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10 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/3

FROM: SR3/W2

Subject: Contact and Briefing of Mykola LEBED Prior to European Trip

Participants: Mykola LEBED, [redacted] Omelvan ANTONOVYCH, [redacted] [redacted]

1. The contact was effected at 1800 hours on 30 July 1953 at the Raleigh Hotel, Washington, D. C. The meeting concerned itself with the re-briefing of Mr. LEBED by [redacted] re United States Foreign Policy and the relation of the American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism to the United States Government. The meeting was deemed necessary in view of LEBED's forthcoming European trip, during which he will present the underground mandate to BANDERA and the ZChOUN. LEBED is expected to leave 10 August 1953.

2. Basically [redacted] noted that the Foreign policy of the United States is still based upon the principles of self-determination and non-pre-determination. Regarding the American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism, [redacted], known to LEBED [redacted], stressed the point that as a private organization and an unofficial agency in emigre politics, the Government was powerless to limit the activity of the American Committee and could only offer informal guidance.

*policy is pre-determination!*

3. A detailed report of the [redacted] LEBED meeting is attached.

[redacted]

Attachment  
Report as noted

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Contact with Mykola LEBED Prior to European Trip

1. With the arrival of [ ] the meeting was launched on a discussion of a study submitted by Mr. LEBED for PP consideration. The paper, entitled Ideas on Psychological Strategy for the Cold War Period, was noted by [ ] as being entirely too long, not fulfilling a specific purpose, too broad in scope, confusing, and having a decided lack of forcefulness. It would have been better, [ ] stated, had the effort been limited to the Ukrainian psychological warfare problem.

Mr. LEBED replied that the paper was not his, but had been given to him by an individual, an Eastern Ukrainian who was a product of the Soviet regime. LEBED felt that this work should be interesting in that it would afford some insight into the Soviet mentality. He further stated that he purposely did not want to correct the paper feeling that it would destroy some of its effectiveness. Smilingly, the ZP leader noted that these people would be more of a problem to us in the future than the ZP is at present.

2. From the Psychological Warfare paper, the discussion then moved to the Foreign Policy of the United States. Here, [ ] as [ ] noted to LEBED "that a great deal can be done on non-pre-determination and self-determination." He added that although the United States Government cannot recognize any USSR states, with the exception of the Baltic areas, in its overt policy, we can offer positive aid in the covert field. [ ] cited the covert cooperation with the ZPUHVR as encouragement to the Ukrainian cause. Overtly, he added, the Ukrainian cause was abetted by such Congressional moves as the House Concurrent Resolution 58, sponsored by Representative Laurence H. SMITH (Rep-Wisc) to establish American diplomatic missions in Kiev, Ukraine, and Minsk, Byelorussia. However, [ ] added, in the event of open conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, support would be given to the underground and its liberation effort.

At this point in the discussion, ANTONOVYCH, who had been acting as a part-time interpreter for LEBED, interjected that "your support has been mostly technical." He then asked for a clarification of the term "political support consistent to American Policy" which [ ] had used. [ ] answered that if the people inside want a free Ukraine, the United States will support it. However, he said should the Ukraine erupt in a revolution "tomorrow", United States support must be based upon such considerations as:

A. How long can the revolution endure?

*is this paper the result of Study Group under Aerodynamic?*

SECRET  
Security Information

2.

B. How much support can the United States give without provoking a global conflict?

C. The legal status of the uprising.

ANTONOVYCH then asked why the American Department of State objected to such legislation as House Concurrent Resolution 58 which implied a free Ukraine. To this [ ] answered the principle of self-determination would no longer be operative.

[ ] added that should the United States recognize the incumbent Ukrainian government we would be adding ammunition to Soviet propaganda. The United States Government, in recognizing the Ukrainian SSR, would place the ZPUHVR in an awkward position, reducing it to the level of a dissident renegade group. This degradation would not serve in the best interest of LEBED and his organization. [ ] again re-emphasized that the State Department policy permitted self-determination if the people wanted it.

Mr. LEBED acknowledged American support to the underground and noted that it did show American sympathy for the Ukrainian struggle and its liberation aims. However, he added, "We don't have a guarantee that in the future the principle of self-determination will be correctly applied."

[ ] In the matter of the mandate received from the underground, [ ] stated that this recognition was fine as far as LEBED's position within the Ukrainian emigration was concerned. He said, however, that the mandate did not apply to the United States Government. [ ] felt that some tangible supporting material of an FI nature would enhance the prestige of ZPUHVR in the eyes of the Government. Mr. LEBED agreed to this. He stated that the underground had had some unfortunate experiences during World War II with German promises and as a result were very reluctant in engaging in extensive FI activities.

[ ] countered, stating that he was thinking in terms of LEBED. He advised that the underground should support the ZP leader, noting specifically that he, LEBED, was in official contact with the United States Government. He asked LEBED to ignore the cries of the misinformed emigre pseudo-politicos who reasoned that because such controversial Ukrainian emigres as GULAI, BOHARTIR-CHUK, DOLENKO, and Taras BULBA-BOROVETZ were granted audiences in the State Department and Department of Defense, this did not constitute a carte blanche recognition of these factions.

The Foreign Representative of the UHVR said he understood the covert relationship, but felt that on the other hand the overt relationship was not aiding the Ukrainian cause; if anything, he added, it was doing it harm. He added that the official stand

SECRET  
Security Information

taken by the Voice of America was inconsistent on the self-determination principle as discussed the previous year. The American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism was brought in as another example of the deviation in the self-determination principle by noting that the group was Great Russian dominated.

[ ] reiterated his previous statement on the private nature of the American Committee and unofficial government interest in that organization. He reflected that he had looked over the American Committee's political efforts in Germany and remarked that it was characterized by the lack of accomplishments. He added, "There is nothing that the Government can do but advise ... In the final analysis, if you (LEBED) can produce more and confidence is built up in you, your position with the American Government will be undisputed. You are in contact with the underground."

[ ] then used as an example: "All previous wars have shown that all good has been done by the underground with their outside representative."

Mr. LEBED said it was in the best interest of the ZPUHVR and the American Government to keep the underground in the Ukraine alive. It was necessary to do everything possible on both sides in order to insure moral and material assistance and not weaken the will to fight by broadcast of material on Radio Liberation and Voice of America which is contrary to what the underground is propagandizing. He asked the United States Government to "come to a clear position -- either support the Liberation Movement ... (or) keep to the preservation of the Soviet Empire."

[ ] admitted that he did not know, but stated that when the present administration took office it announced a policy of liberation. He noted that the Government was in an awkward position and that only "place and time" would decide the support to be given. [ ] used as an example the recent East German riots, in which it would have been very inopportune for the United States to offer overt aid for an uprising. As for the Ukrainian situation, should a revolt be fermented tomorrow, [ ] said, the United States could not send tanks, but it could increase courier traffic into the Ukraine with supplies. It is therefore imperative, he continued, that more strategic intelligence be transmitted from the underground. "We know of the contact, but it has not shown any positive results."

In recapitulation, Mr. LEBED said he wished to explore the stand of the United States Government to determine the status of the Ukraine vis-a-vis the USSR satellites. The position of the Ukraine was uncertain, while the satellites are sure of support and recognition. Then returning to the American Committee, LEBED

asked, "Are the machinations of private committees reflecting the American attitude?"

He agreed with [ ] on the FI aspects of the operation, and said he would write to the homeland. The text of the letter would tell the underground to supply specific intelligence as per our needs. When this intelligence is received, LEBED said he would then check the attitude of the American Government. However, he said that it was imperative that the underground does not over-extend its capabilities and jeopardize the safety of the people inside. He felt that the reluctant position adopted by the underground in gathering intelligence against specific targets was brought about by (a) difficult, untenable military situations, i.e., oblavas; and (b) misinformation about the present situation at home and abroad disseminated by the British.

*where +  
select in  
channel?*

LEBED felt that the next set of messages from the underground would clarify the internal situation.

In order to establish the bona fides of the ZPUHVR mandate, LEBED asked the Case Officers concerned to intercede in his behalf with the British. As for BANDERA, LEBED felt that he would have some difficulty in convincing the ZChOUN leader to honor the ZPUHVR mandate, but felt that he would win the support of many BANDERA followers.

3. This phase of the meeting terminated at 1930 hours.