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1 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, SR/DOB

SUBJECT : Changes in Training Schedule for Class XIII:  
August 1963

1. As you recall, we have discussed on a number of occasions the changing of the basic training schedule to more accurately reflect the tasks described in the original Project Outline, as well as to provide coverage anticipated in carrying out requirements levied upon SR/DOB in certain "Cold - War" situations. You suggested that we hold in abeyance the formal attempt to obtain guidance on this matter [my paper to you in early April] until such time as we were certain to whom such questions be addressed.

2. The Training Officer has reminded me on a number of occasions that he has received no guidance with respect to the basic course either from me or my predecessor. Attached are copies of memoranda which I have written on the basic course of instruction which I felt were adequately responsive to his requests, as well as being reflective of your feelings as they relate to the matter in Para. 1.

3. You most recently counseled the Training Officer and myself against any drastic or fundamental change in the basic course until a more lucid program from all Divisions concerned was obtained. However, you agreed that the utilization of [ ] in the Soviet Realities field be explored. After having interviewed [ ] the Training Officer felt that some use could be made of him in an instructional capacity in this area. Also, I have asked that the EE representative introduce to the Training Officer the possibility of using [ ] in a similar capacity (with the added concern of [ ] terminating the contract of [ ] is delighted with this prospect. The Training Officer assured me that he could supplement instruction in the "Realities" field by working directly with [ ] SR/6, if the schedule permitted.

4. The following are additional subject matter which I feel either should be restored or added to the basic course in Class XIII:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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Elicitation; Instructional Techniques; E&E (maneuverability under quasi or legal conditions); and Psychological Warfare (as a corollary of para-military activity).

[ ]

Project Officer

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**DRAFT**

2 April 1963

*Attached as  
reference only*

MEMORANDUM FOR : War Plans Staff

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : Request for Guidance to Implement the Training  
Phase of Project AEDEPOT

REFERENCES : A. AEDEPOT Project Outline, dated 7 April 1960  
(Revised)  
B. CIA Global War Plan for Clandestine Operations  
(Revised 1961) (TS)  
C. WPS Memo No. WPS 142.10 dated 28 February 62,  
"CIA-Military Relationships in USCINCEUR UW  
Areas during Wartime" (TS)

BACKGROUND : The most recent declaration of objectives of Project  
AEDEPOT (Reference A) states that the Project "has been established to recruit,  
train, and hold externally, selected personnel for wartime infiltrations to desig-  
nated targets in the USSR. In wartime or in local emergency, these cadres would  
serve as all-purpose agents or action personnel with communications who could  
collect positive and operational intelligence; spot and assess for possible recruit-  
ment, other personnel in the area; and establish contact with local resistance  
potential or provide reception, safe-haven, or communications facilities and ser-  
vices as required".

Among the tasks listed for its agents (also Reference C) are :

- 1) To be prepared for immediate commitment;
- 2) To report operational intelligence;
- 3) To refrain from overt and direct acts of sabotage and raids which may  
unduly expose its members (or himself if solo) to capture;

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- 4) To organize, support, and advise indigenous friendlies in U/W through their leaders;
- 5) To provide in certain categories and some instances such support and turnover of responsibilities to Special Forces as directed by proper authority;
- 6) To assist in the development of an E&E capability;
- 7) To perform any mission directed by proper authority;
- 8) To perform current missions of an operational nature;
- 9) To assist and support other operating divisions in their hot-war programs.

Targets in the Project are those delineated by USCINCEUR in UW areas of the Soviet Union.

In addition, there appears every indication, or suggestion at least, that assets trained under Project AEDEPOT may be employed in carrying out responsibilities implicit under "Conduct of exceptional operations and non-theatre operations" as described in Reference B, at Page 3, as well as to "Develop and maintain capabilities for the conduct and support of clandestine operations in the United States' interest during or after the war" (page 4). This would appear to be ostensible since at the very moment, there are a number of trained agent assets who, because of their unique background, offer considerable operation potential of a Hot-Cold War nature. One, incidentally, appears to possess the potential of being targeted against a Priority 1.a. IPC requirement.

Also, on a number of occasions since 1960, assets trained under the AEDEPOT


**DRAFT**

Program have been called upon to both render service in connection with Agency Cold War commitments and to avail themselves in Cold War contingency-crisis situations. Therefore, there would appear to be ample formal authority, precedent, and experience to suggest that training under Project AEDEPOT encompass as wide a clandestine capability as possible. However, your instructions in Reference B delineates AEDEPOT agent utilization peculiarly as Unconventional Warfare assets with very specific missions, which, incidentally, have changed drastically from time to time, structured under a Military Command Relationship. Since the two positions are somewhat divergent, your comments on the above are requested.

SR/DOB/P&P:PJK:mp:2 April 1963


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
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


[Signature]

Project Officer







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6 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SR/DOE/P&P

SUBJECT : Recommendations that DOE Case Officers Accompany  
AEDEPOT Trainees during Field Training Exercises.

1. Following are some thoughts on the advisability of having SR/DOE case officers accompany the trainees on their field trips during the 16 weeks training course.

a. It provides an effective way of establishing and maintaining good rapport with the trainees, something which is so essential in any future case officer/agent relationship. Control is a very important factor in the type of activity the agent is being trained for and control of the agent is the first requisite to the eventual control of the operation.

b. It has its obvious good effects in terms of students' morale. The case officer is the one person to whom the trainees are instructed to turn for guidance and assistance, when personal problems or matters bearing upon the overall aims of the Program are involved. In other words, since the case officer is administratively and operationally responsible for the welfare of the trainees, it follows that he should be as closely as possible identified with them. The case officers must be in position to either explain why a situation must be thus or take steps to have it rectified after hearing the trainees' comments.

c. Being on the spot to monitor each man's performance affords the case officer an opportunity to note for the record each student's behavior and reactions to the unexpected as well as the expected situations. These observations will provide the basis for the operational development of the agent in the future by the host Division.

d. It provides an insight into the trainee's potential that might not otherwise be obtainable. If, as is generally the case, the agent accepts the case officer's role in their relationship, understandably he would then be inclined to discuss specific

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facets of his background, including any prior clandestine experiences that he might have had, only with his case officer, the one person who is responsible for and most interested in his file (area knowledge) and in his operational potential.

e. It enables the case officer to monitor the training exercises and, when applicable, recommend changes that will improve the course. As we know, other trainees in the past have expressed considerable criticism of certain aspects of the course and it behooves the case officer to note which changes, if any, have occurred as a result of these valid comments. As a matter of fact, at least as far as EE Division is concerned, a case might be made for having an experienced EE officer available to determine if the aims, content and the results of training are in consonance with the Division's requirements.

2. The above, therefore, represents but a few of the reasons one could cite in support of the basic argument. The undersigned believes that, briefly, there is ample evidence justifying the recommendation of having at least one of the Base case officers accompany the trainees on their field trips. Its importance and value to the Project cannot be overstated. However, in fairness to the other point of view, reasons discouraging case officer involvement on the order mentioned herein are probably as numerous but, in the opinion of the undersigned, not as valid. At any rate, the role of the case officer is paramount and every effort enhancing his relationship with the agent should be encouraged.

[ SR/DOB/EE ]

STV/dms

Distribution: 0 & 1 - C/SR/DOB/P&P ✓  
1 - C/EE/G: attn: [ ]  
2 - SR/DOB/EE ]

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17 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Observations Made at the Student Critique, Class XII,  
at the Ft. Meade Training Site on 10 May 1963 by  
the Project Officer

Unfortunately the Project Officer was unable to participate in the entire critique due to other pressing business. He was able to take in the critique of the comprehensive exercise. (A Project Officer was present during the earlier critique, however.) The opening criticism by a number of students was that insufficient time with lack of proper detail was given in the student's briefings prior to the launching of the comprehensive exercise. The immediate response by the Training Officer in charge was that "I object to the Project allowing two people (reference here made to [ ] ) to go home early in the comprehensive exercise. Further I object to the Project allowing the students to go home prior to the completion of the debriefing for the exercise during the last week-end".

It would appear that the Training Officer was, completely incorrect on both accounts. Further, had he had something to say on this matter, he should have exercised more discretion in the time and place for a comment of this type. The requirement for the two individuals named was placed by the Chief Training Officer, this requirement was filled. At no time was anyone on the Project Staff appraised of an additional requirement for personnel. Further, there was no additional requirement placed on the Project to provide more time to brief in connection with the comprehensive exercise. The week-end was scheduled free and both Project Officers at the site on Friday, 26 April 1963, were especially careful in assuring that all of the business of the day was complete prior to the conduct of Project business. As a matter of fact, Project business was performed earlier than usual because the students were made available earlier.

During the course of the evening party festivities the Project Officer had occasion to discuss training with various members of the Class. Among these was Linards JAUNZEMIS @ JOYCE. Subject is a 38 year old ethnic Latvian born in Lithuania who left the Soviet Union in 1946. Perhaps more than any other of his experiences reflect most accurately operational problems and conditions which would be anticipated in the Soviet Union, at least in the Baltic area. He related to the Project Officer his concern over what appeared to him to be a serious deficiency in escape and evasion

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S-E-C-R-E-T

COMMENTS

CSR/DOB \_\_\_\_\_

① ✓ SR/DOB/COP

Message Center \_\_\_\_\_

② Plans & Project \_\_\_\_\_

AEDEPOT \_\_\_\_\_

SA&E \_\_\_\_\_

Training \_\_\_\_\_

SSO & Finance \_\_\_\_\_

Logistics \_\_\_\_\_

Security \_\_\_\_\_

Bill,

These are   thoughts, which I requested, on getting some PP into SSIII. I believe there is sufficient material here which will allow us to make our effort more realistic, giving our assets some opportunity in PP, as well as the JEG Base an opportunity to "administratively" lay on some PP. Worth pursuing?

paul

*Paul - Do you desire to have this in file for future reference?*

S-E-C-R-E-T

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Memo for Record

Subject: Training Program Recommendations

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLAN

I. Prior to 7 July 1963:

- a. Identify, contact and establish commo link with resistance leaders.
- b. Establish a political platform (or political basis) for resistance movement.
  1. This is a joint effort with the resistance movement policy tempered by and synchronized to overall Blue Homeland policy interests but maintaining its own particular national flavor.
  2. The platform agreed upon should be calculated to achieve the maximum degree of mass popular appeal, with the desired end result being a sympathetic population among which can be found the required recruits for the guerrilla forces and potential intelligence, counter-intelligence, E and E and psychological warfare support elements.
- c. Consolidate the various resistance elements into an organizationally sound, effective disciplined unit that will be responsive to the future command needs of the Blue Homeland forces.
- d. To establish within the resistance organization an effective and responsive mechanism for the systematic dissemination of information (propaganda) to the local population.

II. 7 July to 18 July:

- a. Tasks for infiltrated AEDEPOT elements.
  1. Contact resistance movement leadership.
  2. Activate, through the resistance leadership, the resistance

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organization's information (psywar) mechanism. If already active, the tempo of activity should be increased in line with future Blue Homeland military plans.

3. Lend material support to the indigenous psywar mechanism to include the following items as appropriate:

- (a) Small, portable hand-operated printing presses.
- (b) Paper supply for leaflets.
- (c) Inks, pens, paint, etc.
- (d) Small radio receivers.
- (e) Local currency, watches, gold, jewelry or other items of inherent value for supporting indigenous psywar operations.

4. Lend technical support to the indigenous psywar mechanism as appropriate.

- (a) Supervise the establishment and/or help in maintaining commo networks, both internal and external for the rapid transmittal of news and other thematic material.
- (b) If an indigenous radio station is available to the resistance movement or if one or more later becomes available through confiscation or capture, to lend technical assistance in maintaining or restoring radio equipment to working order.
- (c) Assist with repair, maintenance and operation of printing equipment available to resistance movement.

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5. Lend assistance in psywar theme production for leaflets, posters, rumors, etc. and in radio programming.
6. Serve in liaison capacity for coordinating indigenous psywar effort with externally conducted psywar operations. This would include coordinating political line followed in the resistance movement psywar program with Blue Homeland policy interests.
7. Lend assistance in establishing and/or extending already existing propaganda dissemination networks and mechanisms.
8. Lend assistance in training indigenous personnel in all required phases of psywar operations.
9. Serve in liaison capacity in introducing Blue Homeland Special Forces Psywar elements to the resistance movement psywar leaders.

III. War Begins, 21 July 1963:

- a. AEDEPOT elements can, theoretically, be expected to perform the following tasks:
  1. Continue in liaison capacity in the introduction of Blue Homeland Psywar elements to indigenous Psywar elements.
  2. Act as interpreters, translators or, in general, as psywar advisors under JUWTF psywar command.

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17 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Comments on the Project Officer's Observations at the Comprehensive Exercises, Class XII, Camp Pickett, May 4-7, 1963

During my recent visit to Camp Pickett to view and participate in the Class XII Comprehensive Exercise, it was noted that there appeared at times serious disagreement between the Training Officer and the pilot over unsuitability of LZ's, DZ's, over appropriate weights of cargo for the aircraft and markings of patterns, etc. Many of these were quite likely the result of honest differences of opinion. However, I asked the pilot whether he presented a critique of his views, in writing or verbally after the exercise. He answered he did not. When asked whether he volunteered his comments on what he might consider improper procedures, he commented he did not feel it was in his capacity to do so. As a result of this, I should like to recommend that the pilot, over whom we have complete control and in whom we have full confidence, be asked after each instance of his participation in air operations, to present in writing a critique on that operation. It is felt that this is essential to the improvement of this phase of training and would enhance our experiences in air operations.

Also I had the opportunity to participate in a number of exercises which not only proved beneficial to the game but were also of some assistance to me in further understanding the problems of field work. One of these exercises concerned the placing of a potential agent into a situation which called for possible recruitment by an AEDEPOT asset of a sub agent. The recruitment effort was performed by Student ANNESLEY who did a commendable job. He carefully performed a preliminary debriefing for the purpose of authentication and verification. On the basis of this debriefing, which apparently was sufficient to establish bona fides, he went to "higher authority" for authorization to recruit. This he did not receive, and under the circumstance could receive. In lieu of recruitment, he very commendably instructed me in air operations.

Upon return to the administrative site the first comment of the Training Administrator to me was "ANNESLEY did well, but he did not go far enough. What he should have done was to have shot you".

It is sincerely hoped that this is not an accurate reflection of the spirit in which we teach our assets to cooperate in the hope of eventual

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controlling the indigenous resistance types. It would appear to me that if in fact an asset of this organization were to take upon himself the prerogative, in the belief that he had the authority, to handle an indigenous type in this manner he could easily jeopardize not only the immediate mission with which he is involved but also seriously render useless the principal motivating factors which bind this Agency and any indigenous resistance group; namely, that only through our asset would any measure of freedom be returned to those under the Soviet Communist yoke.

The second exercise in which I participated was a replacement for an E&E evader who had become ill and was removed from the "rat line". Since the timing of this introduction into the E&E process was such that it coincided with the final "holding area", as much exposure to E&E was not obtained as was hoped. However sufficient discussion by the evader (myself) and the student (agent asset) took place to render some pertinent observations. The final holding area was some 30 yards from a main highway. Its only shelter was the usual semi-dense forest typical of the Camp Pickett area. Sleeping bags were thrust some 10 feet upon trees and little effort was devoted to cover and concealment. The immediate observation was that any terminal holding point of this type under realistic conditions would be completely sheltered or covered, i.e., an abandoned building, the cellar of an indigenous asset, etc. The previous movement of the evader took place during the day with rest and sleep accomplished during the night, again in the semi-dense forest. It would likewise appear that any realistic movement of an evader in an operational area would require the assistance of indigenous assets. I would be unthinkable that a workable E&E mechanism in a denied area be based on any other consideration. Therefore, it is suggested that incorporated into future E&E training be the movement of the E&E evader during the night with shelter and food provided by an indigenous asset during the day (or this can be simulated, if indigenous assets are unavailable).

The escort in the E&E movement stated that he had to wait initially for his contact to pick up the evader for approximately 1½ hours at the contact point. Asked whether an emergency recontact plan was enforced, he stated "No, I never know when they will show up, they are too busy with other things".

While the evader was being moved to motor vehicle transportation prior to being taken to the LZ, an occasion arose where the movement had to take place on or across the highway, this was accomplished very effectively and controlled by the agent asset who took every precaution to protect the evader. Especially noted was the professional manner in which the rucksack and the evaders duffle bag were cached. They were effectively retrieved by the escort as the vehicle moved slowly along the highway.

Also noted during the final phase of the LZ pick up operation was the fact that the evader was escorted to the aircraft not from the right

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rear approach as is customary of an aircraft of this type, but from a front left approach which took the moving parties in front of the aircraft and the propellar. This movement took place at dusk and was not critical; however, at night such a movement could be disastrous as the aircraft commander quickly pointed out. Once airborne the pilot likewise commented that there was no wind velocity guidance given by the RCL which necessitated some change in the pilot's original landing pattern plan.

A number of student trainees commented both during the exercise and subsequently upon return to the training site that they thought it unrealistic to be placed in the field with insufficient briefing for the exercise and to allow apparent arbitrary management of the teams by a team leader who was chosen by the training staff. Team members were exercised in but few of the various phases of training to which they had been exposed; for example, my excort felt very strongly that he should have been permitted to exercise some of his communications ability, others felt that mistakes were made and no one in authority was present to correct them. Therefore, the same mistake from their point of view was being made continually throughout the exercise.

It is recommended that future comprehensive exercises be designed so that team members are afforded the opportunity to participate in as much of the various phases of the scenario as is possible. It is felt that this could be accomplished without seriously disrupting the scenario mechanism. Admittedly the total net gain of the exercise, from an operational point of view, may not be as great but the individual experience gained would more than outweigh the former consideration. Further in order to render on the spot critique during the exercise, it is suggested that either a Training Officer or a Project Officer be present on as much of the various phases of the scenario activity as possible and to "administratively" critiqued. It is felt that the time to make the mistakes if they are to be made, but more important, the time to correct these mistakes, is on the spot rather than through discussions which occur on the last day of the student's presence at the training site.

[ Project Officer ]

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