

16 Oct 53

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TO: Chief, SR/3
FROM: SR/3-W2
SUBJECT: Operational Meeting

EYES ONLY

1. On 16 October 1953 an operational meeting was held for the purpose of discussing current items of operational interest with CASSOWARY 2, as well as for the purpose of debriefing him concerning his recent trip to Europe. Present at this meeting were CASSOWARIES 2, 4, 15, [] and [] Specific items discussed at this meeting were as follows:

- a. Recent messages received from the Homeland.
- b. Text of message to be transmitted to the Hruzin in which he would be instructed to attempt to set up an alternate method of communication and supply in lieu of receiving air drop supplies this year.
- c. Action required regarding the three W/T operators who recently refused to be dispatched to the Ukraine.
- d. Recruitment of additional trainees.
- e. Final outcome of CASSOWARY 2-CAVITINA 1 negotiations.
- f. Plans for coordinating W/T messages with CASSOWARY 2 when control of traffic is reverted to headquarters.
- g. What should be done to revise our efforts and planning in assisting the Homeland in current and future operations, a revision which has become necessary as inadequacies in our present approach become apparent.

2. Re para 1a and 1b:

a. Amenities dispensed with, the meeting was opened with the presentation to Cassowary 2 of the latest message from Hruzin wherein he pointed out his dire straits and the urgent need for another attempt at re-supply. After solemnly reading the message, Cassowary 2 expressed his views regarding this request. They were as follows: although another flight over Hruzin's territory might very well prove disastrous to Hruzin and colleagues, Hruzin preferred taking this chance in preference to possibly starving to death this coming winter or being liquidated when and if he leaves his bunker this winter in search of food. In light of this, Cassowary 2 requested that another drop be attempted. The two case officers present agreed that another attempt at resupply would be ideal if success in that endeavour proved successful. However, since it was already agreed by higher echelon that the drop could not take place for reasons of security to both the plane and Hruzin and his men, aggravated by lack of detailed information from Hruzin on the area situation, the two case officers presented their arguments why the drop could not be made. Since these arguments were contained in the body of the proposed text to Hruzin, the message was given to Cassowary 2 to read for himself.

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Briefly, the message stated that the drop could not be made because we lacked sufficient intelligence of the target area to insure some degree of success; that an alternate means of supply via mail drop could be devised providing the homeland provided us with proper names and addresses.

b. After reading the message and after hearing its contents stressed in greater detail by the two case officers, Cassowary 2 agreed completely with the decision not to attempt to supply Hruzyn by air but to attempt the mail scheme. Here too, Cassowary 2 himself admitted that the homeland was more than at fault for its present predicament in not complying with our past request for information. Cassowary 2 also stated that in the near future he would strongly instruct the homeland to comply with requests for detailed information if adequate aid is to be expected.

c. The other point contained in the proposed text, i.e., request of the homeland to utilize S/W and addresses in the West as a means of communicating with us, was agreed to by Cassowary 2 without comment. This ended phase one of the meeting.

3. Re para 1c.

a. CASSOWARY 2 suggested that at some future date the homeland should be told why CARTHAGE 10,15 and 16 refused to be dispatched. It was thus agreed that CASSOWARY 2 compose the message at his convenience.

4. Re para 1d.

a. The topic of recruitment of new trainees was broached with the case officer's direct statement to Cassowary 2 that it is necessary for future operations that he provide several recruits for immediate training if we are to be prepared to fulfill the Homeland's request for W/T operators this coming spring. Cassowary 2 was then asked whether he had lined up any likely prospects. His answer was negative and qualified in this manner. Although it might be possible to recruit one or two potential W/T operators from any number of places in either Europe or the Western Hemisphere, it would be impossible to instill the proper ideological motivation into these supposed disassociated persons to such a degree that it could be taken for granted they would never "turn" once on the inside or if caught by the enemy, thus jeopardizing the entire Ukrainian underground. (It was for this very reason, Cassowary 2 pointed out, he felt that Carthages 15 and 16 were unsuitable for dispatch; that they lacked proper motivation.) The only sure way to select recruits and to indoctrinate them along the right lines, continued Cassowary 2, would be to create a cadre of perhaps fifty students, begin their ideological build-up simultaneously with other training, and then spot and withdraw several good prospects from within this group for agent training. The exception to this method of recruitment, of course, would be to train and dispatch any exfiltratees who might arrive here from the homeland.

b. As a sidelight to Cassowary 2's request for a cadre, he stated that somewhere in his recent travels through Europe he talked with two Ukrainians who told him that they had been recruited by the NTS for training at a school in Bad Homburg but because of medical reasons, were dismissed. It is doubtful that this bit of information influenced Cassowary 2 to make a request for a Ukrainian cadre as a pool for agent recruitment since the cadre scheme has already been discussed with both Cassowary 2 and 3. However, the existence of the NTS school did add weight to Cassowary 2's arguments for the need of a similar set-up for this operation.

c. Continuing on the subject of recruitment, both the two cases officers present and Cassowary 2 agreed that an ideal solution to bolster the dwindling assets of the homeland would be to induce young students to exfiltrate West for training, then dispatch them to the Ukraine where they would legalize themselves rather than go underground.

d. No final decision was reached regarding recruitment. All aspects of this topic were discussed and it was agreed that the matter be thought over and again taken up at a later date for solution.

5. Re para le:

a. Cassowary 2 shed some light on his recent negotiations with Cavatina 1, touching this subject lightly since he had already provided the [] case officer with all pertinent details, which we assume, will be forthcoming soon. He made mention of the fact that when he returned to Munich from London, he had a lengthy discussion with Cavatina 5. According to Cavatina 5, Cavatina 1 had been in London the same time DYNAMO (Mr. David Murphy) and Cassowary 2 were there. Sometime during this period when all were present in London, Cavatina 1 had met with [] without the presence of Cavatina 5, contrary to established arrangements. What was discussed at this meeting could only be surmised since Cavatina 5 did not know nor was he told by Cavatina 1, but Cavatina 1's actions showed his reluctance to cooperate in the negotiations.

b. Cassowary 2 stated that when he conferred with [] he invited Cavatina 5 to sit in on the meeting for the purpose of verifying later any statements Cassowary 2 might make regarding the discussion, to serve as a material witness to any rebuttal Cassowary 2 might be forced to make to any accusations from Cavatina 1, and to prove his intentions of dealing above board. Cassowary 2 felt that Cavatina 1 should have behaved in a similar manner.

c. Another important aspect resulting from the negotiations was a meeting Cassowary 2 had in Munich with Cavatina 2 and Cavatina 14. It seems that Cavatina 1 had instructed these two to contact Cassowary 2 for the purpose of obtaining his signature to a pre-prepared document to be sent to Miron in which, among other things, stated that Miron was to subordinate himself to Cawmpore and that all problems of the conflict between ZPUHVR and ZChOUN had been adequately settled. Cassowary 2, as he related it, flatly refused to be a part of such a scheme and suggested Cavatina

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14 inform Cavatina 1 that if he, Cavatina 1 desired seriously to have MIRON subordinate himself, then such instructions should be sent from Cavatina 1 only and at the same time Cassowary 2 would inform Koval of the instructions sent to MIRON. Under the scheme presented by Cavatina 1, not only would Cassowary 2's honesty be questioned by the homeland, but the signed document would later be used by Cavatina 1 to strengthen his own position at any future ZChOUN meetings at which he could show this document as proof that Cassowary 2 has agreed to the resolution of the existing conflict otherwise he, Cassowary 2 obviously would not have signed the document. By the same token, any future action by Cassowary 2 regarding Cavatina 1 would be interpreted as a breach of promise and a sign of double dealing on the part of Cassowary 2. This is all rather complicated but logical in view of the homeland mandate setting up the triumvirate of Cavatina 1, Matla and Rebet.

6. Para 1f:

a. The matter of transferring control of W/T traffic here and of coordinating messages presented no problems whatsoever as far as Cassowary 2 was concerned. Since during the winter months traffic is limited to messages from us to the field only, with messages containing only general information not requiring close coordination, it was agreed that either Cassowary 4 or 15 could serve as coordinator from the Ukrainian side. In the event messages of a more sensitive nature were to be sent, then Cassowary 2 would himself participate in the coordination.

b. Cassowary 2 did not obtain from Cassowary 3 message authenticators as used in important messages to Hruzin. These authenticators or the system used to derive them must, obviously, be gotten by Cassowary 2 if he is to sign off messages as Cassowary 3 has been doing.

7. From a CE standpoint, Cassowary 2 elicited from several sources important information concerning JAYHAWK operations and JAYHAWK assets in the Western Ukraine and Poland. However, due to the scope of this information and the intricate details involved therein, Cassowary 2 was requested to submit to us a separate report of these JAYHAWK operations as he knows them. This Cassowary 2 agreed to do.

8. The meeting ended in the wee hours of the morning and only after every major topic of discussion had been dwelt upon sufficiently enough to determine the next course of action to be taken. As can be discerned from the above, some problems of the operation were left unresolved. After allowing Cassowary 2 what we consider a sufficient length of time to mull over unsettled problems, another such meeting will be held.

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