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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM : AECOB
AREA DIVISION: SR
STATION : Washington, D.C.

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:

[] 3582
Room No. 2504 "J"
Extension 2538 4177
Date 18 January 1954

The attached project outline is presented for approval.

amendment
Renewal
[]
Blair / Org. Br.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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Chief, SR

27 January 1954
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PROJECT OUTLINE

CRYPTONYM: AECOB

PART I

1. Area of Operations

Operations will be conducted into the Latvian SSR. Recruitment of agents will take place in the Western Hemisphere and Europe, as circumstances warrant. Training will be conducted primarily in the United States by SR/DOB.

2. Purpose

To gather intelligence from the Latvian SSR through REDSOX operational methods.

3. Background

This project is an outgrowth of former, similar projects--ZRLYNCH and AECOB. Three agents were recruited, trained and dispatched under Project ZRLYNCH in 1952. One of these agents has never been heard from; another is considered to be free from control and is still operating in the Latvian SSR; the third is reporting to us, but has indicated that he is under Soviet control. Under Project AECOB, one agent was trained and dispatched to the Latvian SSR in 1953. This agent has not been heard from and is presumed to be lost. This project is a counterpart to proposed project AEMARSH which will strive to achieve the same objectives by utilizing legally-existing means of penetration and gathering of intelligence. *(See memo dtd 2 April 54 from SR attached.)*

4. References

- a. OPC/EE-2 Project ZRLYNCH No. 48.
- b. EE-2 Memorandum, "First Conversations Held with Alfreds LAUNAGS," 26 January 1950.
- c. Dispatch from [] Meeting with Alfreds LAUNAGS," 725-CHGWU, 26 July 1950.
- d. Report prepared for DYCLAIM by [], 26 August 1949, on the subjects "Latvian Resistance against Russian Occupation" and "Applications for Support of the Latvian Resistance Movement."

5. Objectives

- a. If feasible, to exfiltrate one or more knowledgeable individuals from the Latvian SSR.
- b. To infiltrate one or more agents for the purpose of supporting and consolidating the existing internal assets.

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6. Targets

a. General

- (1) Warning of a Soviet offensive, or of Soviet expectation of hostilities.
- (2) Trends in active and passive air-defense readiness.
- (3) Trends in basic economic policy.
- (4) Trends in availability of consumer goods.
- (5) Trends in railroad equipment, operations, construction.

b. Riga (N50-19, E33-17)

- (1) Army OB
- (2) Naval OB
- (3) RIGA/Spilve Airfield
- (4) Radio Plant (VEF) (N56-58-05, E24-09-42)
- (5) Radiotekhnika Plant (N56-56-10, E24-06-15)
- (6) Naval facilities and coast defenses
- (7) Telephone exchange

c. Lepaya (Libau) (N56-32, E21-00)

- (1) Army OB
- (2) Naval Base and Port
- (3) Airfield (N56-32, E21-01). (North).
- (4) Airfield (N56-31, E21-05). (East).
- (5) Seaplane Station (N56-33, E21-00).

d. Ventspils (N57-24, E21-35)

- (1) Naval Base and Commercial Port
- (2) Radar Stations

7. Tasks

- a. To organize, develop and execute operations for the exfiltration of CAMUSO/2. This may entail appropriate arrangements for the

assistance of the Finnish Intelligence Service.

- b. To recruit, train and prepare for infiltration one or two suitable agents.
- c. Continue spotting and preliminary assessment activities of prospective agent candidates so as to have available a limited reservoir of agent candidates for any eventuality.
- d. All covert personnel under this--as well as the related AEMARSH --Project will have the standing requirement of spotting for REDSOX as well as REDSKIN agents. This spotting activity will be a continuous effort; after an individual has been spotted, all available information regarding him will be gathered, and a determination made as to whether or not such individual is sufficiently qualified to warrant a preliminary assessment. At this point, no commitments will be made to the individual; and his name, all data on him, and the assessment and evaluation will become a matter of permanent record to be used at a time when there is a need for this type of agent.

8. Personnel

a. Cryptonyms

- (1) CAMUSO/1
- (2) CAMUSO/2
- (3) CAMUSO/3
- (4) AEBIAS/2
- (5) CAMBARO/2

b. CAMUSO/1:

CAMUSO/1 is of Latvian nationality. He had lived in Latvia prior to World War II, where he attended high school which he did not complete. While his country was under the occupation of the Germans in 1943, CAMUSO/1 was conscripted into the so-called Latvian Legion where he rose to the rank of lieutenant. At the very end of the war, he fled his native country which was being overrun by the Soviets and arrived in Sweden, where he lived the life of a refugee, holding various odd jobs until 1951, at which time he was recruited and brought to Germany for training. Upon completion of his training in the latter part of 1952, he was dispatched on his mission and has not been heard from since.

c. CAMUSO/2:

This agent, also of Latvian nationality, lived a mediocre life in Latvia, and held a number of sundry jobs prior to the war. In 1943,

while his country was under German occupation, he was considered for military service in the Latvian Legion and served in this military formation until the beginning of 1945. He realized at that time that Germany was fighting a losing battle and deserted this military formation in order to join the various partisan units so that he may continue to fight the German and Russian authorities which were occupying his country. When he saw the futility of fighting this losing battle, he fled to Sweden in the very last days of World War II. In 1951, he was recruited and trained in Germany; he was dispatched in the latter part of 1952, and has since that time maintained S/W contact with us. It is planned to exfiltrate this agent in the spring of 1954.

d. CAMUSO/3:

Having been born and having lived on the very fringe of the Russian-Latvian border, CAMUSO/3 could pass as a Russian very easily. Because of the poverty that existed in his native area along this border, CAMUSO/3's education was limited. Having worked as a farm-hand, a lumberman, and having lived on the water for a long period of time, CAMUSO/3 became a very strong individual and a champion swimmer. During the war, he avoided all military service; and toward the end of the war arrived in Germany as a displaced person. Subsequent to the cessation of hostilities, he lived in a displaced persons' camp and later served in a guard company in the U.S. Zone of Germany. He was recruited in the beginning of 1952, trained during 1952, and dispatched from Germany at the end of 1952. He has been heard from fairly regularly; all messages indicate he is under Soviet control.

e. AEBIAS/2:

AEBIAS/2 is an individual of Latvian nationality who remembers little of his homeland because he left it at a very tender age. Along with his family, he arrived in Germany as a displaced person in 1944, and continued his education there, graduating from the so-called Baltic University in Pinneberg, Germany. In 1949, he arrived in the U.S. under the auspices of the displaced persons' program and attended the University of Louisiana, from which he graduated in 1951 as an engineer in electronics. Original spotting of this individual and preliminary assessment began in the latter part of 1951 and continued through 1952. He entered training in the very end of 1952, and was dispatched from Germany in the middle of 1953. He has not been heard from since his dispatch.

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f. CAMBARO/2:

Subsequent to a high school education in Latvia, CAMBARO/2 embarked on the career of a policeman. He served in the police department until 1942, at which time he joined the so-called police battalions, which were indigenous para-military units established under the German occupation. These units were assigned to combat remaining Russian partisan units in Latvia. These units were later incorporated

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into the "Latvian Legion". While in the Latvian Legion, CAMBARO/2 served on the Russian front and subsequently fought the Russians in his own native country. When the German war machine showed signs of collapse, CAMBARO/2 deserted from the German forces and, organizing a partisan unit, remained in the Latvian woods until the day that hostilities ceased. At that time, he escaped to Sweden, where he lived like most other refugees. After he met CAMBARO/1 (who has been diverted from the former AECOB Project and will henceforth be utilized under Project AEMARSH, a counterpart of this project), they organized the so-called Latvian Contacts Group in Sweden, which was engaged in carrying on a variety of operational schemes, none of which proved too successful. In this group, CAMBARO/2 was the chief of operations and recruitment. In 1951, CAMBARO/2 was recruited and brought to Germany, where he trained the agents he recruited in Sweden, CAMUSO's 1 and 2, as well as the agent he recruited in Germany, CAMUSO/3. Upon dispatch of the CAMUSO's, CAMBARO/2 was brought to the United States in the end of 1952, where he trained AEBIAS/2.

9. Operational and Security Clearances

- a. CAMUSO/1, Operational Clearance dated 5 January 1952. No number assigned.
- b. CAMUSO/2, Operational Clearance dated 13 November 1951. No number assigned.
- c. CAMUSO/3, Operational Clearance dated 28 February 1952. No number assigned.
- d. AEBIAS/2, Operational Clearance #4367, dated 9 April 1953.
- e. CAMBARO/2, Covert Security Clearance #47281, dated 4 November 1952.

10. Cover

- a. The agents who have been dispatched, as well as the agent who will be dispatched under this Project, have used and will use legends based upon the documentation and the other items of cover authentication available to TSS. While in the United States in training or otherwise, CAMBARO/2 is utilizing a commercial cover arranged in Germany with a leather firm. This cover closely fits into CAMBARO/2's past activities in Sweden, where he was employed in a leather tannery.
- b. The cover used by case officers in contact with principal and operational agents is that of an unidentified U.S. Government agency. CAMBARO/2 is aware of being employed by CIA. All agents who have been trained and dispatched under Projects ZRLYNCH and AECOB were aware of being employed by "American Secret Service" or "American Intelligence."

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11. Contact and Communication

- a. Direct contact is maintained between Headquarters' case officers and CAMBARO/2.
- b. W/T and S/W contact is maintained between Headquarters and the agents in Latvia.

12. Control and Motivation

a. CAMUSO's 1, 2 and 3:

Originally, CAMUSO's 1, 2 and 3 were recruited through the "Latvian Contacts Group," an emigre Latvian group, and little if any CIA control was had over those individuals. Prior to their departure in 1952, control of this operation was taken from this group and direct CIA control instituted. This was difficult to accomplish, and, as a result, the degree of control desired was never quite achieved. The reason for this is that these agents consider themselves free and independent fighters for the liberation of their homeland. Under no conditions have they ever or do they desire to be considered as in the employ of any particular government. Their motivation, therefore, is extremely nationalistic and ideological. Although there is a certain token financial payment made, this can hardly be considered adequate for financial control as well as motivation purposes. As a result, the only control that is practical at present, with regard to CAMUSO/2, is the fact that we can cease communicating with him and supporting him while he is on his operational mission. Little, if anything, can be done regarding CAMUSO/3 who is, at present, under Soviet control. However, should it become feasible for him to disengage himself from Soviet control--or should it develop that our assumption that he is under Soviet control is not correct--a good deal of control can be exercised because of the fact that CAMUSO/3 has a common-law wife and son in the U.S. Zone in Germany, of whom CAMUSO/3 is very fond.

b. AEBIAS/2:

(1949 - College age) C.F. Plans 10 Aug. 51.

Having spent several years in the United States, and having arrived in the United States at an age when he easily adapted to the American way of life, AEBIAS/2 is probably motivated more toward the United States and its cause than by his desire to free his own country--although such latter desire is quite prevalent, as well. His motivation, therefore, can be considered as that of an ideological nature. In order to compensate for the time lost from the well-paying job that he held prior to entering training, he is being paid a salary equivalent to that he earned on his job. This resulted in obtaining a moderate degree of financial control over the agent. Control in this case is one of financial dependence to a smaller degree and one of satisfying an ideological craving to a greater degree.

d. CAMBARO/2:

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Being a very practical individual, and at the same time a most patriotic one as well, this agent's motivation is two-fold: He is exceedingly nationalistic, yet at the same time feels that he can earn a fairly decent living being in our employ. The control problem with this agent is a very difficult one inasmuch as he well knows all of the aspects of this profession; he fully understands that little if anything can be done for an infraction of any rules and for disobedience, because obviously he cannot be brought to court or he cannot be openly and official reprimanded. Moreover, he fully understands the only reprimanding action that can be taken in this case is to drop him from our employ. He does not fear this in the least, as he has often expressed that, if we either drop him from our employ or if we do not send him on an operational mission, there are other Western intelligence services who would be most eager to obtain his services. There is no denying this because this individual is an extremely capable agent, and can perform most any task within reason. Consequently, the only control that can be exercised in this case is in appealing to this man's logic and common sense, as well as the substantial amount of patriotism he has within him. These shortcomings in control are far outweighed by the man's capabilities and consequently assume smaller proportions and should be viewed in the proper perspective.

e. The following individuals have been disposed of because there has been no further need for their services:

- (1) CAMUSO/11
- (2) CAMUSO/12
- (3) CAMUSO's 9 and 10
- (4) AEBIAS/1
- (5) CALZA

See

13. Equipment and Other Support

a. The preparation of necessary equipment for the infiltration of one or two agents will include the usual array of operational gear that a REDSOX-type agent infiltrates with him into the target area. This will consist of foreign-type clothing, W/T set, a limited amount of weapons and ammunition for self-protection, S/W materials, etc.

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b. Proper documentation will be furnished by TSS.

14. Coordination

a. Coordination will be effected with the appropriate area divisions. Exfiltration support will probably be requested from the [] Germany Stations.

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- b. Coordination will be effected with the Air Maritime Division for assistance as needed for possible exfiltration and infiltration operations, as well as possible black entry into the U.S.
- c. The British Intelligence Service, as well as the Swedish Intelligence Service, will be informed to the extent deemed to be necessary of the infiltration or exfiltration activity in the Baltic area.

15. Timetable

- a. Approval for this project is requested for the period 1 April 1954 through 31 March 1955.
- b. Preparation of plans for possible exfiltration of CAMUSO/2 are currently being developed and implemented, as feasible.
- c. The spotting and preliminary assessment of one or two prospective agents for possible infiltration in the summer or fall of 1954 are currently proceeding.
- d. It is anticipated that the preparation and training of one or two infiltration agents for dispatch will commence at the end of April 1954.

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PROJECT OUTLINE

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PART II

16. Estimated Cost

Salary for CAMUSO/1	\$ 1,200.00
Salary for CAMUSO/2	2,400.00
Salary for CAMUSO 3	1,200.00
Additional payment to CAMUSO/3's common-law wife (considered as part of his salary)	1,800.00
Salary for CAMBARO/2	5,500.00
Operational Equipment	9,075.00
Travel	7,300.00
*Operational funds (two new agents)	7,000.00
Salary (two new agents)	8,000.00
Salary for new indigenous instructor to replace CAMBARO/2	3,600.00
TOTAL	<u>\$47,075.00</u>

*This item represents amounts of appropriate indigenous currency to be utilized operationally within the Latvian SSR and adjoining border areas. Inasmuch as normal methods of accounting will not be feasible, these funds will need to be written off. Finance Division is authorized to accept certification of project case officer, approved by SR Division, for operational expenditures of funds within the Latvian SSR.

17. Special Problems and Commitments

- a. No plans for disposal of CAMUSO's 1 and 3 have been made because the former has never been heard from and the latter is under foreign control.
- b. In the event CAMUSO/2 successfully exfiltrates and does not accept a return mission, he may be disposed of by a lump sum payment. (Approval for this and for existing commitments will be requested separately as an amendment to this project.) Commitments made to CAMUSO/2 and included in his contract provide

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for: (1) A provision for the payment of \$3,000.00 bonus upon the successful completion of his mission; and (2) A payment of \$200.00 for each six months of satisfactory service while on his mission.

- c. Implementation of overt disposal of AEBIAS/2 (for benefit of his parents) has begun. Final plans for such disposal have been approved by Chief, FI/Plans/Cover and the Security Office.
- d. CAMBARO/2. Disposal of CAMBARO/2, when and if it may become necessary, should not be a difficult problem. CAMBARO/2 is a secure individual and it is anticipated would present little, if any, security problem even if he should be fairly bitter about a severance of relationship. He could be disposed of by giving him a lump sum payment and returning him to Sweden. (At present, he is on a six-month visitor's visa to the United States.) Should CAMBARO/2 be dispatched on a mission, it is felt that, subsequent to his exfiltration, he should be brought to the United States under Section 8 of Public Law 110; he would probably continue in our employ as an agent-trainer in the future.
- e. For security reasons, it would be wise to exert every effort short of resorting to Section 8 of Public Law 110, to bring CAMUSO/3's common-law wife and son to the U.S. It is obviously a great deal easier for the Soviet espionage mechanism to gain access to these people in Western Germany than it would be in the U.S.; such access then would provide them with sufficient lee-way to exert a great deal of pressure upon CAMUSO/3 for the purpose of having him reveal a great deal more than he has done to date.
- f. Commitments made to CAMBARO/2 and included in his contract provide for: (1) An increase of salary from \$5,000.00 per year to \$6,000.00 per year during the period he is on his mission; (2) A provision for the payment of a \$5,000.00 bonus upon the successful completion of his mission; and (3) A death or disability clause providing for payment of benefits not to exceed \$10,000.00 in the event of his death or disability. Approval for the latter two payments will be requested separately as an amendment to this project at the time they fall due.