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W/95-NTS  
302.A.(1)

14 September 1950

TO: Chief, FDS  
FROM: FDS/[ ] J  
SUBJECT: Discussions with Mr. Angleton and [ ] [ ] Regarding NTS

1. The writer discussed the exploitation of NTS this date, first with Mr. Angleton (at his request) and then with [ ] [ ]

2. Mr. Angleton believes that the NTS possesses excellent potential and should be energetically exploited. He has the utmost confidence in Mr. Boldyreff, one of the leading members of the organization presently residing in Washington, and believes that an operation with the organization should be mounted along the following lines:

- a. A well qualified case officer should be assigned full time as a contact for Boldyreff.
- b. A specific agreement of cooperation should be set-up with Boldyreff and contact with the Americans maintained in absolute secrecy as a condition of the contract.
- c. Boldyreff, after receiving proper documentation and authority from the president and leaders of NTS, should go to Germany with the case officer and begin clandestine operations into the USSR.

3. During the conversation the writer raised the following objections to immediate OSO exploitation of the NTS:

- a. The organization is large and unwieldy.
- b. Its security is poor.
- c. There are indications of Soviet, French, and British penetration.
- d. Control of the organization would be difficult.
- e. Their objectives might conflict with ours and since control was difficult might result in "shelving" our missions.
- f. An operation involving such a large organization would be extremely costly.
- g. OPC was already exploiting the NTS.

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4. Mr. Angleton, considering war imminent, felt that these objections were unrealistic and that energetic exploitation of the NTS was necessary. His responses keyed to the objections in para 3 above follow:

- a. Use of the entire organization is not proposed but rather a contact with one man, with whom a specific agreement can be reached.
- b. Since we do not propose to use the whole organization, the overall security is not a problem. Our contact with Boldyreff would be maintained in secrecy.
- c. The intelligence operations conducted by Boldyreff would be with a small and trusted segment of the organization which would be adequately investigated to determine Soviet connections. Penetration of the NTS by the British or French is not important since this is done regardless of our use of the organization. British penetration might even be useful in showing us just how much of the material they turn over to us through official channels. It would, of course, be essential that our participation in NTS activity be kept absolutely secret, and this would be the case if we contacted only one man.
- d. Our contact would be with only one man and a capable case officer would be able to develop his confidence completely. In addition, there would be the initial agreement made with NTS which would specifically outline our relationship.
- e. NTS objectives are not in conflict with ours and adequate control would exist through Boldyreff and the assigned case officer to see that our assignments were carried out.
- f. The cost of the operation is no problem.
- g. OPC exploitation was not sufficiently energetic.

5. The writer was unable to clarify the progress of OPC to Mr. Angleton but said that he would look into the matter and notify him. The interview with Mr. Angleton was very cordial and the various aspects of the operational potential were discussed at some length. The writer conceded to Mr. Angleton that under the conditions he proposed, i.e. imminent war, disregard of cost, security, etc., an operation such as he proposed, (using one agent full time in contact only with Boldyreff), would be feasible, BUT that assessment of the various anti-Soviet groups presently being carried out in the field and the degree of progress made by OPC would be determining factors. Mr. Angleton did not consider further investigation of the anti-Soviet organizations relevant since NTS presented a real possibility here and now; however, he was interested in knowing what OPC was doing.

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6. After the interview with Mr. Angleton, the writer spoke to [ ] who stated that:

- a. OPC has a project on NTS which is being actively pursued.
- b. Their operation is still in the exploratory stage but definite progress is being made.
- c. The object of their operation is the dissemination of propaganda among Soviet Forces in Germany and establishment of an operational link into the Soviet Union.
- d. A case officer will be assigned full time to the NTS.
- e. The bulk of the operations with NTS will be carried on with the organization in Germany although they have some contact with Mr. Boldyreff and Mr. Baydalakov and will include them in their operational plans to any degree which they find necessary or expedient.

[ ] inquired about our interest in NTS and was told by the writer that it was in connection with reassessment of some of these organizations and since OPC had taken over NTS we were interested in knowing what progress or developments had taken place with the group.

7. The writer believes that Mr. Angleton should be told that in view of the effective and comprehensive program set up by OPC for the exploitation of the NTS, OSO should take no further action in the matter until such time as actual operations into the Soviet Union are launched by that organization. OPC will notify us at such time as our participation will be required and regular liaison with [ ] will keep us informed on the progress of the NTS operation.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SR/3 SOURCE DESIGNATIONS

Source 3-A	<del>AENABLE</del> Caccola 6
3-B	Camposanto 9 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> notified
3-C	<del>AENABLE</del> Caccola 24
3-D	B/F source (SR/3 memorandum of 30 Sept 1953)
3-E	<del>AENABLE</del> Caccola 5
3-F	<del>AENABLE</del> Caccola 27
3-G	Canvasback 2 - CE confirmed
3-H	AENABLE 22
3-I	AENABLE 26

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