

VIA: SECRET AIR OR SEA ROUTE

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 16 JUL 1951

TO: Chief, SE
FROM: Chief, SE
Chief of Station, Frankfurt

SUBJECT: INDEX/Operations

ASSAULT—CE and Security

References: MOG-1-1544 (A)
MOG-1-1506 (B)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. The CE/Security aspects of ASSAULT/CACCOIA 1 operations are currently undergoing close study here. In compliance with reference A, the project outline on the CAPABLE 1 CE Security section at Frankfurt is being revised to meet your objections as well as other considerations which have recently arisen here. In general, the new project outline will provide for a CAPABLE 1 CE group organized only to afford protection to CAPABLE 1 operations, and not as a source of information on the Russian emigration in Germany at large.

2. Comments on reference B follow. (Paragraph numbers refer to those in reference B)

1(a) According to present policy all recruitment for CAPABLE 1 operations—whether it is done by local chapters or by special recruiters—is for the CAPABLE 1 Cadre School only, and all candidates must pass through this school before being assigned to any of the CAPABLE 1 operations. While in school an evaluation of their ability is made by the school instructors, CAPABLE 11 and 7, and on the basis of these evaluations CAPABLE 7 proceeds to make assignments. Thus no candidate is in a position to know where he or his fellow students will go before completion of the course. Also, no recruiter is able to make prior commitments as to a man's ultimate disposition. This system apparently works in practice for all CACCOIA 1 candidates indicated that they had been recruited only for the Cadre School where they were told they would receive their assignments. In one case a candidate told his recruiter that he was interested exclusively in work in the USSR and was told only that his wish could probably be realized.

The three men from Morocco were recruited by their local chapter head. One of the others was recruited through long correspondence with CACCOIA 2 followed by interviews with his wife—chief recruiter for Germany. Another candidate was recruited by a chapter head in Belgium, and another by one in England.

Dist:

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File to (MOG-1-15062)
7/16/51

The men from Morocco had no good cover story to explain their movement from Morocco to Germany, and it was known by the Casablanca police that they were members of CAPABLE I. It was easier to proceed to Germany from England and Belgium where dissatisfaction with present work conditions is causing many DPs to return.

1(b) Candidates in all CAPABLE I operations train together in the Cadre School. While in school they are urged not to disclose their real names nor their hopes in the field of operational assignments. Once a candidate has received an assignment he is under obligation not to discuss it. The effectiveness of this policy is obviously hard to determine but we included a question on the Carriage to give us some indication. We can determine more in future conversations with the trainees.

The Cadre School is located in an alley in Bad Homburg and the trainees live in private rooms around town or in some barracks on the edge of town. Their behavior while in training is good. (e.g., for drunkenness a man can be dropped. During the third month of training each student foregoes all alcoholic beverages except beer). Recently [] on three different occasions picked up three inhabitants of Bad Homburg and made casual inquiries concerning DPs in the town. All stated to the best of their knowledge there were only a few old Russian emigres left.

1(c) The best way to avoid this is (1) by doing none of the packing for the mission at the school where activities should appear as normal as possible, and (2) by making frequent trips away from the school on field problems to camouflage the actual trip for dispatch.

1(d) The problems of cover and general security for the agent training area have been discussed in MGR-A-09836. For the new training site it is planned to use the cover of a Signal Detachment. It is hoped that if the group remains in Germany a new site and a new cover can be used for the last half of the cycle.

1(e) Although CAPABLE 7 submitted to Carriage readily, it is unlikely that we will be able to secure the cooperation of the other secret staff members without leaving a very serious, and probably permanent mark on our relations with them. Desirable and logical as it is to make them take Carriage, their pride of independence as leaders of CAPABLE I, and their unchanged feeling that there is something extremely degrading about this test, is bound to cause difficulty. In the long run we hope to find means of persuading them to take Carriage, as for example we have persuaded CAPABLE II: the latter is being told that Carriage is a prerequisite to the training he will undergo at our hands. However, we feel that forcing the secret staff into Carriage will have very negative effects.

1(f) Physical security measures for the protection of CAPABLE 1's principal personnel will be covered in the new project outline mentioned in para 1 above. At the present time CAPABLE 1 employs several of its younger members for this purpose; however, they are all in need of technical training which we hope to furnish. CAPABLE 1, of course, understands that responsibility for the protection of their installations and personnel is theirs. Since the attempt to abduct CAPABLE 7, physical security measures have, on the whole, been maintained rather strictly, and the new physical plant in Frankfurt has greatly facilitated the implementation of these measures. For example, CAPABLE 16, which houses several staff sections, is in a separate building. All classified papers, especially those pertaining to ARESAURUS operations are held in a safe which we provided. We are currently providing a second safe for the staff headquarters located at RIA.

1(g) [] requested a complete list of CAPABLE 1 membership, and was told that CAPABLE 1 headquarters did not keep centralized records on their entire membership, but only on its more significant workers and leaders. We have already been furnished with a good many of the names of these. However, the membership of each local chapter, especially the "peripherals", is somewhat fluid, and CAPABLE 1 headquarters has not thus far had the facilities for keeping up with all changes. Gradually, we shall certainly be able to gather a list of at least all the significant CAPABLE 1 personnel. As regards the clearance by CAPABLE 1 of their candidates for membership, the only means really available to CAPABLE 1 is that of "group scrutiny", which is applied usually over a rather long period of time. In selecting candidates for clandestine operations, CAPABLE 1 makes a distinction between candidates for CACCOLA 1 and those used in propaganda nets. In the first instance CAPABLE 1 gathers biographic material on the candidates, receives such assessment as it feels safe to send through the mails from the chapter leader from which the candidate came, and/or from the recruiting officer who picked him up, further assesses him at the Cadre School, but in the end depends upon our tests and clearance procedure. In the second instance, the only resources open to CAPABLE 1 are the assessment of the chapter leader, recruiter, and Cadre School. With the implementation of the CR/Security section, a more thorough assessment will undoubtedly be possible; however, it must be kept in mind that CAPABLE 1's facilities in this field will always be limited from our point of view, if only because correspondence on all candidates must usually be carried on through the open mail.

1(h) CACCOLA 12 will be put on carriage as soon as [] finds an opportunity to arrange this. The carriage will be administered by arrangement with CAPABLE 7 under the guise of a routine CIC check. Sidorenko was picked up on 23 July and is currently being questioned by [] A full report on his case will be rendered shortly. The Basikov case is considered closed; final report will also be forwarded. The

Orebenschikov case is not being followed up by our office since BROADWAY was concerned with this case from the start, and has turned up nothing of interest on it thus far. We are kept informed on the progress of the case by the BROADWAY CAPABLE 1 case officer, but are unable to follow it ourselves due to shortage of CB personnel here.

As a great deal of time goes into briefing agents on the DZ it would be necessary to separate the CACCOLA trainees from their CACCOLA instructors some time before the dispatch in order for AIS to do the briefing alone. To do the briefing in the school without the cooperation of the CACCOLA instructors would be awkward and possibly not effective. Furthermore, not to include the CACCOLA instructors on the DZ to the target area is at present an exceedingly important part of every agent mission. CACCOLA 3 was exceedingly useful in the briefing of CACCOLA 4, 5, and 6. For these reasons the Case Officers feel that CAPABLE 7 and the CACCOLA instructors should be excluded only from knowledge of the dispatch site and the actual date of dispatch as was done in the case of the last dispatch.

Only that CACCOLA instructor who is assisting in composing the answers to cable traffic is told the messages verbatim. The other instructors and CAPABLE 7 hear the messages from us in paraphrase.

3. Re your paragraph 2, CAPABLE 7 upon his return from the United States will supply information on Gonyuk and on all other persons whom he is able to recruit. He is prepared to gather full PRQs on all candidates.

APPROVED: _____