

# DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
~~SECRET~~

### PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ABSTRACT	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief of Base, Frankfurt

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany

FROM: Chief, FR

SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~  
Contact with Professor Leopold SCHUBER

#### ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

**FBI**

REF 8166, November 1960

1. Attached is ~~SECRET~~/27's report on two meetings on 28 and 29 November 1960, with Professor Leopold SCHUBER, member of Maria Theresia-Universität in Salzburg, Austria. Included are joint comments on the meetings by ~~SECRET~~/27, ~~SECRET~~/4, and ~~SECRET~~/25, the latter two having participated in the planning and execution of the operation.

2. We were able to locate SCHUBER with the help of KUBARK, which has been regularly debriefing a United States college professor in contact with him. ~~SECRET~~/27 also got in touch with a German collaborator and obtained information from Professor George H. H. HENCK, a German who had talked to SCHUBER when the latter was in Germany. We found considerable information on SCHUBER at Headquarters from KUBARK and other sources. We debriefed ~~SECRET~~/27 in New York on the evening of 27 December (KUBARK revealed that SCHUBER's visa would run out on 29 December) with all the facts and opinions available. ~~SECRET~~/27 was instructed to use the first meeting to establish the extent of SCHUBER's knowledge of the Station, the nature of his contacts there, his travel plans and immediate itinerary, and to form some impression as to his character and vulnerabilities. ~~SECRET~~ (correct spelling, we believe), who had been in correspondence with the KUBARK source (they had met at Oxford on SCHUBER's recommendation in early 1960), had alleged that money in Salzburg dated SCHUBER would go to Communist China as Poland's next ambassador. ~~SECRET~~/27 was therefore particularly charged with learning if there was any truth to that rumor.

3. Following the first meeting, we decided that ~~SECRET~~/27 should make another run on SCHUBER to probe more pointedly in the direction of operational collaboration with SCHUBER's low contacts and/or with SCHUBER.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

74-124-29/3

DATE TYPED: 16 January 61  
DATE DISPATCHED: 23 JAN 1961

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER  
~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER  
74-124-29/3

CLASSIFICATION  
~~SECRET~~

ORIGINATING  
OFFICE: SR/3/CA  
OFFICER: [ ]  
TYPIST: kfs  
EXT: 4387

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
ACSR/3/CA	16 Jan 61	[ ]
CSR/3	16. 1. 61	[ ]
EE/P	-	[ ]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
EE/G	3/Jan 61	[ ]

ROUTING	INITIAL
RI/AN	ap
RI/	W
SR/3	

himself. In the course of the telephone conversation with SKIDLER, ARKASSONARI/27, in explaining the purpose of his call, mentioned his desire to contribute to the support of his countrymen inside the Ukraine in their striving to maintain their national character. SKIDLER termed the people in Lvov and himself "bitter realists" and said something to the effect that books were fine, but did ARKASSONARI/27 have anything else to offer. On the basis of these remarks, which were interpreted by the ARKASSONARI and the undersigned to mean that SKIDLER was really interested in "doing business," ARKASSONARI/27 was encouraged to suggest official collaboration and if conditions were favorable, to hint that he could get SKIDLER in touch with the "proper" SKIDLER element.

4. An elaborate electric razor was bought by ARKASSONARI/27 for SKIDLER, primarily as a memento but also to get SKIDLER's reaction to material benefits.

5. Apparently, we had misinterpreted SKIDLER's remarks. He was not in fact interested in immediate personal gain or in a clear-cut operational arrangement for that or any other reason. It was felt at the conclusion of the operation by all concerned that the contact had been developed to the furthest possible extent for the time being.

6. Although ARKASSONARI/27 was unable to obtain SKIDLER's subsequent itinerary, KINSEP learned from its source that he was returning to Poland via London and Paris, but was unable to provide dates. It is virtually certain that SKIDLER has gotten together with HENRIK in London. If there is any way to obtain information through HENRIK on what SKIDLER had to say or on his plans, we would appreciate receiving it.

7. Although the immediate results of the SKIDLER contact were less than we had for a while hoped for, the case does appear to have a future, and on a greater scale than we had at first believed. The apparent fact that certain circles within Poland are in sympathy with Ukrainian nationalistic aspirations appears significant, though certainly not in keeping with pre-war Polish policy. Restrained nationalistic tendencies on the part of certain Ukrainian intellectuals in Lvov are known, of course, and SKIDLER's disinterest case as no surprise.

8. ARKASSONARI/27 will follow up the contact as agreed with SKIDLER.

Attachment:

As stated

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addresses, w/att.  
2 - COS, Germany, w/o att.

1 - RI, w/o att.  
1 - EE/P, w/o att.  
1 - EE/G, w/o att.  
1 - SR/3/CA, w/o att.