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file 74-26-27/1

Box 8-46  
Soviet Union

13 August 1954

Dear [unclear]

There are transmitted herewith one (1) copy each of the following two (2) memoranda:

1. Effort to Analyse Soviet Provocation and Inspiration in Recent Years in Western Europe and Role in such Provocation Activity of Emigre Political Organisations.
2. Fabricators of Soviet Information.

These memoranda were prepared by WRAQA who is regarded in informed circles as an expert on the subject matter.

Data therein may be helpful to American officials concerned with Russian emigre matters and Soviet propaganda.

Sincerely,

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten initials]*  
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Enclosures:

as stated

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Efforts to Analyze Soviet Provocation and Inspiration  
in Recent Years in Western Europe and Role in such  
Provocation Activity of Emigre Political Organizations

A careful study of Soviet activity in the West indicates that in certain periods of the history of the Soviet regime, provocation and inspiration play an important role in the struggle of the Soviet Union against the West. An intensification of Soviet provocation and inspiration always:

- (a) corresponds with an expansion of the international political and economic crisis and contributes to more profound international political divergencies
- (b) is related to the tendency of the Soviet Government to gain the time necessary for a reconstruction of the Soviet regime and re-generation of the economy of the Soviet Union.

Three periods in the history of the Soviet regime were the following:

1. Period of the New Economic Policy (1921-1928)
2. Period of the preparation of "people's fronts" (1932-35)
3. Period of internal reorganization after the so-called "massive purges" (1936-38).

During the first of these periods the Soviets initiated a number of propaganda organizations intended for creating and spreading disinformation in the West. The "propaganda of Russian Revolution" in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and other countries being provocation in character. The Canadian "League for Democracy" the activity of fabricators of information (including the "League" in Berlin, late dissolved League of the American Friends of Russia in London) utilizing several hundred agents for purposes of misinformation (KARAVANOV and KUMAROVSKI in Paris, London and others).

In the second period the Bolsheviks formed an important organization for framing and provocation activity among the Russian emigration known as the "Internal Line," infiltrated a number of Russian, Ukrainian, Canadian and other emigre political organizations, and spread a large network of fabricators of information throughout Europe (BOGACHEV and KUMAROVSKI in Paris, KUMAROVSKI in Belgrade, KUMAROVSKI fabricators in Germany and Austria).

During the third period, the Bolsheviks succeeded in infiltrating a number of intelligence services (the German, Japanese, American and Italian) which they inspired and misinformed.

Throughout this activity, the Bolsheviks aimed at gradually decreasing the information and intelligence possibilities of the secret services of the West, and largely succeeded in this field. They fanned the differences and conflicts of interest among these services, and helped increase the role of fabricators of information, at the same time reducing the role and value of emigre political organizations as weapons of anti-Soviet struggle.

An analysis of these periods of Soviet activity in the sphere of provocation and inspiration shows that:

- (a) Soviet activity in this field was always centralized; it originated in one general plan to which were subordinate all acts of provocation and inspiration from the most to the least important
- (b) Soviet activity in this field was organized in a fashion which indicated particular interest in controlling all anti-Soviet action in so-called limitroph countries (bordering on the USSR)
- (c) Soviet activity in this field set itself as a principal task the intensification of conflicts between individual intelligence services of the West although utilizing identical sources of information, and aimed at provoking the absorption of these services (both from the technical, material and intelligence point of view) in secondary matters or problems of insignificant or no importance.

## II.

A careful analysis of the present Soviet policy (particularly since the death of Stalin) reveals all the premises necessary to declare that the Bolsheviks are utilizing at the present time methods of provocation and inspiration on a very extensive scale. The most important of these premises follow:

- (a) in the field of international affairs, the Bolsheviks are making every effort to expand the international political and economic crisis and to increase international conflicts.
- (b) in the field of domestic policy the Bolsheviks are in need of a period of respite to:
  - (1) promote the recovery of economy, primarily the development of heavy and war industry which could permit the USSR to conduct a war relying exclusively on its own forces and the resources of the Soviet block
  - (2) complete the re-shuffling of the so-called "Soviet people" by blending the peoples in the Soviet Union in order to deprive them of their national centers of development and not permit a repetition of the phenomena

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witnessed in the war of 1941-45 when these peoples indulged in mass defeatism and opposition to the Soviet regime .

- (3) link together the Soviet block into one strategical, political and economic entity
- (4) reorganize the stratified and bureaucratized party and bring about its ideological regeneration.

These premises show an analogy between the situation of the USSR in the period of its reconstruction in 1921-28 and the present moment. It is therefore necessary to take into consideration that the methods of provocation and inspiration of the Soviets today originate from intentions similar to those of that period, i.e., to create the impression in the West that the Soviet domestic situation is difficult and that the contemporary trend is toward peaceful evolution and important domestic changes favorable to the West. It is to be concluded that the present aims of the Soviets are likewise similar to those of 1921-28, i.e., they aim at preventing the West from correctly evaluating Soviet potentials and the present domestic conditions of the Soviet Union, increasing the conflicts between Western political centers and Western intelligence services; and subordinate all basic sources and decisions of Western intelligence services and anti-Soviet organizations to Soviet influences.

In order to achieve these purposes the Bolsheviks always followed in the past a strictly synchronized program both in the official speeches and acts of the Soviet Government and official propaganda for outside and internal consumption. The same synchronization of purpose could be observed in the activity of Soviet direct and indirect agents and the information they supplied to the political centers and the public opinion of the West; it was revealed in the political emigre organizations widely used by the Soviets, and in the intensified activity of fabricators of information.

It must be pointed out that at present Soviet provocation and inspiration have much broader possibilities than in the period preceding the world war in view of:

- (a) the decrease in the number of active and independent intelligence services operating against the Soviet Union
- (b) the intensification of the domestic isolation of the USSR and the diminishment of possibilities for intelligence operations in the USSR
- (c) the considerable increase in the number of indirect Soviet agents in the West exercising great influence over public opinion in the West in a fashion favorable to the USSR

- (d) the increase in the number of political emigre organizations from the Soviet block and the simultaneous intensification of the hostility among and within these organizations
- (e) the increase in the number and importance of fabricators of information on the USSR.

## III

A number of concrete facts indicating an intensification of the activity of the Soviet information service and Soviet diversion against the West have taken place in the last few months. Here are some of these facts:

- (a) the kidnapping of one of the leaders of the Russian emigre organization NTS (Solidarists), Dr. R. TRUSHNOVICH
- (b) the case of the Captain of Soviet security services N. KHOKHLOV
- (c) the defection to the Bolsheviks of the prominent Ukrainian Socialist I. KRUTII
- (d) the arrest and execution on USSR territory of the prominent Ukrainian nationalist V. OKHRIMOVICH
- (e) the Soviet reports concerning the arrest on Soviet territory of two American agents and members of the NTS KUDRYAVTSEV and YAKUTA
- (f) the official Soviet memoranda concerning the activity of the NTS addressed to the British and Swiss Governments.

To this list must be added that at the same time the case of RASTVOROV broke out in Japan, the case of PETROV in Australia, as well as others which seemed to confirm that a new wave of purges in the intelligence and security service had started in the Soviet Union. All these facts were directly or indirectly commented in the Soviet press and by Soviet propaganda, in a form which had not been used for a number of years, i.e., in a form which served as publicity for the anti-Soviet activity of the political emigration. Similar publicity was used by the Soviet Government only during periods when large scale provocations were being constructed and developed in the Soviet Union, provocations mentioned above (thus in 1922-24 when the "Trust" was under construction, there was publicity on Russian emigre military organizations, while in 1930-32 when the "Interior Line" was under construction, the Bolsheviks publicized the Russian emigration attributing particular value to its activity in the eyes of the West; similar publicity was used at the proper moment as far as the Ukrainian, Caucasian and Turkestan emigrations were concerned; in the last war period "publicity" was employed in the case of the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian emigrations, and in this manner the value and importance of these groups were increased in Western eyes.

An analysis of all the known elements in the cases referred to above, as well as an analysis of Soviet statements on the subject, indicates that all these facts are manifestations of a single program of provocation and inspiration planned by the Center and directed by the Center likewise, that all these facts are linked together (in certain instances even publicly by the Soviets, as in the case of I. Krutii and that of R. Trushnovich, in the official Soviet communique published in PRAVDA of May 19, 1954), that all these elements are strictly synchronized, and that they are accompanied by a number of secondary activities of the Bolsheviks directed at disorientating and misinforming intelligence services, and public opinion, and at demoralizing political emigres and increasing the hostility and scission in their ranks.

As a result of recent Soviet activity two organizations have been brought to the forefront among the groups acting against the Soviet Union. These are:

- (1) the Russian NTS (National Labor Union) otherwise known as "Solidarists"
- (2) the Ukrainian nationalists.

It should be remembered in further analyzing the situation that all the elements listed above coincide with the decision of American groups to shift from tactics of "coordination of political anti-Soviet activity" of emigres from the Soviet Union, which had been applied in the past to a new approach, placing these American groups in immediate charge of the work of these emigre organizations in the propaganda and information fields. Such a decision which leads to the establishment of control over the emigres, rationalizes the activity of the emigrations and will undoubtedly (in the long run of course) intensify the common anti-Soviet activity of the emigres, could not but be of concern to the Soviet intelligence service. Past Soviet experience shows that Soviet provocation and inspiration can achieve the most spectacular results in those instances when individual emigre organizations enjoy the greatest independence in their anti-Soviet activity and when foreign intelligence services apply the so-called "concession" (contractual?) method of exploitation, i.e., limit themselves to the supply of material and technical means, and to the indication of a general line to be followed, and otherwise give complete freedom of activity to the emigre organization. This was precisely the "contractual" method employed in the 1921-1934 period by all the intelligence services of the West (particularly the British and Polish) with regard to Russian emigre military organizations, and it was precisely this method which largely contributed to the establishment and successful operation of both the "Trust" and the "Internal Line."

One should also take into account the fact that at present (as already been stated) the efforts of the Soviet Government are directed at eliminating the national conflicts between Russian and Ukrainian population. This was the purpose of the

large scale propaganda campaign of the three hundred years anniversary of the "union of Russia and the Ukraine" and simultaneous increased deportation of Ukrainians to Soviet Asia under the pretext of reorganising Soviet agriculture and economy in general. Such a policy inevitably leads to a more or less open opposition on the part of the Soviet population and the Bolsheviki are of course interested in obtaining documentation concerning the "responsibility for all anti-Soviet manifestations" of the Russian and Ukrainian national emigrations under the leadership of "capitalist imperialists

Soviet provocation and inspiration are always constructed with a view to utilize as base the strongest and most active organizations. This applies also to emigre organizations. Weaker groups of organizations of secondary importance are used to hit at the principal organization which is to be disintegrated by provocation. Thus in the cases of the "Trust" and the "Internal Line" all the efforts of Soviet provocation were directed toward the Russian monarchist and military groups, which at that time (1920 - 1934) were the strongest and most active, while simultaneously Soviet inspiration operating through the medium of other Russian emigre organizations worked toward undermining the faith and confidence felt toward Russian monarchist and military groups by spreading about them rumors and accusations (sometimes correct) showing them up as Soviet infiltrated. Provocation directed at Ukrainian groups first (in 1920 - 1929) attempted to infiltrate the so-called "Petlyura" groups, and later (in 1930 - 1940) turned its attention to the nationalists (KONOVALETS-MELNIK) as the strongest emigre Ukrainian organizations of the period.

V

Of all Russian emigre organizations the National Labor Union (NTS) or Solidarists, is the most active, the most powerful (in Europe alone it has 600 active members) and the best adapted to anti-Bolshevik struggle. It has at its disposal experienced cadres for operative (secret) propaganda and diversionist activity and has succeeded in organizing the recruitment of new emigres to replace old cadres. At the same time the NTS is the most vulnerable group from the point of view of Soviet provocation and diversion and can be therefore the most dangerous for the anti-Bolshevik front. Its vulnerability and the danger it presents for the anti-Bolshevik front are due to the following facts:

(a) the NTS finds support in the political, material, technical and juridical respect on three political bases, the American, the British and the German. It must also take into consideration other bases of secondary importance, the French, the Italian, the Belgian, the Scandinavian and other bases in Europe, Asia and America. The NTS is compelled to take into consideration the political and pure-specialized conflicts existing between intelligence services, which is always able to put through projects, undesirable to one base, with the assistance of another base. Consequently,

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not one of the political bases of NTS has full control over the whole work of NTS. This situation permits and sometimes forces the NTS to be insincere with its sponsors. The situation is further complicated objectively by the fact that the leaders of NTS became accustomed during World War II (and even before the war) to tactics calling for staking on two fronts (one NTS group collaborated with the Allies, while another group worked with the Germans) and elaborated methods and practices incompatible with moral and ethical principles.

Not necessarily true. → (b) the sponsors of NTS (both American and British) direct the activity of this organization both toward intelligence, diversion and propaganda simultaneously, which is fundamentally opposed to the principles established in this type of work. It is a particularly dangerous system in view of the Soviet efforts at inspiration and diversion since propaganda activity brings with it tendencies toward inspiration and misinformation which after a while become directed not only at the enemy but also against the sponsors.

Not clear { (c) the NTS is an exceptionally ambitious and self-confident organization which treats with contempt other anti-Soviet Russian and non-Russian organizations and which is inclined toward fake glorification (the spreading for example of false stories by BOLDYREV in the USA). These fake legends pertain both to the actual performance of NTS and to its possibilities of activity in the USSR and its satellite countries. Such legends form the foundation, for example,

- Not true
- (1) for the basic so-called "revolutionary doctrine" of NTS known as the "molecular revolution" which uses as point of issue a theory which does not correspond to the truth regarding the possibilities for mass revolution existing in the USSR and concealed in the individual sentiments of the population
  - (2) for the constant assurances of the NTS leadership that there exist possibilities for anti-Soviet plots in the Red army, and even of a revolution in the armed forces; to support this theory, the solidarists falsify the history of the 1937-39 purge in the Soviet army and invent ridiculous stories regarding plots led by TUKHACHEVSKI, BLYUKHER, and others, which are totally unfounded
  - (3) of the most recent reports of the NTS concerning alleged, and actually non-existent conflicts in the upper echelons of the Soviet party and administration, as well as concerning personal conflicts, vacillations of the government, and even a panic in the USSR.

The NTS presents such doctrinal allegations or such "information" as confirmation of the tremendous operative possibilities of the solidarists and of the correctness of its views on the revolutionary situation of the Soviet population, particularly the army. In effect these allegations may be regarded as a misinformation campaign directed

at the sponsors of NTS. What is still more unfortunate is that they coincide with the tendencies manifested by direct and indirect Soviet inspiration and disinformation.

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An extremely damaging influence upon the NTS, an influence inciting it to further disinformation and inspiration and leading it to demoralization, has been exercised over this organization by certain units of American intelligence and their methods. These branches of the American intelligence service without taking into consideration the exceedingly limited possibilities for intelligence within the USSR set before NTS as well as before other organizations of a similar type tasks which clearly cannot be executed, present too ambitious demands and requirements, and evaluate NTS activity on the basis of the number of "sensational" or "concrete" accomplishments. In this respect these branches of the American intelligence service literally repeat all the errors of British intelligence in the 1926-30 period, the years when Soviet misinformation and inspiration were most active.

unfortunately, not from Romanov + Arsenov - that's all.  
An important role in the work of NTS is played by "new" (1941-45) and "most recent" (since 1945) emigres. These emigres who very often as proved by experience have not been subjected to sufficient investigation and are too soon permitted to occupy positions of responsibility, while useful to the organization, present a serious problem. As a rule they are extremely self-confident, suffer from a "moral ideological" complex of "superiority over the West" engrained in them by the Bolsheviks and attribute too great a significance to questions of tactics and technique while at the same time treat superficially questions pertaining to morals and ethics. They rapidly get accustomed to the Western environment and soon realize that their position and value depend on the amount of information or "possibilities" that they are able to supply to the British and the Americans. Since no Soviet citizen can be in possession of a great deal of information nor can he have any serious "possibilities," these men immediately begin engaging in fabrication and inspiration. In the NTS their reaction coincides with the general trends of the organization as described above, and there is nothing surprising that the NTS is precisely the organization which is joined with particular willingness by the "new" and "most recent" emigres. Besides, NTS enjoys the reputation of an organization with good contacts in British and American circles, which can offer rapid possibilities of promotion to an able man.

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The NTS does not possess any serious security or counter-intelligence service in the strict sense of the word for the verification of its men. In most instances this is replaced by a so-called "ideological" or "party" trust. As a rule, it may be added that no emigre political organization, whatever is its nationality, is able, working on alien territory to organize a counter-intelligence service guaranteeing its security and protecting it from the penetration of provocateurs and Soviet agents.

Asian General Military Union (ROVS) although a military disciplined organization, as was proved many years later,

was all, from the lowest to the highest ranks infiltrated by Soviet agents (the grandiose cases "Trust," "Internal Line," etc.) and became a tool of Soviet inspiration and misinformation. A similar situation existed in other Russian organizations such as "The Brotherhood of Russian Truth," "Mladorossy," "Peasant Russia" and various socialist and social democratic organizations. This took place likewise in Ukrainian, Georgian, Turkoman and Bielorussian emigre groups. The only factor which can protect emigre organizations from provocation and infiltration by Soviet agents is a serious and efficient counter-intelligence service of the country where the organization is operating. Emigre organizations in Europe under present conditions cannot count on such protection since neither the juridical set-up nor the security organs in the countries of Europe are interested in protecting the political and other special interests of emigre groups. In France, Germany and Italy, security services not only fail to warn political emigres of the Soviet agents discovered in their midst (so long as these agents are not deemed dangerous to French, German or Italian interests from the purely French, German or Italian point of view) but often recruit the Soviet agents which they have discovered to work as informers on emigre questions.

From the counter-intelligence viewpoint, NTS therefore is a completely uncovered and defenseless organization as far as Soviet provocation and infiltration are concerned.

All the above stated leads to the following conclusions:

- (a) NTS as the largest and most active Russian anti-Bolshevik organization, with numerous contacts in the West, must and does attract the particular attention of Soviet intelligence both as an object of observation and as a possible tool for inspiration and disinformation
- (b) The fact that the NTS is simultaneously connected with three centers of anti-Bolshevik activity, the American, British and German, makes NTS particularly valuable to the Soviet services, since, should Soviet agents succeed in taking over NTS, this would enable the Bolsheviks to direct their inspiration along three channels
- (c) The higher the value set by the West on NTS as a weapon of anti-Bolshevik struggle, the more likely it is that NTS will absorb the organizational, material and technical forces of the West intended for the struggle (cold war) against the Soviets. Such concentration will then possibly prevent the West from applying other means of struggle and using other tools in operations against the Soviet Union, and will confirm the practice of "contractual" methods of anti-Soviet work employed by the West.

## VI

A situation similar to that occupied by NTS in the Russian emigration is occupied by the Ukrainian nationalists in Ukrainian emigre circles. Two groups are of particular interest: (OUN/R (Association of Ukrainian Nationalists-Revolutionaries or the so-called "Bandera organization") and the UHVR (Ukrainian Chief Liberation Council) expanded recently by the adherence of a small but active faction which recently broke with Bandera. The former of these organizations receives support from England, the Vatican and the Germans, the latter from certain American organizations. The former group has always been an organization favored by Soviet infiltration (the group of YAKYL, a definite Soviet agent, in the 1938-1941 period). The latter organization has granted membership to a large number of recent emigres with an extremely suspect past, as well as to persons supporting extremely left-wing views closely related to Trotskism and Titoism. It must be remembered that Trotskism and Titoism play an important role in the political life of all emigre organizations.

Both the above groups (as is the case with NTS in the Russian emigration) have their men planted in other emigre organizations. Both have succeeded in surrounding themselves by an atmosphere of legends confirming their claim to immense intelligence, diversion and political possibilities on Ukrainian territory. Both groups (as is the case of NTS) have a large number of specialists on Soviet (or Soviet Ukrainian) political and economic questions. As does NTS, they base their propaganda and operative tactics on theories of a spontaneous popular anti-Soviet movement. At the same time, however, both these groups are politically intensely hostile to the NTS.

As does the NTS, the Ukrainian nationalists have their opponents and enemies in the emigration, who for some time past openly fight against them and accuse them of being entirely or partly infiltrated by Soviet agents. It is significant that among these enemies of the NTS and of the Ukrainian nationalists are suspect groups undoubtedly penetrated by Soviet agents (for example, the ARTSYUK-DERZHAVIN group around NABAT, the Ukrainian group VPERED, or the Ukrainian socialists).

Thus, while the program and tactics of the NTS and the Ukrainian nationalists provoke an intensification of conflicts among the Russian and Ukrainian emigres and between these two emigrations, the activity against them of direct and indirect Soviet agents intensifies their isolation and by often ridiculous propaganda and just as ridiculous accusations, obstructs verification and proper evaluation of their activity. As does the NTS, the Ukrainian nationalists have no possibilities for undertaking a thorough control of their organizations to protect them against the infiltration of Soviet agents, nor are they subject as whole organizations and otherwise to any outside control. The activity of the Ukrainian nationalists moreover contributes to the fanning of conflicts between the American and British intelligence services. These conflicts form a constant subject of discussion in emigre circles, and at times one gets the impression that the propaganda is engaged in exaggerating and fomenting them.

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As may be seen from the above, the Ukrainian Nationalists as well as ~~the~~ the NTS constitute an organization which is suitable for Soviet manipulation as a "provocation."

## VII

The cases of N. KHOKHLOV and R. TRUSHNOVICH led to a considerable increase of the value of NTS as an anti-Bolshevik organization. An analysis of these cases and their development makes it evident that the self-publicity engaged in by the leaders of NTS found ideal support on the part of Soviet propaganda.

From the technical standpoint of both these cases, neither one can be regarded as perfectly clear, comprehensible, and giving no cause for doubt. At any event neither fully corresponds to the usual and customary tactics and technique employed by the Soviets in such instances.

The kidnapping of R. Trushnovich has still been incompletely utilized by the Bolsheviks. The impression created is that the Bolsheviks are keeping the case on ice for future utilization at a more appropriate moment, when with the aid of Trushnovich, they will be able to expose whatever they need concerning NTS, and the American, British and other services. A number of elements indicates that the case of the NTS is being expanded by the Bolsheviks and spread over other countries (several times, for example, the name of A. Stolypin from Paris was named in Soviet statements; this may gradually be developed to an extent where the Soviets will consider themselves entitled to accuse the French authorities of protecting NTS activity). Nor is there any doubt that the Bolsheviks are withholding the "confessions" of Trushnovich in order not to interfere with the efforts of NTS to utilize the favorable environment which has been created for NTS and to keep the NTS in the good graces of its sponsors. Consequently, the kidnapping of Trushmovich has so far only contributed toward increasing the authority of NTS as an anti-Soviet organization.

brother  
Not true < The Khokhlov case is far more complex. It has been greatly confused by the tactics employed by NTS in its connection. To judge from generally publicized data (Khokhlov's published statements) it may be assumed that Khokhlov is an unconscious Soviet agent well prepared for the role of a "murderer conscience-stricken at the last moment." Neither the psychic and moral characteristics of Khokhlov nor his position justify his selection by any serious service for the role which he was destined to play. At the same time, none of the information obtained from Khokhlov as far as can be judged was particularly detrimental to the Bolsheviks.

The case of Khokhlov and that of Trushnovich in combination with the official Soviet statements directed against NTS create the impression that the Bolsheviks intend to direct their inspiration and information precisely through the NTS channel and that they are every measure to have the Western services use the NTS as a for their anti-Soviet operations. It must be noted that, on

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their own hand, the leaders of NTS are likewise making every effort to utilize the favorable environment and to develop NTS activity in such a manner as to be able to influence all possible information centers (besides the American and British, also the French, Swiss, Scandinavian, Italian and of late the centers in the Near and Middle East!).

Of particular significance is the fact that the arguments advanced against NTS and the accusations that it is completely subordinate to Soviet intelligence were raised among the political emigre organizations which themselves are regarded as most suspect, for example, the Artsyuk-Darzhavin group, or Grigori Aleksinski who was compromised in the "Trust" and "Internal Line" cases, was a former collaborator of Besedovski and was a paid agent of practically every European intelligence service, or the Ukrainian nationalists, and others. This circumstance confuses the issue and brings the problem of "suspicions" against NTS to the level of inner political problems.

### VIII

The case of I. Krutii is far more simple. There is no doubt that I. Krutii was a Soviet informer as early as 1945. It was only due to the complete absence of control reigning in the internal organization of individual emigre groups that this remained unnoticed by anyone. Krutii's "confessions" published May 18, 1954 in the Kiev newspaper RADIANSKA UKRAINA and May 19, 1954, in the Moscow PRAVDA were simply aimed at linking together the Ukrainian emigration into one whole (contrary to facts), to brand this whole by the term "Ukrainian nationalists" and to connect it with American services. In this instance therefore the Bolsheviks are utilizing a method contrary to the one used with respect to the Russian emigration, where the work of other organizations is ignored and the NTS is advanced to the forefront, as the most active group.

This may be explained by the fact that contrary to the Russian emigration composed of organizations which, from the Soviet point of view, are extinct or insignificant, most Ukrainian organizations are comparatively active. They are furthermore linked together by principles of chauvinist nationalism. It is therefore in the interest of the Bolsheviks to speak of the Ukrainian emigration as of a political whole.

The main point in the Krutii case, however, is not his defection to the Bolsheviks but the arrest and elimination in the Ukraine of the notorious Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary V. OKHRIMOVICH who was in contact with most nationalist Ukrainian groups and who is regarded by all these groups as one of themselves. The elimination of Okhrimovich and the "confessions" of Krutii serve to prove that there exists in the Ukraine a national liberation movement connected with the emigration. As in the case of NTS, this gives tremendous publicity to the Ukrainian nationalists and makes it possible for the

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safe in  
74-126-27/1  
per May Wilson, eq.  
August 16, 1957

"Conference Olivaint" at Port-Croix

With the help of FERR aid (see P. EXNY 182, June 21st and NYTRIP of June 25) a group of young members of the Polish Catholic Intellectual Clubs arrived from Warsaw to attend the Catholic intellectual "Conference Olivaint" in Port-Croix, July 7-30, 1957. The delegation of young Poles was headed by D. Morawski, former private secretary (1945-46 to Karol Popiel, Mr. Auleitner, secretary of the Central Clubs Committee and Mr. J. Zablocki, Chairman of the Warsaw Catholic Club. The rest of the delegation consisted of students from the Catholic University of Lublin. The Warsaw Poles were accompanied by three representatives of the Polish Christian Social Youth Federation (in exile).

The leaders of the group took advantage of their brief stay in Paris to contact such French Catholic intellectual milieu as "La Croix," "ESPRIK," "Témoignage Chrétien," and were introduced by Mr. Eustachiewicz. Such contacts were aimed primarily at dissipating misunderstandings which occurred before last October on the importance of Pax in Poland and the desirability of relations between Pax and French Catholic intellectuals. From reports of these meetings, it would appear that Pax is almost completely discredited in France at this point.

Mr. Morawski also met M. de Menthon, who is particularly interested in current developments in Poland. Morawski persuaded de Menthon to include Catholic deputies in the invitation he will extend this year to Polish MPs to visit Paris. He also suggested that de Menthon visit Poland himself, but as a private citizen rather than officially. As such, Morawski contends, de Menthon would have more freedom of action and could arrange a more flexible schedule.

There were about 70 young persons attending the Port-Croix sessions. Apart from the French and Polish groups, there were 12 Americans and small groups of Belgians and Germans. Prof. Henry Steele Commager and Prof. Hys, as well as the Cultural Attaché of the American Embassy in Paris, Mr. R. Agree, visited the Conference. Prof. Commager lectured on "Nationalism without Chauvinism." Robert Schuman delivered a lecture on Communist influence in the free world. Discussions were held every afternoon on topics introduced by different national groups. The French team gave brief lectures on French literature, French politics and economics and on the prevailing tendencies among University students as well as among youth in general. Similar reports were given by the American group and two evenings were devoted to discussion of Franco-American relations.

...../.

The Polish group gave three lectures: on the political situation in Poland after October, on the rôle of Catholics in today's Poland and on the situation of youth and students. The Polish group made the point of stressing the evolutionary character of the development of the situation in Poland and the severe damage done during the last 12 years which is only now being carefully and painfully rectified.

On the initiative of Mr. Neil Alter, leader of the American group, the Americans and Poles met privately on several occasions. They discussed questions such as the American loan to Poland, the present economic situation in Poland, the public opinion trends in the United States toward the changes in Poland and the question of scientific exchanges. The Americans maintained that the proper use of the present loan would determine whether any further aid would be granted and, if so, how much aid that would amount to. At first the atmosphere was cool between Poles and Americans and the latter took on the attitude of listeners, but after certain precisisions on their respective positions, it warmed up and a climate of understanding and interest was created.

During the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Olivaint Conference, various local French dignitaries addressed the participants, including the Commander in Chief of Toulon, Admiral Bergère. A discussion of trade unions and their rôle in modern society took place on that occasion and was one of the high points of interest to the visiting Poles. At the closing sessions, the young Poles were given special attention by the outgoing President, M. J.C. Casanova, and the new President, Mr. G. Berger. Mr. Windsor Cousins, of the American group, joined the others in expressing satisfaction at the new and close links just established between the young Polish Catholics and their Western colleagues. The director of the Conference, Père Huvene, S.J., spoke highly of Poland and expressed the wish that a visit might be arranged to that country in the interests of closer future cooperations.

Several frank conversations were held between the Poles and the Germans at Port-Cros. The Germans were said to have expressed themselves in favor of a compromise with Poland regarding the Western Territories, suggesting certain marginal frontier changes or provisions whereby Germans wanting to return to their homes in what is now Poland be allowed to do so. Several of the Germans at Port-Cros were from Silesia, which made their talks particularly interesting, though more delicate, for the visiting Poles.

The three exile Poles who accompanied the visitors took advantage of the situation and probed the possibilities of an early creation of a Christian Social Youth group in Poland. The visitors were extremely interested in the idea. They also were stimulated by the activities of the International Union of Young Christian Democrats as well as by other free youth groups in the West. As usual, they were unanimous in their

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requests for reading matter and ideological documentation, as well as material on the activities of the young Christian Democrats in the free world. They also were very enthusiastic about exchange visits among Catholic youth in Poland and in the West.

These young Poles, like all Polish Christians who have visited the West since early Spring, have stressed the need in Poland of an ideological/Christian review printed by Poles in the West for distribution in Poland. They suggested that they would contribute to the review sending articles from Poland itself. This is roughly the same idea that Kisielewski had two months ago and that Sawicki suggested to the Christian Democrats in Rome. Almost without exception all militant Catholics discussing the situation in Poland today, lay particular emphasis on the need for a vehicle for articles and ideological comment as well as interpretive news stories.

The young Poles visiting Port-Gros were also eager to make it clear that a center in Paris where Christian Social visitors from Poland could acquaint themselves with analogous trends in all the Western countries would be particularly advantageous. This is another idea put forth by Sawicki during the Cardinal's visit to Rome. The young Poles also showed interest in scholarships offered by the West to Polish students to come and study in Western universities. Once in the West, they would also get in touch with and cooperate with the political activities of the Polish Christian Labor Party and the Polish Christian Social Youth Federation, to their mutual advantage. All these suggestions and ideas point to the enthusiasm felt by young people from Poland and the confidence they have in future contacts with their compatriots in the West. They seem firmly convinced that the tide is not about to be turned back in Poland. On the contrary, the programs and plans they outline indicate fuller and broader possibilities for collaboration with the emigration and with their counterparts in Western European countries.

The Port-Gros experiment in uniting Poles with Catholic youth from Western countries has proved to be far more of a success than we anticipated. Their rapprochement with the American participants and the good terms which they managed to achieve with the Silesian Germans did them great credit. The links they established with French Catholics on a youth level again points to the high caliber type coming from Poland on such missions. From this side we consider the Port-Gros project an exceptionally rewarding one.