

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>KAPOK SECRET</b>	SYMBOL AND NO. EGOW-1653 <i>29</i>
TO INFO	Chief of Station, Germany Attn: [ ] and [ ] Chief of Base, Munich Chief of Base, Frankfurt	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 74-124-29/3	
FROM	Chief, SR	DATE 30 JUN 1960	
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/REDSKIN/AERODYNAMIC Improvement of KUTUBE Product of AERODYNAMIC Project	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	Acceptance of ABCASSOWARY/29's assignment to Frankfurt to be directed by FOB	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)			
<p>1. The coincidence of two observations concerning current REDWOOD activities led Headquarters to re-examine carefully the operational possibilities of the AERODYNAMIC Project. First, it was observed that constant efforts over several years to derive substantial KUTUBE yield from expensive operations involving emigre organizations as now constituted and as now directed by KUBARK have proved utterly abortive. Second, it was observed that comparatively substantial REDWOOD KUTUBE yield had been reaped from short-term trips by legal travelers - particularly Americans - who had been briefed and trained by KUBARK to simply use their eyes and ears, their memories and sometimes their cameras, with reference to requirements (most often physical targets) of interest to us.</p> <p>2. In re-examining our emigre projects generally, all the familiar empirically established limitations on their exploitability for classical espionage purposes were recognized; particularly, the predominating self-interest of emigre organizations, their insecurity as a result of opposition penetration or blabber among their members or both, and their intractability. It appeared, however, that the exploitation of the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization specifically, in contrast with perhaps all the rest, is not critically limited by these factors and not limited by some of them at all. As set forth in detail in the attachment hereto, there has never been any problem with the tractability of the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization, nor, insofar as we have been able to judge over a 12-year period, with its security. While its self-interest predominates by very definition, I have personally confirmed by conversation with ABCASSOWARY/2 that he sees that self-interest coinciding almost precisely with the interests of ODYSSEY. (The only aberration is apparently where the former espouses the cause of nationalist separatism and the latter overtly professes non-predetermination - which divergence is hardly likely to affect ABCASSOWARY/1-KUBARK cooperation.)</p> <p>3. We therefore concluded that the inadequate KUTUBE yield from the AERODYNAMIC Project, assuming as we still do that the potential is there, stems not from limitations inherent in the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization, but from our own omission to take the measures best calculated to realize that potential. Therefore, as explained in detail in the attachment, we have taken the time and trouble to set up an organizational and procedural system, to clear, train and brief key personnel, and to press ABCASSOWARY/2 exhaustively to supply the basic "OI" (biographic profiles and "who-knows-who" studies on all his assets) conspicuously lacking in the past. All this we have done in the hope that we can thereby significantly tap the relatively large number of Ukrainian emigre travelers to the Soviet Ukraine, as well as Soviet Ukrainians traveling in the West, for KUTUBE profit at least in the form of visual-aural observation reports and at most in the form of recruited reporting sources inside the Soviet Union.</p> <p>4. The operational desirability of making this effort strikes us as threefold: first, we would enlarge and sophisticate the spotting and assessing capabilities of ABCASSOWARY/1 with resultant benefit to operations run by us unilaterally or through them; second, we would achieve considerable proliferation of our capability to run the short-term briefed traveler type of operation and at the same time perhaps liberate some case officer strength, hitherto preoccupied by this type of endeavor,</p>			
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>KAPOK</b></p>			
FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PAGE NO. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED 1

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for concentration on the longer range, more difficult task of establishing inside clandestine assets; and third, we would be in a position to run the short-term briefed traveler type of operation without attributability to ODYSSKY, which seems particularly significant in this early post-U-2 era.

5. We think it highly desirable that **ARCASSONARI/29** be stationed in Frankfurt rather than in Munich for a number of reasons, principal among which are Frankfurt's remoteness from the curious eyes and ears of the abundant emigre community in Bavaria and the greater convenience of Frankfurt as a starting point for speedy transportation to various parts of Western Europe. He should be handled and directed by a case officer in the Soviet Branch of FCB because his work is directly in line with the mission of that Branch. We are well aware of the personnel shortage of which the Base has repeatedly complained but, if we are right in our expectation that this Project will multiply **RENNER** cases far beyond the capability of a single case officer to handle directly, we should think that FCB would consider it desirable to assign one case officer the responsibility of managing it full time. Your attention is invited in this regard to the fact that **ARCASSONARI/29** can be handled in English, nor do we believe that the case officer need have a Ukrainian background. Indeed, while some knowledge of Ukrainian affairs would undoubtedly enhance the case officer's rapport with **ARCASSONARI/29**, we believe that any good case officer will quickly acquire such knowledge sufficient for the purpose and that the absence of Ukrainian background on the part of the case officer may well enhance his ability to direct the Project with a completely objective eye to the interests of **KURARK** exclusively.

6. You will note in the attachment that we are providing **ARCASSONARI/29** with the documentation he needs to travel easily to other European countries. Needless to say, we would welcome any suggestions you may have for a better arrangement.

7. Since **ARCASSONARI/2** is about to travel to Europe in July on the routine business of his organization as well as **ARCASSONARI/1** activities connected with the Olympic games in Rome, and since it appears highly desirable that he personally introduce **ARCASSONARI/29** to various **ARCASSONARI/1** contacts and assets in Western Europe, we should like to get **ARCASSONARI/29** to the field as soon as possible. If he could get there in time to exploit the Congress of Historians commencing in Sweden on 16 August, so much the better. Our exploratory discussion with Chief, WE Division has shown a disposition on his part to cooperate as fully as the realities of liaison considerations will permit, and we propose to coordinate closely with WE Division those **ARCASSONARI/1** activities which affect West European countries. Your earliest favorable consideration of this matter would therefore be most appreciated and, upon receipt of your concurring views and comments, we shall prepare to dispatch **ARCASSONARI/29** to Frankfurt promptly.

8. A biographic profile of **ARCASSONARI/29** follows.

[ ]

Attachment: As noted above

28 June 1960

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee (w/att)
- 2 - COB, Munich (w/att)
- 2 - COB, Frankfurt (w/att)
- 1 - RI (w/att)
- 2 - SR/3 (w/att)

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Att. to HCOW-1653

30 June 1960

1. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to acquaint addressees with measures Headquarters has taken and proposes for the promotion or augmentation of the operational capabilities of ANCHONANY/1, particularly regarding FI collection via HEDSKIN and contact operations. This does not represent the launching of a new project, but an endeavor systematically to revitalize and expand an old one.

2. Summary of Past Activities: While several readers are already familiar with Project ANCHONANY, the present status of the project and Headquarters plans can be best put in perspective by a brief review of the past. Project ANCHONANY is older than any other going HEDSKIN project involving groups of erstwhile Soviet citizens. The original organization of which ANCHONANY/1 is an off shoot, was an anti-Soviet political organization founded on present day Soviet Ukrainian soil during World War II as the governing body of an independence movement. Both in name and in program the Ukrainian liberation movement was and is widely known throughout the Ukraine through its partisan warfare and anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet propaganda activities, which were conducted in an organized centralized manner on Soviet soil from 1943 until approximately 1953. Towards the end of World War II, a representation of the parent governing group in the Ukraine, i.e., ANCHONANY/1, was ordered abroad to seek liaison with and aid from Western governments to further the Ukrainian nationalist cause. Most members of ANCHONANY/1 had been in one way or another directly involved with Ukrainian nationalist intelligence operations in the late 1930's and during World War II. By 1946 they were already trying to re-establish from Western Europe reliable, covert communications with underground headquarters in the Ukraine. More than any other Ukrainian group abroad, ANCHONANY/1's target audience has been the population of the Ukraine and not the emigration.

In 1948, under Project KOB, KUBARK examined the KUBARK potential of all major emigre groups in Europe composed of World War II Soviet defectors. Out of about 30 groups studied, ANCHONANY/1 was selected as the organization best qualified for clandestine KUBARK operations with KUBARK. Since 1948, activities under this project have fallen into three distinct eras:

a. The years from 1948 to 1953 included active KUBARK KUBARK operations with minor attention to KUBARK and KUBARK. Although emphasis during this period was on FI production, the vagaries of intermittent communications by courier and W/F with ANCHONANY/1 forces in the Ukraine did not permit anywhere near as favorable FI and operational results as KUBARK expected. Nonetheless, ANCHONANY KUBARK FI results, which admittedly seem meager compared with what is available via other types of operations today, were decidedly superior to those of other KUBARK endeavors of those years, in the

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edition of HIRSHO'D Report's Bureau. It was, however, all too clear by the early 1950's that underground work in the Ukraine was seldom able to collect and transmit PI enough on their own immediate scene, usually the five oblasts which formerly comprised southwestern Poland. In 1950 disintegration of this project was thus changed from HIRSHO'D to ERMAN, after further AMBASSADOR's Bureau flights were ruled out, because no solid Russian potential was discernible.

b. The years 1953 to 1958 were characterized by Russian activity and a few KAPPOK's gains. On the HIRSHO'D side some useful operational data were collected and limited major hits of PI operationally came into the group's hands via the open walls of newspapers and had been to the USSR. The first correspondence with a disaffected Soviet Ukrainian prisoner which yielded no significant positive intelligence but which was an absolute for the AMBASSADOR's regarding the possibilities of HIRSHO'D.

c. Summer 1958 until fall 1959 was the beginning of three new activities: first, organizational HIRSHO'D-supervised contact operations directed at Soviet Ukrainians traveling abroad; secondly, the first productive AMBASSADOR's/1 legal travel operations; and thirdly, two-way clandestine communication via an established correspondence with an AMBASSADOR's/1 movement member in the Ukraine.

The first major contact effort took place in 1958 at the Brussels World's Fair. It produced not only high-grade PI, but also showed that as much as could AMBASSADOR's/1's team of agents could spot, assess and use; important of all, turn over to HIRSHO'D disaffected Soviet Ukrainians whom HIRSHO'D then served unconditionally to exploit. (See Case History 1 in HIRSHO'D's, dated 19 June 1959.) The major AMBASSADOR's/1 team effort in 1959 took place at the Vienna Youth Festival and at the Marshallian Trade Fair respectively. While operating conditions at the latter events were less propitious than at Brussels, interesting leads on such Soviet Ukrainians were picked up and the AMBASSADOR's/1 agents again showed their ability both to get at disaffected anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists and to cooperate closely and well with HIRSHO'D.

The AMBASSADOR's/1 ran one HIRSHO'D operation in summer 1959 involving a young agent with Western citizenship. Although he was in the Ukraine for only a week, that good PI disconnections and several leads on vulnerable Soviet Ukrainian nationalists resulted from his trip.

Intelligence on the Soviet Ukraine was also disadvantaged as the result of an AMBASSADOR's/1 agent's trip to Poland, where he failed to Ukrainians who had access to information from the Ukraine proper.

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3. Major Deficiencies in Past Project AEGASHOVARY Operations:

AEGASHOVARY/1 HEDSKIN and contact operations over the past three years have been makeshift and by no means worthy of the opportunities available, nor of A/1's apparent potential. Many of the following deficiencies have stemmed, in large part at least, from KURANK's omission to assign staffers to the project, both at Headquarters and in the field, adequate in number to either the expense (now [ ] [ ] annually) or the potential of the project:

a. The AEGASHOVARYS have not been adequately familiar with our KURANK concepts, procedures and objectives; in addition, there have been no AEGASHOVARY/1 personnel professionally trained by us and qualified to run operations as competently as some of our better contact assignments.

b. AEGASHOVARY/2, the leader of the group and the man with the greatest amount of operational experience and responsibility, has been too busy himself and has not delegated enough authority to those subordinates who have worked with us briefly and on specific operations such as the Brussels Fair. A/2's tight control of operations and his location in New York City, away from direct frequent case officer contact, have tended to stultify both the planning and the conduct of operations.

c. During the years 1953 to 1958, mostly at our suggestion, KURANK activities (black radio, mailing to the Ukraine of publications for Soviet Ukrainians) expanded, with the result that the AEGASHOVARYS had little time or money left to spend on KURANK.

d. From roughly 1946 until summer 1958, the AEGASHOVARYS had a somewhat clouded, outdated picture of Soviet Ukrainian public opinion and of basic intelligence on Soviet reality needed to mount efficient HEDSKIN or contact operations.

e. Briefing and training of HEDSKIN legal travel agents handled by the AEGASHOVARYS has been inadequate by KURANK standards.

f. No deliberate system has been established for the quick transmission of AEGASHOVARY/1 leads or other operational information to KURANK or for the consequent timely issuance of KURANK guidance or for prompt KURANK intrusion in the operation.

4. Headquarters Action to Correct These Deficiencies:

a. To get the AEGASHOVARYS thinking more in our own terms, AEGASHOVARY/15 and 29 were given, at Headquarters, the most extensive and thorough training and briefing program (see paragraph 5 below) yet administered to members of a HEDSKIN exile group.

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- b. For our new agreement with A/R (see paragraph 6 below), Headquarters needs adequate executive authority and responsibility for operational action. Some have suggested the AMASSADOR/15 and A/R/2 to permit them to cooperate with KIRMAK and officers in virtually any way they see fit.
- c. The blank radio broadcasts from PRIME are being tested, recording every A/R man knows the other way than simple writing and taping.
- d. During the testing of A/15 and A/R/2, Headquarters has put great stress on operational data as applied to what a terminal can or cannot do with respect to PRIME. The PRIME has used four distinctly opposed operational terminal. Legends also has been separately organized. (Finally, we could be surprised, the terminal had only a vague and old fashioned view of what PRIME terminals in the USSR can and cannot do, their present overall importance or public opinion, living conditions, sociological changes, etc., in the Soviet Union are precise and tally well with PRIME information from other sources; they have been able to keep abreast of general developments in the USSR via direct conversations with Soviet PRIME stations abroad, via debriefings of returning tourists, via scrutiny of several hundred letters from the USSR and through regular study of some 80 Soviet PRIME publications.)
- e. We have drilled into AMASSADORS 2, 15 and 20 that careful evaluation, assessment and training are indispensable to productive operations.
- f. We have brought A/R to realize that the level of future support of his organization depends on good results in operations supported by KIRMAK. Fortunately, he has always been just as interested in content with reporting success in the USSR as we, even though his methods to get them have been simple or unorthodox by our lights. He realizes that his organization, to remain vital, must either improve the touch with the USSR or wither. In addition, he claims to be in full accord with our efforts to professionalize the operational methods of his organization.
- g. Headquarters has ascertained to the our satisfaction that there will be no conflict between the USSR and USSR activities of A/R: 1-8, unless  , the AMASSADORS have no qualms about directing PR, nor, in principle, about turning over classified Soviet PRIME terminals travelling abroad to KIRMAK.
5. Personnel, Training, Security and Governmental Matters: That does AMASSADOR/1 have to offer PRIME in terms of personnel and activity A/R has had excellent results in some 10 countries. These results require to date have varied on some distinctive activities on behalf of AMASSADOR/2. More of them have diplomas from Western universities and many have graduate degrees. Pro-PR quently, their cover for being in the area is that of graduate students. In

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other cases they are professional men who have become international criminals. In A/15/1975 and 89, A/2 has given us two men whose operational experience goes back to the beginning of our history world war II. For current plans, the better located and more talented of A/8's agent-employers overseas will now be placed under A/89 and those in North and South America under A/15. In Vienna, the local A/1 residents agent happens also to be an agent of the Vienna Station [redacted]. Local contact with a Russian case officer can obviously be arranged elsewhere if expedient.

A/15 is an associate of A/1 group of long standing. He has been associated with A/2 since the end of WW II and with KIMBLE since 1971. Regarding A/89, although he had taken part in A/1 contact operations in Brussels, Vienna and Amsterdam, he was something of an unknown quantity to KIMBLE until he arrived in the U.S. in 1960 after completing studies at an English university. (see Linsky detachment). Following thorough assessment of A/89 and reassessment of A/15, both men began a 13-week training program, including the 800 course, a five-week course on basic operational techniques and teamwork and two weeks of photography and SW. This program ended on 10 June, with the final two days devoted to briefings on requirements, KIMBLE and IMPACT, the latter primarily based on SW/10 experience, with [redacted] and others participating.

It is important to note that A/1 differs in several operationally germane respects from other active entities in the REDWOOD field. For example, the source of the A/15/1975 activity to represent the veritable Russian underground and Ukrainian nationalists in the theater did not originate in the anti-Communist. The A/15/1975 have not tried to become a mass organization, to mobilize the migration or to lobby for the approval of the migration to the extent other groups have. Full-time members of the A/1 organization were recruited in the Ukraine during or after WW II. There are only about 12 such full members abroad and only one of these, A/8, has been directly involved in A/1-ORANGE KIMBLE operations over recent years. Most A/1 agents used at the Imperial Fair and their resident agents in normal foreign consulates are sympathizers, ex-situated supporters and in some cases employees, but not full-time members of the group. A/15 and 89 fall in the supporter-employee category. They are former active members of the Ukrainian underground movement and participated in the A/1 organization during or after the war.

Compared with other active organizations from the USSR, the security behavior and consciousness of the A/15/1975 have been quite good. As former members of an underground, they seem genuinely to adhere to and not just talk about the need-to-know principle and compartmentation of operations. We have 12 years of operational experience with them on which to base this conclusion. Since they are not interested in absorbing new members into their

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inner circle, it would presumably be hard for the KIS to penetrate them via an outsider. Some bogus couriers were sent to them from the Ukraine in the late 1940's and early 1950's, it is true, but they categorically refused to take the chance of using any post-World War II defector or former courier in their sensitive operations no matter how reliable he seems. Obviously, Headquarters has no evidence yet that the inner circle of the A/1 group has been penetrated or is insecure.

As far as their honesty and cooperativeness towards KUBARK are concerned, after many years of cooperation we have no grounds for significant complaint.

6. Basic Agreement with ABOLETSKY/2: The following agreement was negotiated with A/2 in early 1951:

a. From the A/2 side, A/15 is designated as Chief of Operations; he will continue to reside in Washington and will take direction from KUBARK; KUBARK's legal travel and contact operations in the Western Hemisphere will be his responsibility.

b. All appropriate operational contacts and data for the accomplishment of his mission will be transferred to A/15 by A/2.

c. A/2 need not be consulted on operational matters, but may be kept generally advised of operational activity by A/15 or KUBARK directly. He has agreed to impart this information to no one, expressing his confidence that his colleagues in the A/1 ruling council will be satisfied by A/2's assurance that he knows and approves what is going on.

d. A/29 is senior operations officer for Europe, will take direction from KUBARK, and will receive from A/2 all enigma contacts necessary for his KUBARK and contact operations mission.

e. Neither A/15 nor A/2 will enter unduly into problems connected with A/29's operations, except in the rare instance where A/2 feels the operation conflicts with A/1 basic interests. However, A/15 will receive a copy of A/29's routine reports from the Headquarters desk officer to be held in a secure area (CHUCK's property) together with his own operational records. Only KUBARK communications channels will be used to convey sensitive information from A/29 to A/15 or A/2.

f. Knowledge of A/1 or KUBARK Ukrainian operations will be restricted on the A/1 side to those who need to know (cf. sub-paragraph c above).

g. A/2, 15 and 29 will generally respect KUBARK's option to remove a lead or operation for unilateral KUBARK development.

h. No formal written protocol to define this agreement will be prepared.

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7. Further Nationalist Political Campaigns Against the Soviet Union Problem:  
Headquarters' renewed emphasis in using Ukrainian nationalism as a plank for getting to respectable Soviet citizens or as a substitute for getting it based only emotionally on the masses of those young substitute operations with the AMALASHOVICH listed in paragraph 5c above. Headquarters' interest is more precisely based on information noted by KIMBLE quite independent of the AMALASHOVICH. Some of the more important latter points are:

- a. Many of the Soviet citizens abroad who have accepted KIMBLE recruitment by KIMBLE have been Ukrainians.
- b. In a majority of the better Soviet emigre EMIGRANT cases, the double agent has been a Ukrainian nationalist.
- c. There are more Ukrainian VI II emigres in the free world than any other single Soviet nationality, including Russians.
- d. More Ukrainian emigres have travelled legally to the USSR in the past two years than Russian emigres.

e. As far as Headquarters is concerned, the easiness of Ukrainian organized nationalists at all levels of urban and particularly rural working in the Ukraine has caused to be susceptible of logical reduction. Such nationalism has been openly noted in recent years by foreign visitors in the Ukraine, by persons talking with Soviet Ukrainians travelling abroad, in letters from the Ukraine and by the Soviet Ukrainian press, which now discusses the problem of nationalism in the Ukraine virtually daily. As one example of the type of reporting Headquarters has been getting on Ukrainian nationalism, all those of the better KIMBLE-controlled guides at the Belomorsk Fair [ ] reported talking at street level with Ukrainian nationalists; further, according to [ ] "the largest number of requests for political asylum (during the Belomorsk Fair) and for delivery of letters to Vice President Nixon came from Ukrainians, who were very careful to identify themselves as such to differentiate themselves from Russians."

- f. There is no evidence, as formerly feared, that the A/I organization is operationally handicapped by the Galician as opposed to Russian Ukrainian origins.
- g. Comparative experience shows that the AMALASHOVICH are more able than other KIMBLE assets to ferret out and make up for recruitment disrupted Ukrainian nationalists in or from the USSR.
- h. AMALASHOVICH have already spotted some eight interesting prospective KIMBLE travelers to the Soviet Union for summer 1960, two of whom Headquarters probably will send on routed KIMBLE missions using the AMALASHOVICH as contacts.

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8. In presenting now to matters specifically concerned with A/29, documentation and cover documents-- documentation for A/29 presents some problems for which there is no previous discussion at Headquarters. He immigrated to the PAPAGO on January 1960 and is now a permanent resident entitled to an Affidavit in Lieu of Passport bearing a re-entry permit. With such a document it would be possible for him to live for extended periods abroad and still return to the U.S. The document is also acceptable to foreign authorities for registration and lengthy sojourn and even permits working in those countries. As you are well aware, however, it is sometimes complicated or time consuming to travel quickly from one European country to another with this affidavit, because visas sometimes are difficult to obtain. This document is therefore inadequate for A/29. Several other alternatives and combinations have been considered, including back-stopped and non-back-stopped third national passports in alias for use in situations where there will not be time to obtain a visa by means of the legitimate affidavit. Alias documentation, while it might still be useful on special occasions, was set aside for regular travel because A/29 is widely known within the European Ukrainian community and in some cases his presence in a given country will not be secret. The flap potential of an alias document is obvious. Thus, basic documentation should, in Headquarters' view, be in true name, which will still allow A/29 maximum freedom of movement. Having considered the documents of various countries available to us, the best solution seems to be a back-stopped legal Mexican passport. This passport allows non-visa travel in all countries of Europe with the exception of Finland, Norway, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. In these cases visas can normally be acquired on short notice. In the case of the Near East, including Turkey, visas are also required. The duration of the Mexican passport is two years, with the option of renewal or, perhaps preferable in A/29's case, issuance of a new passport on the basis of the old one. It should not be necessary for A/29 to contact Mexican diplomatic representatives throughout the entire period of his use of the passport unless we choose to renew it legally after two years. In conjunction with issuance of the Mexican passport, KUNUK will take steps to safeguard A/29's U.S. residency status through liaison with KUNUK.

9. There is an obvious basic weakness in this device. Although the Mexican passport is legally issued and will stand up to examination and investigation, A/29 has nothing in his background to provide justification for possession of the document. Furthermore, he does not speak Spanish. However, we are assured that similar cases exist, and if A/29 consciously avoids circumstances in which he might be put on the spot, he should have no trouble or even embarrassment, particularly since he does handle several common European languages, including English. For further information on this subject, available locally, please refer to [redacted], who recently arrived at MEXIPAZ from Headquarters. Klenack took part in our initial discussions on A/29's documentation and is well aware of all aspects of the particular problem, with all documentation possibilities and specifically with the Mexican passport arrangement in question.

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10. Headquarters has also wrestled with the question of A/SB's cover. Obviously his cover should include an active connection with AMMERMAN, A/L's primary editorial officer and publications center, as A/SB will be indirectly engaged in conducting A/L supporters and collaborators' news already connected with AMMERMAN and A/L. It would seem best to affiliate A/SB with the primary segment of A/L as opposed to the Munich segment in order to justify within the group A/SB's direct control over his and to allow him freedom from Munich A/L control. (A/SB is, after all, a fairly junior on the A/L ladder. He is entrusted by many in Munich from the point of view age, experience and position in A/L.) In the A/SB's feeling, however, that his ties with AMMERMAN, while certainly supplementing his presence in Europe to the publications, will not stand up within the American community. He sees therefore working out an arrangement for a strategic supplementary cover job not requiring cover details or issues of work but involving either an educational grant or a nominal part-time job on behalf of some political foundation or commercial establishment. This would certainly provide A/SB with some of his financial support and with reason for some travel. He should keep you informed as the details are worked out.

11. From previous AMMERMAN correspondence the field is probably aware that A/L has recent operations underway in at least three international events scheduled for this summer: the Bonn Congress, 25 August through 31 September; the Congress of Intellectuals in Stockholm, 16-20 August and, to a lesser extent, the International Law Congress in Hamburg, 8-13 August. The timing of these events requires that A/SB be in Europe between the middle and end of July in order to make suitable preparations. The recommended documentation outlined above calls for several meetings/ steps which we are expediting in order to meet this deadline.

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