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Memorandum for: Chief, SR Division

Subject: Project AEOGMA

Hdqs Case Officer: [ ]

Field Station: [ ]

Room No: 1060 J

Target Area: USSR

Extension: 8757

Date: 26 August 1960

1. The attached project outline is submitted for extension for the period 1 August 1960 through 31 January 1961.

2. Authority is requested to obligate [ ] in FY 1961, subject to the availability of funds.

3. Attached also are Branch comments and previous project actions.

[ ]

Chief, WE/3

[ ]  
GSR/2  
[ ]

SR/COP/CE

[ ]

Chief, WE

[ ]

SR/BF

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

[ ]

SR/SS

APPROVED: [ ]

Chief, SR Division

[ ]

C/PG/FI Projects

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

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26 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division

SUBJECT : Approval for Extension of Project AEDOGMA

1. It is requested that Chief, SR Division approve extension of Project AEDOGMA for the period 1 August 1960 through 31 January 1961.

2. Background: Project AEDOGMA is a project of [ ] to place a source in the Russian/Soviet emigre community in Paris to monitor and counter Soviet intelligence activity within this group. The sole agent in the project is AEDOGMA/1. Prior to his transfer to Paris in 1959, AEDOGMA/1 had served as a CIA agent in Germany and Austria since 1947.

3. Extension of Project AEDOGMA is requested because the agent's illness during the last period of extension frustrated [ ] intention of evaluating his operational effectiveness in Paris. Early in March 1960 AEDOGMA/1 became ill with what has been diagnosed as probably a very severe case of herpes zoster, which was complicated and prolonged by infection and an allergic reaction to penicillin. There was, and still is, the possibility that AEDOGMA/1 was the victim of an external contact poison. (TSS analysis of his clothing did not detect the presence of such poison, but their analysis was hindered by the shipment of his clothing in a non-airtight container.) Because of his failure to find successful medical treatment for his illness in Paris, AEDOGMA/1 returned to Munich early in March 1960 and remained there until the first of June.

4. Despite his extensive absences from Paris, AEDOGMA/1 has performed so well there that we feel another extension is justified in order to accurately appraise his usefulness [ ]. He has been cultivating students of Ukrainian ethnic background. Two of these students will be travelling to the USSR for a period of study in the near future. Another Ukrainian student was given a CA briefing by AEDOGMA/1, prior to leaving for the USSR with a Quaker group.

In the CE field AEDOGMA/1 has shown even more promise. He is investigating a young Ukrainian emigre, who has been active among Ukrainian students, is avowedly anti-Communist, and yet who has been in contact with Soviet officials under suspicious circumstances. AEDOGMA/1 has reported the recruitment approach to a Ukrainian emigre by a Soviet tourist from the Soviet ship the Pobeda. The Soviet, in parting with the emigre, suggested that the chief cook of the POBEDA frequently comes to France and could visit the emigre in the future.

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Another example of CE reporting by AEDOGMA/1 is his identification of the author of an article denouncing an AECAVATINA as an American agent. AEDOGMA/1 is now investigating the possible Soviet intelligence connection of the author and his family.

5. AEDOGMA/1 has a provisional operational approval, valid through 27 August 1960, for his use in Project AEDOGMA. An operational approval has been requested.

6. It is estimated that the period of extension will cost \$4,966.50, broken down as follows:

Salary (escrow)	\$1,200.00
Salary (local in francs)	\$1,200.00
Raise to offset income lost in transfer to Paris	\$1,000.50
Operational expenses	\$ 666.00
Rent living quarters/safehouse	<u>\$ 900.00</u>
	\$4,966.50

Chief, SR/2

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On the basis of reading part of AEDOGMA files and my knowledge of agent's REDSKIN performance so far, I am not in favor of revising AEDOGMA's project to use him primarily for REDSKIN/Paris in the future:

1. Limited access: His access to REDSKIN targets appears to be limited to students of Ukrainian extraction and to Ukrainian emigres. As it is my understanding Paris is going to reduce its emphasis on spotting and developing both students and emigres (because their REDSKIN usefulness has proven disappointing), AEDOGMA/1, therefore, doesn't seem to have access to targets of prime REDSKIN interest. [ ] has several spotters in student and emigre circles so that this area will not be "uncovered" by not using AEDOGMA.

2. Poor REDSKIN performance to date: AEDOGMA has not spotted or developed any positive REDSKIN candidates since July. He has not appeared to follow up on the three individuals he has suggested.

a) Helene HUNDER (spotted April 1960) - POA cancelled 8 Dec 60 at [ ] request because no immediate prospect of her operational use. CIA aware of Subject prior AEDOGMA reporting on her because of her participation in [ ] activities in Marseilles in 1959.

b) Olga ROMACZUK - Altho POA granted early August, there is no indication in Headquarters AEDOGMA has developed Subject as a regular and productive informant.

c) Jack DAVIDCHUK - Headquarters has received no information to indicate AEDOGMA has even attempted to debrief Subject following his trip to USSR last August.

d) Any CA materials AEDOGMA may have prepared for REDSKIN use hr for briefing purposes has not been received in Headquarters so that no comment can be made on its operational value.

3. Security aspects:

a) As Subject is known to be a target of RIS interest and reporting, his use to develop and serve as cutout for Paris REDSKIN candidates and operations risks burning any agent prospect with whom he becomes associated.

b) Furthermore AEDOGMA's employment by UPHILL and his loyalty to that service render it likely that Paris REDSKIN activities will be reported to UPHILL.

c) In addition, the files indicate AEDOGMA is generally known to be a AIS agent so that whatever activities he participates in become pretty well marked as being AIS sponsored.

4. TSD assessment: Although the written report has not yet been received, TSD/RB [ ] assessment of AEDOGMA/1 indicates that Subject has little ability to direct or instruct agents. While the report finds Subject able to spot and contact agents, he is not recommended to serve as a cutout, P/A, or even to transmit intelligence requirements.

In view of these four considerations, AEDOGMA's REDSKIN potential in France appears to me to be very limited: essentially only as a spotter/informant. Even in this ~~limited~~ capacity AEDOGMA's limited access, lack of personal initiative, and well-known intelligence connections seem to