

# SECRET

Discussions with CASSOWARY 15

29 June 1951

1. Reaction to the Second W/T Message

CASSOWARY 15 read a copy of his notes on the second W/T message received from the Ukraine to CASSOWARY 2 in New York on the week end of June 23-24. CASSOWARY 15 describes CASSOWARY 2's reaction as "pleased" that contact had at last been established "after so many attempts." CASSOWARY 15 insists that no political discussion took place at this meeting, and that CASSOWARY 2's position vis-a-vis the representatives of this organization and joint ZPUHVR-American projects remains unaltered.

A single political footnote to the New York meeting is CASSOWARY 15's remark that both CASSOWARIES regard the meaning of the message as "quite clear" and when asked what they understood that meaning to be, CASSOWARY 15 answered that the significant core of the message was found in the closing sentences where the underground said:

"We hope that in the matter of the consistent realization of this principle the just struggle of the Ukraine for independence will find full political support from the government of the USA. We hope that in accordance with this, the government of the USA supports politically the supreme governing organ of the fighting Ukraine, the UHVR." \*

Both CASSOWARIES felt that UHVR had unmistakably asked America for "full political support" with ZPUHVR serving as liaison and coordination agency. CASSOWARY 15 said that mere clandestine assurances of American support of the principle of self-determination in general and carefully-guarded expressions of American sympathy for the Ukrainian revolutionary movement in particular were meaningless words unless implemented by action. CASSOWARY 2 had offered no further political comment at the New York meeting because it was not required: as a result of the message, the burden of political initiative rested with the American side.

CASSOWARY 15 prefaced his discussion of the need for positive American action by saying that ZPUHVR did not ask for and fully understood the impossibility of open and/or formal recognition of any kind for the Ukrainian underground at this time. ZPUHVR's willingness to face this political and diplomatic reality, however, did not alter their concern over the current schizophrenic character of American policy toward the Ukraine. The significance of clandestine American assurances of support to ZPUHVR and such unofficial W/T policy

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\* CASSOWARY 15's notes on the content of the message agree in meaning with the above official translated cabled version.

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statements as we might undertake was eroded when matched against the overt acts and publicly declared policy of the American government. CASSOWARY 15 documented ZPUHVR's stand in two ways.

- a. He observed that while the American government founds and finances - "plays midwife at the birth of" - such groups as the Committee for a Free Europe and the Committee for a Free Russia, organizations whose program and membership roster make them irreconcilable foes of self-determination for the national minorities, there can be little serious reliance placed in American support of minority aspirations offered by "nameless Americans" and in unsigned and unbinding W/T messages.
- b. Secondly, he pointed out that the attitude of the Voice of America whose program tone is offensive to UHVR and all national minorities speaks far more eloquently for real American intentions than any clandestine assurances to the contrary. CASSOWARY 15 cited the broadcast of June 20 on the day following the underground's transmittal of their request for American support and while they still awaited an answer to that request. The VOA broadcast on their Ukrainian language program of that day a biography and discussion of Mykhaylo Drahomaniv, late 19th century Ukrainian Socialist leader who counseled against "conspiracy," argued that a "nation will gain more through spiritual propaganda than through bloody uprisings," and preached a federation of nations theory. CASSOWARY 15 asked the undersigned how American officials thought the homeland headquarters would view an assurance of sympathetic interest and support through secret W/T channels when the overt and official Voice of America spoke to the Ukrainian people in so contradictory a tone. CASSOWARY 15 suggested that the homeland headquarters would certainly monitor the Voice on the day following the transmittal of their message and that they not only would not understand but might seriously discount the sincerity of any expression of contrary American policy in a later W/T message.

## 2. CASSOWARY 2's Position

The preceding discussion was a convenient opportunity to reopen the question of CASSOWARY 2's disassociation from joint American-Ukrainian activities. In this conversation, the already familiar generalizations

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about CASSOWARY 2's withdrawal were documented with references to specific points of friction, and the conversation provides

- a. a catalog of precise reasons for CASSOWARY 2's current stand.
- b. the basis of any action to reenlist CASSOWARY 2 as an active participant in this project.

No attempt has been made to evaluate the following material in terms of the relative importance of various complaints, and the answers offered by the undersigned to CASSOWARY 15 have not been included.

There is a strong note of injured vanity in the cataloging of CASSOWARY 2's reasons for retirement.

- a. "No one who is forced to labor in a factory all night can assume the heavy responsibilities of a diplomatic representative and political leader."
- b. A man such as CASSOWARY 2 "cannot be expected to account for every nickle of money he drops in a subway turnstile and to report at precise times his expenditures of funds advanced to him."
- c. The polygraph incident was insulting.
- d. Men such as CASSOWARY 2 and 15 have spent lifetimes underground and resent the repetition of security warnings and advice on rudimentary points from such rank amateurs as American intelligence. (Note: In this connection it is of interest that at an earlier meeting this week, following a gentle security needle from the undersigned, CASSOWARY 15 said "we will be watching what happens now that radio contact has been made and I bet we will hear about it from someone in Washington who may not know the entire story but will have had a hint of what has happened," implying that any security leak would come from the American partner in the project.
- e. CASSOWARY 2 should have a contact with a responsible and named American "probably not from your organization" who could deal with him at a level worthy of his position and the mandate of ZPUHVR. Such a contact would probably be unaware of the intelligence aspects of ZPUHVR's association with "your organization." CASSOWARY 2 desired more than the opportunity to present his position and the

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"formally" polite hearing given CASSOWARY 3 and 15 at their 22 March 1951 visit to the State Department. The ideal contact would probably not be a member of the State Department but would have access to responsible members of that Department. Heretofore all UHVR contacts have been restricted to contact with branches of the American government concerned with "gathering the information upon which policy decisions are made" but not of a policy-creation character themselves. "Mr. Chamberlin (William Henry) would be acceptable to ZPUHVR because he is closer than most others to an understanding of the Ukrainian problem and is partially sympathetic to Ukrainian aspirations." "Mr. Levine and Mr. Williamson are not acceptable because they were born in Russia and think like Russians."

In the above connection, earlier in the week while driving to dinner and without warning, CASSOWARY 15 asked the undersigned if he "knew Mr. Levine." He was told that the undersigned knew several Mr. Levines, and CASSOWARY 15 answered that he meant the "political Levine who commuted between Germany and Washington."

Entwined with the theme of injured vanity is a minor theme of persecution which at first was described as "efforts at blackmail" although CASSOWARY 15 withdrew that characterization of CASSOWARY 2's treatment when questioned about evidence of such persecution and admitted that blackmail was too strong a word for what he was attempting to describe. CASSOWARY 15 cited the following examples:

- a. Negotiations with Life magazine were firm until "someone's hand" intervened and for no understandable reason publication plans for CASSOWARY 2 material were discontinued.
- b. Threats of deportation have been allowed to filter out in the hope of coercing CASSOWARY 2 into cooperation. "If you drive him from America he will go to England or South America. He is not the kind of man you can terrify now by such threats after all he has suffered." Such ~~deportation proceedings~~ are based upon charges that CASSOWARY 2 is a terrorist and "your organization which brought him to America could easily halt investigation or action by any other part of the American government which did not understand the motivation of these charges."
- c. The questioning following CASSOWARY 2's return from his Canadian trip showed distrust and that "somebody was interested in what he was doing and following his movements in Canada."

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3. ZPUHVR and a National Minorities Anti-Soviet Group

At this meeting CASSOWARY 15 again discussed the possibility of ZPUHVR joining a group of national minority representatives for joint anti-Soviet activity. CASSOWARY 15 has repeatedly mentioned the "well-known American sponsorship of the Committee for a Free Russia (\*) and other groups." When asked why he thought the Americans sponsored such groups, CASSOWARY 15 answered that they had large sums of money which could come from no other source and that certain "supposedly private American citizens" had to "rush back to Washington" whenever a policy decision was to be made by the group they sponsored. CASSOWARY 15 added that most of the Ukrainian emigre press recognized and resented the American sponsorship of this and other groups and that some of the press had recently openly condemned the American action in their editorial columns.

CASSOWARY 15 said that "the Ukrainians have been told to join several of these groups at various times and have been warned that they would get no help or money otherwise," but added that after all the Ukrainians had "suffered" and with their history of resistance to any compromise of their political principles even in German imprisonment during World War II, they were unmoved by such threats. Membership in any Great Russian group was impossible for the Ukrainians since most of the members of such groups were frankly inimical to Ukrainian hopes for independence, and those who were not as candid in their opposition to such independence were at heart opposed to it. The Russians, unlike the Ukrainians, have had no historical experience with democracy and those few Russian emigre leaders who style themselves democrats pervert the meaning of the word. The bait of vague promises of self-determination in the charters of any group containing such Great Russians would not deceive ~~the~~ many Ukrainians and certainly not ZPUHVR. The suggestion of the use of a plebiscite technique for determining the future of the Ukraine is insulting to the Ukrainians who have earned the right to independence without proving that right again at the ballot box, and the proponents of such solutions actually do not believe in Ukrainian independence.

CASSOWARY 15 has said during several conversations that ZPUHVR would be eager to join with the representatives of other "oppressed national minorities" in a united anti-Soviet program. When he was reminded of the schisms dividing the various minority emigrations he agreed that compromises would be required and added that in the Ukrainian emigration, ZPUHVR would be willing to compromise the less-significant points of dispute in the interest of the strength that can be gained only from unity of all national minorities.

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\* American Committee for the Liberation of Peoples of the Soviet Union

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CASSOWARY 15 further observed that such a group could be successful only with the financial support and organizational aid of the American government, assistance at least comparable to that now being offered to Great Russian groups "such as Mr. Levine's organization."

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