

EYES ONLY

SECRET

3 October 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AECOB Exfiltration Operation 10/11 September 1955

1. Negotiations with the Danish Intelligence Service were successfully completed on 27 August with the Danes agreeing to provide the following support:

- a. Clearance for an USAFE L-20 to land and take-off at Kastrup, Copenhagen.
- b. Clearance for landing an USAFE L-20 at Ronne, Bornholm.
- c. Parking and refueling facilities for the L-20 at Ronne, Bornholm.
- d. Services of the airport manager at Ronne, Bornholm.
- e. Services of two DIS intelligence officers.
- f. Services of two DIS communications men.
- g. Two RS-6 W/T sets and one 70 watt German transmitter.
- h. Safehouse for installation of above equipment and housing of the Headquarters communications man.
- i. Backstopping of cover story to explain the presence of Col. A. R. White and Maj. D. Reed, USAF, and [] in hotel in Bornholm.
- j. Arranging for "magnetic anomalies" cover story for the Danish Air Defense system to avoid a possible air-raid alert.
- k. Arranging for Danish Navy minesweeper to stand by at sea for rescue operations if required, consistent with legend in paragraph j, above.
- l. Arranging for Danish Rescue Service PBY to stand by at Bornholm for rescue operations if required, consistent with legend in paragraph j, above.

2. A tentative target date of 4 August was set for the operation. It was necessary to extend this, however, when a message was received from CAMBARO/2 reporting that the original landing zone (LZ) was no longer useable and that details on a new LZ were enroute by S/W.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-26

EYES ONLY

3. Pending the receipt of the necessary details regarding the new LZ, traffic was passed to CAMBARO/2 reviewing the procedures to be employed on the ground by the reception party.

4. Inasmuch as the two agents scheduled for exfiltration had had no contact with each other since the fall of 1954 and had no means available for establishing independent contact CAMUSO/2 had been instructed to select a secure meeting site and transmit the details by S/W. The next subsequent message from CAMUSO/2 indicated he had not monitored our broadcast and was unaware of our requirement for a meeting site. It was therefore necessary to instruct CAMBARO/2 to select a site and report by W/T. This information was received on 26 August.

5. CAMBARO/2's message with the details on the new LZ was received at Frankfurt on 6 September and a firm date of 10 September for the operation was decided on. CAMBARO/2 was notified of this date on 6 September by means of a special broadcast. Both CAMUSO/2 and CAMBARO/2 were instructed to establish contact with each other on the following day. CAMUSO/2 was instructed to cease monitoring his daily 1300 Z broadcasts and cache his W/T set inasmuch as any traffic for him could be received by CAMBARO/2 during the latter's daily 1100 Z broadcasts.

6. In a W/T message received from CAMBARO/2 on 7 September, he reported establishing contact with CAMUSO/2 and gave the weather information requested of him. A second weather report was received from him on 9 September. Because of heavy interference from other stations on approximately the same frequencies and unfavorable propagation conditions, it was too garbled to be of any value. During the daily 1100 Z broadcast on 9 September the agent was instructed to change his location and set up a black W/T base at the LZ in time to receive our 10 September transmission.

7. On 7 September, the container of operational equipment and a VHF W/T set for use between the Danish minesweeper and Bornholm were dispatched to [] by means of a special USAFE flight.

8. [] Headquarters commo man, departed Frankfurt by commercial air on 7 September and was met at Copenhagen by [] and [] of the Danish Intelligence Service. They spent 8 September in Copenhagen, checking the radio equipment, and that evening left by commercial vessel with their equipment, arriving in Bornholm the morning of the 9th.

9. The VHF radio was installed in the Danish minesweeper on 9 September and she put to sea that evening in order to reach her assigned position 125 miles out along the outbound leg of the projected course of the operational aircraft. Communications to the ship were handled by the local Danish naval base which in turn relayed any messages by means of direct telephone line to the home of the Danish naval district commandant. A position report was received from the mine-

SECRET

-3-

sweeper as the aircraft passed overhead inbound to the target and as it returned on its homeward leg.

10. Our W/T Station for maintaining contact between Limber, the L-20 and the C-54 was set up in the attic of the naval commandant's home and consisted of 2 RB 6's and 1 70 watt German transmitter furnished by the Danish Intelligence Service. First contact between [] and Limber at Rhein-Main was established 1900 Z 9 September and it thereafter operated on scheduled contacts.

11. Col. White and Maj. Reed of the Frankfurt Air Section left Wiesbaden AFB in the L-20 bearing USAFE markings early 9 September. They were accompanied by [] dressed and documented as U.S. Air Force Captains.

12. The L-20 made a brief stopover at Copenhagen, where it was met by the [] and the container of operational equipment placed on board. It then left for Ronne, Bornholm, arriving there in the afternoon. The cover story for its presence on the island was that it was about to engage in extended local flights investigating magnetic anomalies in the area. There appeared to be no particular curiosity occasioned by its arrival on the island.

13. A detailed weather analysis was performed by Lt. Col. Brock at Frankfurt early on the 10th, and at 0900 Z a "Q" signal was transmitted to [] on Bornholm from Limber indicating that the weather prospects for the mission looked favorable. A "Q" was received in reply from Bornholm indicating all was in readiness at that end. A detailed weather report for use in the pilots' briefing was transmitted to Bornholm later in the day. Limber was now monitoring Bornholm continuously.

14. In the 1100 Z broadcast to CAMBARO/2, the agent was given the ETA of the aircraft at target as 2330 Z and instructed in the recognition signal to be used. A special broadcast was set up with him for 2000 Z that day so that the operation could be cancelled before take-off in the event the weather deteriorated. The agent was instructed in the use of a special "Q" danger signal with which he could notify Limber to recall the aircraft. From this time on, Limber monitored the agent continuously.

15. A message was received from the agent at 1515 Z indicating he had received and understood our broadcast and that all was in readiness at his end. This information plus the agent's weather report was immediately transmitted to Bornholm by W/T, whereupon the specific briefing of the crew was begun.

16. At 1930 Z a USAFE C-54 took off from Wiesbaden AFB for Copenhagen. This aircraft arrived in the area NE of Bornholm shortly after the L-20's take-off and orbited at 12,000 feet in order to provide a commo link between Limber, Bornholm and the L-20 since the latter did not possess the capability of receiving VHF training from the ground at the desired range. It, as well as the L-20, were under continuous monitor both by Limber and Bornholm. When it was judged the L-20 had passed its maximum reception range, the C-54 turned for Copenhagen, landing there at 2200 Z. It now stood by at Copenhagen awaiting the return of the L-20 crew and passengers.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SECRET

-4-

17. Since weather conditions were still favorable, "QNU" (no traffic) was transmitted to the agent during the final broadcast at 2000 Z. The mine-sweeper was in position and on picket duty, and a Danish Air Sea Rescue Service PBY was standing by at the Bornholm Naval Base. The mission aircraft's Air Force insignia and serial numbers were attached to it by a special arrangement utilizing DEBUS fasteners. Their unobtrusive removal immediately prior to take-off was readily accomplished and was facilitated by the fact that Ronne airport shuts down all operations at sundown. The only person present in the area was the airport manager whom DIS used to reopen the field and clear the aircraft for take-off and landing. Take-off occurred at 2037 Z.

18. Agency personnel equipped with duplicate sets of Air Force insignias and serial numbers for the mission aircraft were standing by at Copenhagen and at Bremerhaven in the event the L-20 was forced to land at either field because of weather on its return. A duplicate L-20 was standing by at Wiesbaden and arrangements had been made to file an arrival report from Bornholm for it in the event the mission aircraft went down over target.

19. The mission aircraft returned to Bornholm at 0419 Z without landing at the target area. A debriefing of the navigator and pilot indicated that the route had been flown as planned, but because of heavy turbulence enroute the aircraft had not arrived over the LZ until 0011 Z. Although they reported seeing lights on an open field, which they judged to be the LZ, the observed lights were not in the proper L pattern nor was a recognition signal seen. The crew had concluded that this could not be the intended LZ and spent approximately 25 minutes flying around the general area in search of a proper light pattern. No identifiable light pattern was observed, and the aircraft returned to base leaving the target area coast at 0111 Z.

20. A W/T message was received from CAMBARO/2 at 1300 Z 11 September, reporting that he and his reception party had been in place at the LZ the previous night from 2200 Z to 0200 Z. No aircraft had been seen, but had been faintly heard far to the north of the LZ at 0015 Z. The party's lights had then been turned on and the recognition signal given without, however, attracting the aircraft. This message, as well as all the previous ones received contained all available indicators properly given to show freedom from control.

21. Inasmuch as the two versions of what occurred at the LZ were at wide divergence, the pilot and navigator were subjected to a further detailed debriefing and extensive polygraph interrogation. The conclusions arrived at as a result of this procedure were that there was no deliberate deception involved on their part, moreover it was further concluded that they were both honestly convinced that no navigational error had been made and both believed that they had arrived over the intended LZ.

22. Conclusions: The circumstances of this case do not appear to fit the pattern of possible RIS control in any readily conceivable way. We are satisfied the pilots honestly believe that the correct LZ had been located. On the other hand, we feel it is probable that the navigator in fact did make an error in navigation. From a careful study of all the facts available to us,

SECRET

EEB ONLY

SECRET

-5-

EYES ONLY

contrary to the opinion expressed in HSOA-68697 that the aircraft was flown within 200 yards of the LE, we conclude that the aircraft was over an area resembling the LE but missed the true LE. Air Maritime Division concurs with our conclusion. We are also able to locate two specific fields which the crew could have mistaken for the LE. An SW report from CANARO/2 received at Headquarters on 4 October confirms his W/T message in paragraph 20, above, that the agents were at the LE at the appointed time and signalled according to plan without attracting the aircraft heard by them to the north of their position.

23. Recommendations: On the basis of the foregoing, it is recommended that:

- a. Consideration be given to attempting this operation again at the earliest practicable date during October 1955.
- b. The procedures to be used by the reception party for marking the LE and displaying the recognition signal be modified to provide for positive, unmistakable recognition.
- c. The L-20 crew be drilled in the new procedures during their training flights prior to the operation.

[
Latvian Section, SR/2
]

APPROVED:

[
Chief, SR/2
]

rdv

SECRET

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-26

EYES ONLY