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WA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. MGMA- 10593

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR  
Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt  
SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/ Operational  
SPECIFIC— AEQUOR/ Spotting and Recruitment in  
U.S. and Canada

DATE: 24 July 1952

| Discontinue:              | Check one:                          |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Hq Action Req. by cable   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| See para 6 by pouch       | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Hq Comments Req. by cable | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| See para _____ by pouch   | <input type="checkbox"/>            |
| For info and files        | <input type="checkbox"/>            |

REF: MUNI 9302

1. It has become apparent over the course of the Summer that Cambista 2's spotting efforts have not been producing satisfactory results -- to date we have no new firm candidates for the next operational team, and it appears unlikely that we shall have more than two by the end of August, if, indeed, we are able to get any at all. On the other hand, it is clear that a minimum of four, and preferably six, W/T men should begin training not later than mid-September if an adequate Spring despatch program is to be carried out. It therefore becomes clear that recruitment in the U.S. and Canada must begin immediately if project AEQUOR is to continue according to its basic operations plan.

2. To accomplish the necessary spotting of candidates, and to implement their recruitment in North America, it appears imperative that there be a Cambista 1 representative there fully briefed to carry out these functions. Normally we would merely approach Cambista 4 and request that he appoint such a delegate. However, in view of previous reports (Ref: MGKW 11803, Para 1) concerning a serious split between Cambista 4 and the Cambista 1 organizations in North America over the question of Cambista 1 participation in discussions held under the sponsorship of the QKACTIVE project, we are hesitant to take this step until we have received from you the answers to certain questions. It is suggested that DYCLOCK should be able to furnish most of the answers. The questions are:

Removed from Project AEQUOR  
 CS Classification: 74-126-44/1 thru 4  
 JOB: ~~62-800/35~~  
 Box: ~~1/1-201d-2~~

POG/ayh  
Distribution:

- ✓ 3 - SR (1 hand carried by [ ] 25 July) (direct)
- 1 - EE (direct)
- 2 - COM [ ]
- 2 - MOB [ ]

*Reference to [unclear]*

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- a. How serious is the political split between Cambista 4 and the Cambista 1 organization in North America?
- b. Does this split affect only the leaders, or also the rank and file -- particularly the young active members who would be of interest to us from an operational standpoint?
- c. Would this split discredit or impair the effectiveness of a recruiter appointed by Cambista 4?
- d. Who are the supporters of Cambista 4 in this split, and what is their influence?
- e. Who are the leaders of the anti-Cambista 4 movement, and what is their influence?
- f. Are any of these latter leaders capable of functioning as an independent spotter or recruiter without authorization from Cambista 4?
- g. If so, would an independent approach to them by DYCLAIM concerning such spotting or recruiting be feasible or desirable?

3. If the answers to the above questions indicate that the split is not irretrievably major, it would obviously be desirable to have a spotter and recruiter appointed by Cambista 4 in order to maintain the solidarity of Cambista 1. However, if the split is actually so fundamental that Cambista 4's influence in North America has been seriously limited, we feel that the urgency of our recruiting requirements would justify an independent approach to the anti-Cambista 4 elements. Such an approach might be undertaken either instead of or in conjunction with similar arrangements with the pro-Cambista 4 forces. In either case, we are interested in the answer to one further question:

- h. What information is presently available to DYCLAIM concerning the number, location, and names of possible potential Byelo-Russian agent candidates?

4. It may be wondered why we do not immediately propose Cambista 2 as the Cambista 1 delegate to North America, either as permanent spotter and recruiter, or as the agent to make an initial survey and pick a permanent spotter and recruiter resident in the U.S. or Canada. There is no question that Cambista 2 would also be the first choice of Cambista 4 for this function. However, there are a number of reasons why we are unwilling to allow Cambista 2 to undertake this function:

- a. Cambista 2 is completely identified with Cambista 4's position in the matter of Cambista 1 involvement with QKACTIVE; Cambista 2 was, in fact, the Cambista 1 representative to the first QKACTIVE-sponsored conferences between the Great Russians and the minority nationalities in 1951. Therefore, Cambista 2 by his very presence in the U.S. would tend to aggravate any split which may still exist.

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- b. The results of Cambista 2's work in recruiting in Europe have been extremely unsatisfactory. Although we feel that there are a number of mitigating circumstances, we also feel that a greater effort and a more intelligent approach to the problem by Cambista 2 would have produced better results. In the face of this poor showing, we are unwilling to "reward" Cambista 2 by permitting him to travel as Cambista 1 recruiting representative to North America, with the consequent great gain in personal prestige which he would maneuver to get out of such an assignment.
- c. In spite of the fact that Cambista 2's recruiting in Europe has shown minimal results, we still have some hope of its producing some acceptable candidates. If Cambista 2 were to receive the assignment to North America, recruiting in Europe would virtually stop during his absence.
- d. We have received persistent reports that a number of young Cambista 1 members are personally opposed to Cambista 2 because of his ambition, his opportunism, and his dictatorial manner. We are not convinced that he would make a good impression on Cambista 1 members in the U.S. and Canada, who have shown themselves capable of resenting autocratic direction by the European Cambista 1 leaders.
- e. In spite of the fact that Cambista 2 is the only experienced spotter and recruiter in the Cambista 1 organization, we feel that the appallingly low calibre of the majority of candidates whom he has sent to Munich for assessment indicates that this "experience" should not be a determining factor in his selection for this assignment.
- f. We have continually and increasingly felt the undesirable effects of our dependence on Cambista 2 as our sole operational link with Cambista 1. It will, in the future, be a major plank in the AEQUOR operational program to develop as many new contacts as possible, and to avoid permitting any one man to make us too dependent on him. For this reason, we are unwilling to see Cambista 2 also expand into the North American recruitment field.

5. One possibility which occurs to us, and on which we should appreciate your reaction, is to use one or more of the three Cambista 1 nominees for the coming ZRELOPE P/A school-term to spot and recruit before the school begins. Each of the three candidates -- Cvirka, Zaprudnik, and Margovich -- has had experience in this field, since they have all worked as spotters under Cambista 2. Each of them is free until the beginning of the P/A school. We consider any one of them qualified for work of this type. As they will be entering the U.S. "black" under the ZRELOPE system, it would undoubtedly be necessary to have somebody constantly accompany them on any recruiting trip which might be made. In view of the fact that a recruiting trip through the productive areas of the Byelo-Russian emigration in the U.S. could probably be accomplished in less than three weeks, this would not appear to be a very difficult thing to arrange. Any case officer could handle the job, and it should not even be

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necessary for the assessee to be aware of his presence, if he handles himself discreetly. Possible candidates from Canada could be contacted and asked to travel to some spot in the U.S. near the border where the conversations could take place.

6. We request that the following action be taken:
  - a. That Headquarters answer by cable soonest the questions asked in Paras 2, 3, and 5 above.
  - b. If the answers to these questions appear to indicate that such a course is desirable, we will approach Cambista 4 and request that he immediately name a delegate to carry out spotting and recruiting in the U.S. and Canada. We shall request that this delegate be someone other than Cambista 2, and, if possible, be someone resident in either the U.S. or Canada.
  - c. If the answers to the questions indicate that the Cambista 1 organization in the U.S. is hopelessly split to the extent that a Cambista 4 appointed delegate would have minimal effectiveness, we will develop an alternative course of action in conjunction with Headquarters; such a course might include direct contact by Headquarters case officer personnel of the anti-Cambista 4 factions in North America.
  - d. It is urgently requested that Headquarters take immediate action to develop all possible information which will be of later use whichever of the above policies are agreed upon. As an example of the type of information which could prove invaluable, we are informed by [ ] that there is an ex-Byelo-Russian partisan lieutenant living in N.Y. who is known to Cambista 10 (Identity A). His address can be located, and a cover reason for wishing to contact him can be given simultaneously by asking Cambista 10 for the address of the "Byelo-Russian partisan lieutenant who has photographs of Byelo-Russian partisans" [ ] at one time intended to secure these photographs but never actually contacted the lieutenant or received his address from Cambista 10). It seems likely that this ex-partisan would know of any other ex-Byelo-Russian partisans presently living in the U.S. or Canada, and might even know which of them would be willing to go back to their former occupation.
  - e. It is requested that Headquarters inform us of any other plans for direct action concerning recruiting of Byelo-Russians in North America which may presently be under consideration or in the process of implementation.

Approved:

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