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TO : Chief, EE (Attn: Chief, SR)

DATE: 15. März 1954

FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt *mmr*

INFO: COM

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC/Operational

SPECIFIC— ZPUHVR-ZCHOUN Conflict

REF: EGMA-10095, 4 March 1954

ROUTING	
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#2	3
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. Transmitted herewith is a cluster of AECAPELIN reports on the ZCHOUN-ZPUHVR conflict, beginning with the arrival of LEBED in Europe (July 1953) and bringing the story to the maturation of a new split in the ZCHOUN in February 1954.

2. For the ZPUHVR-ZCHOUN negotiations in August 1953, see SMUNI-4932, 4958, 4997, 5018, 5038, 5085, 5137, 5345. For the MATVIEYKO pouch, see SMUNI-5889, 5895, 5936, 6176, 6297 and EGMA-9389. For the February 1954 crisis, see SMUNI-6549, 6598, 6604, 6617 and 6636.

3. It is to be remembered that Ivan KASHUBA, AECAPELIN's main subsource, is a pro-BANDERA personality, and that in consequence the enclosed reports portray to a large degree the intentions, miscalculations and interpretations of BANDERA and his followers. In KASHUBA's language, the ZCHOUN and BANDERA are equivalents. This helps to explain such matters as BANDERA's belief that he was the "leader of the entire OUN" (B2, B5, C3, D2, G3, G4, N3, T7). According to AECASSOWARY 3, that belief is a hypnotic self-delusion, the Byuro Provodu OUN having been composed of SHUKHEVICH, VOLOSHYN, and MAYIVSKY (not BANDERA, SHUKHEVICH, and STETSKO, as the pro-BANDERA faction believes). BANDERA's story that he received a letter from SHUKHEVICH, wherein the latter addresses BANDERA as "leader of the entire OUN" (G3c), is a fabrication, according to AECASSOWARY 3.

4. It should also be cautioned that not everything developed as either the pro-BANDERA faction or ZPUHVR anticipated. Thus LENKAVSKY at this writing is still loyal to BANDERA, and the oppositionist leader to go to England eventually turned out to be Volodymyr KEROD (not RIPETSKY or MANYAK). KEROD had worked as a W/T instructor for PIDHAINY in previous JAVELIN-supported training cycles. Most recently it has been reported by AECAPELIN that BANDERA's tactic of attacking ZPUHVR for flirtation with "neo-Communism" through Ivan MAISTRENKO has borne some fruit. AECAPELIN has reported that Boris LEVITSKY and Volodymyr BOBIKEVICH (the latter is employed as a physician by a U.S. army hospital) printed in Vpered an announcement of the URDP-Left's central committee, wherein ZPUHVR is attacked because of alleged "orientation on foreign forces inimical to the Ukraine", meaning the United States. ZPUHVR retaliated by terminating Ivan MAISTRENKO's employment with Suchasna Ukraina, although in fact MAISTRENKO opposed the anti-American steps of LEVITSKY and BOBIKEVICH. It is worth noting, in passing, that UN RADA circles, now holding a parliamentary session in Manich,

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generally support BANDERA because fundamentally he can offer the RADA no competition, whereas the existence of ZPUHVR is interpreted by RADA leaders as a challenge to their monopolistic claim to represent the entire Ukrainian people, both in the homeland and in the emigration, on an above-party basis.

5. At this writing the split in the ZChOUN seems irrevocable, and both factions are addressing their energies to cadres in different countries in a race to gain control of the ZChOUN apparatus and win over the rank-and-file.

6. Transmitted herewith are photo-copies of some of the basic original-language documents concerning the dispute, some of which having already been printed in the emigre press. Document Nr. 6 in this series, under the signature BANDERA (YARYCH), and dated 2 January 1954, represents an attack on the homeland OUN Provid, especially KOVAL-LEMISH. Sent by BANDERA as a secret ZChOUN directive to ZChOUN cells, this document has not yet been published by the opposition press, and according to AECAPELIN, both KASHUBA and BANDERA are in mortal fear that the anti-BANDERA camp will publish it as evidence of BANDERA's position toward the homeland. The unnumbered document represents MATLA's notes taken during the 19 February ZChOUN meeting conveyed by BANDERA.

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gka

10 March 1954

Attachment: A. AECAPELIN Reports
B. Original-language Reports

Distribution:

- 3 - SR (w/2 att. A & 1 att. B) DIRECT
- 1 - EE (DUMMY COPY)
- 3 - COM (w/2 att. A)
- 2 - MOB (w/2 att. A)

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att. A to EGMA-10198

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A. AECAPELIN Report Dated 6 July 1953

1. On 6 July 1953 I talked with Capt. Volodymyr ~~X~~ KOZAK, an "opposi-
tionist" within the ZChOUN, and with Ivan ~~X~~ KASHUBA, pro-BANDERA SB leader
in the same organization. I wanted to find out whether a new ZChOUN
Provid had already been named. Both informants stated that all Provid
posts as yet have not been filled.

2. KOZAK stated that ~~X~~ BANDERA learned at the London conference that
opposition is mounting, that opposition leaders Bohdan KORDYUK, Bohdan
PIDHAINY, and Stepan LENKAVSKY have a growing following. This awareness
caused BANDERA to deem it advisable to include the above mentioned oppo-
sitionist leaders in the new Provid. BANDERA's tactic, according to
KOZAK, was refined in that BANDERA hoped to mollify ~~X~~ KORDYUK, ~~X~~ PIDHAINY
and ~~X~~ LENKAVSKY by giving them posts in the Provid but that at the same
time BANDERA planned to purge all oppositionists from influential spots
in the ABN, SUM, and the German territorial Provid. Further, BANDERA
planned to "screen" all other territorial units of unreliable elements,
to reduce the oppositionists to "paper members" before their expulsion.
This tactic, according to KOZAK, would deprive the oppositionists in the
ZChOUN central Provid of support from below and thus render them harmless.

3. KASHUBA stated that a rather long period of time must pass before
an efficient new Provid can function, that BANDERA is in no hurry to cre-
ate a new body since its essential core was named at London (BANDERA,
~~X~~ STETSKO, LENKAVSKY). Further, BANDERA expects the arrival of news from
the Ukraine, news which will definitely solve the problem of his resig-
nation from the post of "leader of the entire OUN." KASHUBA stated that
BANDERA expects that the homeland will reject his resignation. If that
comes to pass, then BANDERA will not nominate KORDYUK or PIDHAINY to
posts in the new Provid.

4. KASHUBA stated that the Suchasna Ukraina story regarding under-
ground instructions has caused much trouble for the ZChOUN. Although
BANDERA is convinced that the documents are false, nevertheless he fears
that ZPUHVR may have definite instructions in regard to the resolution of
the conflict. BANDERA wants at all costs to know the content of the
ZPUHVR pouch. BANDERA expects that talks with ZPUHVR will begin in August.
According to KASHUBA, BANDERA is worried by the letter from former ZChOUN
members sent to the London conference under the signature of Lev REBET.
This letter suggests that ZPUHVR has evidence from the homeland to the
effect that the homeland Provid takes a dim view of Myron ~~X~~ MATVIEYKO's
activities. If such homeland evidence in fact exists, then BANDERA will
have to use other tactics. For the time being, however, BANDERA will
proceed as though the materials in REBET's letter are false. BANDERA and

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KASHUBA feel than an oppositionist within ZChOUN, KORDYUK or PIDHAINY, gave ZPUHVR information ZChOUN received from MATVIEYKO and intended only for BANDERA. Armed with data from the opposition, ZPUHVR concocted a phantasy, including the charge that MATVIEYKO desires by force and terror to liquidate Colonel Vasyl KOVAL.

B. AECAPELIN Report Dated 13 August 1953

1. Ivan KASHUBA visited me on 12 August 1953 and immediately asked about Mykola LEBED's arrival in Munich. KASHUBA wanted to know how long LEBED would remain, why LEBED came, his plans, whether he would dispatch couriers to the Ukraine, whether he would negotiate with other Ukrainian emigre groups, whether he planned to talk with ZChOUN leaders. I replied that I could not answer all questions, and moreover, even if I were knowledgeable in these matters, I would ponder deeply before I would tell what I knew. I stated that for some time I have lost confidence in the security-consciousness of ZChOUN leaders because some of them talk too much. I then told KASHUBA that I would talk about LEBED's visit only if I received an honest answer to the following question, "Who in the ZChOUN Provid knows that I work with KASHUBA and the SB?" KASHUBA replied that BANDERA, STETSKO, and Stepan MUDRYK are the only persons in the know, the last (MUDRYK) however, being unaware of the details, knowing only that I work as an aide and adviser to KASHUBA. I further asked whether Bohdan PIDHAINY knew of my ZChOUN contacts. KASHUBA replied that PIDHAINY knows nothing, and then excitedly asked why I put such strange questions. I replied that I was concerned about my own safety, that I frequently visit ZPUHVR people, who consider me one of their men. This I consider fine, for it serves to protect my ZChOUN contacts. My concern now is based on the observation that ZPUHVR apparently has an informant within the present ZChOUN Provid. I indicated that I do not want that informant to betray me to ZPUHVR.

2. My tactic excited KASHUBA as a red cloth a bull. He asked who this provocateur might be. I replied that I do not know precisely, and then asked who in the ZChOUN Provid has the pseudonym BEK. KASHUBA stated there is no such person in the Provid but that there is a person there using the pseudonym PEK. Then I told KASHUBA that I have information that a certain BEK, a member of the ZChOUN Provid has informed ZPUHVR about ZChOUN liaison with the homeland, including the contents of Myron MATVIEYKO's correspondence. I stated further that rumors circulate that LEBED has copies of MATVIEYKO's correspondence. Fired by this ruse, KASHUBA began to run about the room and shout: "Didn't I tell you several days ago that a ZPUHVR provocateur is in our midst? Some consider me a fool, but I am no fool. I'll gather all data to show that someone in the Provid is leaking to ZPUHVR. For me it is clear who is guilty -- Bohdan PIDHAINY. It couldn't have been KORDYUK, because he does not have access to MATVIEYKO's pouch. PIDHAINY kept the pouch longer than he should have.

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I talked to BANDERA about my suspicions, but he didn't want to believe me. Now on the basis of what you have said, BANDERA will realize that I was right. Now they will know how useful SB work is. They thought that the SB was not necessary. As soon as ZPUHVR began to say that it had a pouch from the Ukraine I concluded that someone had betrayed our pouch to ZPUHVR. For me the matter became even more clear when at the London ZChOUN conference the oppositionists charged that the ZchOUN is doing destructive work in the Ukraine, that MATVIEYKO wants to liquidate everybody opposed to BANDERA. I immediately saw that ZPUHVR has no pouch, but having learned of our pouch from MATVIEYKO, made false conclusions which they submitted at the London conference."

3. X KASHUBA stated that he concluded that PIDHAINY informed ZPUHVR on the basis of the following:

(a) ZPUHVR is well oriented in regard to MATVIEYKO's work, which in the ZChOUN is known only by BANDERA, STETSKO, PIDHAINY and KASHUBA. Of these four, only PIDHAINY is an oppositionist.

(b) At the London conference PIDHAINY demanded that the conference, not the ZChOUN Provid, select the man to be in charge of liaison with the homeland, and that this official be independent of the Provid. Why did PIDHAINY so demand?

(c) SB subordinates have reported several times that Dr. Ivan HRYNIOCH and PIDHAINY were observed in prolonged conversation. About his contacts with HRYNIOCH, PIDHAINY has reported neither to BANDERA nor STETSKO.

(d) It is a fact that among fellow oppositionists PIDHAINY once said that "if things continue as they now are, I shall put a bullet to my head." When his friends asked why he was so depressed, PIDHAINY replied openly that he likes neither the work of MATVIEYKO nor BANDERA's plans.

(e) When KASHUBA at the London conference announced that ZPUHVR has no correspondence from the homeland and that REBET's letter is a tissue of lies, PIDHAINY turned red with rage and stated that ZPUHVR does have news from the homeland. Did he not so behave because he wanted to protect himself because he had leaked information to ZPUHVR?

4. KASHUBA stated he argued this matter with BANDERA after the London conference, but that the latter, an old friend of PIDHAINY's, wanted more concrete details, stating that the evidence was insufficient. Taking added confidence in me, KASHUBA talked about Myron MATVIEYKO's work.

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X KASHUBA stated MATVIEYKO went to the Ukraine as the official representative of the ZChOUN Provid and as the personal representative of BANDERA, who considers himself the head of the entire OUN. MATVIEYKO brought from BANDERA for Colonel KOVAL letters in which BANDERA asked that MATVIEYKO be received as a representative of the ZChOUN Provid as well as BANDERA's personal representative. However, to BANDERA's dismay MATVIEYKO reported that KOVAL accepted his (MATVIEYKO's) letters through couriers only and refused to see MATVIEYKO personally. More, KOVAL forbade all members of the OUN Provid to contact MATVIEYKO. All this is the work of Vasyl OKHRYMOVICH, and represents a slap in the face to BANDERA. When MATVIEYKO received no reply from KOVAL, then it became obvious that MATVIEYKO is being boycotted.

5. KASHUBA continued: What was MATVIEYKO to do? He was unable to return to Germany because he had no such command from BANDERA. He had been instructed to return only when the conflict has been settled. MATVIEYKO could do nothing else but contact the leaders of individual krays. To work on that level he had full right, for he represented BANDERA, the leader of the entire OUN. Subsequently BANDERA approved MATVIEYKO's endeavors, informing him that he acted properly in contacting individual krays without approval of the homeland Provid. Lower units, KASHUBA stated, are not aware of the conflict between the ZChOUN and ZPUHVR, the rank-and-file believing that BANDERA, although in the emigration, continues to head the entire OUN. MATVIEYKO asked one of the Kray leaders to write a letter to BANDERA wherein this leader should emphasize that the homeland supports BANDERA. This kray leader did so, and the recent pouch from MATVIEYKO contains this letter. When BANDERA learned from MATVIEYKO that the homeland leaders refuse to see or cooperate with the latter, then he (BANDERA) resigned from the post of leader of the entire OUN and gave his mandate to Colonel KOVAL for a final decision. The homeland's treatment of MATVIEYKO, according to KASHUBA, forced BANDERA to resign. Along with his resignation, BANDERA printed in the Ukrainsky Samostiynyk parts of the letter which a leader of one of the krays wrote at MATVIEYKO's request.

6. KASHUBA summarized by stating that MATVIEYKO does not have access to KOVAL, only to individuals who are members of kray Provides. Before these men MATVIEYKO presented himself as the personal representative of BANDERA. MATVIEYKO's position became very complicated following BANDERA's resignation. Almost a year passed before MATVIEYKO heard of it, and in the interim he acted in BANDERA's name. Now he acts only as a ZChOUN representative and is subordinated to KOVAL. KOVAL and the entire OUN Provid, including Vasyl OKHRYMOVICH, support ZPUHVR. The krays are loyal to BANDERA. And because liaison between the Provid and subordinate krays is weak and at times non-existent, the influence of the Provid on lower levels is weak. On the other hand, MATVIEYKO is very active. Because BANDERA and STETSKO feel that the homeland Provid has abandoned nationalist positions, they will never withdraw ZChOUN support from individual

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krays. ~~X~~ MATVIEYKO will continue his work. ZChOUN leaders plan to aid MATVIEYKO by sending him more men, by curtailing ZChOUN expenses in the emigration by 80 percent, by sending supplies and medicine to MATVIEYKO (with the aid of the British), by sending in microfilmed propaganda which MATVIEYKO will reproduce and distribute. MATVIEYKO asked BANDERA to aid in this fashion, and the ZChOUN leaders have agreed. After all this is accomplished, KASHUBA contemplated, ZPUHVR will see who sits on top.

7. It is not the personal wish of ~~X~~ BANDERA, ~~X~~ KASHUBA continued, to create/schismatic situation in the homeland. Matters will take such a radical turn only if BANDERA is forced. When BANDERA learned that LEBED is in Munich, he sent ZPUHVR a letter requesting negotiations. BANDERA will endeavor to talk in a friendly way. If matters do not resolve favorably, then BANDERA will push MATVIEYKO's proposition.

8. On 13 August I had a brief talk with KASHUBA, who gave BANDERA's personal thanks for my revelations regarding PIDHAINY. KASHUBA received instructions to authorize me to learn more of ZPUHVR penetration of ZChOUN secrets. Specifically, I was asked to obtain at least one exact sentence from the MATVIEYKO pouch which PIDHAINY passed on to ZPUHVR. If the text I might produce agrees with the original in ZChOUN files, then PIDHAINY will be expelled in 24 hours.

C. AECAPLIN Report Dated 17 August 1953

1. On 14 and 17 August 1953, I talked with Ivan ~~X~~ KASHUBA about the arrival in Munich of Mykola LEBED. On 14 August KASHUBA confirmed the report that MATVIEYKO has contact only with subordinate OUN units in the Ukraine. KASHUBA stated that MATVIEYKO, upon arrival, first made contact with a certain PRISHLYAK, who has a brother in Belgium who heads the ZChOUN territorial Provid in that country. Through PRISHLYAK (his pseudo was not revealed to me) MATVIEYKO was able to contact the Provid of two other krays. Thus MATVIEYKO is in contact with three homeland krays. KASHUBA in turn asked me how I knew that MATVIEYKO has contact with the homeland underground. I stated that his contact was no secret, that all ZPUHVR knows of it. KASHUBA replied that in all probability ZPUHVR learned of MATVIEYKO's doings from someone within the ZChOUN, not directly from the homeland.

2. In our talk on 17 August we talked about LEBED's reasons for coming to Munich. I stated that his arrival grew out of the receipt of a pouch from the Ukraine, in which pouch ZChOUN-ZPUHVR conflict is discussed. KASHUBA replied as follows: "The ZChOUN Provid, especially BANDERA, waits for ZPUHVR to inform them of the contents of the pouch from the Ukraine. All homeland decisions will be binding upon the ZChOUN only if:

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- (a) The decisions are addressed to the ZChOUN, not merely to LEBED or ZPUHVR;
- (b) The decisions clearly state that they were approved by the entire homeland Provid after consideration of the opinions of subordinate Provides.
- (c) The decisions show clearly that BANDERA's resignation has been accepted by a Great Congress of the OUN, which congress selected a new OUN Providnyk.
- (d) The decisions are confirmed by a pouch brought out by ZChOUN couriers, or when the ZChOUN is convinced that LEBED's pouch is genuine, for the ZChOUN views skeptically "a homeland pouch received by ZPUHVR."

3. KASHUBA stated that the conflict must be settled by the convocation in the Ukraine of a Great OUN Congress. If this conclave accepts BANDERA's resignation and chooses a new Providnyk, then BANDERA will consider himself relieved of his obligations. Until then, he in fact remains the Providnyk of the entire OUN, although he does not perform the functions of that office. When all the provisions noted in the preceding paragraph are fulfilled, then the ZChOUN will subordinate itself to homeland decisions. Moreover, the ZChOUN must consider whether the homeland has not departed from nationalist positions. MATVIEYKO's reports, KASHUBA stated, show that there are profound difference between the OUN Provid and individual krays. The individual krays continue to adhere to nationalist positions, whereas the OUB Provid had deviated therefrom, going to the left. The homeland Provid does not consult the lower units, KASHUBA charged, and may in fact not have any contact at all with these lower levels.

4. Moreover, according to KASHUBA, ZChOUN leaders must consider whether homeland leaders, influenced by either foreign or internal circumstances, have not departed from OUN ideology. MATVIEYKO's reports suggest that there are profound differences between the homeland Provid and individual krays, the latter preserving all nationalist principles while the former frequently departing therefrom. The homeland Provid has gone too far to the left, it does not coordinate its position with lower echelons, and perhaps has only weak or irregular contact with lower echelons. If there are signs of coordinated activity, then this is the work of MATVIEYKO. This ZPUHVR must not forget, KASHUBA asserted.

5. Although the ZChOUN is interested in LEBED's pouch, it is doubted that clarification will ensue. The situation in the Ukraine is clear in that two camps exist, and ZChOUN leaders, assuming the pouch is genuine,

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must ponder whether to abide by instructions contained therein or, knowing the feelings in lower echelons in the homeland, to ignore the instructions in the pouch, pressing the homeland Provid to change its position. ZChOUN leaders have not yet reached a final decision. This will come after the talks with LEBED and ZPUHVR are over.

6. AECAPELIN Comment: KASHUBA's stand reveals interesting views held by ZChOUN leaders. It must be assumed these views are those of BANDERA and STETSKO, KASHUBA's words also indicate that the projected discussion with ZPUHVR is not intended by ZChOUN leaders as a step toward settlement of the conflict. Rather, ZChOUN leaders merely desire to obtain information on which they can base further action. ZChOUN leaders seem determined to go against the homeland Provid, and with the aid of MATVIEYKO, to continue their diversionist activity. It seems that the conflict has been transferred from the emigration to the homeland, a development advantageous to and capable of exploitation by Soviet security organs.

D. AECAPELIN Report Dated 24 August 1953

1. On 24 August 1953 I had a talk with Ivan KASHUBA, who was in a very depressed mood. KASHUBA told me about the documents signed by Col. KOVAL which ZPUHVR gave ZChOUN. KASHUBA stated that the documents were not in the original; rather they were the exact text of W/T messages received by ZPUHVR; that they state that BANDERA was and is not the leader of the entire OUN either in fact or formally; that ZPUHVR leaders strengthened their authenticity by affixing their signatures; and that efforts of ZChOUN spokesmen to question their authenticity evoked strong criticism from Dr. Ivan HRYNIOCH.

2. To my question as to what the stand of the ZChOUN will be in these matters, KASHUBA replied as follows:

(a) Currently the ZChOUN Provid is split on the authenticity issue. Some, including KASHUBA, doubt the documents are genuine and are searching for a way of checking them. Others in the Provid believe the documents are genuine and favor immediate realization of the homeland's instructions.

(b) Both tendencies in the ZChOUN Provid, however, agree that in current negotiations with ZPUHVR the authenticity of the documents must not be questioned, primarily because ZPUHVR by the signatures of HRYNIOCH and Mykola LEBED has accepted full responsibility for their authenticity. No one has anything against

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checking the authenticity of the documents, but this check cannot be allowed to put a stop to negotiations with ZPUHVR.

(c) Those in the ZChOUN Provid that doubt the authenticity of the documents do not exclude the possibility that the documents represent a Bolshevik provocation. Nor do they exclude the possibility that the documents represent a provocation by American intelligence, for they came through the Americans, not directly from LEBED. It is not excluded, KASHUBA stated, that the Americans deliberately created the documents in order to reorganize the ZChOUN. This theory is based on the circumstance that the documents discuss burning emigre matters of a recent nature about which the homeland as yet could not be informed.

(d) The ZChOUN Provid holds that the issues at stake are so basic and significant that the Provid itself cannot take full responsibility in resolving them. After all, the Provid was created by the London Conference and answers to it. Accordingly, the ZChOUN Provid will negotiate with ZPYHVR but reserves final decisions to a new general ZChOUN conference.

(e) Insofar as the homeland statement that BANDERA is not the leader of the OUN is concerned, this circumstance causes no concern because BANDERA himself resigned from that post. If, it is held, formerly BANDERA believed that he was the leader of the entire OUN, then the homeland is to blame, because until now it never took a clear-cut stand in this matter. Previous pouches from the homeland, as well as the oral reports of Mrs. SAVITSKA-KOZAK, gave BANDERA reason to believe that the homeland considers him the over-all leader.

3. In reply to my question as to what tactics BANDERA will follow in talks with ZPUHVR, KASHUBA stated that the ZChOUN is prepared to negotiate, hoping thereby to discover how ZPUHVR pictures the final resolution of the dispute, how it wants ZChOUN to be reorganized, the ideology ZPUHVR would like to make official, and how ZPUHVR envisions ZPUHVR-ZChOUN cooperation. Such matters are very important, KASHUBA stated, because they involve liaison with the homeland, financial matters, the ABN, and ZChOUN delegates in ZPUHVR. When the ZChOUN leaders will have learned all ZPUHVR proposals, then a conference will be called to make final decisions. Reliance on a conference is completely justified, KASHUBA stated, because of personal and fundamental organizational reasons. It is possible that some of the men now in the ZChOUN Provid will leave the organization completely if the conference accepts all homeland instructions, because their firm personal convictions run counter to the proposed reorganization. However, it is also possible that the proposed conference will conclude that the homeland is not properly informed about the emigre situation and will instruct the Provid to attempt to show the homeland the proper path.

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4. To my question who precisely in the Provid does not doubt the authenticity of the homeland documents, KASHUBA named "all old oppositionists," including PIDHAINY, KORDYUK, LENKAVSKY, "and others". He intimated that STETSKO too may be somewhat pleased that BANDERA is having trouble. STETSKO feels that he was unjustifiably attacked at the London conference, BANDERA failing to defend him in all instances. This does not mean, KASHUBA continued, that STETSKO will not support BANDERA in the struggle with ZPUHVR. In the case of LENKAVSKY, his opposition stems from opportunism rather than real sympathy with ZPUHVR. KASHUBA felt it is possible that a new ZChOUN conference will approve homeland instructions, in which eventuality those feeling that the instructions are unjust will leave the organization. I asked KASHUBA whether BANDERA planned to oppose homeland leaders with the aid of MATVIEYKO, as KASHUBA stated in previous talks. KASHUBA replied that can happen only if the proposed conference rejects homeland instructions and authorizes BANDERA to maintain separate liaison.

E. AECAPELIN Report Dated 25 August 1953

1. On 25 August 1953 KASHUBA and I talked about ZPUHVR-ZChOUN negotiations. KASHUBA was depressed, stating that he is thinking of finding new employment because sooner or later he would have to abandon his SB duties. When I asked why he could not continue to head the SB, KASHUBA stated that since the ZChOUN Provid has accepted the authenticity of the homeland documents it must be consequential in all future acts. In other words, it must subordinate itself to ZPUHVR, allow itself to be reorganized, and permit control of the SB by ZPUHVR. ZPUHVR will have the main say in selection of personnel. ZPUHVR will do so in accordance with UHVR and ZPUHVR procedure, which bodies chose officials on an individual, not fractional or party, basis. ZChOUN cannot say, for example, that it delegates BANDERA or STETSKO to ZPUHVR. What obtains is for ZPUHVR to say, "We select from the ZChOUN Provid so-and-so representatives of the ZChOUN." KASHUBA continued that it is well known that ZPUHVR takes a dim view of the SB. ZPUHVR always felt that MATVIEYKO was the source of all evil in the emigration, and when he left, this attitude was transferred to KASHUBA. It is to be recalled that at the London conference the opposition demanded the abolition of the SB. If the reorganization goes as ZPUHVR desires, it will take over all intelligence, counter-intelligence and liaison functions. ZChOUN will be vested only with a cadres section charged with checking ZChOUN members.

2. It will be unthinkable for KASHUBA to work for ZPUHVR along intelligence or security lines, KASHUBA himself related. Moreover, all future ZPUHVR intelligence activity will be an American show. In other words, all materials worked on will be done for the Americans, ZPUHVR will get the money, and KASHUBA will continue to be poor. KASHUBA does not want to be an American agent, and in all probability the Americans do not want him. ZPUHVR is greatly mistaken, KASHUBA continued, if it believes it

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will get all SB archives. All old materials dating from before the ZChOUN-APUHVR split in 1948 can be turned over to ZPUHVR. Files on SB activities after the 1948 split ZPUHVR will never obtain. "Tell me," KASHUBA went on, "Can I turn over to ZPUHVR files on such as the BULAVSKY, STEIMASHCHUK, or POTEPLYTSKA cases? Especially since in regard to these cases ZPUHVR denounced me and the SB to the Americans? Perhaps ZPUHVR will put Evhen VRETSYONA in charge of its intelligence activities. With VRETSYONA I shall never work because he is an American agent. The picture will be totally different if ZPUHVR asks you (AECAPLIN) to take over its intelligence. Then you could ask me, perhaps even XUREVICH, to work for you. We do not know whether ZPUHVR will so propose. If it does, then the ZChOUN will support the idea."

3. Here I interrupted KASHUBA to say that he is speaking as though ZPUHVR and ZChOUN have already come to an agreement and are discussing details of cooperation. "No," said KASHUBA, "The ZChOUN Provid has not come to such a decision. But one must suppose that sooner or later such agreement will come. Currently ZChOUN spokesmen are trying to drive the best bargain for themselves, to take the least amount of blame for the mess of the past five years. ZChOUN spokesmen will try to put most of the blame on ZPUHVR and will attempt to put obstacles in the way of agreement. ZChOUN spokesmen will put ideological matters first on the agenda, accusing ZPUHVR of departure from nationalist ideology, of going beyond the resolutions of the Third Extraordinary OUN Congress in 1943, of perverting homeland positions by working with neo-Communists like Ivan MAISTRENKO. The first prerequisite for cooperation, as demanded by ZChOUN spokesmen, will be the purging of ZPUHVR from neo-Communist influences. If ZPUHVR continues to support MAISTRENKO, then ZChOUN will never consent to agreement. Neo-Communism will be the first important item on the agenda of ZChOUN-ZPUHVR talks."

4. In talks with ZPUHVR, KASHUBA continued, ZChOUN representatives will stress that they recognize fully homeland decisions. There is no difference of opinion here as regards the opposition (PIDHAINY, KORDYUK, LENKAVSKY) and the loyalists (BANDERA, STETSKO, BENTSAL). The BANDERA loyalists will emphasize the purely technical details of the implementation of homeland instructions. They will demand clarification of the following issues:

(a) Cooperation of ZPUHVR with the "neo-Communist group of MAISTRENKO."

(b) ZPUHVR deviation from nationalist positions as evidenced by the leftist articles of Volodymyr STAKHIV, editor-in-chief of Suchasna Ukraina, who, for example, equated the significance of Semen PETLYURA, Evhen KONOVALETS, the communists Mykola SKRYPNYK, Mykola KHVYLOVY, and Volodymyr WINNICHENKO.

(c) ZPUHVR association with American intelligence. ZPUHVR must square its activities with the revolutionary principle: orientation

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on the Ukrainians alone, which is subverted by cooperation with American intelligence and expectation of American aid at a time when the Americans take a negative stand on the Ukrainian question.

(d) Although the homeland "documents" say ZPUHVR has the right to conduct training courses for preparing aid to the homeland, this does not give ZPUHVR the right to do as it pleases. The methods of training must be taken under advisement. The homeland in all probability does not know that students recruited by ZPUHVR had to sign a statement to the effect that they would withhold secrets from Communists and BANDERAITES. This proviso signifies that Americans equate BANDERAITES with Communists. Since this is so, how can ZChOUN cooperate with ZPUHVR? KASHUBA stated that the ZChOUN mounted training courses with the aid of the British, but that the British did not demand that the students swear not to reveal secrets to ZPUHVR, nor did the British equate ZPUHVR with the Bolsheviks.

(e) ZPUHVR must explain to ZChOUN delegates what obligations it has undertaken in regard to the Americans. For more than two years the Americans have been financing ZPUHVR's attacks on ZChOUN. A precondition for agreement must be resolution of such duplicity on ZPUHVR's part. On basis of financial accountings ZChOUN can prove that for intelligence work it has not accepted as much as one penny. All ZChOUN income comes from members.

(f) The appointment of new persons to ZPUHVR and ZChOUN organs requires clarification. The ZChOUN Provid considers that it does not have the power to accept ZPUHVR representatives into its membership. This is a matter for the conference to decide. Normally, it is to be expected that all former ZChOUN members now associated with ZPUHVR return to the ZChOUN, and having done so, then they can be permitted to attend the forthcoming conference. What if the conference chooses a new Provid without ZPUHVR representation? Democracy, so desired by ZPUHVR, requires loyalty to the elective principle. What will ZPUHVR's reaction to such a development?

(g) The problem of ZChOUN representation in ZPUHVR is also not simple. ZPUHVR holds that it can coopt delegates from any political party on an individual, not party, basis. ZPUHVR will want to choose ZChOUN delegates without consultation with the ZChOUN Provid. To this procedure BANDERA loyalists will not agree, because this guarantees that only oppositionists will represent ZChOUN in ZPUHVR.

X (h) The ZChOUN blames ZPUHVR for the development that Col. Vasyl KOVAL refused to see Myron MATVIEYKO. Or more exactly, Vasyl

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XOKHRYMOVICH, ZPUHVR representative in the Ukraine. ZPUHVR must clarify why MATVIEYKO has not permitted to see KOVAL. The homeland documents are one-sided because MATVIEYKO was not able to present BANDERA's case to KOVAL.

5. The preceding lists the more important issues the BANDERA loyalists plan to bring before ZPUHVR representatives, according to KASHUBA. Agreement will be difficult, and may even require retirement from political life on the part of BANDERA and STETSKO, KASHUBA remarked. This may come to pass if the future conference decides to accept all homeland instructions. In a mood of despair, KASHUBA began to criticize BANDERA and STETSKO, accusing them of making mistakes. "I warned BANDERA," KASHUBA said, "Not to take into the new Provid either PIDHAINY or KORDYUK because they have sold themselves to ZPUHVR. BANDERA demanded concrete evidence. Now he himself sees that I was right, but it is too late. Before ZChOUN-ZPUHVR talks began, PIDHAINY met secretly with LEBED. When BANDERA demanded that he reveal the content of his talks with LEBED, PIDHAINY replied that he talks about whatever he desires with whomever he pleases. 'Must every member of the Provid report to BANDERA on all his private talks?', PIDHAINY asked. BANDERA's tactics have led to such a state of affairs. KORDYUK for two years has been a ZPUHVR man, reporting ZChOUN secrets to ZPUHVR. Foolish BANDERA could not or did not want to understand this. Now to BANDERA all is clear, but what can be done?"

F. AECAPELLIN Report Dated 27 August 1953

1. On 26 August 1953 Ivan KASHUBA requested that I approach ZPUHVR circles in an effort to sound out opinion there after BANDERA broke off talks with ZPUHVR. On 27 August 1953 KASHUBA visited me and asked me what I had learned. I told him that, despite BANDERA's demonstrative break-off, ZPUHVR leaders are optimistic because they think they have the homeland behind them and that they feel that adventures by BANDERA loyalists represent final, desperate attempts to save themselves. Only those engage in irresponsible actions that have no solid arguments on their side. Faced with precise instructions from the homeland, BANDERA chooses not to abide by them but to unearth obstacles, cast denunciations, break off talks. ZPUHVR is convinced, I continued, that BANDERA's act was prepared in advance deliberately. This act, however, does not free him from homeland instructions. LEBED is pleased that BANDERA so behaved and considers this behavior proof of BANDERA's overweening ambition. LEBED was glad to have the chance to tell BANDERA off in strong words, an opportunity he had been seeking for several years. It would be wrong, I continued to invent, for BANDERA to continue to believe that he is regarded as God, the Savior of enslaved Ukraine.

2. To KASHUBA's question regarding future ZPUHVR intentions, I replied

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X that I know only that LEBED does not intend to take the initiative in requesting resumption of talks. To my question as to ZChOUN intentions, KASHUBA replied: "All members of the ZChOUN Provid, despite the unpleasant incident, feel talks should continue. Nobody knows who will take the first step. However, BANDERA feels highly insulted and he personally will not initiate new discussions. Perhaps KORDYUK or PIDHAINY will make the overtures. If new talks develop, BANDERA will demand the exclusion of LEBED. BANDERA will sit at the same table with LEBED only if the latter apologizes. BANDERA and STETSKO now feel that unqualified acceptance of homeland demands will not resolve the ZChOUN-ZPUHVR conflict, which is so sore that mechanical agreement will not produce real unity. Today ZChOUN and ZPUHVR quarrel as two separate organizations. Mechanical unity will merely transfer the conflict to the bosom of one organization. Later eruptions within the one organization will emerge. Such a development will serve to strengthen the opposition within, disorganize the membership, weaken nationalist ideology. Mechanical union will strengthen ZPUHVR. This reasoning calls us not to come to agreement with ZPUHVR. Thus a solution must be found which permits surface acceptance of homeland demands but which simultaneously prevents their realization. ZChOUN members must be convinced that its Provid has subordinated itself to the homeland and that their realization is blocked by ZPUHVR. And ZPUHVR does not permit their realization because it cooperates with American intelligence, because its activities cannot be controlled, because it does not want to heal the breach, because it insults ZChOUN spokesmen. This goal can be achieved if the Provid informs ZChOUN members in time of its point of view, if it dispatches agitators to various countries to convoke local territorial conferences. In addition, the ZChOUN Provid should distribute a letter to all members, wherein its stand is explained."

3. X KASHUBA continued: "If the ZChOUN Provid so behaves, what will the results be? BANDERA and STETSKO have concluded the worst possible result will develop if part of the Provid (KORDYUK, PIDHAINY, LENKAVSKY) and part of the various territorial Provids will side with ZPUHVR and continue talks in the name of the ZChOUN Provid. They will even reach an agreement. Then the real ZChOUN Provid (pro-BANDERA) will have to expel these men. With the expellees will go part of the membership. Then the opposition can be expected to control part of Germany, part of England (those with a military background will side with PIDHAINY or Capt. KOZAK), part of France, and perhaps part of the United States. With the aid of ZPUHVR the opposition can call its own conference, create its own Provid, which will recognize all homeland decisions. Two ZChOUNs will thus result. BANDERA made a mistake in appointing KORDYUK and PIDHAINY to the Provid after the London conference. He wanted thus to prevent their going to ZPUHVR. However, it would have been better if they had, for then they could not act in the name of the Provid, agitate members, and cause a schism. The best possible development will be for ZChOUN to prevent the preceding turn of events from

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taking place. This can be done by convincing ~~KORDYUK~~, ~~PIDHAINY~~, and ~~LEN-KAVSKY~~ that the ~~BANDERA~~ loyalists are not against homeland instructions, by getting the above mentioned oppositionists to resign from the Provid and join ZPUHVR on an individual basis, rather than as ZChOUN leaders, if they cannot be convinced of the rightness of the BANDERA stand. The oppositionist leaders must be stopped from joining ZPUHVR as Provid spokesmen and as leaders of an anti-BANDERA movement. BANDERA must send directives and propagandists to various countries, emphasizing that he is subordinate to the homeland and recognizes Colonel AKOVAL, putting all blame for failure to agree on ZPUHVR. ZPUHVR must be attacked skillfully, striking against neo-Communism and being careful not to criticize homeland positions. Thus ZChOUN members will have no cause to doubt the good intentions of the pro-BANDERA Provid."

4. ~~KASHUBA~~ then pictured what things would be like should the opposition gain following and create a new ZChOUN. Two organizations would then exist. On the one hand, the homeland Provid with ZPUHVR and the rebellious ZChOUN oppositionists; on the other, homeland kray provides recognizing BANDERA plus the legal ZChOUN in the emigration. KASHUBA opined homeland leaders would be without followers and without influence in the underground, while the ZChOUN under BANDERA will gain control of the underground in the Ukraine.

5. AECAPELIN Comment: KASHUBA's remarks show that at this writing BANDERA does not know how to resolve the dilemma he faces. He is alarmed by the opposition against him, by the possibility of schism should he refuse to honor homeland instructions. Hence, his tactic of officially accepting the homeland decisions while planning a way to render their realization impossible.

G. AECAPELIN Report Dated 31 August 1953

1. On 31 August 1953 I talked with KASHUBA. We discussed the communique from the underground published in Suchasna Ukraine. KASHUBA stated that the ZChOUN Provid several days before learned of the communique from an SB member who works in the "Logos" printshop and who supplied an early run of the page. KASHUBA stated that the ZChOUN Provid has noted that the communique is well written and is without any attack on the ZChOUN. The end of the communique, which states that the ZChOUN Provid has accepted the homeland instructions passed on by ZPUHVR to the ZChOUN, BANDERA considered advantageous because it suggests that the ZChOUN Provid respects the homeland. This passage, it was held, contradicts previous ZPUHVR statements that the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN has nothing in common with the homeland OUN. BANDERA expected the communique to be polemical and surmised that in so wording the communique ZPUHVR hoped to create an accomplished fact, to induce ZChOUN acceptance of homeland decisions. Here, it was held,

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ZPUHVR erred because it failed to separate two different things--it is one thing to take cognizance of homeland instructions but quite another to accept them without qualifications. The fact is, KASHUBA continued, at the present time BANDERA sees no possibility of realizing them.

2. The homeland proposed that a triumvirate (Lev REBET, Zenon MATLA, BANDERA) reorganize the ZChOUN. ZPUHVR calculations are clear, KASHUBA stated, for two (REBET, MATLA) will always outnumber one (BANDERA). The fact that REBET's name appears first in the communique may suggest that he is to head the new Provid. In building a new Provid the duo will have final say as to who their new colleagues will be, thus creating a completely pro-ZPUHVR Provid. This BANDERA will never accept. A way out is presented by the ZChOUN constitution, which states that a conference is the highest legislative body in the organization. Let a future conference decide these matters. ZPUHVR has always demanded democratization of the ZChOUN. The London conference accomplished just that, setting up new regulations. BANDERA will now demand strict adherence to these organizational regulations. ZPUHVR never anticipated, KASHUBA continued, that the principle of democracy might so soon be turned against itself.

3. Moreover, KASHUBA stated, pro-BANDERA men in the Provid are convinced that LEBED's documents are a falsification. BANDERA negotiates with ZPUHVR not because he is convinced that the homeland documents are genuine but because high ZPUHVR leaders by their signatures assume responsibility for their authenticity. There is an essential difference. BANDERA will attempt to obtain evidence that the documents are false. Once such evidence is obtained, ZPUHVR will be finished once and for all. Therefore BANDERA has started a check, which may take two months. If the check-up takes too long, then BANDERA will go a step farther by convoking a special ZChOUN conference to settle disputed matters. I asked KASHUBA on what basis it was held that the homeland documents are false. KASHUBA replied:-

(a) The pouch brought out in 1946 by Mrs. Irina SAVITSKA-KOZAK shows clearly that a new OUN Provid had been chosen in the Ukraine headed by a collective body of three persons, the so-called Byuro Provodu OUN, consisting of BANDERA as its head, Roman SHUKHEVICH as vice-chairman, and STETSKO as the third member.

(b) The ZChOUN Provid possesses letters written by SHUKHEVICH himself, which letters suggest that BANDERA is the head of the Byuro Provodu OUN and that SHUKHEVICH is subordinate to him.

(c) BANDERA possesses letters from Colonel Vasyi KOVAL, written after SHUKHEVICH's death, in which KOVAL calls BANDERA the head of the entire OUN. About these letters ZPUHVR knows nothing.

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4. In view of the above, KASHUBA continued, the Byuro Provedu OUN existed with BANDERA, SHUKHEVICH, and STETSKO as members, not with VOLOSHYN, MAYIVSKY, and SHUKHEVICH (as Daria REBET wrote in Suchasna Ukraina). The current situation is as follows:- BANDERA has resigned as head of the Byuro Provedu; SHUKHEVICH is dead, and STETSKO is the only legal member of that body today. In place of BANDERA perhaps KOVAL has appeared. Now the pro-BANDERA Provid in the ZChOUN must strive to understand how it came to pass that present OUN leaders in the homeland deny the composition of the Byuro Provedu; why KOVAL, the right-hand man of SHUKHEVICH, has contradicted SHUKHEVICH's previous letters; why KOVAL, who two years ago called BANDERA "leader of the entire OUN," can now sign a document which avers that BANDERA "never was nor is either formally or in fact the leader of the entire OUN." Such puzzles impell the ZChOUN leaders to conclude that LEBED's documents are false, products of American intelligence. If the documents are true, then they can be the product of a very grave misunderstanding. Whatever is the real story, everything must be explained before any progress is made. KASHUBA stated that BANDERA does not seek to re-claim (after his "resignation") the post of leader of the entire OUN, whereas STETSKO stated that he has never resigned from his membership in the Byuro Provedu OUN.

5. KASHUBA stated that BANDERA will continue to negotiate with ZPUHVR, but that he will have but one purpose-- the convocation of an extraordinary ZChOUN conference. BANDERA wants to know when ZPUHVR would want the conference to take place, on what basis, whether ZPUHVR would like to take part and whom it would like to attend, what the agenda should be. After obtaining ZPUHVR's views, BANDERA will decide what to do. Currently, BANDERA still insists that the homeland documents result either from falsification or grave error. In preparing the conference, BANDERA wants first to summon leaders from various countries. Several days later ZPUHVR delegates will be invited to give their stand in regard to the conference. Then a discussion will follow, resulting in the formulation of final plans.

6. The entire ZChOUN membership has learned of the BANDERA-LEBED clash. Most say that what happened was good, for BANDERA was spoken to in a manner he should have experienced long ago, but that the tongue-lashing should not have happened during official ZPUHVR-ZChOUN negotiations. LEBED should have had a private talk with BANDERA and under such circumstances to speak harshly. Now BANDERA has a good excuse for not taking part in further discussions, saying he was attacked personally while he himself merely presented the considered views of the ZChOUN Provid and of himself. This was the tenor of remarks made to AECAPELIN by Volodymyr KOZAK, Mrs. Irina SAVITSKA KOZAK, Volodymyr KEROD, Stepan LENKAVSKY, and Hritskol NANYAK.

7. PIDHAINY has gone over completely to ZPUHVR, according to KASHUBA. BANDERA is now considering what to do in his case, which is complicated by the circumstance that PIDHAINY has liaison with the British and the homeland in his hands. If ejected by BANDERA, PIDHAINY may turn over his functions to ZPUHVR. Hence, BANDERA has concluded, PIDHAINY must be tolerated at least until the authenticity of the homeland documents is verified.

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H. AECAPELIN Report Dated 3 September 1953

1. In a talk with Ivan KASHUBA on 3 September 1953 I learned that the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN Provid has already queried the homeland in regard to the authenticity of the documents presented by Mykola LEBED. BANDERA expects a reply within two months. KASHUBA did not indicate in what manner the homeland had been contacted, and it may be surmised that the message went either by W/T or by secret writing by way of Poland. KASHUBA also stated that the Provid has decided to call an extraordinary ZChOUN conference to settle issues brought to a head by homeland instructions. If this conference accepts the trio as stipulated by the homeland (REBET, MATLA, BANDERA), then BANDERA plans to retire completely from political life. BANDERA is of the opinion that LEBED is ready to split up the ZChOUN at any cost and will make efforts to agitate among members in England and Canada. In England they hope to capitalize on the differences between the ZChOUN leaders in that country and the former leaders of the SUB ("Union of Ukrainians in Britain"). KASHUBA stated that BANDERA has already warned his followers in England about ZPUHVR intentions. Although generally confident, BANDERA fears the following in England of Bohdan PIDHAINY.

2. According to KASHUBA, ZPUHVR would like to send LEBED and Lev REBET to England for a visit. These two, BANDERA feels, will have little success there because they will be surveilled by British authorities. KASHUBA spoke literally as follows: "The British are not dumb. They know well that LEBED and REBET are nothing but American agents. They also know that the Americans are attempting in all ways to bring under their control all Ukrainian emigre and homeland political life. If the Americans succeed, this would mean yet another British defeat, no matter if small. Therefore, the British will do everything to keep the sympathy of the ZChOUN and to block American influence. If the English learn that LEBED and REBET are engaging in political work not to British interest, England will revoke their visas and expel them in twenty-four hours."

I. AECAPELIN Report dated 15 September 1953

1. Ivan KASHUBA told me that for ten days the SB has lost track of Mykola LEBED. It is supposed that he has gone to England, France, or Luxembourg. However, SB reports from France and England state that LEBED is not in those countries. One report suggested that LEBED had gone to France in an automobile along with Volodymyr KOZAK, Bohdan KORDYUK, Atanas FIGOL, and Dr. Ivan MRITZ, but it turned out that LEBED had gone to Switzerland in order to talk with Evhen VRETSYONA, ZPUHVR leader residing in that country. Both STETSKO and BANDERA fear, according to KASHUBA, that KORDYUK has accompanied LEBED to Switzerland to talk over with VRETSYONA internal difficulties in the ZChOUN.

2. KASHUBA also stated that BANDERA had received from Prof. Ivan

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XVOVCHUK, ZChOUN leader in the United States, information that Zenon MATLA, who also lives in America, is about to come to Munich to negotiate toward the activization of the triumvirate. KASHUBA stated that STETSKO is highly displeased that the homeland has not appointed him to a leading role in the ZChOUN, since he (STETSKO) continues to believe that he is a member of the Byuro Provodu OUN. When ZPUHVR heard that STETSKO feels slighted, REBET reportedly stated that he has nothing against STETSKO's participation in the work of the triumvirate provided Dr. Myroslav PROKOP, a member of the homeland OUN Provid now living in the United States, also takes part. KASHUBA stated this move by REBET displeases ZChOUN leaders, for this new line-up would read three pro-ZPUHVR men (REBET, MATLA, PROKOP) against two BANDERA loyalists (BANDERA, STETSKO).

3. Pending receipt of news from the homeland concerning the authenticity of LEBED's documents, BANDERA is reorganizing the ZChOUN. Beginning 1 September it is planned to reduce the number of paid ZChOUN employaes in order to cut expenditures by 50 per cent. This curtailment is necessary, according to KASHUBA, in order to provide for the infiltration of BANDERA men into the Ukraine.

4. I asked XKASHUBA about the British attitude toward homeland instructions. KASHUBA replied that BANDERA does not inform the British in detail about internal ZChOUN matters, as ZPUHVR does the Americans. When I insisted that BANDERA must inform the British about the homeland documents because they touch upon liaison with the homeland and the dispatch of new bodies, KASHUBA replied as follows: "The British in no wise believe in the authenticity of the telegrams presented by LEBED. These telegrams conflict with previous letters from the homeland OUN Provid, about which letters the British are well informed. Therefore, the British advise to interrupt further talks with ZPUHVR until the ZChOUN through its own channel checks their authenticity. The British stress that they are not interested in internal ZChOUN matters but that they are interested in the Ukrainian underground, which they have helped so much by sending in people and material." Here it should be noted that KASHUBA speaks very rarely and very reluctantly about British Intelligence.

J. AECAPELIN Report Dated 24 September 1953

1. On 23 September 1953, Mykola LEBED, General Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the UHVR, gave a talk on "The Ukrainian Problem in International Politics" before the Club of Young Ukrainian Journalists in Munich. The talk was heard by over sixty guests representing all Ukrainian political formations. In his talk, LEBED surveyed the Ukrainian problem in its international ramifications since 1917 to today. His most important assertions:

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(a) There is not much as one piece of documentary evidence to show that the United States is carrying out an anti-Ukrainian policy, or that that country opposes the right of the Ukrainian people to its own independent state. When he speaks of the United States, LEBED pointed out, he does not have in mind an individual government employee or some private institutions, but the United States Government as such.

(b) If within some American private circles there exists a negative stand toward Ukrainian liberation efforts, then this must be ascribed to their lack of orientation in this regard, which lack of orientation is the result of the work of old Russian emigrants, who having obtained positions in various American universities and research institutes, indoctrinated the American public and young students in a manner compatible with Russian interests. From the Ukrainian side nothing, or almost nothing, has been done to counteract this. Within recent years, however, several Ukrainian scholars, naturalized Americans and Displaced Persons, are breaking the ice for the first time. Today a definite change for the better is evident and will continue.

(c) The task of the Ukrainian emigration in regard to the outside world is, by common effort of all political groups, to inform the Western world. All party or ideological differences must be excluded from this informational work. Instead of publishing around 96 Ukrainian-language papers, as the Ukrainian emigration does, we must, at the expense of reducing the Ukrainian press, build up foreign-language publications, solid, worthy carriers of information to the Western world.

(d) In all probability no other Soviet people has the moral capital that the Ukrainian emigration has in the underground struggle in the Ukraine, along with its political leadership. The objectives of all parties and political formations is to exploit this capital.

(e) The struggle in the homeland is a struggle of the entire Ukrainian people, not that of one party or political group. No political group has the right to activate a liberation struggle from the emigration. This is the exclusive prerogative of the homeland and its revolutionary leadership.

(f) It is not permissible, as has been done, to blame the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in 1917-18, the socialists who predominated at that time, for the defeat of the Ukrainians during World War I. The Ukrainians at that time had leaders such as the Ukrainian people brought to the fore. For mistakes and failures the nation as such is responsible as much as the leaders of that time.

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(g) In regard to internal Ukrainian matters, the same principles bind all political groups. These are, face toward the homeland, aid to the liberation struggle, recognition of the homeland struggle and capitalization of it. This can be achieved only by consolidation and toleration of all that hold different opinions.

2. After the talk, lively discussion ensued. Of note is that fact that not one who took the floor opposed any of the above points. On the contrary, all speakers agreed enthusiastically with LEBED's conclusions. Old Prof. GLOVINSKY, a UNDS and UN RADA leader, was so moved that he personally approached LEBED to offer congratulations. In a conversation with me afterward, GLOVINSKY stated that never before had he heard a speech so much to the point, so solidly thought out, so tolerant and cultured. GLOVINSKY stated LEBED showed himself to be a real diplomat with whom real cooperation is possible. What especially moved GLOVINSKY was the fact that LEBED is a product of the so-called BANDERA camp and yet he was able to present the Ukrainian cause so ably. "We are going ahead not by the usual short steps," GLOVINSKY stated, "But we are making kilometer-long jumps."

3. Some portions of LEBED's speech evoked reservation among orthodox BANDERAITES, particularly his statement that Ukrainian Communists have also opposed Moscow. Alexander KALINNIK and Engineer (fnu) BLIZNYUK opposed that stand, holding that all Ukrainian Communists are traitors. Not giving LEBED a chance to reply, a whole group in the audience took the floor in defence of LEBED's thesis. The question became so acute that Dr. Lyubomir ORYNSKY, the chairman, announced that at the next meeting of the club the issue will be discussed. Mikhailo VOSKOBIYNYK, URDP-BAHRYANY and UN RADA, was selected to give the main speech.

K. AECAPELIN Report Dated 8 October 1953

1. Previously I reported that ZChOUN leaders, anticipating failure in ZChOUN-ZPUHVR endeavors to come to an understanding, contemplated to intensify activities by giving increased support to Myron MATVLEYKO, helping him organize new OUN units loyal to BANDERA. I indicated that in 1954 BANDERA plans to exfiltrate several groups into the Ukraine, to send MATVLEYKO microfilmed pamphlets, newspapers, and articles for reproduction and distribution within the Ukraine, and that BANDERA planned that these homeland reproductions would return to the emigration as proof that the homeland does not share the political, social, and tactical views of the homeland Provid as expressed by HORNOVY and POLTAVA. In one report I stated that the ZChOUN Provid had cut its emigre budget by 80 per-cent, the savings being allocated for liaison needs.

2. After Mykola LEBED failed in his efforts to come to an agreement with BANDERA, AECAPELIN talked to Ivan KASHUBA regarding ZChOUN plans. On 7

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October 1953, KASHUBA spoke approximately as follows: "First you must know what the homeland OUN is like. I will give you precise data. During 1948-50, the MGB and the MVD almost completely destroyed the homeland OUN. The organization ceased to exist as such. There remained but a few individuals, mostly in the homeland Provid with a few members in different Oblasts. These persons saved themselves by going into deep conspiracy, living in bunkers and seldom venturing therefrom. This handful had almost no contact with the Ukrainian population in the villages and towns. Liaison with the inhabitants was so rare as to be non-existent. In local areas where the bunkers were located there was just enough contact to obtain food. Such was the real situation with the homeland OUN in 1950, although we in the ZChOUN never revealed this to anyone.

3. "This situation changed radically in 1950, when Myron MATVIEYKO appeared in the Ukraine as the personal representative of BANDERA. He re-built OUN units, recruiting new members, reestablishing old contacts, creating Oblast Provids. Publications began to appear. MATVIEYKO, of course, informed these newly recruited people about the ZChOUN-ZPUHVR controversy, and all of them took BANDERA's side. Therefore, the ZChOUN has full right to say that the rank-and-file in the homeland support BANDERA. However, MATVIEYKO cannot handle everything himself and asks the ZChOUN to send him helpers from abroad. In the homeland it is also difficult to put out underground literature and MATVIEYKO asked for microfilmed materials, which he later might duplicate and distribute. According to MATVIEYKO's reports, OUN units can be organized in the Ukraine. In a few years this chance may not exist. This work must be done by fresh persons not exhausted by underground life, with nerves stronger than those now in the underground have. Best proof that new persons can do more in the Ukraine than old underground members is supplied by the fact that beginning with spring the homeland Provid has not been able to send any couriers to the emigration. MATVIEYKO, however, has contact with the ZChOUN and his subordinates in summer 1953 send out material from the Ukraine. Thus it must not be forgotten that the homeland OUN is Myron MATVIEYKO and the people he organized in 1951-53.

4. "Perhaps ZPUHVR is not properly informed and therefore acts as it does. The real facts are otherwise. BANDERA is well oriented in regard to homeland realities through the reports of MATVIEYKO and does not intend to capitulate to ZPUHVR demands, even if these demands derive from the homeland. For BANDERA it is clear that the homeland Provid is but a small band of people in bunkers without contact with the Ukrainian people or with OUN members. MATVIEYKO has contact with a homeland OUN deprived of a Provid, as well as with ZChOUN. Therefore, regardless of the results of the current ZChOUN-ZPUHVR talks, BANDERA is already decided to give MATVIEYKO all help possible, in personnel, money, materiel. Such is naked reality and truth about the OUN in the homeland," KASHUBA concluded.

5. KASHUBA stated that the ZChOUN planned a campaign for a "Liberation

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Fund" to be used for maintaining liaison with the homeland. Appropriate appeals will soon be published in ZChOUN controlled papers.

6. AECAPELIN Comments: I have no facts to show that KASHUBA's story agrees with the truth in all details, but I am inclined to believe that what KASHUBA says about BANDERA's intentions are true. It is probable that MATVIEYKO's reports depreciate the role of the homeland Provid and gilds the situation in MATVIEYKO's favor. Nevertheless, it can be stated now that BANDERA will infiltrate men into the Ukraine without regard to dangers and sacrifices that may be visited upon the underground. At an earlier date, KASHUBA once stated that ZChOUN has 1,500 members ready at any time to go into the Ukraine if they are so commanded. These men will be exploited by BANDERA for his own ends. Another important matter should be remembered. homeland leaders, on the basis of ten years of experience, have concluded that given the present conditions in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, rebellion on a large scale is not useful. They have restricted both the UPA and the OUN to a minimum activity needed to survive, to keep contact with the population, and to show that opposition to Bolshevism still exists in organized form. Homeland leaders want to preserve the underground's strength for an auspicious moment. Suddenly, MATVIEYKO appears, a man without any previous underground experience, and without knowledge of Soviet realities. He begins to organize new OUN units and to ask for fresh men from the emigration, men who like himself know nothing about Soviet realities or underground life. MATVIEYKO reported, apparently, to BANDERA that he is having much success and that in a few years much will be done. Thus MATVIEYKO's view conflicts strongly with that of the underground leaders.

7. This state of affairs suggests the possibility that the Bolsheviks are deliberately interested in permitting MATVIEYKO to be successful. The Communists would have three things to gain: A wedge is thus driven between the homeland leaders and the homeland rank-and-file. The conflict between ZChOUN and ZPUHR is widened. Thirdly, the best and most patriotic youth in the emigration is seduced into the homeland, to be destroyed. I base my thinking on simple premises. If in reality it were possible in the Ukraine to organize units on a large scale, then such would have been done by the homeland Provid. The homeland Provid has not done so for very good reasons. One such reason could be that they did not want to have the patriotic Ukrainian element wiped out by Soviet security organs. I do not suggest that MATVIEYKO is a witting Soviet agent. I am inclined to believe, however, that the MGB learned of his arrival in the Ukraine, perhaps even facilitated his initial work, and knows of his present activity. The MGB may support him by sending its own members to be organized into MATVIEYKO's new OUN cells, these new members in turn insinuating MGB plans to MATVIEYKO. Thus the matter of exfiltrating new men into the Ukraine may be an MGB provocation. Mykola LEBED told me that lack of food makes it very difficult for the present number of underground members to survive. MATVIEYKO, however, behaves as though a problem in feeding underground members does not exist.

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L. AECAPELIN Report Dated 15 October 1953

1. On 15 October 1953 KASHUBA told me that, after the failure of the ZPUHVR-ZChOUN talks, BANDERA will continue his plans toward both the homeland and the ZChOUN.

2. Discipline in the ranks will be tightened. Anyone breaking discipline will be expelled. The SB has received instructions to draw up a list of all that have broken discipline, beginning with active oppositionists. The lists should include the indiscretion of each member, explaining his betrayal of secrets, criticism of the ZChOUN Provid, talks with the opposition, or departure from orthodox ZChOUN ideology. The lists will be studied personally by BANDERA, who will decide what is to be done in each case. This program, ~~KASHUBA~~ continued, calls for the strengthening of the SB, which is to regain all the power and competence it enjoyed prior to the 1948 schism. The SB will be allocated special funds, large enough to free its operatives from all other employment. KASHUBA is to inspect SB activities in Germany, Austria, France, England, and Belgium. He is also to coordinate the work of the SB in the countries across the Atlantic. Hitherto, SB operatives in those countries were required to send reports at least every six months. ~~Now~~ they will be required to report every three months. Because these reports are liable to censorship, KASHUBA has been charged with elaborating a plan whereby censorship is to be avoided. KASHUBA felt the best solution would be for reports from the United States to be taken by courier to Canada, thence mailed to England, whence couriers will bring them to Munich. Moreover, a species of secret writing is contemplated. KASHUBA asked me to prepare general instructions, showing me three old sets of instructions and asking me to elaborate one set of instructions using them as the base. KASHUBA stated he would pick up my product on 20 October, and added that later additional instructions would come in regard to secret writing.

3. BANDERA is determined to send more men to the Ukraine to help Myron MATVIEYKO. Candidates will be indoctrinated ideologically and informed in regard to the internal OUN struggle. Those receptive will then be given intelligence and partisan training. To my question whether the British would aid in this matter, KASHUBA replied that British aid was expected in intelligence and partisan training. To my question regarding the British attitude toward the ZChOUN-APUHVR conflict, KASHUBA replied as follows: "During their talk with LEBED, the British clearly emphasized that they are of the opinion that the Ukrainian cause can but gain if both sides come to an agreement. That is the British feeling. However, at the same time, the British told BANDERA that they do not intend to interfere in internal ZChOUN matters and intend in no way to paralyze the present activities of the ZChOUN. The English assured BANDERA that, as before, they are ready to aid in the training and dispatching of persons into the homeland regardless of the present conflict. In other words, as far as the

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British are concerned nothing changed after their talk with LEBED."

4. On the international level, KASHUBA stated that the ZChOUN Provid will continue to propagandize in favor of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, regardless of any activities ZPUHVR or the UN RADA may be engaged in. To give its efforts a broader base, the ZChOUN will work through the ABN. Early in 1954 it is hoped that the new ZChOUN building in Munich will be ready for occupation by the ZChOUN and its cooperating institutions. The new building will have a separate hall for press conferences. The ZChOUN also plans to publish books and pamphlets on the liberation struggle. The ZChOUN will take on this work, KASHUBA stated, because the ZPUHVR has neglected to do so.

M. AECAPELIN Report Dated 9 November 1953

1. Ukrainsky Samostiynyk, Munich ZChOUN weekly, in a June 1953 issue published two articles on "the situation in underground Ukraine." Issue number 25, dated 21 June 1953, carried a picture of the front covers of underground publications. Before the appearance of that number, Ivan KASHUBA had told me that these materials had arrived early in June 1953. On the basis of his talk it was impossible to say with certainty whether these materials had been brought by courier or by mail, although KASHUBA intimated that they had come by courier. It is a fact, however, that among the materials there were letters from Myron MATVIEYKO, including one to his wife, Gena KOSHULINSKA-MATVIEYKO. What was strange at that time was that no ZChOUN newspaper subsequently reprinted any of the alleged homeland materials. Questions aiming at a clarification were always evaded by Ivan KASHUBA. I accepted his evasions as an indication that the homeland materials conflict with ZChOUN ideology, and that for that reason they were not being reprinted.

2. Recent developments clarify the matter. In June the ZChOUN did not receive original homeland materials. All that was received was microfilm of the title covers. The microfilm was used in preparing pictures for ZChOUN and ABN publications.

3. On 6 November 1953, KASHUBA telephoned and asked for a meeting. I suggested that we meet on 7 November, but he insisted on an immediate talk "at least for a few minutes, because there are very important matters to discuss." Therefore we met on 6 November, and KASHUBA asked me to contact ZPUHVR as soon as possible in order to discover what Bohdan PIDHAINY and "Little SLAVKO, the ZPUHVR SB-man," had talked about. KASHUBA stated that the SB had learned that on 4 or 5 November PIDHAINY and SLAVKO had a meeting. "This signifies", KASHUBA stated, "that PIDHAINY wanted to pass on some information to ZPUHVR. And he had something to pass on. We must find out what ZPUHVR obtained from PIDHAINY."

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4. I asked for further clarification. KASHUBA stated that on 2 November a ZChOUN courier or couriers had arrived in Munich from the Ukraine. A pouch weighing around four kilograms was brought out, including homeland publication, encoded letters from MATVIEYKO to the ZChOUN Provid, and clear-text letters from MATVIEYKO to his wife. The pouch, KASHUBA stated, contained the original issues of those publications the title pages of which had been pictured in the Ukrainisky Samostiynyk. KASHUBA stated that PIDHAINY knows about the arrival of the pouch, as well of the content of the clear-text portions. The SB fears, KASHUBA stated, that PIDHAINY will inform ZPUHVR about the pouch. Therefore, PIDHAINY's home is under observation and he is being surveilled. It was learned that PIDHAINY had a telephone talk with SLAVKO. KASHUBA stated that it is possible that PIDHAINY tried to inform ZPUHVR through SLAVKO.

5. I replied I was puzzled. "I do not understand everything," I said. "You told me that early June homeland literature arrived in Munich, pictures thereof were printed in the Ukrainisky Samostiynyk, titles were named, but now you say that no materials arrived at that time. You say the materials arrived but a few days ago. I simply don't understand."

6. KASHUBA replied: "In June the pouch the ZChOUN received contained only photo-films of the titles of homeland publications. The materials themselves did not arrive. A cover letter stated that the literature would come with the next pouch. It was of obvious interest to the ZChOUN to make propaganda in its own favor and therefore we did not reveal in our article that only photo-copies of title pages were involved. The article was so edited so that it would seem that the literature is already in the emigration. However, now the materials are here, around four kilograms, including some very interesting articles. There is especially a very interesting article by POLTAVA against the Marxists. This will be the first article to be reprinted in the ZChOUN press. Other materials will also be reprinted."

7. On 7 November 1953, I met Myron MATVIEYKO's wife on a Munich street. In a brief talk with her I learned that her husband is well, and that several days ago she had received a letter from him. She stated that in all probability MATVIEYKO would return to Munich in spring, 1954. She would not talk more about him.

N. AECAPELIN Report Dated 11 December 1953

1. Although KASHUBA told me that a pouch had arrived from MATVIEYKO, he put off all questions regarding its content with the excuse that the material had not yet been decoded. On 11 December 1953, however, I questioned KASHUBA about the pouch. I firmly told him I, an SB operative giving aid in all SB matters, am entitled to know the content of the homeland pouch. I complained that I usually learn about ZChOUN "secrets" from

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the opposition or from ZPUHVR, and stated that I can only consider KASHUBA's silence as lack of confidence in my person. KASHUBA replied that lack of confidence in my person is out of the question, that I enjoy great confidence with both BANDERA and STETSKO. That I do not as yet know about the content of the pouch is due not to lack of confidence, but to a directive of the ZChOUN Provid which prohibits talk about the pouch. The SB has a list of all people knowing the pouch content, as a device for learning who in the ZChOUN Provid leaks information to the ZPUHVR.

2. KASHUBA then stated that the pouch recently arrived comes from Myron MATVIEYKO and contains letters to the ZChOUN Provid, BANDERA, STETSKO, one for KASHUBA, others for MATVIEYKO's wife. KASHUBA stated that the decoding of the letters, as well as making photo-copies, took a long time. KASHUBA stated that, although the pouch is not in favor of the ZChOUN Provid in every respect, still it clarifies many matters. Especially does it destroy ZPUHVR arguments that MATVIEYKO is causing a split in the homeland, KASHUBA stated. He was reluctant to elaborate, but finally spoke as follows: "As you know, MATVIEYKO went to the homeland as a member of the ZChOUN Provid with the task of maintaining liaison between the homeland Provid and the ZChOUN. In addition, he received from BANDERA, the leader of the entire OUN, special accreditation as BANDERA's personal representative. As BANDERA's representative he was charged with clarifying on the spot the matter of ZPUHVR and the so-called opposition. When MATVIEYKO arrived in the homeland and through liaison informed KOVAL about his arrival and obligations, KOVAL, under the influence of Vasyl OKHEYMovich, refused to meet MATVIEYKO. About this MATVIEYKO informed the ZChOUN Provid. BANDERA, as the leader of the entire OUN, ordered him to continue his work and to contact lower OUN cells, that is, subordinate Kray Provides. MATVIEYKO in fact so did. And it is this fact which the opposition has exploited, bruiting about not only in Munich but also at the London conference that MATVIEYKO is carrying out a diversion in the homeland."

3. KASHUBA continued: "MATVIEYKO in fact was able to convince some Kray Provides that BANDERA is right and ZPUHVR wrong. Everything would have gone according to plan had not BANDERA resigned from the post of leader of the entire OUN. In so doing BANDERA made a big mistake. He turned over his mandate to the homeland Provid. This incomprehensible move by BANDERA put MATVIEYKO in a very embarrassing position. As soon as he heard of BANDERA's resignation, MATVIEYKO knew that his mission as person representative of the leader of the entire OUN automatically was ended. He had no legal basis for continuing his work in the Ukraine without consultation with the homeland Provid. In consequence, MATVIEYKO had to subordinate himself completely to the homeland Provid, cease all activity as instructed by BANDERA, that is, he had to break contact with individual Kray Provides. More, he had to explain why he had conducted himself in a different manner up to that point. MATVIEYKO's subordination entailed other consequences. Most

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important, in the future he cannot contact the ZChOUN Provid without permission of the homeland Provid. All word from the homeland will go through ZPUHVR, which in turn will pass on appropriate matters to the ZChOUN. All this BANDERA did not take into account when he resigned. The homeland Provid considered his resignation a species of capitulation and behaved accordingly. The homeland informed MATVIEYKO that all previous functions given to ZPUHVR are to be supported without qualification, that ZPUHVR alone has the right to represent the homeland struggle abroad, that the ZChOUN must be reorganized, democratized, must adhere to homeland ideology and tactics. MATVIEYKO was told that the ZChOUN-ZPUHVR conflict must be settled, that only one liaison channel to the homeland is to exist, and that that channel must be through ZPUHVR. About all this MATVIEYKO told BANDERA in his letters."

4. KASHUBA continued to say that from the content of the pouch recently received it can be logically deduced that this pouch will be the last to come from MATVIEYKO, that henceforth all matter will go directly to ZPUHVR. Further, MATVIEYKO reported that after he had subordinated himself to the homeland Provid he was promoted. He did not stipulate the nature of his new duties. KASHUBA promised that he would let me read the letter MATVIEYKO addressed to him as the leader of the SB.

5. I asked KASHUBA what BANDERA's tactics would be in the light of MATVIEYKO's revelations. KASHUBA replied: "As I said before, only now does BANDERA realize that in resigning he committed a grave error. He wanted to show good will toward the homeland but he did not calculate all possible repercussions, especially MATVIEYKO's predicament. He did not foresee that his resignation would be tantamount to breaking off liaison with the homeland. Now he must take the consequences and accept homeland decisions as binding. Accordingly, the ZChOUN Provid must now realize the instructions regarding the reorganization which is supposed to be carried out by REBET, MATLA, and BANDERA. Currently, the basic concern is to save all that can be saved. In other words, we must come to an agreement with the ZChOUN opposition, reach settlement with ZPUHVR, but in all of this we must demand that nationalist ideology be preserved from drowning in a socialist sea. What future cooperation will be like no one in the ZChOUN can predict. Coming talks will show. The situation is complicated in that either KORDYUK or PIDHAINY has leaked or will leak to ZPUHVR the content to our homeland pouch, thus giving the opposition more arguments against ZChOUN positions."

6. AECAPELIN Comment: I do not know how much of what KASHUBA stated above is in fact true. It can be assumed that he did not reveal all, that MATVIEYKO's pouch brought more bad news for BANDERA. However, from what KASHUBA did reveal it is clear that the homeland line and Provid have won out and that ZChOUN as BANDERA sees it will be bankrupt in the emigration. It can be expected also that BANDERA will enter into negotiations with the opposition, endeavoring to save as much personal prestige as he can.

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O. AECAPELIN Report Dated 21 December 1953

1. On 21 December 1953, KASHUBA stated: "The REBET-MATLA-BANDERA talks have reached a culmination point, that is, they have come to such a pass that BANDERA must say a firm 'no'." KASHUBA stated that BANDERA intended honestly to come to an agreement because of the revelations in the MATVIEYKO pouch, hoping for a compromise. However, during the negotiations BANDERA's position weakened, ending in an announcement by MATLA and REBET that what it is at is ^{the} taking over of the ZChOUN by the triumvirate. In other words, KASHUBA continued, it is intended to dissolve the current ZChOUN Provid in favor of rule by the triumvirate. The triumvirate will reorganize the outfit, check its membership, and intends to transfer a majority of present ZChOUN members to so-called "organic sectors," of non-political community and social organizations. The triumvirate plans, according to KASHUBA, that the new ZChOUN consist of but a small number of old OUN members who, in the opinion of MATLA and REBET, deserve membership. After such a "purge," the trio will call a conference, which in turn will select new executive and political organs.

2. This development, KASHUBA stated, means the end of the ZChOUN, and therefore BANDERA will not agree, maintaining that a special conference alone is competent in such matters. However, MATLA and REBET are against calling a conference prior to activation of the triumvirate. They have begun to threaten that on their own they will put together and publish a communique without BANDERA if he does not abandon his intractability. The two state that this will be the end of BANDERA's political career. In retaliation, BANDERA is hurriedly contacting leading members in all territorial Provids, as well as individual ZChOUN members, in order to sound out their opinions. When he feels assured that most of the members are against homeland demands, then BANDERA, regardless of the aftermath, will break off the talks. The ideals of the ZChOUN must be preserved, KASHUBA asserted.

P. AECAPELIN Report Dated 30 December 1953

1. On 28 December 1953, the triumvirate signed a document in regard to the reorganization of the ZChOUN, KASHUBA told me today. The document concerns an agenda to be followed by the triumvirate in its efforts to reorganize the ZChOUN. The document formalizes the authority of the triumvirate, temporarily dissolves the existing Provid, and makes initial steps toward the calling of a special conference. The document also touches upon ZChOUN-ZPUHVR relations, security, and liaison matters, ideological problems, and military matters (see Ukrainsky Samostinyk, anti-BANDERA issue, 21 February 1954, and 7 March 1954).

2. News of agreement within the triumvirate circulated quickly in

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Munich, and in order to assess opinion, I talked with various persons. I asked Volodymyr KOZAK, an oppositionist, what caused BANDERA to come to an apparent agreement. KOZAK replied as follows: "Neither the political wisdom of BANDERA nor the diplomatic skill of MATIA and REBET. The political feelings of ZChOUN members caused BANDERA to sign, for recently feelings have been running high against BANDERA; even his onetime friends have been walking about the corridors threatening that if he does not come to an agreement that they will kick him out head first of the Dachauerstrasse offices. They threaten to make an open revolt and take over the entire organization. Of course, the SB has reported these feelings to BANDERA, who realized that when pressed to the wall the only out for him is to subordinate himself to the homeland. He knows that if he goes against the homeland he is finished for good."

3. Roman ILNYTSKY, another oppositionist, stated: "That all is not well within the ZChOUN was known not only to leading members but this was also known to BANDERA. Once he said 'A' he had to follow with 'B'. When he accepted the homeland documents as genuine, then he had to draw the proper conclusions and abide by them. Moreover, BANDERA realizes that the homeland underground is the only worthwhile thing in emigre political activity, his only asset. He would lose this asset if he went against the underground. Therefore, he decided upon a painful compromise in order to save his dwindling prestige. Perhaps his prestige will increase a little now."

4. Boris LEVITSKY, URDP-Left: "News of agreement between the ZChOUN and ZPUHVR has disturbed the UN RADA, fearing that now the anti-RADA front will be strengthened. It is not excluded now that the OUN/M will negotiate with a reorganized ZChOUN. At any rate, the OUN/M feels much stronger now, and if it does not get any of the RADA posts it demands, it may be more inclined to leave the RADA completely."

Q. AECAPELIN Report Dated 25 January 1954

1. The newspapers Ukrainski Visti (No. 7) and Ukrainske Slovo (No. 636) printed the same article by Teodor DANYLIV of London under the title "They Deliberately Ruin." DANYLIV, formerly president of the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (SUB), accused in this article the ZChOUN of having taken over that association for purely party reasons in March 1953, thus subverting a non-party organization. Hrihoriy DRABAT and Volodymyr YAVORSKY, ZChOUN territorial Provid members in England, were named as the leaders in this drive. Having gained control of SUB, the ZChOUN now plans to take over the non-party organization of Ukrainian war veterans ("Union of Former Ukrainians Soldiers", Obyednannya Buvshykh Voyakiv Ukrainsiy), DANYLIV charges. This veterans' group was organized in 1950 and has a membership of over 5,000. The ZChOUN began by organizing

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a special organization for veterans of the "Galicia" division (Obyednannya Ukrainskykh Kombatantiv). In so doing, the first organization would be considerably weakened, since most of its members are veterans of the "Galicia" division. Thus controlling "Galicia" veterans, the new organization would take over the original non-party veterans' group. Thus wrote DANYLIV in his article against the ZChOUN.

2. I asked Bohdan ~~X~~PIDHAINY and Volodymyr ~~X~~KOZAK, both "Galicia" veterans, about his matter. Both tied in the matter with the BANDERA-REBET-MATIA talks. They were of the opinion that ~~X~~BANDERA agreed to negotiate because of pressure from below only, and that he planned to use the talks as a tactic to appease ZChOUN members. At the same time he began negotiations, BANDERA, in collaboration with ~~X~~STETSKO, put into motion attempts to preserve BANDERA's position everywhere. STETSKO considers England to be the fortress of the pro-BANDERA faction, and therefore they decided to concentrate on England. Knowing that, according to homeland instructions, military matters are to be reserved exclusively to ZPUHVR, BANDERA decided to try to gain control of the "Galicia" veterans in England and of the worldwide organization of these veterans, who are organized in the Bratstvo Voyakiv Pershoyi Divisiyi UNA, which is ZPUHVR-oriented (Lyubomyr ORTYNSKY, Capt. ~~X~~MARTINETS, Dr. HORBACH). BANDERA ordered one of his loyalists, the "Galicia" veteran, Evhen ~~X~~POBIHUSHCHY (alias ~~X~~REN), to gain control of the Bratstvo. POBIHUSHCHY told BANDERA that the assignment was very difficult because most members and almost all officers are pro-ZPUHVR. A democratic election will cement ZPUHVR control, POBIHUSHCHY stated.

3. BANDERA proposed a different approach. He advised POBIHUSHCHY to go to England to create a local branch of the Bratstvo. ZChOUN members belonging to the already existing non-party veterans' organization will be ordered to join POBIHUSHCHY's new group. Then, at the next meeting of the Bratstvo units from all over the world, the British branch can send the greatest number of delegates and gain control of the entire Bratstvo, which will thus become a ZChOUN-oriented organization. Early January, 1954, ~~X~~POBIHUSHCHY went to England, where he talked with such ZChOUN leaders as DRABAT and ~~X~~YAVORSKY. POBIHUSHCHY worked clandestinely, but the public learned of his activities. Officials of the already existing veteran's organization in England made counter-actions, and DANYLIV began to expose POBIHUSHCHY in the emigre press. The leaders of the Bratstvo, headed by ORTYNSKY, also started counter-actions. Before leaving Munich for England, POBIHUSHCHY circulated the rumor that he had taken sick and had gone for treatment in a hospital at Haar, near Munich. It is worth noting that BANDERA also gave POBIHUSHCHY money to begin publishing a new veteran's paper in the name of an inactive paper outfit (Obyednannya Ukrainskykh Kombatantiv, OUB, "Union of Ukrainian Combatants") in Germany, headed by POBIHUSHCHY, which paper is to oppose The Bratstvo-Visti ("News), edited by ORTYNSKY.

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R. AECAPELIN Report Dated 26 January 1954

1. On 26 January 1954, KASHUBA spoke to me as follows: "The triumvirate is still meeting but today it can be said that the talks will lead to nothing. When talks began BANDERA was convinced that the conflict would be ended. But the first few days showed that liquidation of the ZChOUN, restriction of its activities in favor of expansion of ZPUHVR activities, were intended. At first BANDERA was ready to compromise, but from the very beginning STETSKO warned that ZPUHVR wants to finish BANDERA off politically. STETSKO argued as follows:

(a) Reorganization is to take place at the instructions of the homeland Provid. But who is in it? KOVAL is known for his socialist convictions back in 1943-4. Can we in the emigration be expected to obey the orders of such a "leader"? Another member of the homeland Provid is Vasyl OKHRYMOVICH, a man who organically hated the ZChOUN and who ceased to be a nationalist in 1946, a man who is closer to socialists than nationalists. OKHRYMOVICH is the evil influence around KOVAL and prevented MATVIEYKO from seeing KOVAL. Others in the homeland Provid are unknown persons who joined the nationalist movement within recent years and who do not have a firm understanding of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation. They do not know the former OUN leaders and therefore will do what KOVAL and OKHRYMOVICH order.

(b) In resigning from the post of leader of the entire OUN, BANDERA gave his mandate to KOVAL. But KOVAL is not the factual OUN leader; he but temporarily executes the functions of that office. The legal leader will be properly selected by a future OUN congress in the Ukraine. It is a question whether the choice will fall on KOVAL. According to MATVIEYKO, Kray Provides favor BANDERA. It can be assumed that at a future congress these Krays will nominate BANDERA for the post, and they may have a majority. Hence, it will be a grave mistake for BANDERA to accept homeland instructions and carry out the requested reorganization. In fact, this will mean that BANDERA has subordinated himself to ZPUHVR, KOVAL and OKHRYMOVICH. STETSKO feels the idea of the triumvirate originated neither with KOVAL nor OKHRYMOVICH, but with ZPUHVR.

(c) The homeland instructions are signed by KOVAL. But there are rumors in ZPUHVR circles that KOVAL is dead. If so, it is better to wait.

(d) To this date, ZChOUN has no evidence that the homeland instructions are genuine. What if later they are shown to be false? If reorganization has already taken place, then it cannot be undone.

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(e) If BANDERA does not abide by homeland instructions, ZPUHVR will shout that the ZChOUN does not have contact with the homeland. But this will be of no significance, for as a matter of fact in 1950 ZPUHVR cut off the possibility of ZChOUN contact with the homeland Provid. Blame for loss of contact therefore rests on ZPUHVR, not BANDERA. KOVAL's failure to receive MAYVIEYKO means that the homeland cut off contact with ZChOUN, at the request of OKHRYMOVICH. If BANDERA does not accept homeland decisions, then it can be expected that part of both the ZChOUN Provid and of the rank-and-file will join ZPUHVR or organize a new group affiliated with ZPUHVR. The loss for the ZChOUN will not be great. Sooner or later the ZChOUN will have to purge itself of such undesirables anyway. Of what use are PIDHAINY and KORDYUK, for instance? At Provid meetings it is impossible to speak plainly because of fear that one of them will report to ZPUHVR. No important instructions can be given because of fear that unauthorized persons will learn about them. All this is abnormal. To make the ZChOUN a healthy organization, the oppositionists must be purged. Let there be only 1000, not 3000, members in the ZChOUN, and it will still be the strongest Ukrainian party in the emigration.

of Matvieyko

(f) In view of the strong terror in the Ukraine, it must be considered that sooner or later the current OUN Provid there will be destroyed. It is an open question whether its ranks can be filled by homeland people. It may well be that the emigration will have to send in people to build the Provid. The letter from MATVIEYKO, in which he asks for SB operatives, suggests that very possibility. The homeland also needs organizers and politicians. The ZChOUN must send in people who are not infected with socialism and ideas of a classless society. MATVIEYKO subordinated himself to the homeland Provid only because he had no one to lean on at that time. With time, his position will be strengthened, and as a member of the ZChOUN Provid he can take over the homeland Provid. If he is sent more men from the emigration, then he will have better results.

(g) All of the preceding possibilities vanish if BANDERA accepts homeland instructions and consents to the reorganization as desired by MATLA and REBET. Therefore, STETSKO advised BANDERA to continue to negotiate but under no conditions to accept homeland decisions as interpreted by ZPUHVR.

2. KASHUBA stated that BANDERA accepted STETSKO's arguments as valid and will abide by them, especially since Osip TYUSNKA, Yaroslav BENTSAL, and even Stepan LENKAVSKY also agree with most of them. KASHUBA predicted that the triumvirate will negotiate to the end of January, with results unsatisfactory for MATLA and REBET. Then there will be a split in the ZChOUN. BANDERA will expel all oppositionists, and in a few months things will be normal again. In spring, men will be sent into the Ukraine to help MATVIEYKO, with the aid of the British.

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S. AECAPELIN Report Dated 28 January 1954

1. At a recent meeting of the triumvirate and in private talks with members of the ZChOUN Provid, Zenon MATLA charged that someone in the ZChOUN Provid is circulating false rumors about the progress of the triumvirate's negotiations in an effort to sabotage victory. MATLA presented the following arguments:

(a) The newspaper Ukrainski Visti, No. 3-4, 7 January 1954, printed an article from a Munich correspondent entitled "Collective Directory in the ZChOUN", wherein, in addition to false information, true data are presented, which true data could only come from the ZChOUN.

(b) Among ZChOUN members in the United States copies of documents signed by MATLA, REBET, and BANDERA are being circulated. Alexander KALYNNYK, member of the German ZChOUN territorial Provid and head of the SUM now visiting the United States, gave such copies to persons to read. Among others, he allowed Ivan DUBINETS, recently deceased URDP leader, to read the material. DUBINETS in turn distributed copies among URDP members and to Ivan KEDRYN-RUDNITSKY, who informed UN RADA people.

(c) As a result, an atmosphere has been created which militates against success in the triumvirate's negotiations. MATLA charged that this represents a deliberate attempt by the ZChOUN to undermine negotiations.

2. KASHUBA stated that his fellow SB operative, Stepan MUDRYK, who lives in Neu Ulm, Germany, reported that the article in Ukrainski Visti was written by Boris LEVITSKY, confirmation coming from Ivan BAHRYANY and (fnu) HRYHORENKO, URDP leaders. KASHUBA stated that thus one of MATLA's arguments can be deflected, since it is reasonable to conclude that LEVITSKY got his data from ZPUHVR through Ivan MAISTRENKO. However, KASHUBA is now trying to find out who gave the documents to KALYNNYK and admits that they may come from the ZChOUN Provid. KASHUBA is of the personal opinion that Yaroslav STETSKO supplied KALYNNYK with the documents. This flows from the knowledge that STETSKO tried to influence BANDERA from coming to an agreement. KASHUBA stated that he plans to remain silent, but if MATLA accuses the SB of being responsible for the security slip, then he will make the counter-charge that STETSKO is responsible.

T. ARCAPELIN Report Dated 3 February 1954

1. Most ZChOUN members were highly pleased with the news that BANDERA

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had agreed to the reorganization of the ZChOUN. Reports that this formal agreement was bringing no concrete results served to agitate the members and hostility toward BANDERA reached unprecedented proportions. Oppositionists within the ZChOUN united with the "old opposition" (expelled from the organization after the 1948 Mittenwald conference) to convoke an "informational meeting", at which the triumvirate's negotiations were to be aired. These oppositionists drew up a memorial, and in late January 1954, under the signatures of 56 members, the memorial was given to the triumvirate. REBET and MATLA were pleased with this development, but BANDERA was displeased, seeing this action as pressure on him and as a revolt against his authority. BANDERA refused to appear at the proposed meeting, issued an order that ZChOUN members be informed of the progress of the triumvirate's talks through official organizational channels, and forbade all ZChOUN members from taking part in the oppositionists' meeting.

2. BANDERA's orders were ignored by KORDYUK and PIDHAINY, both members of the ZChOUN Provid, and by the leaders of the Brotherhood of Former UPA Soldiers, Modest RIPETSKY (who is also the legal publisher of Ukrainsky Samostiynyk) and Mykhailo FEDAK-SMIRNY. RIPETSKY is the head of the UPA group, and FEDAK-SMIRNY is its finance officer. The informational meeting took place on 1 February 1954 and was attended by 47 persons. MATLA and REBET attended; BANDERA did not appear. KORDYUK was chosen chairman, and MATLA gave the first report, briefly summarizing the triumvirate's negotiations and being careful not to attack BANDERA. However, REBET was more outspoken and placed blame for difficulties on BANDERA. He stated that because of BANDERA the triumvirate cannot carry out the homeland's instructions. Among those present were the most active ZChOUN members in the Munich area: KORDYUK, Irina SAVITSKA-KOZAK, RIPETSKY, FEDAK-SMIRNY, Volodymyr KEROD, Hryhoriy NANYAK, Stepan PROTSYK, and such "old oppositionists" as REBET, Volodymyr STAKHIV, Daria REBET, Ivan HUTSUL-BUTKOVSKY, Lyubomyr ORTYNSKY, Fedir YUREVICH, Yaroslav FEDYK.

3. I asked KASHUBA about this meeting. He spoke as follows: "Participation by over 25 current ZChOUN members, headed by KORDYUK and against the order of BANDERA, can be understood only as an open revolt against BANDERA. In the very near future, BANDERA will make the proper conclusions. Hitherto there has never been an occasion in the history of the OUN in which Provid members or ordinary members in such an open and heinous manner broke an order of a leader. KORDYUK not only did not obey the order, but headed an illegal 'mob'. SB leaders noted all ZChOUN members present at the meeting." KASHUBA stated that although PIDHAINY was not present, the latter agrees one-hundred per-cent with those that were, requesting Volodymyr KOZAK to so inform those present.

4. KASHUBA stated that after the meeting he talked with some of those that had been present in order to find out why they disobeyed BANDERA.

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KASHUBA stated RIPETSKY argued approximately as follows: "We former UPA soldiers went abroad in order to further the Ukrainian liberation fight and to tell the truth about the homeland. We received orders to go abroad from the UPA command and from the OUN homeland Provid. In the emigration, too, we are bound to all orders of the OUN homeland Provid. When the homeland orders that the ZChOUN must be reorganized, then the order must be obeyed, especially by former UPA soldiers. Therefore, we shall be against all that sabotage homeland instructions, regardless of whether the guilty is BANDERA, or MATLA, or REBET. And because it is BANDERA who is doing the sabotage, we are against BANDERA. For us KOVAL's order takes precedence over that of BANDERA, and therefore, we went to the meeting. Moreover, it must be remembered that BANDERA gave his instructions regarding the informing of ZChOUN members only after our meeting had been scheduled. Why did he not do so sooner? Did he not fear criticism from the ranks? What guarantee is there that BANDERA's organizational channels will give a true picture in regard to the talks? We could, however, get objective information if BANDERA had come to our meeting, for then we would have heard all members of the triumvirate. And the fact that BANDERA refused to attend suggests that he is afraid to talk openly about his plans. We want to know what BANDERA will say via organizational channels, but we have our own views as well. We feel simply that BANDERA is opposing the homeland, and we shall never go against the homeland."

5. KASHUBA stated FEDAK-SMIRNY argued as follows: "BANDERA's order not to attend our meeting was so strange that I could not obey. It seems to me there is no other organization in the world which would so restrict its members, tell them where they may or may not go, whom they should hear. If BANDERA had ordered us not to attend a Communist meeting, then we would all obey. But when he orders us not to go to a meeting at which men mandated by the homeland Provid are to speak, then such an order we will never obey. Let BANDERA know that we former UPA soldiers continue to obey the orders of the homeland."

6. The oppositionists decided to hold another conference in February and asked REBET and MATLA to keep them informed. BANDERA's plans, according to KASHUBA, are to leave the rebels in peace until the triumvirate's talks are over. He will again issue a directive, however, warning them that if they continue to disobey the ZChOUN Provid they will automatically exclude themselves from the organization. After the trio's talks break down, which KASHUBA believes will take place in a few days, BANDERA will mete out final punishment to the revolting members. All will be put under the organization's judicial arm and legally expelled. First to go will be KORDYUK and PIDHAINY. The purge will hit the Brotherhood of Former UPA Soldiers, and all territorial Provids and branches, KASHUBA stated.

7. For around a month there have been rumors in the Ukrainian emigration that the OUN Provid has ordered that all future underground publications

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refrain from mentioning BANDERA's name. I asked Ivan KASHUBA weeks ago what the source of these rumors is. On 3 February 1954, while criticizing PIDHAINY and KORDYUK because they were involved in the 1 February informational meeting, KASHUBA spoke to me as follows: "You once asked me whether it is true that Colonel KOVAL had ordered all Kray Provids in the Ukraine not to mention BANDERA's name in their publications. At that time I could not answer, because I myself did not know. I felt then that that was propaganda emanating from ZPUHVR. However, today I can say that that rumor is unfortunately true. Recently, BANDERA let me read a letter addressed to him from Myron MATVIEYKO. The letter had been decoded, a job that took rather long. In this letter MATVIEYKO charges that BANDERA made a mistake in resigning from the post of leader of the entire OUN, for that act forced MATVIEYKO to subordinate himself to the OUN Provid. But what is even more important, the homeland Provid interpreted BANDERA's resignation as capitulation and decided to finish BANDERA politically once and for all. Soon after, he got word of BANDERA's resignation, KOVAL issued an order that BANDERA's name is not to be mentioned in any organizational newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, proclamations, or meetings. Even more, the order states that all old publications that mention BANDERA's name should be edited so that his name is eliminated, either by inking or by cutting. Of course, this order is being literally executed by Kray Provids, for not everybody understands why such an order was given. As a result there is much speculation and rumor, which in turn only cause BANDERA more harm. ZPUHVR would not know about this if KORDYUK or PIDHAINY had not informed them. And today, when so many ZChOUN members, including so many of its leaders, openly refuse to obey BANDERA's orders, all this can be ascribed to KOVAL's order, which the sons-of-bitches PIDHAINY and KORDYUK passed on to ZPUHVR."

8. AECAPELIN Comment: KASHUBA stated that he himself read MATVIEYKO's letter to BANDERA and that the story about KOVAL's order appears in that letter almost literally as KASHUBA it to me. I am inclined to believe KASHUBA in this instance, for usually KASHUBA remains silent when things unpleasant are broached. And when he is induced into talking about unpleasant things about the ZChOUN, the essential data are generally true.

U. AECAPELIN Report Dated 9 February 1954

1. In a previous report, I stated that BANDERA issued an order forbidding all ZChOUN members from attending the informational meeting called by the opposition on 1 February 1954. I also reported Ivan KASHUBA's consternation that so many members ignored the order by attending. On 8 February 1954 I talked with Capt. Volodymyr KOZAK and Stepan PROTSYK, both members of the opposition. KOZAK told me that ZChOUN members did not obey BANDERA's order because of the following reasons: Munich members of ZChOUN feel that since July, 1953, no ZChOUN Provid in fact exists, that is, from the moment that Colonel Vasyl KOVAL signed the order authorizing the

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triumvirate to take over, that formally the ZChOUN Provid ceased to exist at the moment when Mykola LEBED, UHVR secretary for foreign affairs, informed BANDERA of KOVAL's order, which act took place several months ago; that in reality the ZChOUN Provid ceased to exist when by majority vote the Provid itself decided to dissolve and handed over its prerogatives to the triumvirate. Therefore, according to KOZAK, ZChOUN members recognize the triumvirate, not BANDERA's Provid. In consequence, members are bound to follow orders put out by the triumvirate, or a majority of its members; by the same token, they cannot follow the orders of one man in the triumvirate. And since two members of the triumvirate took part in the organizational meeting of 1 February 1954, ZChOUN members in Munich had all right in the world to attend.

2. PROTSYK advanced the same line of argument. To my question, how to interpret BANDERA's removal of Bohdan KORDYUK from the ZChOUN Provid, as well as suspension of KORDYUK from membership in the ZChOUN, PROTSYK replied approximately as follows: Neither BANDERA nor any other member of the so-called Provid (STETSKO, KASHUBA, BENTSAL, VASKOVICH, LENKAVSKY) can expel or suspend KORDYUK, for no ZChOUN Provid exists. The triumvirate alone is competent in these matters. The fact that BANDERA went so far as to expel KORDYUK shows that he does not want to accept homeland decisions and is prepared to fight for personal power even if he has to cross over the corpses of his closest colleagues. BANDERA's move brought results opposite from those intended. He hoped thereby to terrorize the opposition. But the result is that the opposition was given added argument against BANDERA. BANDERA's action showed that he is overly ambitious, greedy for power, unworthy of confidence. He signed a statement that he accepts homeland decisions, but now shamefully ignores his signature. In the eyes of ZChOUN members, BANDERA ceased to be a member of the ZChOUN Provid at the moment he broke the regulation of the London conference, which regulation, point 47 clearly stresses that all instructions of the homeland Provid bind the ZChOUN. Now, PROTSYK continued, BANDERA attempts to give this point a one-sided interpretation, holding that that point pertains only to the ZChOUN-ZPUHVR controversy, not to internal ZChOUN matters. All present at the London conference had in mind all homeland instructions, not merely the ZChOUN-ZPUHVR conflict.

3. To my question, how ZChOUN members foresee the settlement of the conflict, PROTSYK spoke as follows: ZChOUN members wait eagerly for the end of the triumvirate's negotiations. All decisions of the triumvirate carried by majority vote will be binding on all ZChOUN members. If the trio by majority vote calls for a special ZChOUN conference, then ZChOUN members will attend that conference. If BANDERA opposes this conference, then he and all his supporters automatically exclude themselves from the ZChOUN. Here in Germany BANDERA has a small handful of followers only; later even this handful will disappear, and he will be supported by 15 or 20 organizational bureaucrats who will cling to him only because he will pay them money. In concrete details, the matter will be as follows, PROTSYK

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outlined:

(a) The printshop "Cicero" (owned by a cooperative under ZChOUN control, and which publishes Ukrainskiy Samostiynyk) will remain in the hands of the opposition. Today the BANDERA loyalists have more members in the cooperative, but the board of directors is controlled by the opposition.

(b) The newspaper Ukrainskiy Samostiynyk, the legal and responsible publisher being Modest RIPETSKY, an oppositionist, will stay in the hands of the opposition, and for a time the pro-BANDERA elements will be without an organ.

(c) The "Brotherhood of Former UPA Soldiers", the chief support of the ZChOUN, will subordinate itself to the UPA Mission attached to ZPUHVR.

(d) Liaison with the homeland is in the hands of Bohdan PIDHAINY, an oppositionist, if that term is properly used. We of the opposition", however, consider ourselves to be "the position", that is legal ZChOUN members.

(e) BANDERA counts on support from various territorial organizations, considering England to be his special bastion. But we believe that sooner or later he will lose in the territorial organizations also, especially if the legal ZChOUN created by MATLA and REBET is active. The old ZPUHVR "Mittenwald" opposition must now work solidly with the new opposition, PROTSYK continued. We will not allow ourselves to be removed from the ZChOUN, as the old Mittenwald opposition did.

4. Thus the thinking of the opposition. On 9 February, I talked with Ivan KASHUBA in order to find out the thinking of the BANDERA loyalists. KASHUBA predicted that the triumvirate's talks will break down soon. BANDERA will decisively reject homeland demands as interpreted by REBET. Schism in the ZChOUN is inevitable. BANDERA justifies his moves by the logic that the ZChOUN and the homeland OUN are two equal, parallel organizations, the homeland having no right to order the ZChOUN to do anything, and the ZChOUN having no right to interfere with homeland matters. BANDERA, following the reasoning above, can consider KOVAL's instructions regarding the re-organization of the ZChOUN only as comradely advice, not an order, and the circumstance that MATLA and REBET consider KOVAL's advice an order gives BANDERA the right to break off talks. It is true that the ZChOUN Provid dissolved itself and turned over its competence to the triumvirate, but the article of dissolution contained a clause which states that the dissolution ceases to be effective if and when the triumvirate does not come to unanimous agreement on any issue. BANDERA holds that the calling of the informational meeting by the opposition on 1 February forced BANDERA to invoke that clause, which abolishes the dissolution of the ZChOUN Provid. Thus,

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according to BANDERA, his veto power annulled the dissolution of the ZChOUN Provid. Accordingly, BANDERA's action against KORDYUK is legal.

5. KASHUBA stated that schism is inevitable, and that therefore the pro-BANDERA Provid decided to take over various offices and functions. The newspaper Ukrainsky Samostiynyk is in the hands of Modest RIPETSKY, who heads the opposition among UPA soldiers. In private talks, the editor-in-chief, Zenon PELENSKY, also revealed he is against BANDERA. PELENSKY's assistant, Roman ILNYTSKY, is also in the opposition. Yaroslav PELENSKY, Lyubomir TATUKH, and Volodymyr LENYK are also in the opposition. The BANDERA loyalist Provid hopes to name Stepan LENKAVSKY editor-in-chief, and Volodymyr PASHNYK legal and responsible editor. From the newspaper administration, the BANDERA loyalists further plan, must be removed Mikhaïlo FEDAK-SMIRNY and a few other oppositionists. The next step of the loyalist will be the taking over of the printing cooperative "Cicero". This they feel will be easy, because the opposition there is in the minority. "Cicero" will be turned over to Stepan LENKAVSKY, Ivan KASHUBA, Osip VASKOVICH, and Volodymyr PASHNYK. The directors are now opposition-controlled, KASHUBA stated, but they can be changed by calling a meeting of cooperative members and selecting there a new board of directors.

6. The most important and most complicated problem concerns liaison with the homeland, KASHUBA stated. Liaison is controlled by PIDHAINY, who is an oppositionist and who stated that he will turn over liaison only to the triumvirate, and that if BANDERA will not agree with the other members thereof, then he will turn over the liaison to REBET and MATLA. BANDERA is making efforts now to circumvent PIDHAINY's plans. As is known, liaison is not in the hands of PIDHAINY alone, but in those of the British also. PIDHAINY cannot work without the British, and with PIDHAINY alone the British cannot send men into the Ukraine or obtain mail therefrom. At present we do not know what stand the British will take, KASHUBA continued. BANDERA, however, is convinced that the British will support him. In anticipation of present problems, several months ago BANDERA personally made contact with that British station which cooperates with the ZChOUN. If PIDHAINY refuses to turn over liaison to BANDERA, then BANDERA will contact the British directly. And if for some reason the British decide to work with PIDHAINY, REBET, and MATLA, then an unheard-of scandal will emerge. "We must control liaison with the homeland", KASHUBA affirmed, "even if we have to spill blood, even if we have to liquidate all those striving to take the liaison away from us. Blood-letting will take place not only here, but also in the Ukraine. This the opposition must not forget it and it alone will be responsible for the blood-letting that may follow."

7. In a subsequent talk KASHUBA stated that on 9 February 1954, the BANDERA loyalists tried to take the Ukrainsky Samostiynyk from the opposition, but that attempt ended in a failure. On 9 February, in accordance with a decision of the pro-BANDERA Provid, Osip VASKOVICH and Volodymyr PASHNYK appeared at Modest RIPETSKY's office on Dachauerstrasse and requested the surrender of the paper. VASKOVICH informed RIPETSKY that the ZChOUN Provid has named PASHNYK the new legal director of the publication.

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Both VASKOVICH and PASHNYK asked for the paper's finances, books, addresses, files, etc. It seems that RIPETSKY was prepared for this. He refused their demand and stated that if they persist he would call the German police, and that he is legally in charge and can do as he sees proper. RIPETSKY ordered all other employees of the paper to follow nobody else's instructions but his own. He stated that all employees with opinions differing from his are free to leave employment with the paper. To date no one has left. Next RIPETSKY named Bohdan KORDYUK director of the publication, who took over in the name of the triumvirate. KASHUBA stated that the matter is not yet settled and that on 10 February the pro-BANDERA Provid is to have a long session devoted to discussion of the conflict.

V. AECAPELIN Report Dated 15 February 1954

1. The last meeting of the triumvirate (MATLA, REBET, BANDERA) took place on 12 February 1954 at 1500 hours in a Munich restaurant at Sendling-erter Platz. In addition to the trio, Yaroslav STETSKO was present, while REBET and MATLA brought Lubomyr ORTYNSKY, who they wanted to act as recording secretary. Prior to this 12 February meeting, KASHUBA told me that this meeting would probably be the last, for the ZChOUN Provid instructed BANDERA, should it be necessary, to accept the document "Plan and Certain Explanations Regarding the Activity of the Temporary Leadership of the ZChOUN", dated 28 December 1953, only under the condition that REBET and MATLA agree that this document pertain to the ZChOUN-ZPUHVR controversy only and that insofar as the reorganization of the ZChOUN is concerned, each member of the triumvirate should have the right of veto. The preconditions were necessary, KASHUBA stated, because MATLA will always be against BANDERA. KASHUBA stated that if the triumvirate refuses BANDERA's preconditions at the 12 February meeting, then BANDERA would break off talks.

2. After the 12 February meeting, KASHUBA told me that BANDERA had protested against the presence of ORTYNSKY at that meeting. ORTYNSKY was obliged to leave, BANDERA basing his stand on the following arguments:

(a) The creation of the triumvirate, in BANDERA's opinion, did not originate with the homeland OUN Provid or ZPUHVR. Rather, its creation was a direct order of the Americans, the result of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs.

(b) ORTYNSKY, according to BANDERA, is an American agent who had finished American intelligence training. ORTYNSKY, it was held, was sent to the meeting by American intelligence in agreement with ZPUHVR.

(c) In private talk and in public utterances ORTYNSKY does not hide that he is in the service of American intelligence. He

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always cites the Americans as an example worthy of emulation. If he had as little as a spark of national feeling he would abandon Ukrainian political life completely.

3. KASHUBA further told me that the present ZChOUN Provid does not consider the new schism a terrible thing. The ZPUHVR-ZChOUN conflict as it developed after the 1948 Mittenwald Conference has shown that in or near ZPUHVR there are no strong individuals capable of active organizational work of creating and vitalizing a new organization. BANDERA and his loyalists anticipate the following course of events:

(a) The opposition will maintain control of Ukrainsky Samostiynyk, which will propagandize against BANDERA. No great harm will result therefrom, however, because neither the opposition nor ZPUHVR has adequate funds to keep the paper alive. It will die as Ukrainska Trybuna did — the ZChOUN paper that went over to ZPUHVR in 1948, only to disappear. The Americans, according to BANDERA, will not give the opposition or ZPUHVR the money needed to keep Ukrainsky Samostiynyk alive. This paper ran on a deficit for three years; only in 1954 was it able to achieve financial solvency. During the deficit years ZChOUN stood the loss, all staff being paid from the organization's funds, rather than by the newspaper. All the pro-BANDERA outfit has to do is to inform present Samostiynyk subscribers that the paper has gone over to the opposition, and more than 80 per-cent will cease subscribing. In anticipation of this move, the pro-BANDERA loyalists in advance obtained the addresses of all subscribers.

(b) If REBET and MATLA create new ZChOUN organs, they will be unable to set up a worthwhile Provid. BANDERA believes that the best element will stick with him. The opposition will consist of careerists. "Give me names of people", KASHUBA stated, "who are really ready to visit all ZChOUN areas in all countries, convoke meetings, agitate, go to England, Belgium, or across the ocean, to make rebellion there. Neither ZPUHVR nor the opposition has such persons. To make a palace revolution in Munich was not difficult, but it will be a hard job to gain control of outlying areas. The opposition will never control the territorial organizations. This we know, and therefore we shall not fight the Munich palace revolution."

(c) The basic problem today, KASHUBA continued, is to have cadres ready to go to the homeland. Only the ZChOUN has such cadres, around 1000 men who are ready at BANDERA's first call to return to the Ukraine. Thus far it seems that the homeland is controlled by ZPUHVR men. But this year the situation will change. In his reports MATVIEYKO stresses that only the homeland Provid is against

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BANDERA, while the rank-and-file are for him. It will be far easier to change the homeland Provid than to liquidate the opposition abroad. Currently, MATVIEYKO is in fact the leader of one homeland Okruha (underground unit embracing two or more Oblasts). If in spring the ZChOUN sends more men into the Ukraine, then other areas will also be in the control of our men. Our men will demand the convocation of a great OUN Congress, at which they will have a majority. The Congress will select a homeland Provid in sympathy with BANDERA and his political line.

(d) BANDERA and his followers expect to convince the majority of ZChOUN members that it is better to go against the decisions of the homeland Provid, thus to save the underground, than to come to agreement with the opposition by accepting homeland decisions, acceptance being tantamount to destruction of all the accomplishments of the OUN since its inception 25 years ago.

(e) BANDERA expects that the British will aid him infiltrate men into the Ukraine this spring. He is certain that they will. That is why he now openly states that behind ZPUHVR and the opposition is hidden American intelligence. It will be in the interest of the British to support BANDERA, not ZPUHVR.

(f) The BANDERA loyalists for the time being will make no counteractions against the work of REBET and MATLA. The loyalists will wait for the opposition to make the first moves, exploiting these moves later to show that MATLA and REBET, not BANDERA, torpedoed the work of the triumvirate. For this reason to this date BANDERA has not yet replied to REBET's and MATLA's "ultimatum" of 12 February 1954.

(g) On 15 February at 1800 hours there is to take place the second informational meeting called by the opposition. BANDERA plans to send several loyalists to this meeting, who in the name of the ZChOUN loyalists will state that the ultimatum from REBET and MATLA to BANDERA made impossible further negotiation by the triumvirate. The loyalists to attend the 15 February meeting will have instructions to go no further than that. Who they will be, KASHUBA did not reveal. KASHUBA is convinced that this 15 February meeting will boomerang against the opposition.

(h) KASHUBA assumes that MATLA and REBET will name new ZChOUN organs only after the 15 February meeting. The behavior of the loyalists attending the meeting is intended to show the opposition that there are still rank-and-file members who follow BANDERA.

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W. AECAPELIN Report Dated 16 February 1954

1. On 12 February 1954, MATLA and REBET put out a communique in which they announced that as of 9 February 1954, a board of plenipotentiaries has officially taken over the ZChOUN. The board consists of MATLA and REBET, the third member of the triumvirate, Stepan BANDERA, refusing to enter. The board of plenipotentiaries stated that as of 12 February the ZChOUN Provid has been dissolved and ZChOUN members are no longer under the jurisdiction of the old pro-BANDERA Provid. The establishment of a new ZChOUN political advisory board and executive committee was promised. As of 15 February 1954, these new organs had not yet been created.

2. Slowness in creating these new organs was interpreted by BANDERA as weakness and lack of decision. BANDERA expected that at its second informational meeting held in Munich on 15 February the opposition would name these new organs. BANDERA dispatched a few of his men, led by Pavlo SHEVCHUK, to this meeting, charging them to observe what transpires. At the meeting SHEVCHUK behaved like an oppositionist, signing the declaration wherein those present declared their loyalty to the homeland Provid. However, SHEVCHUK observed what he considered weaknesses in the opposition in that MATLA and REBET did not announce the composition of a new political advisory council or of a new executive committee. Instead, SHEVCHUK observed that the meeting got lost in the discussion of socialism, neo-communism, and the position of Ivan MAISTRENKO in ZPUHVR. He reported to KASHUBA that the oppositionists are neglecting to take over key ZChOUN spots. KASHUBA reported to BANDERA and STETSKO, who decided to take advantage of the indecision evident.

3. Learning from SHEVCHUK that the Ukrainsky Samostiynyk was to appear as an anti-BANDERA number, BANDERA instructed KASHUBA to sabotage the paper at all costs. KASHUBA then contacted ZChOUN members working in the "Cicero" printshop, ordering them to destroy the first page of the Samostiynyk; to refuse to obey the orders of Stepan PROTSYK and Bohdan PIDHAINY (the directors of the printshop) and to obey only KASHUBA's orders; to refuse to turn over to anyone, especially Modest RIPETSKY, REBET, or MATLA, other printed pages of the paper; and to put out a new first page as soon as the materials arrive. KASHUBA named Myron KARPINETS, a "Cicero" employee, head of the "counter-action committee" at the printshop. KARPINETS was given three telephone numbers, any of which he might call in case of need, after which call an armed action squad would appear in twenty minutes. On 15 February, moreover, KASHUBA sent a cable to Stepan MUDRYK in Neu-Ulm, Germany, asking the latter to bring an action squad from that city to Munich on 16 February. KASHUBA and Hryhoriy VASKOVICH collected another action squad to take over the editorial offices of the paper, located on Dachauerstrasse 9/II. KASHUBA put the start of the "counter-action" as 0800 hours, 16 February.

4. Not expecting anything unusual, PROTSYK opened the printshop on

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16 February and admitted its employees. Upon entry, the action squad began to destroy the first page of the paper. When PROTSYK intervened, they threatened to beat him up. Terrorized, PROTSYK telephoned the editorial office on Dachauerstrasse and informed the editors of what was transpiring at the printshop. At the same time, another action squad under KASHUBA and VASKOVICH was in action at the editorial office. RIPETSKY called the German police, who demanded that both RIPETSKY and VASKOVICH promise in writing that from each side nothing irregular would be done pending the arrival of a court decision. The police also cleared the offices of all persons not employed by the newspaper. The action squad, however, continued to walk the corridors. Police intervention prevented full physical possession. However, KASHUBA did take over the paper's finances, records and circulation lists. The opposition lost its head for a time and seemed helpless.

5. Seeing what was taking place at Dachauerstrasse, the oppositionist Roman IILNITSKY departed to have a final talk with BANDERA. In a long talk IILNITSKY appealed to BANDERA to join the triumvirate, accusing the latter of being responsible for a new split in the ZChOUN. Stepan LENKAVSKY, a fence-sitter, was present at the talk. LENKAVSKY requested BANDERA to reconsider. BANDERA's reply was that he is ready to work in the triumvirate under the condition that it accept his additional stipulations as listed in his letter to REBET and MATLA, especially that these two order PIDHAINY to turn over liaison with the homeland to the pro-BANDERA Provid. IILNITSKY replied that the last was an impossible demand in conflict with the order of the homeland Provid. BANDERA then replied that he will do what he considers best and then at least he will save the ZChOUN from moral disintegration. IILNITSKY returned to the newspaper office and reported to the opposition.

6. Having heard IILNITSKY's report, REBET and MATLA concluded that BANDERA would do anything to save his prestige. After a long conference, they sent RIPETSKY and KORDYUK to the "Cicero" printshop, to pick up the already printed pages of the Samostiynyk and take it to the "Logos" printshop, where the first and sixth pages would then be reprinted. PROTSYK tried to turn the pages to the two men but KARPINETS's men refused. RIPETSKY and KORDYUK called the police, who put in an appearance at the printshop but refused to take the side of any of the disputants. REBET, in the meantime, had ordered that "Logos" be engaged to print the first issue of an anti-BANDERA Samostiynyk.

7. Faced with the situation at "Cicero", the opposition gathered at Dachauerstrasse and discussed what should be done. I was present, and suggested that MATLA and REBET order that the oppositionists take over the printshop, by force if necessary. I stressed that RIPETSKY had the law on his side, that RIPETSKY as the legal publisher has the full right to pick up his own property, especially since PROTSYK, the printshop's director, is

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in agreement. I stated that the protests of the type-setters is illegal and need not be heeded. I suggested that 12 persons simply go to the printshop and pick up RIPETSKY's property, the already printed pages. Dr. Lyubomyr ORTYNSKY seconded my suggestion. MATLA and REBET, however, held that use of a show of force might compromise the opposition, holding everything must be done in a legal manner. I again emphasized that to pick up the printed pages at the plant was a legal act. The oppositionists refused to move. Instead, BANDERA sent new material to the printshop, and during the night of 16-17 February set up a pro-BANDERA issue. An SB auto picked up the edition in the morning and hauled it to Lindwurmstrasse, where the mechanical side of distributing the paper was done.

8. It is evident that the pro-BANDERA Provid had a well-planned program of action. It ordered that no one should take a copy of its Samostiy-nyk out of the office until the paper had been mailed outside of Germany to all non-Munich addresses, both inside and outside of Germany. This was done because of fear that RIPETSKY, receiving a copy in Munich, might get the German post to confiscate the edition as illegal mail. In mailing the paper, first to be mailed were issues to subscribers in England and all trans-ocean countries; next, subscribers in Germany, excluding Munich; lastly, Munich subscribers. Pavlo SHEVCHUK took the subscription lists from the Dachauerstrasse office.

9. ~~KASHUBA told me that in the "counter-action" in Munich there were five action squads, each with from 5 to 10 members.~~ Most came from cities other than Munich. All action squad leaders received instructions to be ~~have peacefully~~ but to be ready for an order to act. All efforts at force on the part of the opposition were to be "bloodily liquidated", according to KASHUBA. I asked what he meant by "bloodily liquidated". KASHUBA replied that the squads had orders to beat up physically anyone who opposed them. "Some of the boys had pistols", KASHUBA stated, but things went smoothly because the opposition behaved in a restrained manner." But the matter does not end here", KASHUBA continued. "All leaders of the opposition that called for aid from the German police will in a short time be given a lesson so that during their stay in hospitals they will have the opportunity to ponder whether in any future event they should call the police or not." Candidates for lessons in patriotism, as KASHUBA put it, he named as Lev REBET, Zenon MATLA, Modest RIPETSKY, Bohdan KORDYUK (because all of them gave orders to call the police) and Bohdan PIDHAINY (because he refused to turn over liaison to the pro-BANDERA Provid).

10. In passing, KASHUBA stated that BANDERA had learned from the British consulate that PIDHAINY had received a visa to go to England to talk matters over with the British. KASHUBA stated that on 18 or 19 February either BANDERA or STETSKO would go to England in order to explain what had happened within the ZCHOUN and to persuade the British to support BANDERA, rather than MATLA and REBET.

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X. AECAPELIN Report Dated 20 February 1954

1. On 20 February at 1115 hours I telephoned the editorial office of Suchasna Ukraina. I wanted to speak to Fedir YUREVICH. As soon as the operator connected me, I heard a telephone talk in progress, apparently YUREVICH talking to an engineer, for so did YUREVICH title his co-speaker. I could also hear that the "engineer" was speaking long-distance, and by the sound of his voice I recognized Bohdan PIDHAINY, who was speaking from London. YUREVICH briefly informed PIDHAINY about the situation in Munich. Their talk was brief, for YUREVICH remarked, "Dr. REBET has just appeared and I'll give the receiver to him."

2. The talk then progressed in this fashion:

PIDHAINY: "Good-day, Doctor. What is new? Why don't you inform me about what is going on?"

REBET : "I do inform you. I wrote you a long letter and enclosed a mass of documents, giving the letter to RIPETSKY to send to you. I believe that you should have already received it."

PIDHAINY: "I haven't. When did you send it?"

REBET : "Three days ago I gave it to RIPETSKY to send to you."

PIDHAINY: "Then all is in order. Perhaps I'll get it today. What is new?"

REBET : "All is in order. Yesterday we named the Political Council and ZChOUN Executive Committee. Today the Political Council is to meet. How did your matter turn out? Is all in order? Do you know whether BANDERA will show up (in London)?"

PIDHAINY: "Things are going nicely to our advantage. BANDERA will come because they called him here. Shenanigans have started here, but I expect that all will be well."

REBET : "I do not understand. Who called BANDERA?"

PIDHAINY: "Our neighbors, of course."

REBET : "And how is it with the rank-and-file in England?"

PIDHAINY: "Good. If we do a little work here, we can have at least 50 per-cent of the members on our side."

REBET : "How long will you stay where you are?"

PIDHAINY: "I must stay here at least for one week more, that is, until I have taken care of everything."

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- REBET : "Wouldn't it be good if we sent you someone to help you. If so, whom?"
- PIDHAINY: "I don't know whom. You yourselves must think of whom to send."
- REBET : "We might send RIPETSKY, for he already has a visa. We could also send Hrytsko NANYAK. Would that be okey?"
- PIDHAINY: "Send them both here."
- REBET : "NANYAK does not have a visa. Can you help him get one?"
- PIDHAINY: "I could help, but I would have to know when he plans to leave and the number of his passport."
- REBET : "I do not know the passport number. But I'll tell him to apply for a visa at the English consulate immediately. Later we will send you the passport number. When should I telephone you? Or will you telephone us?"
- PIDHAINY: "Good, I'll telephone you today, but when?"
- REBET : "Five in the afternoon."
- PIDHAINY: "Good, What else is new? How is Zenon PELENSKY holding out?"
- REBET : "Zenon is doing splendidly, completely on our side. He continues to edit the Samostiynyk. Except for KIZKO, all the editorial staff is holding out well. At first KIZKO was with us, but later he joined BANDERA. He compromised himself, writing a foolish declaration in the pro-BANDERA Samostiynyk. I also want to say that today RIPETSKY received from the courts a documents stipulating that the Samostiynyk belongs to him."
- PIDHAINY: "And the printshop?"
- REBET : "There the matter is not clear. If you were here on the spot, all would have gone well. PROTSYK is somewhat indecisive, but I think things will go well there too. The BONN DP bank has mixed into the printshop matter. Yesterday Dr. MAKARUSHKA telephoned from Bonn. He intends to set up a temporary board of directors in order to protect the interests of the bank because bank property has been damaged. In general the affair is loudly bruted about in Germany."
- PIDHAINY: "And how are others holding out?"

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REBET : "Generally, very well. RIPETSKY, SMIRNY, KEROD, NANYAK and others were very active during the BANDERA action."

PIDHAINY: "And how's old LENKAVSKY?"

REBET : "Old LENKAVSKY is like an old army horse. As soon as he heard the bugle battle call of BANDERA's action squads, his blood quickened and he went over completely to BANDERA's side."

PIDHAINY: "And what is MATLA doing?"

REBET : "MATLA will still spend a few days here. At the end of next week he will go to Paris and en route will visit you in England. Then he will go to America, because all his documents will soon expire, and moreover, someone must do our work in America. Yesterday the BANDERAITES had a meeting, lasting from 1700 hours to 0400. Our boys present stoutly poured salt into BANDERA's skin. What will further develop is difficult to say, but we are confident of victory."

PIDHAINY: "Thank you for your information. I shall phone you at 1700 hours."

REBET : "Hello, Hello! (and here the talk ended)."

Y. AECAPELIN Report Dated 21 February 1954

1. On 20 February 1954 I had a long talk with KASHUBA about the situation in the ZChOUN. He stated that the meeting of ZChOUN members called on 19 February in Munich by BANDERA at 1700 lasted until 0400 hours. Thirty-nine persons attended, including 12 oppositionists. MATLA took part; KORDYUK was also present, because he as yet has only been deprived of his position in the Provid. After his case is tried by the ZChOUN judicial arm, KASHUBA stated, KORDYUK will be expelled from the ZChOUN. Among other oppositionists present were Irina SAVITSKA-KOZAK, Volodymyr KOZAK, Hryhoriy NANYAK, Stepan PROTSYK, and Mykhailo FEDAK-SMIRNY.

2. BANDERA gave a long report, putting blame for the crisis on MATLA and REBET. He charged that the two broke off talks and initiated unilateral action. BANDERA charged that the activity of the duo (REBET, MATLA) is illegal because the homeland named three persons, not two, to take matters over. BANDERA stated that the duo is spreading false rumors that the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN Provid is going against the homeland, the speaker maintaining that the ZChOUN is subordinate to the homeland and is only endeavoring to defend its structural-constitutional forms. KASHUBA stated that BANDERA's

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report, seconded by STETSKO, LENKAVSKY, and Yaroslav BENTSAL, impressed the rank-and-file so much that the oppositionists present took the floor to try to prove BANDERA's position erroneous. REBET was barred from the meeting on the grounds that he is not a ZChOUN member, the meeting being an exclusively internal ZChOUN affair.

3. Despite KASHUBA's interpretation of the meeting, I gathered the impression that things are worse than the pro-BANDERA Provid seems to admit. I base my conclusions on the following:

(a) KASHUBA revealed that BANDERA had received news that the matter of liaison with the homeland is not very promising. KASHUBA did not indicate his source, but did say that the English apparently will refuse to help BANDERA maintain contact with the homeland. KASHUBA spoke literally as follows: "From England we have news that PIDHAINY succeeded in convincing the British not to aid BANDERA. Perhaps BANDERA will be able to settle this matter favorably for the ZChOUN. But if it should develop definitely that the British refuse aid, we shall not abandon liaison with the homeland. Formerly, we used to send our people into the Ukraine overland across Czechoslovakia and Poland, and we had less losses than we had when the British supplied planes. In spring we shall again send people overland. Let there be losses. We will gain control of the homeland even without the aid of the British."

(b) KASHUBA stated that the German courts issued a temporary order which gives RIPETSKY sole right to publish the Samostiynyk. The ZChOUN lawyer told STETSKO and VASKOVICH that the final court decision will be in their favor, advising them to get Samostiynyk employees to swear that RIPETSKY had been merely the ZChOUN legal instrument when he obtained the publishing license. In their oath the employees are to state that the ZChOUN, not RIPETSKY, hired them; that the ZChOUN through VASKOVICH paid their salaries; that they have always considered the ZChOUN, not RIPETSKY, their employer; and that office supplies were paid for by ZChOUN funds. This supported, the German lawyer felt he could win the case provided the Americans do not intervene. If the court action is lost, KASHUBA continued, the ZChOUN will continue to publish a new paper, which is already being printed.

(c) In order to have a clear conscience and to deflect charges that the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN is going against the homeland, an extraordinary conference will be called in the near future. If we are supported by this conference, KASHUBA stated, then action will go full steam ahead toward gaining control of both the rank-and-file and Provid in the homeland, purging the ZChOUN of undesirables, organizing new liaison with the homeland without the aid of

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a foreign power if necessary, and the organizing of training courses for cadres to be sent to the homeland.

4. KASHUBA opined that gaining control of the entire homeland OUN will not be difficult. He stated that the homeland cannot exist for an extended period without aid from abroad, and that only the ZChOUN can give such aid. If we send 100 people into the Ukraine in the spring, KASHUBA continued, it can be assumed that half of them will get there and work with in the OUN. This will guarantee that BANDERA will control the homeland. KASHUBA stated that the current split has weakened the ZChOUN and such developments must not be repeated. Therefore, a radical purge must be made and iron discipline installed. The ZChOUN must become an "order", he stated. All members that remain will be told that violation of an order will call for punishment by a revolutionary tribunal. "If we shoot a few people", KASHUBA stated, "Then the ZChOUN will have discipline such as it never had before." Liaison with the homeland without foreign aid will be difficult but possible, KASHUBA stated. Anticipating trouble after the London conference, the ZChOUN Provid set up a special liaison fund, which was augmented by restricting other expenditures. Money for liaison exists, KASHUBA continued, and no one can accuse us of agency in behalf of the British, who aided us disinterestedly. KASHUBA stated that they have a list of several hundred persons willing to go immediately to the homeland. All must be screened and trained, primarily ideologically and program-wise, in a nationalist spirit, so that those arriving in the Ukraine might be able to oppose "neo-Communist and socialist influences in the OUN". Partisan and military training is of secondary importance, KASHUBA stated.

5. AECAPELIN Comment: In previous reports I stated that BANDERA is prepared, with MATVIEYKO's aid, to make a diversion in the Ukraine and to remove or liquidate the OUN Provid there. I consider KASHUBA's words to be sincere and do not doubt that BANDERA will push the program as outlined by KASHUBA, even at the price of death of many men. In order to stop BANDERA's plans, it is necessary that MATVIEYKO be isolated from organizational matters in the Ukraine and that he be deprived of liaison with the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN. It will also be necessary for the OUN homeland Provid to state decisively that BANDERA's attempts at diversion will result in the liquidation of persons sent to the Ukraine, such a statement being made available to all ZChOUN members siding with BANDERA. So warned, such persons will be loathe to go into the Ukraine at BANDERA's behest. If some such steps are not made, there is grave danger that the underground will be destroyed by the internal conflict being pushed by BANDERA. It can be assumed that MATVIEYKO's reports to BANDERA, which emphasize that the lower underground echelons support BANDERA and that only the homeland Provid is against him, are the chief reason for BANDERA's stand in the emigration. MATVIEYKO gives him hope that he can win over the homeland, and as long as this hope exists, BANDERA will not accept homeland decisions.

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Z. AECAPELIN Report Dated 23 February 1954

1. On 22 February I talked with Ivan KASHUBA, who stated that the pro-BANDERA ZChOUN Provid had concluded that it will no longer publish a newspaper with the name Ukrainsky Samostiynyk because Modest RIPETSKY had received a temporary court decision declaring that only he had the legal title to that paper. A new paper, Shlyakh Peremohy ("Road to Victory"), will be published. Further, KASHUBA stated, because the Bonn DP bank for refugees, through Dr. Lyubomyr MAKARUSHKA (one of the bank's directors), threatened to send a provisional manager to take over the "Cicero" printshop, the BANDERA leaders decided not to cause any more scandals at the printshop. KASHUBA ordered the typesetters loyal to him not to indulge in any more sabotage, even if the opposition desires to have the Samostiynyk printed at that plant. "We were only interested in not permitting the publication of that issue which was to contain the communique of the opposition", KASHUBA commented. "Had the subscribers received that edition, then for the ZChOUN great harm would have resulted. But now that we have informed its readers that the Samostiynyk is in the hands of the opposition, it makes no difference what is printed in it." KASHUBA stated he told PROTSYK that no more trouble would be caused at the printshop, but that PROTSYK is so afraid of new acts of sabotage that he has proposed that two new members be co-opted to the shop's board of directors, said new members to be from the opposition, thus increasing its strength. "To frighten the opposition," KASHUBA remarked, "I still tell them that we shall continue to publish the Samostiynyk, although this is not true."

2. On 23 February, according to KASHUBA, a final effort will be made, at the initiative of ZPUHVR, to solve the conflict within the ZChOUN in a diplomatic manner. At 1000 hours, 23 February, a meeting between ZPUHVR and pro-BANDERA men is to take place. BANDERA will act as spokesman of his side. KASHUBA stated that BANDERA and STETSKO will be prepared to come to an agreement with MATLA and REBET only if the latter two exhibit greater appreciation of both the person and behavior of BANDERA. BANDERA would favor understanding, KASHUBA stated, but he fears he will always be in the minority. If only REBET and MATLA would guarantee him some species of important influence in the triumvirate, then as a matter of course BANDERA will accept homeland decisions.

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