

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM: SR/3/PP				COMMENTS	
					<p>KAPOK</p> <p>MICROFILMED MAY 31 1962 DOC. MICRO. SER.</p> <p><i>copy is attached</i></p> <p>13. For Filing March Cos/8</p> <p>KAPOK</p>
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.				<i>[Signature]</i>	
C/SR/3/PP					
2.					
3.					
4.			31 XII	<i>ku</i>	
C/SR/3					
5.					
6.		6 JAN 1960	6 JAN 1960	<i>[Signature]</i>	
<i>s dm</i>					
7.		7 JAN 1960		<i>[Signature]</i>	
<i>Rid/or</i>				<i>dku</i>	
8.					
9.					
10.					
RI/DP					
11.					
12.					
13.					
SR/3-PP					
14.					
15.	DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007				
16.					
17.					
18.					
COORDINATING OFFICERS			AUTHENTICATING OFFICER		
NAME		OFFICE	NAME		TITLE
			<i>[Signature]</i>		
					C/SR/3/PP
RELEASING OFFICER					
NAME		TITLE			
				C/SR/3	
ENCLOSURE	ABSTRACT	FILE NUMBER			
	INDEX	<i>74-124-29/3</i>			
DATE MICROFILMED			DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NUMBER	
			17 JAN 1960	EGMW-8642	

RECORD COPY

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION KAPOK SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMW 8642
TO INFO	Chief of Base, Munich Attn: [] COS, Germany	KAPOK SR/CA/E	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 74-124-29/3
FROM	Chief, SR	DATE	1 JAN 1960
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/ASSOCIATIVE Follow-up on Operational Lead from Marseille	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	Comments	<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)	<p>A. EGMA 45273, 15 October 1959 B. DIR 07419,</p> <p>1. Reference A was read with interest here at Headquarters, particularly your comments on techniques of approach to Soviets by emigres, on the one hand, and PEPRIERS on the other. (We should imagine that Soviet attitudes toward third nationals of Western or Central Europe would closely approximate those shown to PEPRIERS.) It is agreed that the "frontal attack" technique most often used by the emigres alerts the Soviet security chaperone and perhaps embarrasses the target. Emigres might well reconsider their techniques of approach with a view to achieving greater subtlety, particularly those emigre agents over whom KURANK control is exerted. At the same time, however, the difficulties of meeting Soviets privately at all in the limited time available are formidable. At least to some extent then, we are saddled with this frontal type of approach with all its frustrations and weaknesses. It can at least be hoped that some of the uncontrolled emigre activity serves as a screen for more sophisticated operations on the part of both controlled emigre assets and KURANK. It can also be argued, purely from a KUEAGE point of view, that exposing Soviets to exchanges of opinion and passing them literature are worthwhile ends in themselves. It can only be added that we need not be satisfied with this type of approach alone and should strive to use less direct means of access when opportunities allow, especially as our contact personnel, particularly emigre, become more familiar to the Soviets.</p> <p>2. The names of <u>Vasyl Ivanovich MALYNYUK (POB Stanislaw, Ukrainian SSR; DOB unknown)</u> or <u>Vasyl SEMOTIUK (DOB 5 August 1932, Stanislaw, Ukrainian SSR)</u> and <u>ANDREY Pavlovich GOROZHANKIN or GOROZHANKIN (DOB 9 November 1919 in Kharkov)</u> have been put on the SR target list. (See "comments" of Case Number 1, EGMA 8992, which explains the function of the Target List.) As you pointed out in Reference A, GOROZHANKIN appears to be a patriotic Ukrainian and a potential target. MALYNYUK made a similar impression, not only on AECASSOWARY/6, but on four other members of the AECASSOWARY/1 contact team whose reports were received by Headquarters via AECASSOWARY/2. Furthermore, MALYNYUK did give AECASSOWARY/6 an address in apparent expectation of overt correspondence. Serious consideration was given at Headquarters to attempting an immediate follow-up to MALYNYUK via an internally mailed letter ostensibly from AECASSOWARY/6, but in the end it was decided that there were too many unknown facts and factors and that we would be wiser to discard the plan in the hope that there will be another opportunity to assess MALYNYUK, either abroad or perhaps even inside the USSR. In line with Reference B, it is suggested that AECASSOWARY/6 not write to MALYNYUK through open mail for reasons which are apparent.</p> <p>3. Headquarters can offer no clarification of the confusion as to whether MALYNYUK is SEMOTIUK or vice versa. It seems that visa information received from [] frequently is incomplete and has gaps which occur when visas are requested from USSR cities other than Moscow. However, our confusion seems at least partly self-induced. From all reports MALYNYUK never claimed to be SEMOTIUK; this was our assumption. And he did give his name and address as MALYNYUK to AECASSOWARY/6 for the purpose of receiving mail. Whatever the truth, we do not know enough of it now to come to a dependable conclusion as to MALYNYUK's contamination or lack of it based on this factor.</p>		
<p>CS COPY</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - Addressee; 2 - COS, Germany</p>		<p>THIS DOCUMENT EXPIRES <u>Indefinitely</u> ON <u>Indefinitely</u> AT THE [] THE DOCUMENT IS TO BE [] WARD TO THE R/D [] REFERENCE SECTION FOR AP- []</p> <p>PROPRIETARY INFORMATION</p> <p>[] CONTINUED COPY</p>	
FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	RECORD COPY	(SIGNATURE) <u>SR/3-PP</u> (UNIT RECORD COPY)

