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AGinder:bal (6 Nov 64)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance of
JCS Wartime UW Requirements

REFERENCES: A. SR Memo, 25 August 1964, Same Subject

B. EE Comments on Ref A, 10 Sept 1964,
Same Subject

C. SOD Comments on Ref A, 28 Sept 1964,
Same Subject

D. Memorandum for the Record, 1 October 1964
Future of WUDEPOT

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 2.

2. In view of the comments expressed in references above and particularly as a result of discussions with Chief, SR as indicated in reference D. It is recommended that the attached proposed memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff be forwarded to the DDCI for his approval and signature.

3. Request your approval of the above recommendations.

☐
Chief, War Plans Staff ☐

The recommendation in paragraph 2 is approved:

Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment:
As Stated

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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Attachment:
As Stated

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/P
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1 - WPS Registry
1 - EE
1 - SR

COORDINATION:

EE

Date

SR

Date

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Change in CIA Acceptance of CINCEUR's
Unconventional Requirements for USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland

REFERENCE: Memo for Chairman, JCS, Subject: Report
on CIA Capabilities to Meet USCINCEUR's
Revised Unconventional Warfare Requirements,
dated 7 January 1963

1. Reference forwarded CIA's capabilities to fulfill CINCEUR's UW requirements to support planned wartime operations. Based on a recent thorough review of our current capabilities, it would be unrealistic for this Agency to continue to accept USCINCEUR's UW requirements for the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

2. In the past all requirements for the above countries have been accepted against assets externally held in the CONUS. With the passing of time, these assets have progressively lost their familiarity with persons and operating conditions within the projected target areas and will themselves now require internal contacts who can place them in touch with latent or active anti-regime elements if, in fact, such dissidence does exist. Thus, these assets no longer have the capability which is essential to the success of their mission.

3. To the degree possible, CIA internal assets which are targeted against current intelligence and covert action requirements will be used to satisfy USCINCEUR's requirements as the needs arises. We believe, however, that it would be highly impracticable to categorically accept UW requirements against such perishable assets. We are fairly confident that our intelligence collection activities in the above countries will provide a basis for locating dissident elements, when and if they appear, which may be useful to military forces.

4. Because of the many considerations involved in arriving at the above conclusions it is recommended that a joint meeting of CIA and JCS representatives be convened to re-examine and bring up to date the entire matter of concepts and criteria upon which the structure of UW requirements and capabilities are determined. Hopefully this will result in a more meaningful and mutually acceptable formula for the establishment of UW requirements.

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5. It is necessary at this time to revise previous UW acceptances to CINCEUR's requirements. Therefore, attached hereto are revised page changes to attachment forwarded by referenced memorandum which reflect CIA's current capabilities.

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Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

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