studying and teaching agriculture at the University of Nebraska and remaining for five years. (Mr. Ulmanis was deported to Russia in 1940, and has been unreported since.)

Rotary Clubs, YMCA's and YWCA's, more than 1,000 A-H Clubs ("Mažpulki") and a Society of Friends of America appeared in Latvia. A Ford assembly plant was built in Riga, shipping line to the U.S. was chartered in 1938, and a Latvian-American Chamber of Commerce established in New York.

Most of the impetus toward Latvian-American amity during this period, however, was supplied by Latvia, and the first policy statement, only indirectly applying to Latvia, appears on 5 October 1939, when the Soviet Union was beginning to put pressure on the three Baltic Republics. In a conversation with the Lithuanian Minister to the U.S., Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., remarked that the U.S. "had continuously had the greatest friendship for the Baltic Republics."^{1/}

On 20 December 1939 the Washington Star published an Associated Press report to the effect that the Baltic States were merely Soviet satellites and that the U.S. was considering the advisability of withdrawing its diplomatic representation from them at some future time. Of a conversation on this subject with the Latvian Minister in the U.S. on 20 December, Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, wrote that he stated in reply:

"I told the Minister that I had seen the report in question and that I could assure him that it did not represent the views of the American Government; that this Government understood the position in which the three Baltic States found themselves; and that it was not considering the advisability of withdrawing its diplomatic and consular representatives from the Baltic States."^{2/}

The next official communication with Latvia was on 1 June 1940, when Secretary of State Hull sent a note to the Latvian Minister, transmitting a statement of amounts due the U.S. from Latvia under the debt agreement

1/ State Department Files, 760a.60m/474

2/ Ibid., 760p.6111/83

of 1925 and the moratorium agreement of 1932, and stating that the U.S. was prepared to discuss any proposals by Latvia on the payment of the debt. On 13 June the Latvian Minister replied that Latvia found it impossible to pay the installment on the debt.

On 15 July 1940 the President signed an executive order prohibiting transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit and export of coin and currency in which Latvia, Estonia or Lithuania had any interest. This was the same protection which had previously been extended to Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark and Norway, swallowed by Germany as the Baltic republics had been seized by the U.S.S.R.¹

The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, on 23 July 1940 issued the following declaration with respect to this action by the U.S.S.R.:

"During these past few days the obvious processes whereunder the political independence and territorial integrity of the three small Baltic republics -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- were to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion.

"From the day when the peoples of these republics first gained their independent and democratic form of government, the people of the United States have watched their admirable progress in self-government with deep and sympathetic interest.

"The policy of this Government is universally known. The people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of intervention on the part of one state, however powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak.

"These principles constitute the very foundations upon which the existing relationship between the 21 sovereign republics of the New World rests.

"The United States will continue to stand by these principles because of the conviction of the American people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the rule of reason, of justice, and law -- in other words, the basis of modern civilization itself -- cannot be preserved.²

U.S. Legations in the Baltic states, including the consular sections, were closed on 5 September 1940.³ At the same time, the U.S. rejected a British proposal to release the credits of the Baltic states to the U.S.S.R.⁴

¹ Dept of State Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 56, 20 July 1940, p. 33

² Ibid., Vol. III, No. 57, 27 July 1940, p. 48

³ Ibid, Vol. III, No. 63, 7 Sep 40, p. 199

⁴ The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, N.Y. 1948, Vol. I, pp. 811-2

"In the fall of 1941 the U.S.S.R. raised with the U.K. the question of territorial settlements in Europe, including the Latvian question.

"These questions came to the front during the Anglo-Soviet negotiations on a treaty of alliance. The U.S. was kept informed of these discussions by the British and exerted an important influence. At Moscow (December 1941), Stalin told Mr. Eden that the U.S.S.R. wanted an immediate agreement to the restoration of Soviet frontiers as they existed prior to the German attack (i.e., including the Baltic States). The U.S. had already, prior to Mr. Eden's trip, informed the U.K. that it would be unfortunate if any commitments regarding specific terms of the postwar settlement were made at that time. After the U.S. had been informed of the Soviet demands, Mr. Hull sent a memorandum to the President (Feb. 4, 1942) stating that it would be unfortunate if, at the present time, an ally of the American Government of such standing as Great Britain, which also thus far refused to make any commitments of a territorial nature on the European continent, should begin bargaining with the Soviet Union or any other continental country."

"Mr. Hull pointed out that there was no doubt that 'the Soviet Government had tremendous ambitions with regard to Europe and that at some time or other the United States and Great Britain will be forced to state that they cannot agree, at least in advance, to all of its demands.' President Roosevelt accepted the State Department's views, but Mr. Churchill was still inclined to favor the proposed treaty. Mr. Roosevelt then suggested that all people who did not wish to join the U.S.S.R. should be allowed to leave with their property; this suggestion was transmitted to Mr. Winant by Mr. Welles on April 1. The State Department, except Mr. Welles, was opposed to this compromise. However, at the discussions between Molotov and Mr. Eden in London (May 1942), the U.S.S.R. insisted on its original demands. The State Department, with the approval of the President, sent a strong cable to Mr. Winant stating that the signature of the treaty would be a terrible blow to the United Nations. Mr. Eden then proposed that the treaty omit all references to boundaries. This suggestion was finally accepted by the Russians, and the treaty was signed on May 26, 1942."

"During a visit to Washington (March 1942) Mr. Eden told Mr. Roosevelt that he believed that the U.S.S.R. would demand the Baltic states at the peace conference. Mr. Roosevelt said that while he realized that we could not drive the Russians out of the Baltic countries by force, he thought the U.S. would urge the U.S.S.R. to hold a new plebiscite. Mr. Eden thought Stalin would not agree to this and insist that we agree to annexation. The President said he realized that we might have to agree to this but if we did, we should use it as a bargaining instrument."

1/ Roosevelt and Hopkins, Sherwood, N.Y. 1948, pp. 401-2; Hull, Vol. II, pp. 1166-74.

2/ Sherwood, pp. 708-9

"Prior to Mr. Hull's departure for the Moscow Conference (October 1943), Mr. Roosevelt told him that while neither the U.S. nor the U.K. would fight the U.S.S.R. over the Baltic countries, he would ask Stalin to hold a new plebiscite after the war." 1/

Following the death of Dr. Alfred Bilmanis, the Latvian Minister in the U.S. from 1937 until 1949, Secretary of State Acheson on 28 June 1949 received Mr. Jules Feldmans as Latvian Charge d'Affaires. Mr. Feldmans spoke as follows:

"Sir, I have the honor to present to Your Excellency the letter of Mr. Charles Zarine, Latvian Minister in London and bearer of the Special Emergency Power of the last legal Government of Latvia, introducing me to Your Excellency as Charge d'Affaires of Latvia in the United States, and thus charging me to continue the work of my predecessor, the late Latvian Minister Dr. Alfred Bilmanis, who during his twelve years of service in Washington until his death discharged his duties with honor and distinction.

"On assuming my duties in this responsible post so important for the Latvian nation, I wish to express the deep gratitude which my people feel toward the United States Government for its friendly attitude in accepting a new Latvian Representative Plenipotentiary in the United States, and acceptance especially significant in times so trying and difficult for my country. By not recognizing either de facto or de jure the annexation of Latvia proclaimed by a foreign power and brutally carried out in breach of the existing treaties and international law, the United States Government not only continued to maintain its traditional benevolent attitude toward the small nations, but also assumed the role of the most powerful guardian of international justice and true Christian morals, upon which the entire Western civilization is based. This attitude gives me great encouragement to assume my duties, and I beg Your Excellency to accord me his assistance in the fulfillment of my mission."

Mr. Acheson replied:

"Sir: I have received from your hands the letter of April 20, 1949 from Mr. Charles Zarine, the Latvian Minister in London and bearer of the special emergency powers of the last independent Government of Latvia, presenting you to me as Charge d'Affaires of Latvia in the United States in succession to the late Latvian Minister, Dr. Alfred Bilmanis, whose untimely death last year ended a long period of distinguished service for his country in Washington. Dr. Bilmanis' cooperation with this government was always full and wholehearted.

"In accepting you as the chief of the Latvian Mission in Washington in the capacity of charge d'affaires an occasion is

afforded my government to demonstrate its continuing interest in the welfare of the Latvian nation. I am therefore particularly happy to welcome you to Washington, and am sure we will establish and maintain with you the same close cooperation and mutual understanding as we had with your predecessor.

"I wish you happiness and success in your new mission and assure you that my associates in the Department and I will always be ready to help in every way we can.

"I would also ask you to thank Minister Zarine for his expression of good wishes, which are warmly reciprocated, on behalf of the Latvian nation and himself for the welfare of the United States."^{1/}

On 9 August 1950 the State Department replied to an aide-memoire from the diplomatic representatives of the Baltic states, as follows:

"The Department of State is pleased to receive the expression of appreciation tendered by the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on behalf of their respective countries for the policy followed by the United States Government toward the Baltic States. The Department is also pleased to note the approval expressed by the representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania of the policy followed by the United States and the United Nations with respect to the recent developments in Korea. As is well known, these policies conform with the traditional views of the United States Government concerning the rights of all peoples to self-determination and freedom from aggression.

"The request of the representatives of the Baltic States that the United States support consideration by the United Nations¹ of the genocidal mass deportations and of the appalling situation in general in the Baltic States² will be brought to the attention of the Department's representatives who are directly concerned with United Nations affairs."^{2/}

^{1/} Dept of State Bulletin, Vol. XXI, No. 583, July 11, 1949, pp. 33-4

^{2/} Dept of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, No. 582, Aug. 28, 1950, p. 334

POSITIVE U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATVIA 1919-1950

On 12 March 1919, Secretary of State Lansing endorsed "all proper economic assistance from the United States" for Latvia, and dispatched a mission to the Baltic states to "investigate the economic and military situation and the question of credits".^{1/}

The chief of this mission, Lt. Col. Warwick Greene, USA, on 1 May 1919, addressed the head of the provisional government of Latvia as follows:

"American sympathies are with the people of Latvia in their efforts toward self-determination and in their struggle against the destructive forces of Bolshevism."^{2/}

The American Relief Administration was active in food distribution in Latvia following World War I, and the U.S. sold Latvia, from A.E.F. stores, \$4,000,000.00 worth of clothing, food, motor equipment and engineers' supplies.^{3/}

President Wilson and the heads of the other allied governments, also in May, 1919, secured from Admiral Kolchak, head of the White Russian government, a pledge to recognize Latvia and the other Baltic states as autonomous, and to confirm the relations existing between their de facto governments and the allied and associated governments.^{4/}

The U.S. extended recognition to the Government of Latvia on 28 July 1922, and Latvia and the U.S. signed treaties of extradition, of friendship, commerce and consular rights and of arbitration and conciliation, and an accord relative to the debts contracted by Latvia during the war. (Latvia in common with other nations, was granted a moratorium on those debts in 1932).

On 23 July 1940, the U.S. took a strong official position condemning the annexation of the Baltic Republics by the U.S.S.R., describing the processes as devious and predatory.^{5/} The U.S. stated to protect Latvian financial interests in this country, and has continued to recognize the chiefs of the Latvian Legation in the U.S. as the duly authorized representatives of Latvia.

Secretary of State Acheson, receiving the new Latvian Charge d'Affaires on 28 June 1949, said that "an occasion is afforded my government to demonstrate its continuing interest in the welfare of the Latvian nation".^{6/}

- 1/ Appendix II to X-Day Plan p. 1
- 2/ Appendix II to X-Day Plan p. 2
- 3/ Appendix II to X-Day Plan p. 3
- 4/ Appendix II to X-Day Plan p. 3
- 5/ Appendix III to X-Day Plan p. 2
- 6/ Appendix III to X-Day Plan p. 4

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APPENDIX V TO ANNEX XXVI (LATVIA) TO X-DAY PLAN

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

"In this world-shaking conflict upon which we are embarked, not the least of our objectives is the achievement of a free, independent Latvia, with a government self-determined by its own people. It was an earlier President of the United States who proclaimed the principle which became, in 1917, the rallying-cry of the Latvian people in their original and successful revolt against Soviet Communist dictatorship, when he said that 'every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live', and 'the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon'.

"These fundamental principles enunciated by Woodrow Wilson were re-stated in the Atlantic Charter by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, who called for respect of 'the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live', and the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

"It was a tragedy of the post-World War I period that so much self-sacrifice and courage was required of the Latvian people, standing almost alone, before the Latvian state could be created. It was a tragedy of the post-World War II period that the Atlantic Charter could not be extended to the Baltic as well. The American people are today determined that when we and our courageous allies -- and we count the Latvian people among our allies -- have fought World War III to a victorious conclusion, Latvia and the other small states of this world will have their freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity restored, and that a world system will finally be created in which they shall never again be threatened or trespassed upon."

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APPENDIX A, SECRETARY OF STATE'S REPORT TO CONGRESS

DECLARATION OF POLICY REGARDING LATVIA

That since the arbitrary seizure of Latvia's political independence and territorial sovereignty in 1940 by the Soviet Communist Government of Russia, the United States has neglected an opportunity to express its continuing interest in the welfare of the Latvian nation and the Latvian people, or to condemn the deliberate annihilation of Latvia's freedom and sovereignty by its predatory neighbor in cynical disregard of both moral and international law.

That since Soviet Communist Government has now chosen to seek to extend its aggressive aims by force even still other free and independent nations, but these free and independent nations are even more determined that the guilt and blood of the Soviet Communists shall be their undoing, that their evil plans shall come to naught, that they themselves shall be fought out in their fair and crushed, and that freedom shall be restored to the nations whom they have previously enslaved.

"That the issue of these nations is Latvia, for whom the United States unequivocally proclaims, at the first moment conclusion of the war, the complete restoration of her freedom, her sovereignty and her territorial integrity. We are repulsed at the genocidal mass deportations and the Latvian people have suffered at the hands of their Red tyrants, and we will not be content until the Latvian lands have been restored to the Latvian people, and the Latvian people to the Latvian lands. We welcome the Latvian nation as an ally in the struggle in which we are now engaged."

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APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX XXVI (LATVIA) TO I-DAY PLAN

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

"In all history there is no incident of perfidy so pronounced as that of the U.S.S.R. with respect to Latvia, and it is a source of deep satisfaction to me that the victory of the United States and our allies in the present conflict will afford the free nations of the world an opportunity to rectify this outstanding example of aggression.

"Despite peace, arbitration, non-aggression, conciliation and mutual assistance treaties with Latvia, plus Soviet statements of amity and 'sincere benevolence toward the Latvian people', the U.S.S.R. manufactured an excuse for serving Latvia with an ultimatum, and simultaneously occupied the whole of the country.

"The U.S.S.R. cannot even offer the excuse that its annexation of Latvia was for purposes of defense of either Latvia or Russia, for although almost a year elapsed between the Sovietization of Latvia and the outbreak of hostilities with Germany, no defense measures whatever were undertaken. When the Germans attacked, the Red Army immediately withdrew from the whole of Latvia, and the Germans were in Riga in nine days.

"Sovietization, if not defense, proceeded apace. In executions, resistance and deportations, Latvia in 1940-41 lost 12,000 killed, 14,000 wounded and 45,000 missing, out of a population of less than two million. The standard Soviet anti-religious and business expropriation campaigns were instituted; most of the rolling stock of the railroads was removed to Russia, stores and warehouses emptied, and a Red reign of terror instituted.

"The United States and its allies are determined to end that reign of terror in Latvia for all time, and restore the freedom and independence of the Latvian nation."

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX XXVI (LATVIA) TO X-DAY PLAN

STATEMENT BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF EUROPE

"Once again the Latvian nation, which fought so bravely for its freedom and independence in 1904 and 1905, and bravely, courageously and successfully from 1917 to 1920, is fighting to regain the independence which was trampled upon by the U.S.S.R. in 1940.

"These have not been the only instances in which the Latvian people have fought fiercely against what to some might seem insurmountable odds. Not content with taking on the entire Russian Empire in 1904, and fighting -- and winning -- on three fronts from 1917 to 1920, the Latvian Army resisted the overwhelming Soviet Communist advance into Latvia in 1940 with every means at its command. One regiment, at Aluksne in Northern Vidzeme, withstood everything the Red Army could bring against it for three days.

"When the Soviet Communists fled from Latvia before the German advance in 1941, Latvian patriots seized Riga and re-declared Latvian independence. Their move was premature, however, and their lives sacrificed in vain when vengeful Soviet Communist troops returned briefly to Riga.

"Mindful of this characteristic Latvian bravery and willingness to act against any odds, no matter how great, if only Latvian independence is promised, I take this means of cautioning the Latvian people against premature action, and bloody Soviet Communist reprisals. The United States does promise Latvian independence, at the victorious conclusion of this conflict, and it welcomes the Latvian people as allies, but it also counsels them to bide their time.

"Not for nothing were the Latvian Rifles for generations the most famed regiments in Europe. They will march again, and they will triumph!"

SECRET