

6138

VIA: Air Pouch
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. CELA-6019

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR
Chief, WE
FROM : Chief of

DATE 13 April 1954

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX
SPECIFIC— Reports from JAVELIN Courier from the Ukraine

The attached reports and the covering letter quoted below have been received from JAVELIN on this date:

"At the last meeting in London attended by we informed him that we had exfiltrated a courier from the Ukraine, and promised to send him the more interesting reports produced by this courier.

"We are attaching four reports which we hope will be of interest. We should be grateful if these reports could be treated on a very restricted basis, and their contents in part or in full should not be passed outside (KUBARK) or (ODACID) circles.

"For your information the courier is a low level leader from the area West of Lwow. He left the Ukraine in September 1953, and was delayed for some time in Poland.

"We hope to let you have some further reports in due course."

Encl.

Distribution
SR 2 (w/atchmt)
WE 2 (w/o atchmt)
Registry
Files

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REF CASE 43-43

CS COPY

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oved from Project Perdynamia
Classification: 74-124-29/B
69-425783
20. Folds 8
1 att.

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR-1949

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

74-124-29/3

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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U.S.S.R. (Western UKRAINE)

Repercussions and reactions in the Western UKRAINE to the main developments in the U.S.S.R. during late 1952 and 1953

Note: This information relates mainly to the rural districts on the Ukrainian-Polish frontier area west of LVOV.

1 September

1st Sept. 1952: Beginning of the new School Year - Enforcement of Universal seven-year education.

① In the country districts the four-year course of primary education had been general. Even before 1st September, 1952, however, efforts were being made to provide extended facilities. Both the parents and the children were anxious to improve education, and many children walked considerable distances to attend seven-year schools voluntarily after completing the compulsory four-year course in their own village.

[Soc] ed

② After September 1952 more strenuous efforts were indeed made to establish seven-year schools in all villages. In general these measures were successful. Some of the larger committees have gone beyond the obligatory provisions and made some degree of secondary education available; their object is to achieve a ten-year course by successive stages. Thus eight-year and nine-year schools may be found in some localities in addition to those where full secondary courses have been officially instituted.

[Soc] ed

③ Primary education ~~is~~, up to the seventh class, is free. Thereafter a pupil either continues to receive general educational instruction in addition to technical training at a factory school or proceeds to a secondary school. In the first case not only his education free of charge but the worker-pupil also receives clothing, board and lodging gratis. Secondary education, however, has to be paid for at the rate of 100-150 rubles per year. This presents no obstacle to the children of the ^{more prosperous} better-off members of the Party, administrative and military hierarchies. The children of the working class and ^{the} peasantry, on the other hand, can avail themselves of higher education only if they gain a state scholarship. These scholarships are worth 250 rubles monthly. ^{There is fierce competition, for these scholarships,} and sometimes ~~more than~~ ^{over} half of the children ~~put forward~~ win awards.

[Soc] ed

Theft and Embezzlement

④ During the latter months of 1952 there were many official reports of convictions for theft of public property, embezzlement of funds, and currency speculation. Crimes of this kind are not uncommon in the Western UKRAINE. Partly because it does not regard such offences against the Soviet regime as morally reprehensible and partly because the situation can be exploited to its own advantage, the resistance organization often collaborates with officials whose defalcations may be in danger of detection.

political resistance

⑤ The manager of a co-operative, for example, who is a sympathizer of the resistance movement may have misapplied official funds or goods. He appeals to the organization for help and gives information when particularly desirable wares are in stock. A raid then takes place and the customary receipt left by the partisans covers the manager's misappropriations. The proceeds of the raid are applied to the support of the organization and partly distributed to the dependents of insurgents who have been killed in action.

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H/w att 1 to OELA 6019
13th Jan. 1953: Unmasking of the "Doctors' Plot". CS COPY 74-124-29/3

⑥ Anti-semitism is endemic in the Western UKRAINE although Jews are numerous only in LVOV and are seldom to be met at all outside the chief town of a country region. The law against racial incitement had hitherto been very strictly enforced by the Soviet authorities and it was a punishable offence to use the term "Jew" instead of the officially permitted "Hebrew".

political anti-Semitism

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10 (8) ← ~~The effect of this was like "throwing a lighted match into petrol".~~
The wildest rumors ^{being} circulated among the population: ~~the~~ Jews were poisoning the meat supply; Jewish hairdressers were applying to their customers toilet preparations infected with skin diseases. Only recollections of the penalties inflicted for attacks upon Jews restrained the populace from physical assaults upon Jews and Jewish property. The resistance movement tried to counter these effects by explaining that not the Jews but the Russians and the Communist Party were the cause of Ukrainian troubles.

Political anti-semitic

11. (9) ← When the "Doctors" were released the official anti-^{semitic} Jewish propaganda ceased abruptly. The word "Jew" continued to be used and the ordinary people went on talking about the "Jews". No apparent attempt was made by the authorities to revert to enforcement of the ban upon the word "Jew".

Political

22nd Feb. 1953: Elections for Local Soviets in the UKRAINE

12 (10) ← In earlier years the resistance movement had made elections the occasion for propaganda successfully urging the people not to vote or else to spoil their papers. By 1953 it had become clear that these efforts were futile: the election results still appeared in the order of 99.7% and the local inhabitants were opposed to retaliation. Moreover, the procedure in the voting booths made it well-nigh impossible to spoil the ballot form without detection. The farce is sometimes carried to absurd lengths such as taking the voting paper to sick electors who are unable to attend at the booth and allowing them to place the form in the urn at their own bedside.

political

1st - 5th Mar. 1953: Illness and Death of STALIN

13 (11) ← At the time of STALIN's illness and death no special security measures against panic or disorder were apparent in the area. There was in fact neither panic nor disorder among the population. The nationally-minded Ukrainian elements of the people were glad that one of their "Russian Bolshevik oppressors" had passed on. On the other hand they did not expect any improvement in conditions to follow; STALIN would simply be succeeded by another "tyrant". The possibility of revolution or of far-reaching changes in the regime, which had been the subject of speculation in Western radio commentaries, was regarded as a fantasy on the part of people who knew little of the internal situation. Busts and pictures of STALIN remained ^{at} their ~~usual~~ ^{customed} places.

political

6th Mar. 1953: Merging of the Ministries of State Security and Internal Affairs

14 (12) ← Immediately before STALIN's death the MVD and the MGB had headquarters offices only in the chief town of a region. These offices were in separate buildings bearing the signs "Go-MVD" and "Go-MGB". The MVD controlled the ordinary police and had in each village as a rule a single policeman who was aided by a ~~number~~ ^{number} of locally-recruited auxiliaries. The MGB by contrast was responsible for political surveillance and security and was not openly represented in the villages but, apart from its secret members and agents, held its ~~forces~~ ^{operational groups} in the chief town and deployed them elsewhere in the region as required.

Security MGB

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16. ~~14~~ ← The declaration of an amnesty for certain classes of prisoners was on the whole warmly welcomed by the people of the Western UKRAINE. The people recognized a distinction between genuine criminals who had been convicted of offences against the persons or property of private citizens and those who had been imprisoned for crimes under Soviet law which the ordinary people did not regard as reprehensible. It was the prospect of the release of the second category which gave satisfaction.

no actual
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17. ~~15~~ ← Fairly large numbers of former prisoners then reappeared in the area, although the figures cannot be estimated. There was certainly much talk of returned prisoners in all districts. No case of a purely political offender or of anyone repatriated from SIBERIA came to notice.

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18. ~~16~~ ← One instance, ^{from personal knowledge,} from personal knowledge was of a man whose field had been incorporated in a collective farm. He himself had not joined the collective. He took a small stack of hay from his own field and was arrested for theft of collective farm property, (this was in 1949 when agricultural collectivization was being introduced in the Western UKRAINE). The sentence was ten years' imprisonment. The man was sent to a labour camp near ~~MYKOLAYIV~~ ^{in the Ukraine} UKRAINE, where he was employed as a joiner. His wife made many appeals on behalf of her husband and spent a great deal of money in bribes without success.

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17. ← Under the amnesty this man returned to his village. He received the normal civilian documents and took up employment in the kolkhoz. He was left unmolested and was still free in August 1953. According to his account the majority of the prisoners at the same camp had been discharged in groups. He assumed that the minority left behind had been serving long terms of imprisonment.

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19. ~~18~~ ← The amnesty was followed by outbreaks of violent crimes. People were held up and robbed in the streets in broad daylight. A train was stopped by a gang near YAVORON and the passengers robbed. As the wave subsided after a time it may be that the assailants had been rounded up and returned to prison. (N 49-56, E 23-23)

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20. ~~19~~ ← Up to August 1953 nothing had come of the promise to revise the penal code. If anything, such offences as thefts of hay were more strictly dealt with, but no specific instances can be quoted.

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April 1953: Annual Price Reductions

1. ~~20~~ ← It can be taken that the reductions announced were in fact implemented in the local shops. As a result of the successive lowering of prices the cost of food and other necessary goods has been greatly reduced. At the same time supplies have increased; in 1953, if one had the money, it was possible to buy all the necessities of life and at least the most common luxuries. (Even before 13 May flour was in good supply in the Western UKRAINE.)

[cc]

2. ~~21~~ ← The quality of the goods, however, was vastly inferior to that of similar articles in Western EUROPE. Good cloth, for example, was an extreme rarity. When any did appear in the shops, large queues formed and the small amount available was quickly sold. As a rule such materials could be obtained only on the black market at prices well beyond the reach of ordinary people.

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3 22. ← In spite of the price reductions, incomes were still too low to enable workers and peasants to take advantage of the variety of goods available. Ordinary people in the country districts could not afford luxuries. In a typical village in the area no-one could yet buy the cheapest wireless set costing about 300 roubles. The most prosperous among the ordinary population are still much worse off than the poorest in ENGLAND or even than they themselves were in 1938.

[cc]

See source comment
Note: ~~The informant believes that~~ the supply of consumer goods to the Western UKRAINE may have been designed to win over the local population and may not be typical of other parts of the USSR.

~~6th April 1953: PRAVA Leading Article on Rights of the Soviet Citizen~~

21 23. ← By August 1953 no change in the activities and methods of the police and security organs had become noticeable locally. The interval was too short for reports to filter through from all districts, and no arrest in which torture might have been used had come to attention. Members of the resistance and their sympathisers were sceptical of any change for the better in this field.

Security

27th May 1953: Reported Execution of four American Agents dropped in UKRAINE

24. No news of the case reached the people independently or official Soviet sources at the time. The announcement aroused a good deal of interest, but as the names were not Ukrainian the people were less concerned than if the agents had been "ours". There was some sympathy with the unfortunate men and the official stigmatisation of the agents as "American spies" made little impression.

[omit]
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1st June 1953: Disturbances in CZECHOSLOVAKIA after the Currency Reform

17th June 1953: Disturbances in Eastern GERMANY

29 25. ← So far as is known, no independent news of the nature or scale of these events reached the Western UKRAINE. The official Soviet announcements became known and were talked about. The mere fact of some resistance in satellite territories was encouraging, but the people had no reason to believe that the disorders were extensive.

[polit]
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Note: ~~The informant was unable himself to listen to the Western radio at that particular period.~~

23 26. ← During the summer of 1953 leaflets printed as Czech currency on one side and containing propaganda calling for sabotage on the other were found. ~~The finders supposed that the leaflets had been dropped by aeroplanes.~~ The call for sabotage seemed unrealistic.

[polit]
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24th June 1953: The New State Loan

27. ← The announced reduction in the new State loan was received with relief. As the terms were not to be implemented until August, however, the effect in practice had not been experienced. Under the previous terms a village of some 150 families had to raise 30-40,000 roubles. Members of the families in employment contributed one month's pay deducted by instalments throughout the year at their place of employment. The share of the others was collected at home. Small prizes were sometimes

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not recognize any differences between BERIA and his colleagues at the head of Party and Government in respect of, for example, their policies towards the national republics. No alterations in policies or personnel were observed locally between the date of STALIN's death and the arrest of BERIA or after the arrest which might be interpreted as showing a more or less liberal attitude towards Ukrainian nationalism than had been true under STALIN. The majority of responsible posts in the Western Ukraine had already tended to be held by Russians (to a lesser extent) or Eastern Ukrainians before March 1953. Although changes in personnel were always taking place, there was no noticeable trend towards the replacement of Russians by Eastern Ukrainians or of Eastern Ukrainians by Western Ukrainians. There was no relaxation in the ban upon the teaching of truly national conceptions of Ukrainian history and culture during these periods.

Note: Any distinction between Soviet leaders comes hard to the informant; as "Muscovites" and "Bolsheviks" they form an undifferentiated group of "oppressors". At most, BERIA was regarded as one of the worst of a bad lot.

30. No change in the relations between the MVD and the Army was noticed either. Minor clashes between the rank and file of these organizations were not uncommon. In 1950 there was a case of the arrest by the MVD of a soldier in the neighbourhood of ~~CYRILLIA~~. The soldier's comrades were bent upon revenge with the use of their rifles, but were restrained by their superiors. There had been no local indication by August 1953 that the Army had established any supremacy over the MVD.

3rd to 7th September 1953: KHRUSHCHEV's Disclosures on Livestock

5. Stock-raising is not an important element in the agriculture of the districts reported upon. It was mainly horses who suffered from the severe weather and the serious shortage of feeding stuffs. The situation was aggravated by the lack of personal interest on the part of the collectivized peasants. Many horses did perish during the winter of 1952-53. On a particular collective farm near a village in the neighbourhood of SADOVA WISZNIA ten horses out of a total of sixty died. Through the progress of mechanization, however, this is less serious than it would have been in earlier years.

6. An illustration of the preponderance of privately owned animals can be taken from the same village. There are about 120 households, each of which owns one cow. The collective farm, on the other hand, possesses only about forty cows.

Note: The informant had left the district by the end of August.

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~~Greek Catholic~~ congregations conform publicly while remaining faithful to their religion in private. Some of them observe ^{Uniate Church} ~~Greek Catholic~~ practices at home, and it is not uncommon for workers and peasants to incur the forfeiture of five days' wages or the equivalent for staying away from work on Greek Catholic feast days. Some of the older priests also continue to practice Greek Catholicism. Most of the younger priests, however, are Orthodox clerics from the East; this in fact ~~accounts for~~ ^{is the case of} almost all the Orthodox clergy.

[Church Sec]

5. ← One result of the change is that congregations no longer have complete confidence in their priests. There is nothing to prevent an MVD officer from being trained and installed in a church, and cases have been reported of attempts under cover of the confessional to obtain information on the location of partisans. Even ~~Greek Catholic~~ priests ^{of the assimilated Uniate Church} who have been arrested by the MVD are distrusted on their return.

[Church Sec]

6. ← Most of the people and the former Greek Catholic priests regard the Orthodox Church as the servant of the "Muscovite Bolshevite State". The Patriarch of ~~MOSCOW~~ ^{is a figure of fun to them,} although he is revered by the Orthodox priests. Such awards as that of the Red Banner of Labor ^{award} to the Patriarch on his 75th birthday caused particular amusement.

[Church Sec]

see Bull of 1949

7. ← There have been no acts of terrorism against prominent advocates of the fusion of the churches since the assassination of ~~KOSTELNIK~~ ^{Sapriel} and ~~HALLAN~~ ^(GALLAN) about 1949. Incidentally, the case of ~~HALLAN~~ (but not of ~~KOSTELNIK~~) was given a great deal of publicity in the Soviet Ukrainian press. ^{Washington Comment. This country church, in its structure and practices, resembles the Greek Catholic church, but differs in that it recognizes the Pope as the head of}

[Church Sec]

Note 7

5) ← There are no schemes of this kind and scale in the area. About 1951 publicity was given to plans to build a hydro-electric power station on the river ~~VISHNYA~~ ^(popularly VISHNYA) near ~~SADOVA VISHNYA~~. Large quantities of materials were dumped at the spot but no start had been made to the building of the dam or power station by August 1953. At ~~NIKOLAEV~~ ^(south of LVOV) a cement factory producing 1500 tons a day had been established. (N49-35, E26-51)

[ec]

Catastrophes

8. ← On the 7th Nov 1947 or 1948 there was a serious explosion at an oil well near ~~DROGOBYCH~~. Many workers employed there perished. The resulting fire burned for nearly a year and could be seen from a distance of 100 km. In order to stop the burning oil an attempt was made to place an iron cupola over the well. This failed as the cupola was blown into the air. The flames were finally overcome by diverting a stream into the well, transforming the area into a lake. The morass remains.

[Sec Tech Catastrophes]

9. ← According to a rumour widely circulated in the area at that time a German engineer had offered to stop the fire by some technique known to him on condition that all German prisoners-of-war were released. The Soviet authorities were said to have refused to pay the price.

Ideological Struggle against Ukrainian Nationalism

3. 8. ← The struggle against Ukrainian nationalism in literature and history /was.....

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5. ~~10~~ ← No case of a local teacher or of a local Party or administrative official being censured for nationalism is known. Such people are in any case quick to conform, outwardly at least. There are certainly frequent changes in personnel but the reasons for them do not often become known.

General attitude of the Population towards the Soviet Regime

- 10 11. ← As a result of successive stages of amelioration of living conditions, such as the annual price reductions, improved supplies of consumer goods, reduced agricultural quotas and taxation, the amnesty, and the reduction in the levy for the State Loan, the people of the Western UKRAINE in 1953 were feeling that life was growing easier. Their resentment towards the regime was to some extent less keen than formerly. (c.c.)

- 18 12. ← On the other hand they did not feel that they owed the Soviet authorities any allegiance or gratitude on this score. After the destruction caused by ^{World} the War and the terrible famine of the winter of 1947, when every train brought a full load of people from the Eastern UKRAINE and MOLDAVIA begging for scraps of food, conditions were naturally expected to improve. The traditional hatred of "Muscovite oppression" and "Bolshevism" was so deeply implanted and recollection of mass transportation and other Soviet atrocities was still so vivid that the spirit of national resistance, although superficially suppressed, remained far from being quenched. (c.c.)

Spontaneous Expression of Popular Discontent

6. 13. ← No large-scale outbursts of popular discontent occurred during 1952-53 so far as is known. On collective farms hay stacks were often burned down and horses were sometimes killed by night. These were acts neither committed nor instigated by members of the resistance organization.

"Black Cat"

7. 14. ← During the first two or three years after ^{World} the War stories of robbery were reported from all parts of the Western and Eastern UKRAINE. Many of these crimes were attributed to bands of robbers called popularly and collectively "Black Cat". (~~Chernij Kot - Chernaya Koshka~~). The name was said to have resulted from a subterfuge utilized by these gangs for gaining entry: they mewed like a cat until the householder opened the door to admit the domestic pet. No evidence is known to suggest that these gangs consisted of resistance elements or were associated together in any larger organization.

Note: This subject was mentioned by the informant without prompting. The notion that the "Black Cat" might be a partisan organization surprised

/him.....

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8.

~~him.~~ Partisans, he maintained, did not rob private citizens. ~~The matter is reproduced here in view of other more colourful accounts which have been given.~~

The Local Press

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15. The newspapers published in small towns and country districts are more informative than those appearing on ~~an~~ All-Union, republican or provincial level. Although all are given a propagandist tinge the local press is in general accurate in its reports of local events and conditions.

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Anecdotes

28

16. A political meeting had been called in a certain village. The speaker was contrasting the welfare of the people in the Soviet Union with that of the population of the United States. In America workers were allowed to die of starvation in the streets; in the Soviet Union conditions were improving every year and the sick were provided for by the State. Improvement would be even greater in the Western ~~UKRAINE~~ were it not for the disruptive activities of the fascist bandits. That was why it was necessary to hunt them down for execution or transportation to ~~SIBERIA~~. At this point an aged peasant in the audience remarked, "Why not send them to ~~AMERICA~~ and let them die in the streets?" 2

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17. Note: This story was told as substantially true, having been received by the informant from a bystander. ~~The informant~~ ^{grudgingly} paid tribute to the excellence of the Soviet medical and health services. He maintained that they were well-organized and efficient and that no sick person need go without treatment free of charge.

29

17. A collective farm had been named after a succession of Soviet leaders who had later been purged. The members were growing chary of risking a further repetition and would have preferred to leave the establishment nameless. The Party secretary, however, insisted upon a new title. "All right," suggested a peasant, "let's call it 'Soviet Union'". "Why?" asked the puzzled secretary. "Well," was the reply, "we named it after X and he disappeared. We named it after Y and he too disappeared. Even when we called it after Z he disappeared. It seems logical to me." 3

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18. Note: This ^{anecdote} ~~one~~ was given apologetically as mere rumour. The names used vary from one telling to another and can always be kept up-to-date.

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Note: The informant's native tongue is Ukrainian. He says that he can understand Polish well (he was educated under Polish rule) and Russian and other Slav languages less well. His knowledge of German seems rather slight. His English conversation is rudimentary; in English he listened only to the B.B.C. English lessons.

3. ~~(a)~~ *Sources* The informant cannot tell with any precision how often he listened beyond saying that he listened as regularly as circumstances permitted. Sometimes this would be daily, at others weeks would pass when he was constantly on the move by night without an opportunity of listening.

4. ~~(a)~~ *Sources* (i) The informant's first preference was always the B.B.C. in Polish from LONDON. That was indeed the only station to which he listened regularly. He liked the quiet objectivity of B.B.C. news and the absence of mere abuse in the political commentaries. This was in spite of his reluctance to listen to Polish at all and his rooted objection to hearing Polish chauvinist propaganda on, for example, the necessity of returning L'OV to a free POLAND.

(ii) Although he had heard the station only a few times, the informant gave second *preference* place to ROME in Ukrainian. The programmes were national in spirit and appealed to the religious convictions of Greek Catholics; and they were in Ukrainian.

(iii) *was his third preference.* ANKARA in Polish took third place.

5. (iv) *Sources* The informant regarded the "Voice of AMERICA" in some respects as the antithesis of the B.B.C. News and commentaries were more tendentious and colored. Listeners were told too often and too boastfully how well-off American workers were. This was too much like Soviet propaganda in reverse. Some of the features were insulting to the intelligence, as when a narrator described in detail how an American housewife would take her foodstuffs from the refrigerator (with full details of what a refrigerator was and how it was operated), arrange the utensils on the electric stove, adjust the air-conditioning apparatus (with a description of what that meant), and then settle down to choose a programme on television (again with considerable detail).

6. (b) The B.B.C. in Polish gave best reception. "Voice of AMERICA" in Ukrainian could be heard without intolerable interference; in Russian interference was bad, but in Polish and Czech less so. Reception of "Radio Free EUROPE" in Polish was better than "Voice of AMERICA". The Polish transmissions from MADRID were easier to hear than the Ukrainian, which were very badly interrupted. Interference with Ukrainian from ROME was also very strong.

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~~(c) No further answer.~~

(d) Jamming was always at its worst during the evening.

(e) ~~The informant~~ had found that it was sometimes possible to reduce the effect of jamming by tuning a little way off the frequency of the strongest signal. It was difficult to find such a spot where the speech did not become unrecognisable.

(f) The first ten minutes or so of a programme were sometimes free. Once begun, jamming was always continuous.

8. (a) ~~The informant~~ last heard the B.B.C. in the UKRAINE in August 1953.

(b) He stopped only when he left the country.

9. (a) ~~(b)~~ He used to listen in the company of two comrades. ~~(this was a condition imposed upon him).~~

10. ~~He~~ normally listened to the B.B.C. in Polish at about 0015 - 0030 hours MOSCOW time.

11. ~~The informant~~ did not remember the name of any B.B.C. speaker whom he had heard. So far as he could recall, names were not usually given except in the course of sporting commentaries.

9. 12. See also 6(a)(i). ~~He~~ liked to listen to the news and political commentaries including quotations from the comments of the daily press. He particularly remembers ~~an appreciation~~ ^{a news item} of STALIN's death (newspaper not identified) which put everything in a proper perspective and raised no false hopes of improvement. This contrasted strongly with other comments about the same time which suggested the likelihood of sweeping changes. He was also ^{especially} interested in trying to learn English from the B.B.C. lessons. ~~(he had acquired a rudimentary knowledge of simple conversation).~~

10. 13. ~~His~~ ^{The following are some of his comments on BBC programmes:} comments on B.B.C. programmes are:

(a) As above, he liked the quiet objectivity of the news and accepted it as reliable although he had no current standard by which to judge Polish and international news.

(b) Political commentaries he also liked to hear, but he could not remember the name of any commentator. He strongly objected to what he termed "Polish chauvinist propaganda", of which he ~~made~~ ^{instanced} claims upon Ukrainian territory, especially INOV. He had little sympathy with what he called "British neutralism" in dealings with the Soviet Union.

(c) Rather than talks about British life he would prefer to hear about life in CANADA and AUSTRALIA, in particular about Ukrainian immigrants. Talks about life in BRITAIN should be down-to-earth and not like the American broadcasts of the same type. ~~The informant~~ was anxious to know how ordinary people, industrial and agricultural workers, lived. Comparisons between the standard

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/of.....

~~was not discussed~~
new aeroplanes talked about. Such news often spread very quickly and no-one could tell how. He had been told even of Communists (school masters and club managers) who had listened to the B.B.C. and the "Voice of AMERICA" and who had discussed the news in private, but he could give no details. Other Communists merely discussed what the Soviet press said that foreign radio stations had broadcast. At second-hand it was not always possible to distinguish the two cases.

12. 15. (a) Apart from comments already made above, ~~the informant's~~ most profound objection to Western broadcasts was the neglect of the Ukrainians, who formed one fifth of the population of the Soviet Union, and of their national interests. This contrasted with the treatment of the Poles and the Czechs, both of whom were addressed in their own language. ~~The informant~~ had had the choice of listening either to Russian or to Polish. He chose the latter because of the greater facility with which he could understand the language. The greatest single encouragement which ~~the informant~~ could have received in this field would have been a B.B.C. programme in Ukrainian.

13. (b) ~~The informant~~ believed that Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union were dominated by the Great Russians. He could not otherwise understand why the express or tacit assumption should prevail that the Ukrainians and other national minorities had to remain under "Muscovite" rule. He did not see why he should have had to choose between listening to Great Russian chauvinist or Polish chauvinist propaganda in political and cultural talks. Ukrainians had two strong motives for resistance: hatred of Bolshevism and hatred of "Muscovite" rule in any form. The Great Russians might have the first, but certainly did not have the second. Although it was no doubt necessary to appeal to the Russian people against the Soviet Government, such propaganda should be based upon the recognition of the principle of equal rights for all nationalities. Propaganda directed towards the UKRAINE would not be fully effective if the national interests and aspirations were not taken into account, including the right of the Ukrainians themselves to decide in favour of complete independence if they wished.

14. ~~14.~~ Given a B.B.C. programme in Ukrainian, ~~the informant~~ would like to hear, in addition to the news and political commentaries generally, talks on the history and culture of the UKRAINE from the national point of view, readings from Ukrainian history and literature, (especially patriotic poetry), and talks by Ukrainian national leaders in the West in whom the people in the homeland have confidence.

~~15. 16. A note on types of radio sets available in the Western UKRAINE and the extent to which they are privately owned is attached.~~

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This set can certainly receive foreign broadcasts with a small aerial.

(c) URAL, an all-wave mains set, expensive.

(d) MINSK, an all-wave mains set, expensive.

Spare parts can be bought equally freely.

16. ~~2~~ The area best known to the informant is mainly rural; ~~the~~ largest town has about 7-8,000 inhabitants. Privately-owned radio sets are virtually unknown as the country people cannot afford even the cheapest. The informant believes that if conditions continue to improve even peasants will be able to buy sets of their own. He similarly believes that circumstances are different in the towns, where industrial workers are better off. Meanwhile, however, in a typical village the manager of the kolkhoz will have a radio set linked to loudspeakers in the individual houses. (rediffusion). The headmaster of the school will also have one with loudspeakers in the class-rooms. There will also be a set in the social club or cultural centre controlled by a manager. These officials would be able to listen to foreign programmes, if they wished, at times when the loudspeaker system was not in use.

17. ~~3~~ Although there is no law against listening to foreign broadcasts, it is unlikely that anyone would dare to listen openly. To communicate foreign news is forbidden and requires great caution. Nevertheless such news does spread quickly. This is no doubt facilitated by the Ukrainian custom of following a greeting by asking for the latest news.

18. ~~4~~ The informant believes that his own views on foreign broadcasts are shared by at least the sympathisers of the resistance movement, whom he estimates at not less than 40% of the population. They would overcome their fear of detection in order to hear programmes with a truly national appeal. The resistance movement could ensure that the existence of a Ukrainian programme and the times of transmission became widely known.

19. ~~5~~ As to times when people could most easily listen, it is ~~hard~~ ^{difficult} to say of ~~the~~ ^{peasants} towns. There industrial workers are usually engaged on the three-shift system, - 03.00 a.m. to 11.00 a.m., 11.00 a.m. to 7.00 p.m., 7.00 p.m. to 3.00 a.m. Moscow time, for instance. In agriculture the hours are long and vary with the season. They coincide generally with daylight, except at harvest time, when work often goes on through the night. Compulsory meetings are usually held in the early evening and on Sundays. From all points of view the informant considers late evening and very early morning to be best ~~time~~ ^{time}.

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1. ← The resistance movement in the Western Ukraine largely relies for the support essential to its survival upon a body of sympathizers among ~~st~~ the civil population. It is these sympathizers who provide the illegally-living members (illegalniki) with food, shelter, medical attention, and funds. They also undertake purchases which would expose the illegalniki to too great danger, arrange the clandestine distribution of propaganda leaflets, and gather information required by the partisans. For their own security legally-living members (legalniki) are never asked to give shelter to, or carry out supply missions for, the illegalniki, nor do they distribute propaganda.

2. ← In the early years following the war the movement could depend upon the sympathy of practically the whole population for its aims and activities. After 1949, however, the extent of active support decreased considerably. Among ~~st~~ the most important factors contributing to this development were the following:

a) The civil population had paid dearly for their cordial reception of self-styled partisans who turned out to be provocative agents.

b) Collectivization had made it difficult for the people to spare food, clothing, or money for the organization.

c) There had been a special drive to improve living conditions in the mountainous areas where the resistance movement had some of its strongest footholds. This had persuaded many people to refrain from supporting illegal activities.

d) At the same time as the strength of the organization had been reduced by heavy losses, the grip of the regime on the territory had been tightened and its anti-partisan measures had improved with experience.

e) The apparent indifference of the Western Powers towards the fate of the subject peoples and the growing unlikelihood of a war of liberation had encouraged apathy.

3. ← Assistance with food, accommodation, and information, including warning of ambushes and searches, was still widely given to the members of the resistance organization in 1953. In the areas around Yavorov, Mostiska, and Sadova Vishnya from 40% to 50% of the population are classed as sympathizers and supporters. In the whole of Lvov Oblast the proportion is probably similar.

(N49-56, E23-23)
(N49-41, E23-09)

← Resistance Propaganda

4. ← In spite of the difficulties propaganda was still being carried on in 1953 among ~~st~~ the civil population in order to keep the national spirit alive. Although mass distribution was eschewed, as many as 2000 copies of a single leaflet could be disposed of in a year in the areas mentioned above, with a total of about 10,000 leaflets /of various...

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approach is cautious, especially in the case of a known Communist. A sympathiser will usually have indicated that an Eastern Ukrainian of his acquaintance seems to be open to approach. Leaflets are then covertly planted upon the target and his reaction is observed. If the indications are that he has not reported the incident to the authorities bolder steps are taken. Alternatively or in conjunction with this method an "illegalnik", protected by his bodyguard and with a safe method of flight, may make an unannounced call or engage the target in conversation in the open. Only leaders are allowed to enter upon such discussions as the rank and file are not considered to be well enough versed in argument and the nationalist case.

6. The following are some of the best examples from this field:

- a) At a village in Gorodok Rayon four lady teachers, two of whom were members of the Communist Party were first approached about 1949 and were given nationalist leaflets. These were well received. The two Communists were so enthusiastic over a leaflet containing a patriotic poem by an intellectual member of the resistance organisation that they wanted to teach the poem to the children.
- b) In the summer ~~of~~ 1950 a group of partisans called at a school in the Yavorov region. Hearing of their approach a student who was a member of the Komsomol hid his membership card in the stove as he had been told that the partisans always killed members of the Communist Youth. When his fears had been allayed he accepted the nationalist case and became a firm supporter of the movement.
- c) During 1952 an "illegalnik" leader made the acquaintance of another schoolmistress and her son and discussed the nationalist case with them. They received it well and always welcomed him afterwards. The leader was convinced that they had never made any attempt to denounce him.

6. As these examples suggest, the approaches were made mainly to teachers, among whom there are many Eastern Ukrainians. Many of them returned to the East for their annual holiday. Propaganda leaflets were usually given to those whose sympathy had been gained in order that they could pass them to close friends and relations at home. According to their reports these leaflets were favorably received.

7. The Eastern Ukrainians generally did not express their views freely on these matters. Often their reaction could only be surmised from reports that they had not denounced the partisans. Many did, however, reject the nationalist appeal outright. It seemed that they could not rid themselves of the way of thinking in which they had been indoctrinated as children. At a very rough estimate about half of the attempts to win over Eastern Ukrainians were received unsympathetically.

Attitude of the Resistance Movement and Its Sympathisers towards the Western Powers.

8. The members of the resistance organisation were frankly dis-

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been made known to the members. The main points are included below.

a) Germany

Through their policies and actions during the Second World War the Germans had forfeited all sympathy on the part of the Ukrainians. Not only had they falsified all hopes of liberation for the Ukraine but they had also played into the hands of the Communists and convinced the unwilling populations of the rest of the Soviet Union that there was no alternative to support of the Soviet authorities in defence of the country. The memory of the atrocities under German occupation made it impossible, the Central Leadership concluded, to tolerate German forces on Ukrainian territory under any guise whatsoever. If they came they would be the object of selective guerrilla warfare.

On the other hand, Soviet propaganda against German rearmament had made little impression on the leaders of the resistance and their sympathisers. It was appreciated that the Western Powers had to find allies against the Soviet Union wherever they could. The Ukrainians are not afraid of German rearmament and expansionism. This is in striking contrast to the Poles, who are genuinely frightened by the remilitarisation of Western Germany.

~~Note: The informant spent about three months in Poland on his way to the West.~~

b) Poland

The aspirations of the Ukrainian nationalist movement towards an independent national state on the national territory conflict with the desire of the Polish emigres to see the Western Ukraine returned to a free Poland. The Central Leadership of the movement had decided that a reasonable accommodation would have to be reached with a free Poland as with other adjacent states. Thus Ukrainian claims to Chelm, Jaroslavl, Przemysl and the surrounding country, which were regarded as undoubtedly Ukrainian territory, would not be pressed if a free Poland were willing to withdraw its claim to Ukrainian areas east of the present frontier. If the representatives of the Poles in exile maintained their "chauvinist" attitude Polish forces entering the Ukraine with the Western Allies would be regarded as invaders and would be opposed.

(N 51-07, E 23-39) (N 50-09, E 22-41) (N 49-47, E 22-47)

c) The United States and the United Kingdom

The Western Ukrainians would not expect the British or the Americans to behave like the Germans or to pursue a colonial policy in the Ukraine. They cannot, however, understand the policy of non-predetermination and regard it as indicating the intention to maintain Great Russian domination of the national republics. If this equivocal attitude continues until war breaks out the Ukrainian nationalists will receive allied forces with caution and reserve, neither molesting them nor greeting them in the traditional manner with triumphal arches and gifts of bread and salt. The final attitude of the nationalists will depend upon whether the right of the Ukrainians to decide the form of their state is admitted. Should a declaration by the Western Powers in favour of self-determination

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determination of the Ukraine be made only on the eve of war the nationalist movement would welcome it with reservations since the obviously selfish motive would give rise to doubts of good faith.

1 [] Comment. Source spent about three months in Poland on his way to the West.