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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM:

*C/WRS*

NO.:

DATE:

Officer, position, room number and

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIAL

COMMENTS (Number each comment and draw a line to whom to whom. Draw a line to whom to whom.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

*1/20/80  
S.R./D.S.*



*W. B. ...*

*I do  
not  
need  
incre  
S.R./D.S.  
copy  
file*

DECLASSIFIED  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
SOURCE INFORMATION SYSTEM  
NAZI WAR CRIMES PROGRAM  
DATE 2007

14

15

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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: *C/WPS*

NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ OFFICER'S INITIAL \_\_\_\_\_ COMMENTS (Number each comment, show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIAL	COMMENTS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
<i>C/SR/DDB/OC</i> <i>63 48 03</i>	<i>63 48 03</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>F Y Z</i>

4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				

*Wm. R. ...*

*I do not fully understand the need for an increase in S.R./DDB capabilities in this area.*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXTENSION BOARD  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM		UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP							
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS			INITIALS	DATE		
1	JR/COP						
2							
3	DCSR			[ ]	9/7/62		
4							
5	C/S12						
6							
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY			
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION			
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN			
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE			
Remarks:							
<p><i>I would suggest that my success should look this over</i></p> <p><i>3/5 - Jack - have you had a chance to talk to [ ] as yet? - oz</i></p>							
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER							
1E. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE		
[ ]					29 June '62		
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET			

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM		UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP							
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS			DATE	INITIALS		
1	SRCOP			9/12	[ ]		
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY			
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION			
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN			
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE			
Remarks:							
<p>Returned to you for file or other disposition. I agree with Quent that there can be no further increase of DOB capabilities over and beyond their current establishment unless we obtain additional personnel from outside sources for this specific purpose.</p> <p>[ ]</p>							
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER							
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.					DATE		
					11 Sept		
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25 June 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Exchange of views with [ ] and members of his staff regarding the establishment of UW assets in denied areas within the EUCOM area of responsibility [ ]

1. The attached memorandum (Att. 1) relates the first broad talk with [ ] and officers of his staff in regard to the long-unresolved matter of CIA's performance in the establishment of UW assets in the so-called denied areas within EUCOM's area of responsibility. It will be recalled that the memorandum also attached (Att. 2) was approved for such discussion by the DD/P and was coordinated with pertinent components of the Clandestine Services. It should be added that C/WPS emphasized that this was not a formal CIA paper, but rather an attempt to define the problem and work toward a solution and that, eventually, such a solution would be formalized with the JCS at the DCI level.

2. It was C/WPS's impression that [ ] ready acceptance of the hard facts and his desire to see something in being which, although not ideal, would be a firm capability, represents a healthy development. The officers of [ ] staff also appeared to welcome this candid and essentially positive approach by CIA.

3. It should also be noted that, as has been previously pointed out to the DD/P by C/WPS, JCS acceptance of major reliance on externally-held assets will call for an increase in DOB capabilities and will require considerable planning and organization both in this country and in Western Europe by CIA in order to achieve meaningful readiness.

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25 June 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Exchange of views with [ ] and members of his staff regarding the establishment of UW assets in denied areas within the EUCOM area of responsibility

1. On Friday, 15 June 1962, Chief, War Plans Staff, [ ] and his Deputy met with [ ] Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), Joint Staff, to exchange views with regard to CIA's performance and proposals in connection with the establishment of UW assets in denied areas in response to the requirements of EUCOM military planners.

2. [ ] summarized the CIA efforts in the past to establish UW assets in denied areas which, although actively pursued, had resulted in providing only one UW asset of questionable value for support of USCINCEUR's UW requirements. [ ] then enumerated several factors which militate against the establishment of such assets in peacetime, and compared advantages of holding UW assets externally for introduction into denied areas when and as needed to support the military effort. He then stated that the CIA has prepared a paper (copy attached) which he hoped could serve as the basis for an understanding between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA on this subject.

3. [ ] agreed that it was impractical to attempt to establish UW assets in denied areas at this time and accepted the alternative of having these assets held externally. He then read the CIA paper and commented on it as follows:

a. NSC 5412/2 was written in 1958 and conditions have greatly changed since that time. For this reason, the special group has issued several National Security Action Memorandums which alter the responsibilities assigned in this document. He

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att. 1

went on to say that he is not interested in how well the CIA can train Montagnards, but he is interested in how much trouble it can make for Ho-Chi-Minh in North Vietnam.

b. He agreed with the proposals in the paper, and asked that we meet with members of his staff to go into the contents of the paper in more detail.

4. [ ] executive officer, escorted us to another conference room where we met with [ ] [ ] of the SACSA Staff. This meeting was fruitful in that it surfaced some of the reservations which the Joint Staff have regarding CIA's capabilities to develop UW assets, and with respect to the D-day capability of externally held assets. The major points brought out during this discussion were as follows:

a. The Joint Staff agrees that externally held assets have advantages over those held internally, but when such assets are held in the U.S. they cannot be considered as having a D-day capability. They prefer that such assets be held within the theater and in close proximity to the airlift which will be used to introduce them into the operational area.

b. That the UW requirements developed to date have in general been predicated upon a general war situation and are, therefore, not specifically responsive to requirements which might emerge in contingency situations. It was recognized that each contingency situation could have different requirements, and that the very nature of contingencies makes it impractical to foresee exactly what will be required. For this reason the flexibility with which externally held assets could be employed, and the fact that they could be used to exploit situations of opportunity, make such assets more responsive to changing conditions than those which have been developed internally. Further, the probability of D-day occurring without warning in a contingency situation is not considered a likely possibility; whereas, in a general war a nuclear attack could occur with little or no warning. Since contingencies usually develop over a period of time, assets held in the U.S. could be moved to overseas locations during periods of tension and prior to a decision to employ them.

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c. [ ] [ ] stated that he thought plans would be greatly improved if capabilities actually existed to implement them. As it is now, military plans predicated on CIA assets within denied areas have no validity since such assets are non-existent. He welcomed the development of plans based on capabilities.

d. [ ] [ ] raised a question regarding the definition of denied areas. It was his opinion that there are several categories of denied areas and that perhaps some distinction should be made between them. He pointed out that there were certainly differences between the USSR and some of the Satellites and between Communist China and North Korea or North Vietnam, but they are all classified as denied areas. It is his opinion that in some of the so-called denied areas it should be much easier to establish covert UW assets than it would be in the USSR. No firm conclusions were reached with regard to this question.

5. The Joint Staff requested that we leave a copy of the paper with them to study, and suggested a subsequent meeting to formalize a position paper which the CIA would forward to the JCS for consideration.

6. [ ] [ ] stated that the War Plans Staff would welcome the opportunity to discuss the paper further and requested that SACSA inform him when they were ready for the next meeting.

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**Proposal for Exchange of Views with Elements of the  
DOD and JCS in Regard to UW Assets in Denied Areas  
within the RUCOM Area of Responsibility**

1. NSC 6412/2 gives the CIA responsibility for covert operations and lists the types of actions to be accomplished. In part this Directive states, "In accordance with established policies and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, including wherever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand these forces in time of war for staybehind assets and evasion and escape activities." In military terminology, UW consists of Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, and Subversion (Resistance).

2. With the advent of the Special Forces (SF) program in the Army, and the development of an Evasion and Escape (E&E) program by the Air Force, military requirements for CIA covert action support increased. The Army and the Air Force have indicated that their respective programs would be greatly facilitated if the CIA could provide assets within denied

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which, upon the outbreak of hostilities, would be prepared to undertake UW tasks in support of military operations.

2. In responding to MILITARY UW Requirements in the past, CIA has listed four types of assets which it would normally be expected to provide. These are:

a. Action units: Mobile strike packages with the capability of potential operations, equipped with communications and supporting facilities, and trained to perform a specific type of UW task, i.e., Guerrilla Warfare, Evacuation and Rescue, or Sabotage.

b. One all-purpose agent organization which could perform a wide range of operations with communications and the capability of gathering operational intelligence and spot and act on necessary special personnel for the requirements in the area.

c. Assets of a supporting character who will be able to provide limited support or reinforcement elements of the military services within the operational area. Such assets may be involved in maintaining specific UW teams but will provide limited operations, establish contact with the local resistance potential, or provide safe havens or communications facilities and services.

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d. Where pre-war establishment of assets resident in the denied area is not possible, to recruit and train and hold externally selected cadres of agent and action personnel for wartime infiltration into the operational area.

The JCS, after making an assessment of these four kinds of assets, stated their preference for g, h and d assets in that order. With regard to external assets, the JCS consider that for these to be considered effective for Priority I operations (D-Day), they should be held within the theater where they would be readily available.

4. In 1959 the number of DW requirements submitted to the CIA by USCENTCOM totaled 198, of which 90 were for assets in denied areas. Of the denied area requirements CIA accepted 68, three against assets in being and 65 against programmed assets. In 1960 total requirements dropped to 116, of which 68 were in denied areas. Of the latter CIA accepted 30 against current assets and 38 against programmed assets. Of the 38 accepted 23 were accepted against externally held assets. Only one requirement was accepted against an asset in place in a denied area. Acceptances based on programmed assets are of little value for current operational planning unless their programmed readiness date falls within the effective date of the Military Plan (1 July - 30 June). CIA experience in the past has been that in more than 50% of the cases the programmed readiness date was not met. As a result, changes have been made in asset development

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programs and requirement evaluation procedures which will make it possible to forecast readiness dates with greater certainty.

5. a. The types of assets which we have informed the military could be developed fall into two broad categories:

(1) Those developed and held within the area of projected operations, and

(2) Those held externally.

*Handwritten: "Security of Source" with an arrow pointing to the text below.*

Assets to be developed within the area of operations are recognized to be the most desirable types, but the many problems in developing such assets in denied areas are of an order and scope that make their development infeasible. Among the problems are internal security within the area, maintaining the motivation of the agents, periodic training, the risk of having the asset come under enemy control, and the time, effort and cost which must go into such an effort when there is little likelihood of success and when there are high priority tasks for current operations.

b. The security risks involved in authenticating individuals for training are such that this can only be done in very special cases and cannot be counted on as a standard procedure. CIA has not yet found a way to maintain the motivation of individuals in denied areas without frequent contact between the case officer and the asset.

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Travel restrictions make this almost impossible. Moreover, if an asset is not allowed to "practice" occasionally, he soon goes stale and, on the other hand, if he is allowed to "practice" he risks discovery. Perhaps the most unfavorable factor, and one which we know all were subjected to, is the degree of the asset coming under enemy control. The validity of such assets would be uncertain. In summary, it does not appear feasible for CIA or any other agency to maintain US assets in any meaningful number in Soviet areas to be held for wartime use.

It is therefore proposed that

1. It is unlikely in the present circumstances that there will be any improvement over past performance in regard to establishment of covert US assets in Soviet areas and, recognizing the record of slippage, it is suggested that past performance will be recalled.

2. Priority of assets will be given to the maintaining of assets having a current capability; however, plans will be maintained to permit their conversion to wartime situations, including US situations when appropriate.

It has been CIA experience, however, that the life span of current assets is uncertain and it is not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy which

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will still be available on the outbreak of hostilities.

c. The development of internal assets to be held outside the projected area of operations, either within the U.S. or overseas, will be continued and augmented as required. Major reliance for the fulfillment of UW tasks will be placed on such assets.

Although it is a costly procedure in terms of personnel and money, this solution is practical and has advantages over assets developed and held internally. These are: They are less subject to compromise; they can be trained for the specialty they are to perform; they can, with proper attention to security factors, undertake joint training with military units if such is indicated; and they will be available at the time needed.

With regard to the development of externally held assets, CIA proposed to develop linguistic assets or small teams of two or more men who could be infiltrated into the operational area prior to the Special Forces Teams. These assets would be complementary to the Special Forces and would be able to serve as guides and interpreters since they would have fluency in the language and a

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Knowledge of the area. CIA has undertaken to create a reserve pool of capable and suitable personnel for operations in the denied areas, and at the present time has a small reserve of such individuals in the U.S. These will be available for use with Special Forces or, if such use did not appear imminent, CIA would propose to use them on CIA national missions. CIA is currently expanding its pool of agent assets and reviewing and improving the readiness of existing assets. In addition, plans are being worked out to enable CIA with military support to transport U.S. held agents quickly to the various staging areas.

4. CIA will continue to review all current internal assets to determine their various UV potential. The broad UV requirements will be considered in connection with recruitment of new agents for current use.

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