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Subject: CHERNIAVSKY, Viktor []

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1. On 20 June 1967 Eugen STAKHIV phoned Viktor CHERNIAVSKY at the Permanent Mission of Ukr SSR to the U.N. in New York City and told ^{him} that he and Vsevolod Holubnychy as leaders of the Round Table Club would like to invite SHCHERBYTSKY and some other people of his entourage for a friendly talk. CHERNIAVSKY did not seem to be very enthusiastic about the idea but promised to get in touch with SHCHERBYTSKY and others and then call back Stakhiv. He did not, however, do so. Instead on 22 June 1967 CHER phoned Dr Kl and asked her whether he could come to see her still same day. Dr Kl invited him to come as soon as he could, and so he did.

2. Following is the gist of what he told Dr Kl:

a/ First he asked her whether she knew about Stakhiv's and Holubnychy's proposal to meet with SHECHERBYTSKY, Premier of the Ukraine. Dr Kl knew about it as in the meantime STAKHIV informed her about on the telephone. In CHER'S view Stakhiv's invitation was rather impolite and on the whole the people from the Round Table Club seemed not to properly appraise Shcherbytsky's position. Asked in detail about what exactly he meant CHER finally admitted that he personally was against STAKHIV, HOLUBNYCHY and CHOMIAK'S meeting with the Premier because "these people behaved themselves rather improperly in recent times". STAKHIV was rather rough, HOLUBNYCHY acted like a typical egocentrist and a man who thinks the whole world is dependent on him, and CHOMIAK looked to him like a small Napoleon^o while being just a little FBI-fry. CHER had nothing against the Round Table Club as such but he did not think the people he had mentioned would lead it in proper direction. Anyway he was not going to call back STAKHIV and would ^{probably} ignore his future calls.

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In such or similar words CHER told that Dr Kl or at least this was her inference of what she was told.

b/ Pressed on this point, CHER explained that they are against contacts with "so called politicians" and wanted to deal with cultural activists among emigres in the first place. Scholars, writers, poets, people like SHEVELOV, PRITAK and alike are partners for talks. To Dr Kl's remark that neither SHCHERBYTSKY nor BILOKOLOS had much in common with science and culture, CHER replied that this did not mean they were against meeting political people altogether, "they just preferred cultural activists to politicians". On this occasion he mentioned that Prof SHEVELOV had also called the Mission and asked for a meeting with SHCHERBYTSKY. He did not know, however, whether they will meet.

c/ Continuing on the topic, CHER stressed that STAKHEV, HOLUBNYCHY and others made a great mistake by giving KOROTYCH "a bad treatment". KOROTYCH became a good friend of CHER, they talked for hours and hours, KOROTYCH was delighted with the treatment he had received from Americans "and very disappointed with Ukrainians". This was very bad because KOROTYCH might be now less enthusiastic about contacts with emigres than he ~~had been~~^{was} before. And KOROTYCH could do really much today, he was not like "still rather immature DRACH" or "your shouting Galician PAVLYCHKO" but "a formed man with proper influence and tact".

d/ Instead of meeting with the Round Table CHER suggested that BILOKOLOS and SHEVEL would come to Dr Kl's house for a meeting with a few people and he left it to Dr Kl whom she wanted to invite. Dr Kl replied that she would welcome the two gentlemen and will wait on^a final word from CHER as she did not want to be in the same position as during former one-time attempt to get an interview with BILOKOLOS. CHER assured that this time it was different. They will stay at least until 6 or 8 July 1967 and maybe even longer. Only SHCHERBYTSKY would probably leave sooner.

e/ CHER added that it would be a good idea for Dr Kl to visit Ukraine next year. Dr Kl asked whether she could do any research there to what CHER replied that he saw no obstacles to that. Incidentally, he

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wanted to know what was going to happen to Dr Kl's book she was working now on and whether Kiev could publish it in Ukrainian. Dr Kl told ^{him} she had nothing against it but this is a matter for future consideration since the book is not finished yet. The book is on the relations of Western Powers with Ukrainian Republic in 1917-20.

CHER also suggested that it would be a good idea if Dr Kl would at least send a short letter to KOLOSSOVA Kateryna with thanks for "Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia" she received from her, "and other gifts".

3. Asked about KOSYGIN'S visit to the UN and whether he would meet with President Johnson, ~~CHER replied that this was not sure as yet because~~ the White House showed "a terrible lack of hospitality". If the UN were on Soviet territory and Mr Johnson would come to the Soviet Union, Mr Kosygin would have done much more to meet with him. But he hoped that finally they ~~will~~ meet.

4. As to the Middle East (Dr Kl pretended to be more on the Arabs' side) the matter is not solved yet. The situation is very dangerous but CHER hoped that "reason will prevail" and "the USA will not go to war ^{the sake of} for Jewish interests". Otherwise there would be a nuclear war and no one wanted it. The USA will have to press on the Israelis to give up their occupation of Arab lands and their arrogant demands in general. The Soviet Union will not give up the Arabs and will remain their staunch supporter. "This is not yet the end of the story" - he stressed. "Of course, the Arabs have ^{so} disappointed." The cause of their defeat lies in "Arab mentality". "Can you imagine, they didn't even unpack equipment we sent them" - he continued. "They are lazy, so lazy they don't even care for themselves".

To Dr Kl's remark that one way or another this was also the Soviet Union's defeat, CHER replied that not altogether or rather necessarily ^{so} because the Arabs will depend on Soviet aid and friendship and the Western influence has been finally wiped out in this area. "No miracle will be able to return Arabs towards the Western capitalists and the USA and England can forget about their

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previous positions there". That's on the one hand. And on the other, the Israelis will have to give in and all Arabs see it quite clearly that this will be done only under Soviet Union(s) pressure. If the West thinks of Israel as its base in the Middle East then it has also to realize that its meaning in the future will be nil in comparison with the Arab world. And the latter was definitely lost to the West.

5. The USA could not, of course, get into another adventure having on its back the Vietnam. CHER stressed that he positively knew that more and more responsible politicians ^{in the U.S.D.} began to realize that the US had completely bogged down in Vietnam and thought no longer about victory but of how to get out of the mess. Had the US not intervened in Vietnam it would be today a peaceful country with no pretext for Chinese to use it "for making trouble in the world".

6. CHER's children will not come to the USA and "under the circumstances (he was referring ^{to} the Middle East) it was better they stayed at home".

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N.B. On 24 June 1967 C. met with Dr Kl at Wallkill, N.J. and agreed on who eventually would take part in the meeting at her house. So far she preferred to wait for CHER'S call and took no initiative of her own despite C's "polite encouragement".

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