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23 February 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: Exfiltration of CAMUSO/2 and CAMBARO/2

1. Pursuant to your request, an examination was made of this case. The study was directed principally to an analysis of the agents' communications which were set forth in two files furnished by SR. A few select operational memorandums were read for background purposes. The most useful information, however, was obtained from the responsible case officers. A number of days could be spent on a more exhaustive analysis, but the views expressed herein were derived from an eight-hour review of the case.

2. Before going into details of this case, it is my wish to state here that a study of the aforementioned information offers no firm evidence which justifies a view that these agents are under foreign control. Furthermore, since clear commitments were made to the agents and because they have performed in accordance with their instructions, it is submitted that we are obligated to do everything within our power to exfiltrate them from a position of jeopardy. At present they are improperly documented and lack legal status in the area. They are or will soon be faced with the uncomfortable prospect of apprehension and probable compromise of their mission, or, in view of our inability to perform, may be forced to go "into the woods" with the partisans. There are other unpleasant consequences which may flow from our failure to evacuate them soon.

3. Since we do not have counter-intelligence capabilities in the area nor adequate sensitive intelligence derived from STD sources, it is obvious that we cannot cross-check and that any analysis based solely on available documentation is not in itself infallible. Nevertheless, we are forced to accept their bona fides, and, in this,

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the exfiltration in one sense represents in its most unhappy light an act of desperation to which we are inflexibly committed.

4. During the course of the study, the possibilities of control kept coming to the surface. It should be evident that such doubts are inevitable, particularly in a case of this type.

5. If the subject case is doubled wholly or in part, then it is evident that the Soviets have achieved a high degree of sophistication in the development of double agents. It would also mean that they have not only apprehended and broken successfully the agents in question but have recreated their personalities, the precise nature of their missions, their danger signals, and have manipulated them into cooperative and active elements of their own. The case officers state that the messages both in tone and attitude reflect consistently the personalities and peculiarities of subjects. As to the technical aspects, they state that some seven or eight danger signals were given to each secretly. If the agents are so highly motivated and courageous as described, then it is difficult to reason why they would have given up all their danger signals and not retained at least one. The total absence of danger signals during the past two and one-half years argues persuasively in favor of the view that the agents are not under witting control.

6. If the agents are under control, then the most attribute to the Soviets the setting up of the factual or notional nets in the area which have been reported to us, and which have much to do with the degree of confidence which we place in subjects. In extending the framework of the operation, the Soviets have also increased substantially the security risks inherent in any doubling since they enlarge the possible channels through which we could conceivably cross-check the operational health of subjects. The existence of new and independent assets in the area is not in itself conclusive evidence of the presence or absence of control. It is believed, however, that in this case it would not have been necessary for the Soviets to have taken upon themselves these new burdens in order to instill confidence in us. If the agents were under control and creatively cooperative, there are innumerable double-agent

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tricks which could have been worked against us without resorting to the risks of implementing an operational net.

7. On the basis of the documentation alone, there are certain negative facts which emerge:

(a) A third man was dispatched to make contact with one of the subjects. He has never been heard from. One can only assume that he was either killed on the trip or captured. If captured, the question of his confession is pertinent. If his contact was under control, then he is the victim of an intoxication. Such success would lead to a much higher regard for the double play and tempt any Service to allocate its superior talent and assets to the case.

(b) There has been between the various messages a considerable time lag. If subjects are under control, these delays would permit and favor the working out of a watertight playback. It would give the local control sufficient time for clearing with Moscow all developments and messages in the case and also enable them to concentrate heavily on the security controls of subjects and their alleged net. In addition, the time lag would make it possible for the Soviets to follow up the counter-intelligence leads derived from this operation both in the U.S. and in Germany.

8. The affirmative view expressed in paragraph 2 above is qualified as follows: It is recommended that a traffic analysis be made through STD in order to see whether there is reflected any unusual activity coincident with the arrival and/or communications from the agents. It is assumed that if the Soviets are in fact doubling subjects, then all aspects of the case would have to be cleared on a continuing basis with Moscow. This is based on the assumption that Moscow would know that subjects work for Central Intelligence. Given their experience in WIN and in other cases, they could not help but deal with it as a matter of the highest operational priority. (According to the case officers, the agents are aware of our Agency's identity.) If doubled, the nature

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of the messages would require a considerable volume of communications between the local control and Moscow. It is of course unknown to what degree the Hall or others are in a position to contribute. It is important, however, that in and beyond this particular case, a check-out point for T/A be automatically utilized and that the technicians be put on notice as to our requirement for such coverage and support. In the event that the Hall should have the pertinent T/A, their findings might be such as to make it certain one way or the other as to the existence of control.

9. To date the agents have not replied to the last communications setting forth the exfiltration proposal. It is presumed that the DCI will not approach the Swedes pending some reaction from the agents.

10. Though gratuitous, it would appear that the current plan may be frustrated through the lack of cooperation by the Swedes. It is also questionable whether the State Department will permit the action. However, these observations should not dilute what appears to be a clear-cut obligation on our part to perform in accordance with our commitments to the subjects.

11. In the event that subjects respond favorably to the proposed exfiltration plan, then it is advised that steps be taken immediately (in the event that they are controlled) to send messages from our end indicating that the exfiltration is triggered to some important and highly sensitive operational matters which will take place in the not too distant future, the nature of which requires their presence. The purpose of such messages should be to create a substantial dilemma in the minds of those Soviets (if they exist) who may be planning to capitalize on the exfiltration -- regarding it to be the high point of the double play insofar as subjects are participants, and to argue in support of the view that there is much greater profit to be gained if the exfiltration is permitted to take place. This idea will be expanded with SR.

JAMES ANGLETON
Chief, Counter-Intelligence Staff

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