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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

14 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SB/POS

SUBJECT : Spotting, Assessing and Recruiting on Campuses

REFERENCE : SB Division Notice No. 68-29 (attached)

1. Although in the past 6 months there have been no AECASSOWARY reports concerning contacts with Soviet students studying at American universities such contacts did exist in the past and presumably will occur again. When a contact is made with a Soviet student in an American university by an American student of Ukrainian parentage, who happens to be a collaborator of the AECASSOWARIES studying at the same university, it frequently is reported to the AECASSOWARIES. AECASSOWARY/29 might then ask his collaborator to report everything he learns about the Soviet during casual contacts with him (e.g., biographical information, personality traits, personal habits, interests, etc.), and on the basis of such additional information either encourage his collaborator to develop a closer relationship with the Soviet, or A/29 might indicate only a casual or no interest and permit the contact to continue on its own or be dropped.

2. A/29 has been instructed always to advise the American student to report any contact with Soviets to the FBI. It is explained to the student that this is for his own protection in the event someone should later report to the FBI that the source was seen associating with Soviets for some purpose inimical to the security of the United States. The FBI has the opportunity to decide whether or not it wants to pursue the contact with the Soviet through the AECASSOWARY collaborator or to instruct him to discontinue the contact.

*See comment in
writing file
11/19*

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3. The AECASSOWARIES never "recruit" Soviet citizens. Details on all contacts with Soviets are reported. If a vulnerability is revealed on the basis of the reports received, CIA can then decide on the procedure to be followed concerning any further contact with the Soviet. The AECASSOWARIES will respond to CIA instructions should it be decided that CIA or the FBI wishes to take over the contact unilaterally.

4. We have been aware of the fact that the FBI has the prerogative on contacts with Soviet students in the United States. However, Project AERODYNAMIC was allowed to conduct such contacts on the premise that the AECASSOWARY collaborators who actually contact the Soviets are unwitting of any U.S. Government involvement, and that such contacts will exist whether or not the AECASSOWARIES collected the information on the Soviet contact from their collaborators. The FBI is aware of AECASSOWARY contact activities and of their collaboration with the CIA.

5. In view of the reference, what new instructions, if any, should be given to the AECASSOWARIES with respect to any future contact with student personnel? To date, nothing dramatic ever developed from such contacts, but we like to believe that where the involvement with the Soviet student reaches the point where he accompanied the AECASSOWARY collaborator to various emigre activities (concerts, dances, churches) or to the homes of Ukrainian emigres that at least a favorable impression of the West is left on the Soviet, and that information collected on the Soviet is of value to the CIA.

[SB/PO/M]

Orig & 1 addressee
2 SB/PO/M

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