

SECURITY INFORMATION

*JOS/West*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3A2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE AUTH.

DATE 2007

18 December 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
Attn: CSOB

Chief, Foreign Division S  
Chief, Foreign Division M  
REDSOX/Operational

Recruitment of Further CASSOWARY Instructors and  
Safehouse Keepers.

1. In anticipation of the transfer of the training program for current operations to this side of the Atlantic. it was decided in conjunction with [ ] shortly after [ ] departure, that CASSOWARY 1 personnel in the U. S. could and should be recruited to assist in managing the training program and other facets of the project. The following categories of personnel were decided upon as desirable:

a. one W/T instructor with the following qualifications: good W/T aptitude, minimum family responsibilities, prior radio experience (if possible), teaching aptitude and suitability for clandestine work; this man would be sent to commercial radio school at our expense as soon as he is available, i.e. before he has received full operational clearance.

b. one translator who can be either male or female but who must have, in addition to adequate facility in both Ukrainian and English, the ability to type clean copy on both American and Ukrainian typewriters; there is no reason why this person should not be handled, at least initially, through a cutout such as CASSOWARY 15; the person concerned would also be encouraged to take schooling at our expense in either typing or language during the security investigation interim.

c & d. A married couple or two women to do the cooking and cleaning at the training site. It goes without saying that these people would not be brought on deck until the training area has been obtained. Trustworthiness, security consciousness and a willingness to do hard work are deemed the only qualifications necessary.

2. On 12 December the above plan requiring the recruitment of four persons was expounded in some detail to CASSOWARY 15 for relay to CASSOWARY 2. CASSOWARY 15 himself is not suitable as a translator or W/T instructor,

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primarily because he does not have the requisite patience, typing ability and interest for these types of work. We, therefore, plan to make him an assistant instructor on some of the 12 tradecraft subjects which we feel CASSOWARY personnel should be able to teach to the CARTHAGES. The covert training staff cannot begin teaching CASSOWARY 3 on a regular schedule until some time in March 1952. By that time it is hoped that the W/T instructor will be on deck so that two persons may receive covert tradecraft training instead of one.

3. On 15 and 16 December CASSOWARY 15 discussed the whole plan with CASSOWARY 2 in New York. The latter's reaction was briefly summarized by CASSOWARY 15 roughly as follows: Since I do not know exactly what was negotiated by CASSOWARY 3 - [ ] abroad, I would prefer that CASSOWARY 3 make the decision on these proposals. I have received no correspondence from CASSOWARY 4 since I saw [ ] I would prefer not to correspond through the mails on these matters. Perhaps when CASSOWARY 4 arrives in the United States he can bring a complete account of the new operational program, including his and CASSOWARY 4's opinions on the advisability of recruiting the three suggested types of personnel. Another possibility exists if CASSOWARY 3 would like to send me a sealed letter via American pouch facilities.

4. We have decided to set up a bank account for CASSOWARY 1 with the proviso that we receive the bank statements and cancelled checks or at least photo copies thereof. This would be somewhat similar to the bank account and receiving system used in the AEROBUS project. This would permit CASSOWARY 1 to dole out salaries to their own personnel who, as we know, are somewhat squeamish about being paid directly by the Americans. CASSOWARY 2 did not comment on this suggestion because CASSOWARY 15 forgot to mention it to him but since the idea was acceptable in the past we imagine that it is equally agreeable now.

5. For the time being, until his covert training program starts, CASSOWARY 15 will continue to survey Ukrainian emigre and the American press for articles of interest. He will also scan the VOA broadcasts, copies of which we have been receiving regularly for the past 6 months. Right at the moment, CASSOWARY 15 is translating several of the operational data questionnaires into Ukrainian; however, since he does not know how to use the Ukrainian typewriter we will probably have to wait until a qualified translator and typist has been recruited before we can forward copies to the field.

6. The action we are requesting the field to perform is specifically this: Discuss the problems raised in this memorandum with CASSOWARY 3 so that we may have the final decision of CASSOWARY 1 far enough in advance so that we can have personnel on hand and at least partly trained before the AERODYNAMIC covert, current operations training is transferred out of Germany.

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7. We have suggested to CASSOWARY 2 that the names and brief biographical histories be submitted to us now on those CASSOWARY 1 people in North America who would be useful at any foreseeable future time for any of the AERODYNAMIC programs so that we can eliminate the inconvenience of waiting 3 or 4 months for operational clearances before using them. CASSOWARY 2's reply to this proposal was a bit obtuse; he cited the fact that, at our request, CASSOWARY 1 gave to us the names of 22 CAWNPORE 4 members in the American army and that we have done nothing with these names, or at least, if we have done something we have not told CASSOWARY 1 about it. CASSOWARY 2 implied his suspicion that, without consulting CASSOWARY 1 we have approached these 20-or-so men and perhaps are using them. In support of this suspicion, CASSOWARY 15 cited the fact that all of the 20 men have ceased corresponding with the CAWNPORE 4 organization under CASSOWARY 1. After pointing out to CASSOWARY 15 that the case of 22 men and the matter of accomplishing operational clearance on other personnel now are entirely separate, the case officer went on to say that to his knowledge nothing has been done with any of these 22 men. Only a small percentage of them were located by means of army files at the Pentagon. One of these men who was transferred to Fort Belvoir was interviewed informally by 2 case officers from this organization who were interested in forming an idea at first hand on the type of CAWNPORE 4 men available to CASSOWARY 1. By choice, the undersigned was not present at this interview which may have been one of the causes of CASSOWARY 2's suspicions. The undersigned also reminded CASSOWARY 15 that the original idea of assembling these CAWNPORE 4 men into one unit had to be dropped in March 1951 after CASSOWARY 13 had, in effect, refused to head up any military training program from the CASSOWARY 1 side unless CASSOWARY 2 ordered him to do so. Needless to say, CASSOWARY 2 did not order CASSOWARY 13 to head up a program which CASSOWARY 13 disapproved of for political reasons. Moreover, without a suitable training area in the United States it was decided that at least the first effort to give military and other types of training to CASSOWARY 1 personnel would be initiated in Europe. (Incidentally, we put CASSOWARY 13 in for operational clearance several months ago so that when we need him we can use him right away). The 22 men whose names were originally submitted by CASSOWARY 1 are, by this time, spread far and wide throughout Japan, Korea, the United States and Europe. Because of the scarcity of this type of personnel, we still intend to get hold of them and others like them as soon as we have a program into which they will fit. We recommend that this matter of the 22 men also be discussed with CASSOWARY 3 since we have had several Trans-Atlantic misunderstandings in the past which have been caused by our inefficiency in keeping CASSOWARY 3 and 2 abreast of recent operational developments. Since mid-April 1951, CASSOWARY 2 has not taken any operational initiative and there is no indication that he desires to do so in the future, unless he comes to Europe on a trip specifically for that purpose. Occasionally he will offer suggestions when prodded to do so and we are keeping in contact with him through CASSOWARY 15 because we want those suggestions and because our relationship with CASSOWARY 1 demands that we

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do not drop this contact. The undersigned plans to talk briefly with  
GASSOWARY 2 at 9 A. M. on 10 January 1952 prior to departing for  
Germany.

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