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DISPATCH NO. EGMA-612

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TO : Chief, EE (ATTN:

DATE: 25 September 1952

FROM : Chief of Base, Munich

SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/AESAURUS

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Report
on Meeting with CAPABLE 7,
CAPABLE 14,
and

Deadline:		Check one
Hq Action Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para	by pouch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
For info and files		<input type="checkbox"/>

Transmitted herewith is
report on subject meeting which took place 23 September in Bad Wiessee.

[]

Approved:

W.M.

Att: (1)

Distribution:

- 3-SR (2 w/att) (1 cy w/att hand-carried Wash by 25/9/52)
- 3-COM (2 w/att)
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At to EGMA-612

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SUBJECT: REDSOX/AESAURUS/Meeting with CAPABLE 7, 23 September 1952

1. The meeting, held in an operational house in Bad Wiessee, was attended by CAPABLE 7, CAPABLE 14, [] and [] This was the first such meeting of the second CACCOLA 1 cycle; it was convened specifically to discuss the assignment of missions to the CACCOLA 1 trainees prior to [] trip to Headquarters.

2. The first subject on the agenda was a review of CACCOLA 5 and 6's radio traffic to bring CAPABLE 7 up on what had happened while he was in the U.S. CAPABLE 7 stated that he had not given contacts to either CACCOLA 5 or 6, and that he thought that the "old man" of CACCOLA 5's Msg No. 3 must be his father. CAPABLE 7 was obviously disturbed by the fact that nothing has been heard from CACCOLA 4, either on the radio or through the mail. He promised to make a check of all the accommodation addresses, especially the one through which he regularly receives letters from CACCOLA 4's contact.

3. We next moved to the subject of mission assignments. CAPABLE 7 agreed to the doubleton team to Odessa (CACCOLAS 20 and 21), indicating that he preferred Kiev to the Donbas as a secondary area of operations for the team. In the event that appropriate candidates are available in the fall class of the Cadre School, the possibility was left open that CACCOLAS 20 and 21 would be broken up to form two doubleton teams.

4. CACCOLA 23: CAPABLE 7 raised no objections to our proposed plan to send CACCOLA 23 to Central Asia to investigate legalization possibilities, collect and transmit document and controls data, and to look in to the black base possibilities in this area. He promised to take up with CACCOLA 23 the question of his willingness to accept such a mission in view of the fact that he might still be known in certain parts of Central Asia. *with H. W.*

5. Far East Black Base Operation: CAPABLE 7 expressed considerable misgivings about our proposition to send a black base team into the Primorskii Krai, and the subject was discussed for over an hour without any real decision being reached on personnel assignment although CAPABLE 7 said he would agree in principle to the plan. It was agreed that a Far Eastern operation merely for the sake of having people in the Far East was pointless -- the operation to be worthwhile would have to serve the general CACCOLA 1 plan, which is based on the premise that only European and central Russia is of real interest. CAPABLE 7 finally agreed that our concept of this operation as offering excellent infiltration-exfiltration possibilities into any part of the Soviet Union was of general CACCOLA 1 interest; the argument finally boiled down to whether or not the plan was feasible, and whether or not it was worthwhile to devote so many CACCOLA 1 trainees to this operation until we have gotten a better coverage of European Russia.

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CAPABLE 7's personal feelings were that the black base team would be pretty well stuck in the woods, cut off from Vladivostok and Khabarovsk by the lack of transportation and communication routes. He also questioned our idea that men placed in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk would be able to collect enough documentation data to make the trip into European Russia via the Transib a safe one. The final decision as to this operation and as to the mission assignments of CACCOLAS 10, 24 and 27 -- our candidates for the nucleus of this black base team -- was postponed until [] return from Headquarters. While in Headquarters [] to bring himself up to date on the latest developments in the far East and to bring back the maps and materials on the basis of which the whole operation can be discussed more specifically.

6. CACCOLA 26: CAPABLE 7 agreed to our plan to have CACCOLA 26 attempt to set himself up as the inside man on the Berlin-Brest overland communications line, but expressed doubts that he would actually be able to operate from Brest itself. We tentatively agreed on Minsk as his area of operations.

7. CACCOLA 22: The question of what to do with CACCOLA 22 was temporarily postponed. CAPABLE 14, [] showed that CACCOLA 22 should not be combined with any of the trainees currently at CACCOLA 1 because of his rather difficult character. If he continues to do badly in W/T training (he is currently lagging far behind the rest of the group) the question of his disposal will have to be brought up.

8. The discussion next turned to the candidates for the fall class of the Cadre School. As the inclusion of some of them in the present CACCOLA 1 training cycle is contemplated, we need to get their biographical data as soon as possible. CAPABLE 7 said that there were 14 Cadre School candidates waiting in their respective countries, but that nothing had been done about getting them to Germany because the present Cadre School budget is not big enough to take care of them. CAPABLE 7 promised to get visa negotiations under way when we assured him that funds would shortly be forthcoming.

9. Instructor Candidates: Prior to CAPABLE 7's departure for the U.S. we had discussed with him the necessity of getting more CACCOLA 1 instructors so that it would be possible to set up another CACCOLA 1 school and get away from the seasonal type of training cycle (fall to spring) with its concomitant loss of time. CAPABLE 7 said that he found an excellent candidate for a radio instructor in Washington, but that he had not mentioned him while in Washington as family difficulties may yet prevent his coming to Germany for this type of work. CAPABLE 7 called him KUDRIAVTSEV, but that does not appear to be his true name. He apparently is a radio engineer who set up the CAPABLE 1 radio station prior to his emigration to the U.S., where he has been for about 2 years. He is currently engaged in television work of some kind, but is willing to return to Germany for CAPABLE 1 work.

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Although he does not have any experience as a radio operator, he would appear to be an excellent choice for a radio instructor in view of his knowledge of English and radio engineering. The only other instructor that CAPABLE 7 has in mind at the present time is CHEREZEV, a 37 year old man with a Soviet background competent to teach the type of subjects handled by CACCOIA 3. The big drawback to CHEREZEV is that he has only one arm, and consequently would be unable to participate in most of the physical aspects of the training. CHEREZEV recently completed the Cadre School course and worked there for a while as assistant instructor, but is unable to continue in that capacity, once again because the Cadre School budget is not large enough to carry him and his family. CAPABLE 7 is consequently eager to have us assess and process him as soon as possible, while we prefer to wait until we see what other instructor candidates CAPABLE 7 will come up with. It was agreed that CHEREZOV will be assessed by us following [] return from leave. In the meantime CAPABLE 7 promised to think over once more the list of instructor candidates, and also to start looking for a man who could accompany the black base team to Japan and remain there as CAPABLE 1 representative in the event that we do mount a Far East operation.

10. The discussion next turned to CAPABLE 7's recent trip to the United States. CAPABLE 7 started off by thanking [] for making the trip possible, and said that he was in general very pleased with the trip, impressed by the country, satisfied with the Washington discussions and not displeased with the overall CAPABLE 1 picture in the U.S. CAPABLE 7 said that although he had been careful to understate the CAPABLE 1 U.S. possibilities in his discussions with Washington out of a natural conservatism, he was actually fairly optimistic. He stated that he had not said that "no CACCOLA type results could be expected from the recruitment plan for the first 6 months," but that it would be unfair to attempt an evaluation of the plan until at least 6 months had gone by. Actually, he expects several CACCOLA candidates will turn up as soon as the program is launched. CAPABLE 7 stressed the fact that the recruitment in the U.S. would be done only for the Cadre School -- the CACCOLA recruiting would be done here in Germany. CAPABLE 7 said that Washington had agreed to provide a living allowance for a candidate's family while he was in the Cadre School, and that they would send the man's family to Germany as soon as he was assigned to active CAPABLE 1 work over here. CAPABLE 7 urged that the question of the amount of this allowance be settled definitely before the recruitment plan is launched as it will have considerable effect on a person's willingness to give up his job and go to the Cadre School. CAPABLE 7 mentioned the name of RUDIN in Los Angeles as being his candidate for the U.S. recruiting head, and said that he was anxious to get him over here as soon as possible.

11. CAPABLE 7 mentioned that he had talked to the various participants of the late WARNACK project, and that although it was obvious to him that the mistakes were pretty well distributed among both sides,

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and that neither side had any basis for recrimination, a certain picture of the bureaucratic nature of our organization in Washington emerged which made the prospects of moving the CACCOLA 1 school to the U.S. extremely questionable. CAFABLE 7 said that he had mentioned these objections in his conversation with "Stevens". The difficulties, as seen by CAFABLE 7, lie in the fact that a bureaucratic Headquarters would be encouraged by the physical proximity of the school to interfere in the conduct of the training, and that would be unable to resist the pressure exerted on them to alter what is, in CAFABLE 7's opinion, the currently correct operation of the CACCOLA 1 school.

12. CAFABLE 7 complained that the Washington attitude to the Finnish, Polish and Norwegian plans was unrealistic and that it would be virtually impossible to proceed with the Polish and Norwegian plans on the basis stipulated by Washington. In the Norway plan, which is based on CAFABLE 7's rather sensitive relations with some fairly highly placed Norwegian officials, CAFABLE 7 says that he was told to "submit the exact details" and that the acceptance of the plan could then be considered. Inasmuch as the different parts of the Norway plan -- the radio, the Spitzbergen and the border operations -- can be run only by the Norwegians themselves, and in view of the sensitive position of the Norwegians involved, CAFABLE 7 feels that he has no basis to go to them and demand names, addresses and the details of their proposed methods of operation, especially when the Norwegians involved proved their good will in the KLIUKIN case. CAFABLE 7 was obviously quite perturbed by Washington's flat rejection of Plan Finland, without any other explanation than "this is impossible," after he had gone to the trouble of obtaining and submitting the names and addresses of the people involved. CAFABLE 7's attitude is that if we were not interested in even the principle of a Finnish operation, he should have been told so at the very beginning. In Plan Poland CAFABLE 7 said that a similar situation exists. He submitted the plan to Washington, together with the name and address of the principle agent involved, then was told that he had to obtain the names and addresses of all the existing and proposed sub-agents before the plan could be approved. CAFABLE 7 feels that the only logical and realistic approach to all three operational plans is as follows: "Yes, we are interested in this plan. We will provide enough money to launch it and to keep it going for 6 months. During these 6 months no questions will be asked. At the end of 6 months we will make a thorough assessment of what has been achieved -- if it has been worthwhile we can continue to subsidize it for another given period of time; if we feel that it has not been worthwhile we will withdraw our support". CAFABLE 7 feels that the Norwegian and Polish plans could be successfully launched only on such a basis, and stressed that after 6 months of operation the type of detailed information in which Washington is interested -- names, addresses, etc. -- could be obtained easily and without friction.

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13. The meeting, which started around 1430, broke up around 1900, after which all participants went to the CACCCLA 1 school for dinner. CAFABLE 7 remained at the school through the following day, talking to each of the trainees.

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