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MEMORANDUM

19 June 1952

TO : SR/DCS
VIA : SR/W/C
FROM : SR/W/OPS

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SUBJECT : Planning on Phase II of CASINO and CACCOLA 1 Operations

A. CASINO

1. There are several possibilities as to what can be accomplished when and if Phase I of the CASINO Operation is completed. The planning for Phase II, nevertheless, has to be based upon speculative estimates of the effect of Phase I. The following tentative plan is outlined:

a) CANICULA 1:

1) If CANICULA 1 is able to exfiltrate sometime in the late summer of 1952, together with one or more bodies whom he has recruited while on his preliminary mission, certain follow-up plans should be immediately implemented. The first is the training of CANICULA 1 for a return mission into the Soviet Union if this is deemed advisable. This mission will presumably be more advanced than Phase I. In addition, training of CANICULA 2 (presumably the cryptonym of CANICULA's first recruit), a legalized resident of the Soviet Union, who will exfiltrate with CANICULA 1 and return after a short training period by an American base, must be accomplished. The nature of this training must necessarily be planned now since at the time of the exfiltration, the training must go into high gear. We are somewhat limited naturally by our lack of knowledge on CANICULA 2. The most we can expect is a fairly low-level type who will be able to serve as a support point for us within the Soviet Union. His training, therefore, will generally take the pattern of (a) basic clandestine procedure and trade-craft (b) W/T or S/W training or other comco techniques, depending, of course, upon the capabilities of the agent and our own capabilities at the time. We may be able to give him enough training to allow him to operate effectively although the time limit is going to be a major consideration. The support point established by CANICULA 2 will be unfortunately only as effective as the communications which are established between the support point and the base. Presuming that we will be able to establish these secure communications channels, the specific duties of CANICULA 2's support point must be outlined. Generally, we can presume CANICULA 2's capabilities will be limited and therefore his tasks will have to be limited. First, he can be assigned

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the task of reporting periodic operational and positive intelligence in and around the area of his legalization. Second, he should be required to set up a secure letter-drop for receiving material from other agents in his general sector; thirdly, he will transmit the information provided by other agent sources to the American base from his support point. Fourth, he will recruit other individuals to act as cutouts, informants, etc., on at least a limited sphere.

2) With the establishment of a support point as outlined above, the following type of operation is possible: Agent "X", operating in Kiev, can obtain information both of a positive and operational intelligence nature and transmit it via letter or, if the situation develops where it is feasible, by cutout, to CANICULA 2 at a support point. The scope of the net will naturally be limited by the capabilities of the support point. Ideally, it would not be wise to have too many agents sending information to CANICULA/2's support point for further transmission since the blowing of the support point, while not necessarily blowing the reporting agents, will deprive them of a communications channel and an agent without a communications channel is for all practical purposes worthless. The product of Phase I of the CANICULA Operation will presumably permit us to document a person more adequately since we will have current operational intelligence as well as exemplars of documents. Since CANICULA/2 will have his own documents through legalization, his infiltration is the major operational problem with which we will be concerned. However, subsequent agents, "X", "Y", and "Z", who are reporting to CANICULA 2, will have to be legalized on the basis of operational and documentary information obtained from Phase I of the operation.

b) CADALSO Operation:

1) If CADALSO and CACUMEN are able to perform the tasks assigned to them, we will receive approximately the following assets from this operation: (a) Operational Intelligence, including documents from the Crimean area of the Soviet Union (b) Recruitment of CADALSO 2 as a support point which will provide us with a possible agent stop-over point, letter-drops, a cutout, etc. It is not contemplated that CADALSO 2 would exfiltrate with CADALSO, and therefore the support point established in the Crimean area would not have a W/T communications contact. Therefore, Phase II of the CADALSO Operation would have to be confined to either re-infiltrating CADALSO or CACUMEN for a longer residence in the area and let them serve as the principal agent or, alternatively, send another trained agent into the area with documentation, etc., based on the outcome of Phase I and have him expand the support point facilities previously established and develop them into an agent net with adequate commo facilities. This done, we could then enter into the network type operation as outlined for CANICULA 2 above.

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B. CACCOLA's 4, 5, 6

1. These agents are lumped together in as far as Phase II is concerned because the problems inherent are similar. If contact is maintained with these three agents, we will have the beginnings of three separate support points with no lateral communication between them. Our most optimistic guess on how these can best be utilized, forces us to assume that at most they would be able to supply us with certain operational intelligence information which would enable other agents to go into the same areas with more adequate documentation and possibly have the benefit of the operational experience of the three CACCOLAs to guide them in their activities. If, however, anyone of the three CACCOLAs is able to legalize himself in his operational area and still maintain contact with us, we may be able to establish a network on the basis of this support point. Suppose that CACCOLA 6 establishes letter-drops through which other agents could communicate with him and thus to the controlling American base. However, we are forced to be a little bit more pessimistic of the success of the activities of all of these agents. The extent of their contact may be merely to inform us where they are located and that they are still alive as of a certain period. However, we may still utilize even this rather nebulous situation as a support facility. At least by having one man in an area whose location we know, even if he is unable to communicate with us regularly, we may be able to send other agents to him for initial support. This second agent will presumably be better equipped to communicate with us; otherwise, there would be no point in infiltrating him. This, of course, is a very risky business from the standpoint of the security of the agents, and any implementation of such an operation would have to be carefully worked out in every detail.