

FDS/W-24

MEMORANDUM

19 July 1951

TO: STC/Operational Clearance Officer

FROM: Deputy Chief, PDS

SUBJECT: Part II of PRQ

REFERENCE: Memo to STC from PDS, Dated 18 July 1951, Subject - Request for Operational Clearances

The operational information requested in Part II of PRQ is at the present time basically the same for each of the agent personnel listed in reference memorandum. The statements below are keyed to Part II and apply to all the agent personnel for which operational clearances were requested.

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37. All subjects except SHTENDERA were first contacted between 11 and 16 June 1951 by [redacted] case officer of OPC in Munich, and by Col. Ivan HUTSEL, who is the commanding officer of the Missia UPA in Germany. All persons were contacted in Munich and interviewed primarily to ascertain their suitability in terms of health, past experience, personality and motivation for training and dispatch as specialists in various phases of partisan warfare.

38. Since all the persons concerned belong to a military organization with very strict security regulations of its own, all subjects could be turned over rapidly and securely to another case officer. In the past all instructions or negotiations concerning the training and dispatch of members of UPA have been handled through the chain of command established by the ZPUHVR, i.e. the ranking UPA soldier or officer has been made responsible for the security and discipline of the other trainees or agents and in some respects that officer or soldier has functioned as a cut-out. Therefore any switch in American case officers would merely mean that a new person is issuing instructions to the Ukrainian commander of the trainees. All case officers in the past have used Ukrainian pseudonyms when dealing with any non-American participants in the operation. Pseudonyms are also used by all the trainees. This practice is rigidly adhered to. The trainees are perfectly aware that the case officers are using pseudonyms. In fact the trainees often pick out the pseudonyms for them, usually selecting some humorous or pointed characteristic of the case officer. Thus the case officers have such Ukrainian names as "tall and silent," "journalist," "dynamo," "football player," etc.

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39. All recruits under this operation to date who have been trained in Western Germany have been ardent Ukrainian patriots. The families of all of these men have suffered from the Soviet colonial policy in the Ukraine. In the majority of cases the recruits are the sole surviving members of the family, other members of which have been liquidated for Ukrainian nationalism. All of the candidates have been members of UPA for at least six years and therefore a portion of their willingness to return to the Ukraine stems from their loyalty to their comrades who are still fighting there. Each UPA soldier thinks of himself as a crusader for a Ukrainian independent state.
40. Name checks have been run in OSO registry and with the exception of SHTENDERA the results were negative. The traces on SHTENDERA were listed in reference memorandum.

The ZPUHVR is very cautious about recommending candidates for this highly sensitive operation and therefore investigates the past history of each candidate thoroughly before recommending his use. Practically all of the candidates have lived in DP camps in Germany for the last several years. The closest friends of each have been other members of UPA in the same camp. It is therefore easy for the ZPUHVR to review the activities and attitudes of each candidate over the past several years by querying his colleagues. Concerning the former activities of each candidate while he was in the Ukraine there are always other UPA men in Western Europe who were in the particular candidate's partisan unit in the Ukraine. None of the candidates recommended to date arrived in Western Europe alone. Each arrived in company with other partisans and the versions of their overland journey were cross-checked to make sure that none were caught or recruited by an enemy intelligence service on the way. Since the security service of UPA checked the early history of each candidate before admitting him into the Ukrainian underground complex, the pre-partisan part of each candidate's life has already been checked and found satisfactory. Should any doubt arise as to the candidate's activities during that period, former citizens of almost every village or farm area in the Western Ukraine can be found in the emigration who would have known subject and his family.

The Munich Operations Base has already stated that it intends to administer the Carriage test to each candidate. It is therefore obvious that the security check performed by the ZPUHVR before recommending them is superior to anything we can do except through the Carriage test because the ZPUHVR has facilities for checking the candidates which are not open to us.

41. Until such time as the candidates are actually in training the only control we have over them operates through the ZPUHVR and the Missia UPA which to date have demanded and received complete obedience to

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security and military regulations transmitted by the American case officer. In 1950 when one of the trainees casually told one of his colleagues that he was tired of the training program and desired to go AWOL for a week or two of recreation, he was court-martialed within 24 hours by the Missia UPA, sentenced to death for planning to desert and it was only with great difficulty that the American case officer persuaded the UPA commander of this group of trainees to commute the punishment to imprisonment in a dank cellar room on bread and water. Therefore the self discipline of the trainees is estimated as better than average on the basis of past experience.

Naturally once the candidates have been accepted for training their movements from the training area will be restricted and clearly defined in instructions from the overseas case officers.

42. All the agents will be aware that they are being trained by some branch of American intelligence.
43. To the best of our knowledge none of the candidates have had any connection with any other intelligence service to date. It is not impossible however that one or two of them may have performed intelligence tasks for the ZPUHVR or the Ukrainian underground.
44. Since the candidates have been in the emigration since roughly 1947 none of them are in a position to furnish recent information on items of interest. Each agent however will be required during training to give a detailed written account of his own underground activities in the Ukraine and his trip out to Germany.
45. Although perhaps one or two of the candidates will receive training in methods of intelligence collection, the majority of the agents will receive training only in military and allied subjects since their duties will be those of partisans rather than intelligence collectors. It should be remembered that this is a joint OSO/OPC training program.
46. As far as we know, none of the agents have received any special training aside from what they gained from experience while in the Ukrainian underground.
47. Not applicable.
48. None of these agents will be paid salaries although each will probably receive an allowance of roughly \$25.00 per month in German currency. This allowance will be doled out to them by the ZPUHVR from money allotted to this project. All food, tobacco and liquor expenses are covered automatically by project funds while they are in training.

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49. The field has not informed us of any promises or commitments made to the prospective agents.
50. Since all of the prospective trainees were Polish citizens in their youth, it is believed that they could pass as Poles.
51. With perhaps one or two exceptions all of the candidates are farmers' sons.
52. To date none of the persons trained under this project have gambled or taken drugs. Practically all of the candidates in the past have smoked, drank on religious holidays, and gone dancing on Saturday and Sunday evenings.
53. The level of honesty, initiative and security consciousness among the trainees dealt with under this project has been extremely high.
54. Had the United States shown no interest in the Ukrainian problem, it is possible that the ZPUHVR, and therefore these candidates, would be working for the British. It is not deemed likely that these candidates or the ZPUHVR would collaborate with any other foreign power so long as their relationship with the Americans is progressing smoothly.
55. It is possible that some of the trainees will be used as guerrilla warfare instructors after they have completed their training.
56. Not yet available.
57. Information in Part I was obtained by a representative of the ZPUHVR and an OPC case officer.

