

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

273 CMCWU

14 January 1952

SUBJECT: REDSOX/AERODYNAMIC
Transmittal of Contact Reports.

TO: Chief, ZACACTUS
Washington, D.C.

INFO: Chief of Mission
Frankfurt, Germany

ATTN: []

ATTN: []

Transmitted herewith are the following contact reports relative to the proposed plans for joint JAYHAWK-U.S. operations:

Enclosure A: Report of the conference held 19 December 1951 between the U.S. and JAYHAWK field case officers to work out the details of joint operations in the AERODYNAMIC field.

Enclosure B: Report based on the meeting held 27 December 1951 between CASSOWARIES 3, 4 and [], outlining CASSOWARY views towards the plans for joint operations.

Copies are being sent through ^{24CAB10} ~~ZACACTUS~~ channels.

Distribution

- 3 - ZACACTUS, Washington w/Encls A & B (in tripl)
- 3 - Chief of Mission, Frankfurt w/Encls A & B
- 2 - CSOB w/o Encls
- 1 - SGHOLDEN w/o Encls

- 2 Enclosures: HEREWITH
- A. Rpt of 19 Dec 51
 - B. Rpt of 27 Dec 51

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DATE 2007

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C O N T A C T R E P O R T

1. From 1200 to 2100 hours on 19 December 1951, [] conferred with the JAYHAWK field case officer on details of the proposed US-JAYHAWK 1952 joint operations in the AERODYNAMIC field. The plan set forth in the following paragraphs is based on these decisions reached at the December 1951 conference in London:

- a) The Spring 1952 teams sent by either the U.S. or JAYHAWK will include both CASSOWARY and CAVATINA personnel.
- b) Those in the team who are members of the group sponsored by the dispatching country will have full control of w/t contacts until partisan headquarters has been reached.
- c) The first team will be sent in by JAYHAWK since they are still in contact with the field.
- d) The entire plan of joint operations is subject to review in the event that the U.S. May 1951 team should come on the air prior to the first 1952 dispatch.

2. Team A (JAYHAWK May 1951 team), which has two radio sets, is still in w/t contact as of 1 December 1951. It has already transmitted contact points for the additional JAYHAWK teams which were to have been dropped in the fall of 1951. Should Team A manage to remain in w/t contact with JAYHAWK until Spring 1952, it can be requested to provide new contact points for Team B (JAYHAWK 1952 joint operations team) if such are deemed necessary. Should Team A fail to maintain w/t contact in the months prior to April 1952, the contact points already transmitted could be provided Team B. This would be done on the assumption that Team A is still safe and clean, but that something has happened to the radio equipment. According to the latest messages, Team A has completed its bunker and gone underground for the winter but will attempt to maintain periodic contact with JAYHAWK. Plans for dispatch are as follows:

- a) Team B will be dispatched by JAYHAWK during the April-May moon period in a JAYHAWK aircraft. Should the Foreign Office at the last moment refuse to sanction the use of a JAYHAWK craft, Team B will be dispatched in a U.S. craft.
- b) Team C (U.S. 1952 joint operations team) will be trained and prepared for dispatch simultaneously with Team B. Team C will be sponsored by the U.S. and dispatched in an American aircraft no sooner than one month after the departure of Team B. However, as long as Team A or B is alive, clean and making progress towards headquarters, word from that quarter will be the touchstone for deciding when Team C shall be dispatched.
- c) JAYHAWK will dispatch an overland team in any event.

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3. Composition of Teams B and C:

a) Team B

Guide	}	CAVATINA
Special Intelligence organizer		
W/T man		
Party man		
W/T man	}	CASSOWARY
Escort (may be Party man)		

b) Team C

W/T man	}	CASSOWARY	}	CAVATINA	
W/T man					
W/T man					
Escort					
			W/T man	}	CAVATINA
			SI organizer		

4. Training:

a) Since we have decided to run joint operations this spring and the possibility exists that the British Foreign Office may at the last minute forbid JAYHAWK to dispatch by aircraft, the CAVATINA members of Team B as well as those of Team C must be trained in American dispatch methods. The JAYHAWK training schedule is rather rigid, beginning between 10 and 15 of February, therefore JAYHAWK would like to have the CAVATINA members of both Teams B and C trained in U.S. parachute methods prior to 10 February 1952. JAYHAWK does not think it would be sufficient to send a US parachute trainer to their training area since it would require his taking all his paraphernalia and even a plane. Therefore, they suggest that the six men, accompanied by a JAYHAWK conducting officer, be trained between 1 and 10 February at the US training site.

b) The CASSOWARY members of Team B will undergo the complete JAYHAWK training, including special intelligence, s/w, parachute and caravan courses but excluding w/t training. The CASSOWARY members of Team B will be accompanied by a CASSOWARY conducting officer.

c) The JAYHAWK case officer believes that JAYHAWK Security will insist on conducting security checks on any CASSOWARY personnel sent to his country. Should the JAYHAWKS insist on this, the U.S. will require similar checks on CAVATINA personnel whom it trains. After the six CAVATINA men finish the US parachute training course, all will go to JAYHAWK territory for refresher courses and two members of Team C will return to the U.S. school sometime in April.

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5. Dispatch:

a) Team B - If the Foreign Office does not disapprove, Team B will go directly from England to Malta for dispatch, and only a GAVATINA man will see the team off from the airport. In the event the Foreign Office disapproves air dispatches, Team B will fly in an U.S. plane from Germany. In this case, both a GAVATINA and a CASSOWARY man will be on hand at the take-off.

b) Team C - will be dispatched from Germany with a CASSOWARY man on hand at the airfield.

6. Equipment:

The U.S. and JAYHAWK will equip those members whom they are sponsoring. This will apply to all equipment except parachutes, Team B will wear HAYHAWK parachutes and Team C will have U.S. parachutes. Both GAVATINA and CASSOWARY personnel should be provided with as much of their equipment as is possible before they are exchanged between the US and JAYHAWK. Should GAVATINA personnel prefer certain US items, or CASSOWARY personnel certain JAYHAWK items, their preferences will be honored. This applies to any item except w/t sets and codes.

7. Drop Zones

These will be determined after guides have been consulted, should Team A fail to transmit new contact points. JAYHAWK will not send Team B into the reception point but only into the general area where the contact points provided by Team A are located. Team C will be sent to a reception party or on the blind, depending upon what success Teams A and B have.

8. W/T Contact Responsibility

Until Team B reaches Headquarters, the GAVATINA members will be responsible for w/t contact unless an emergency arises and they are unable to function. The same policy applies to Team C for which CASSOWARY personnel will bear the responsibility of w/t contact until headquarters is reached.

9. Final Briefing

Both GAVATINA and CASSOWARY officers will have access to Teams B and C for final briefing.

10. In the event the CASSOWARY May 1951 team resumes contact prior to the first Spring 1952 dispatch, the above agreement for joint operations will be subject to review. Should Team A succeed in contacting headquarters before the first dispatch, headquarters instructions will be the touchstone of 1952 operations.

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SECRETEnclosure to CMGWU - 773
BCONTACT REPORT

1. On 27 December 1951, [] presented to CASSOWARIES 3 and 4 the general principles of joint operations as formulated at the London conference and the details of these operations as worked out by the JAYHAWK and US field case officers on 19 December. The following paragraphs contain CASSOWARY 3's statement of the CASSOWARY 1 views in regard to operations in general and in the proposed joint JAYHAWK - US - CASSOWARY - CAVATINA operations into CAWNPORE.

2. CASSOWARY 1 Approach to Operations

The sole CASSOWARY concern is the continued existence and support of the underground, as represented by CAWNPORE 1, 2 and 3. The CASSOWARIES have a moral approach and will do nothing that can in any way bring harm to the underground or any of the couriers that are dispatched to make contact with it. This applies also to any attempts made by the CAVATINA group to contact the underground, in other words, the CASSOWARIES make no effort to determine or blow the "opposition" dispatches as does the CAVATINA group.

3. CASSOWARY 1 aims in its operations into CAWNPORE

a) Contact with the supreme leaders. CASSOWARIES do not accept contact with peripheral leaders an end in itself. (This was in reference to the contact made by the JAYHAWK May 1951 team with some regional leader).

b) Maintenance of a regular continuing contact with the underground.

c) Transmittal of assistance to the underground, but only of the type that helps strengthen the underground.

d) Utilization of information and intelligence forwarded from the homeland on the condition that this information has been cleared with higher authorities in the homeland.

4. CASSOWARY Opinion of operations to date

a) US-CASSOWARY operations

1. CASSOWARY 1 has the moral satisfaction that neither it nor the U.S. has reneged on any of the points listed in paragraph 2 above.

2. Since the first US-CASSOWARY operation in 1959, all of the dispatches have been based on the wishes and requests of the underground.

3. ~~Every~~ one of the teams dispatched by us has been sent in on the blind (it was expected even though the DE may not have been known by the homeland) and each one reached supreme headquarters.

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b) JAYHAWK-GAVATINA Operations

1. The initiative for all their dispatches has originated in Germany and these have been carried out en masse with no regard to the situation in the homeland.

2. GAVATINA has made no attempt to determine whether its operations were in any way interfering or crossing CASSOWARY operations.

3. The planning for 1952 GAVATINA operations is based on word from Team A, which has established only peripheral contact with partisan headquarters. Contact with Team A is not a responsible one since it is based on a team acting without authorization from CANNFORN headquarters. The team has been seven months without contact with headquarters and is now operating on its own.

5. CASSOWARY views on aims of coordination

In view of the needs of the homeland, there must be coordination abroad in any operation directed at establishing contact with it. However, coordination also means coordination between the homeland and the various parties abroad. There must be no more mass actions and, for security purposes, there must be no more attempts by the opposition to blow the operations of the other side. Careful planning is essential.

6. Methods of Realizing Coordination

a) The JAYHAWK-US London Plan

This plan requires a joint staff, joint training and joint dispatch. The implementation of this plan raises numerous problems:

1. There can be only one w/t line, yet CANNFORN 6 did not seem inclined to eliminate ours.

2. The plan will give GAVATINA control over contact with the homeland and over the CASSOWARY 1.

3. Four partners means that operations will become a game with GAVATINA coming out on top.

4. By dropping Team B on Team A's instructions, CASSOWARY 1 will be departing from its long standing policy of acting only with authorization of CANNFORN headquarters.

5. The plan will create serious complications in the homeland.

b) Compromise to the JAYHAWK-US London Plan

The personnel in Teams B and C will be equal in number and some system be worked out so that each group of three will have its own leader.

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This would give more security to GASSOWARY members and improve their morale.

c) Alternative to the above plans

1. Regardless of whether Team A maintains further contact, Team B, consisting solely of CAVATINA personnel, will be dispatched by JAYHAWK, and will carry a GASSOWARY pouch for transmittal to headquarters. Likewise, Team C, consisting solely of GASSOWARY personnel, will be dispatched by the US and carry a CAVATINA pouch for transmittal to headquarters.

2. CAVATINA will forbid the SB from meddling in the work of GASSOWARY 1. All operational matters must be kept from the SB. Both sides must make known a list of those persons charged with operational responsibility and guarantee that no other persons are informed of operational plans or details. There must be no more security breaches.

3. Until Team A or B reaches headquarters (CANNPONE 6 or higher), CAVATINA will refrain from uncoordinated mass dispatches. Both CAVATINA and GASSOWARY must promise to have their teams deliver the other's pouch to headquarters.

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