

SECRET

16 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CSR/3

SUBJECT: Comments on OELA-4552 of 30 November 1953

A. General

1. It appears that the subject message adds very little to the improvement in the relationship between ZCH/OUN and the ZP/UHVR. The principal points affecting control and responsibilities still remain unsolved.

2. It is also obvious that the British have not exerted their share of influence on Bendara. In fact, we must assume a priori British approval.

B. Specific

1. Point 1 is a statement of fact and needs no further elaboration.

2. Point 2 emphasizes that Bendara does not agree with the OUN homeland leadership's accusation. In fact, it strengthens his hand and his position, as any one can deduce from this message that he is in a position to challenge a decision made by the homeland.

3. The fact that in point 3 a statement is made that the leadership of the ZCH/OUN is troubled over disagreements in the homeland is an implication that Bendara still remains the official leader of the OUN. Otherwise why should he place the blame for disagreements and disunity on the homeland?

4. Point 4 does not clearly spell out to which OUN leadership Hiron should submit himself. Is the leadership of the OUN at home or abroad? Again it appears that this could have been spelled out a little more clearly.

5. It is true that under point 5 Bendara admits that he has relinquished his position as leader of the OUN and that Koval has taken over his functions. However, the way it is phrased, it would appear that Bendara has relinquished his post entirely of his own accord and not due to any pressure which the homeland may have exerted, or due to any disagreements with the ZP/UHVR.

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6. Point 6 is not clear and raises doubts as to the validity of Bendara's request for Koval to recognise Miron as ZCH/OUN's representative. Moreover, is Miron to be exclusively ZCH/OUN's representative or is he to represent the coordinated Ukrainian leadership.

7. By making this the appeal in point 7 Bendara succeeds in placing the blame on ZP/UHVR. It also has been the case.

8. No comment on point 8.

9. I thought that the purpose of Lebed's meeting with Bendara was to develop a single line of communication with the homeland. If all organisational matters are to be channeled through the Bendara link, Bendara will in the long run obviously play a more important role than Lebed in control, supervision and allocation of organisational matters.

10. No comment on point 10.

11. Point 11 implies that the organisational disputes have not as yet been settled and that no consolidation effort from abroad can be expected until such disputes are ironed out. When and how this will be accomplished still remains unsolved.

[ SR/CFP ]