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Chief, SE
Attmt
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INFO: GIB, Germany
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REEDWOOD AEVIROIL

Status Report and Plans for Future
Development of Project AEVIROIL

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1. Forwarded herewith is a status report on project AEVIROIL in which we have attempted to indicate in broad outline the general direction of our efforts during the past year and a half and to put forward certain considerations bearing on the future development of the organization.

2. The report itself was started shortly after the conclusion of the July Geneva Conference and was delayed only by the pressure of continuing AEVIROIL-1 routine business. The projected course of action in Section F was discussed in some detail with [redacted] prior to his departure in late September in order that he might be able to pass on to Headquarters a fairly accurate portrayal of field thinking on this subject. From the "Supplementary Report" which he has sent by mail to the AEVIROIL-1 office we gather that he has discussed the matter in some detail with his Headquarters contact.

3. We are proceeding with development of plans for the SVSODA conference in late January or early February. At the same time the necessity for reorganization of AEVIROIL-1 is being discussed privately by AEVIROIL-1 with members of the Presidium, and a full-scale plenary session will shortly be devoted to this subject. It should be emphasized that voluntary concurrence by a majority of the Presidium is a matter of highest importance. If it should become necessary for us to force through a reorganization plan against the will of the governing body we can expect resignations, public denunciations, and the sort of "scandal" familiar in emigre political movements. This we will want by all means to avoid.

4. Headquarters views are requested.

APPROVED: [redacted]

3 November 1955

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SECRET REPORT ON PROJECT ANVIRILL

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to present a status report on Project ANVIRILL and to set forth certain considerations bearing on plans for further development of the project and of the emigre organization which KUBARK has founded and supported.

2. As this memorandum was drafted the Geneva Conference had just concluded. The effects of the conference and the true meaning of changes in Soviet attitudes, whether tactical or strategic, defensive or unendingly dominating an offensive goal—all this will continue to be studied and analyzed for many months to come, and the results of this analysis will eventually be reflected in the formulation of SECRET policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which in turn will determine the nature and direction of SECRET (including ANVIRILL) psychological and political progress during the next several years. Under these circumstances, with changes in goals, emphasis or timing all possible, we would be foolishly indeed to attempt to discuss the possible future of this one project under any set of circumstances other than that which actually exists today, and we are therefore forced to make certain basic assumptions in order to have some solid ground for discussion. Few tenets these assumptions may be will be at once evident to the reader.

a) Despite the change in Soviet attitudes or actions, however motivated, the long-range ideological struggle between the "Great World," led by the United States, and the Communist dominated world will continue over the foreseeable future.

b) The effort to reach and influence the mind and thinking of the Soviet citizen will continue to be of importance, probably even of added importance during the next several years.

c) Emigre organizations have certain special capabilities in the field of communication with their brethren in the West. A group such as ANVIRILL, consisting of recent emigres, has perhaps the best basis for acceptance by its target audience, whether this be Soviet troops in Eastern Germany or the population of the neutralized itself. The experience of the ANVIRILL "action", therefore, does not diminish, although we will probably want during coming months to effect certain changes in organization as well as in method of operation.

d) Despite the changed relationships inherent in assumption of sovereignty by the Federal Republic, possibly in the future necessitating some form of joint control or sponsorship with appropriate German officers, ANVIRILL will continue to be permitted to conduct its operations from German territory.

3. We emphasize that these assumptions are at once arbitrary and tentative, and we are not sure that they could be debated at length and perhaps debated. Particularly in the realm of speculation, of course, is the question of whether ANVIRILL or any emigre political organization will be allowed to continue to conduct psychological warfare operations in Germany for the indefinite future, and this, as Headquarters is aware, is a question intimately related to the future course of German internal politics. We proposed these assumptions, nevertheless, in order that we may at least have some sort of common starting point for discussion of a many-faceted problem.

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B. SECRET EARLY HISTORY

B. EARLY HISTORY OF PROJECT ANVIL-1.

1. We will make no effort here to write an exhaustive review of the ANVIL-1 project since its inception in late 1952, particularly in light of the excellent and detailed report prepared by [redacted] and forwarded on 13 November 1953 under KMM-5715. This early history is presumably available for such light as it may throw on the present development of the project and the possibilities for the future, and we will thus limit our discussion here to a broad analysis of trends in the group-KMM-1 relationship and in the internal growth of the organization itself.

2. ANVIL-1 was given its first impetus by KMM-1 staff officers and on the results of plans developed within various KMM-1 staffs in the German situation and at headquarters in mid-1952. Just exactly where the original project was formulated is not now clear, nor is it known to the present reviewer, but there is no doubt whatsoever that much of the early planning and implementation was attributable directly to [redacted] whose name by some unaccountable oversight, appears to have been omitted from [redacted] report. It was [redacted] who first discovered the November 1952 Convention in Berlin at which a competition was started with James H. Dunnington as Chairman, and with KMM-1 operational control of the entire study established. The specific elements from the Berlin case, led by ex-Soviet Major Dunnington were finally selected, but the victory was not entirely bloodless in that it became necessary to do some behind-the-scenes politicking with [redacted] and the latter's cover position as a Russian 2-2 employee made it clear that OTHER was intervening in this presumably all-outside affair. This is all now common history, although ANVIL-1's genuine delight in dragging it through their publications (e.g. *Revolutsionnyi Vestnik*) every so often to emphasize that ANVIL-1 is a tool of American intelligence. We, of course, in ANVIL-1 publications do not dignify the assertions by reply. As far as the KMM is concerned, the fact of OTHER support can now be no secret.

3. As [redacted] rightly points out, the original effort was very much in the nature of an experiment in that for the first time in the Russian field at least, KMM-1 was setting up an outside group under its own direct control, rather than making contact with an existing support to a group already in being, as in the case of KMM-1-00. The word "neutral," so often, alas, heard about randomly in planning papers and project outlines, is very much in order here, since a fairly strict control was imposed in the early KMM-1-group relationships. The leading ANVIL-1s, including the Chairman and the most vocal members of the Provisional, were completely willing of the group's total financial support by OTHER and were aware that this support could be fairly easily terminated if the group should choose to go off on some tangent not acceptable to the case-officer and his organization. This situation continues to obtain, although we have made efforts to stimulate initiative among the ANVIL-1 leaders and to eliminate any aspects emphasizing complete subservience to KMM-1 command decisions.

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4. The case-officers [redacted] at first, [redacted] and [redacted] later had a very important place in the initiation and direction of operations extensively conducted by the editors around the two centers' agent sub-unit, [redacted] and [redacted] were quickly given responsibility for various phases of the program and were in close intimate and direct contact with the group leaders than the case-officers. To speak of "group operations" during this period is perhaps something of an exaggeration since so much of the activity was carried on either by KIBARK staffs, KIBARK technical facilities, or other KIBARK German Mission projects. It might be said, it has been said that AVIRGOL-1 at this stage was little more than a front for psychological and KEMAP operations conducted by the German Mission itself. To illustrate this point we might consider one of the major operational elements--the writing, printing and distribution of Russian-language leaflets for Soviet troops in Eastern Germany. As the writing developed during the first year and a half of the projects' existence, leaflet writing was being done by some two or three of the AVIRGOL-1 staff, with [redacted] contributing greatly as planner, with [redacted] as leeturer and editor. The finished texts were then brought up to Frankfurt and passed on by an ad-hoc editorial review board consisting of one or more of the case-officers, [redacted] and [redacted] accepted texts were flown out to MIROVAL for printing, with [redacted] shop as printing "assistant". The group had no distribution facilities of its own, and had to do the liaison work to have the job taken on by various propaganda distribution sets run by several German Mission projects. This finally settled down to WILSON for the new hallooning action, one group from Berlin, one from Bavaria, and finally a third from the British zone, and CAMERONIS for mass distribution of material printed in Berlin from texts supplied by AVIRGOL-1. The distribution was financed by a special fund (Gibral) which had been made available to the Mission for distribution of official-support material.

5. Notable, by a curious combination of circumstances, another element was added to the AVIRGOL-1 complex. [redacted] had put together a small but highly competent staff of emigre writers to publish an anti-Soviet satirical magazine ("Kritik") which was distributed for the most part among emigre readers, although one or more penny editions were printed for covert dissemination among Soviet troops. It was apparently decided that the two projects could be mutually complementary and that the writing talent available in the Berlin group might be used to excellent advantage by the still infant AVIRGOL-1 organization, and thus a loose relationship was early established. The satirical magazine, an excellent anti-Communist "brochlet", could and did have something important to contribute in the ideological struggle, but its impact was largely in the West, and Headquarters finally had to decide whether funds should continue to be spent on a publication which was not targeted directly to Soviet forces. In late 1953 publication was suspended several of the staff were retained but a few of the most talented people were kept on for the AVIRGOL-1 program. Their position was and continues to be anomalous. One of them, AVIRGOL-6 is probably our best writer, speaker, ideologist, and the brains and spirit behind the group. Not he and the other individuals who were thus inducted can not be members of AVIRGOL-1 since they are not post-war emigres. Their status is thus only that of paid employees of the group, although AVIRGOL-6 was nevertheless designated by Ducasier as "general manager" of AVIRGOL-1 affairs and continues in this capacity.

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6. During the first year and a half of its existence, then, the project occupied itself primarily with the printing and distribution of propaganda material, mainly leaflets, designed for the Soviet Forces in Eastern Germany. Another important operational element must now be mentioned--the AEVIRGIL-1 Berlin office. Again, the full history is available in appropriate KUBARK files, and we will present here only the briefest summary. The office was opened in mid-1953 as a BOB REDCAP operation, the primary purpose being to have an overt office to which people from Berlin and the zone might come with information about individual Soviet soldiers and officers. At the beginning the AEVIRGIL-1 connection was purely nominal, and the characterization by Chief, BOB--"a flytrap for Soviets"--was splendidly descriptive of the reason for its existence. The BOB operational officers, with the experience of a going SEEM-100 operation as a guide and yardstick, soon decided that a little more was needed than an AEVIRGIL-1 shingle on the door, and the Munich case-officers were asked to send a real live AEVIRGIL-1 representative who might in fact speak for the group in Berlin, particularly in the more overt forms of political and propaganda warfare. This turned out to be AEVIRGIL-3, a bright and talented activist with excellent German, a flair for public appearance, and good capabilities for getting about in German political circles. He has continued in this job, although it has become necessary to divide his time among Berlin, Munich, and the other points in Western Germany where he can help the organization by personal contact or by participation in conventions, meetings, and the like. We will have more about the Berlin aspects of the AEVIRGIL-1 operation in later paragraphs.

C. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS SINCE SPRING, 1954

1. We will trace now the major direction of effort in AEVIRGIL-1 during the past year and a half, a period corresponding roughly with our own stewardship of the project, emphasizing, of course, that this time delimitation is made purely for purposes of convenience. In listing the various things we have tried to accomplish we will not be able to show any significant order of priority, mainly because we have had to be guided by common sense rather than by any absolute, rigid, planning-paper schedule whenever we had to decide where or how to use our somewhat limited resources. In addition, it should be emphasized that the below listing is by no means intended to be a complete history of developments or individual actions but merely a broad review of our major efforts.

2. Development of Group Operations

As noted above, the group might well have been characterized as a front or facade for psychological and defector-inducement operations conducted essentially by KUBARK through its own staff officers and contract agents, and, additionally, with the aid of other KUBARK-supported groups operating in or out of Western Germany and Berlin. We felt it important to attempt to make AEVIRGIL-1 far more self-sufficient than it had been, against the day when conceivably KUBARK might have to withdraw and limit its aid to provision of financial support to an organization operating largely on its own. Whether this should or should not eventuate, however, it seemed to be wise to make the group less reliant on facilities we

at under its own control and which could

at any time be withdrawn by reason of policy changes ensuing from German sovereignty. A number of measures were initiated, some of them more or less concurrently, to gain the above ends, and although we mention them here only briefly they do nevertheless represent significant forward steps.

a) Printing Shop

Through purchase of some equipment and by dint of case-officer scrounging in the Mission supply depot we were able to set up an AEVINGIL-1 printing shop capable of turning out leaflets, pamphlets, brochures, and the like in very acceptable quantity and quality. There are still some kinks in this operation, mainly because we have not yet found the right base printer, but despite break-downs and assorted minor misfortunes we have been producing very nearly all the AEVINGIL-1 printed matter during the past year and we hope to increase the production rate during the coming months.

b) Balloon Team, Bavaria

We got ourselves into the propaganda distribution business with a balloon team made up of AEVINGIL-1 members working out of an operations base in northeastern Bavaria. It has provided a fine assortment of case-officer headaches, but the team is now putting out a respectable quantity of leaflets into the southern part of the Soviet occupation zone. The same crew, aided by our contact agent and KUBARK ops personnel, was launching long-range balloons into the Soviet Union until the action was first postponed (Geneva, Adenauer to Moscow), and then temporarily suspended under circumstances familiar to addressees. The short-range action might be characterized as semi-covert, since ballooning from border areas cannot be carried on without the knowledge and consent of the local authorities, and the team leader has been directed to maintain close and friendly liaison with the appropriate police chiefs and bureaus. At the same time we have not advertised our site location as HFK does, and we are presently moving to a new base on the theory that a year in one area is probably about enough.

c) Balloon Team, Berlin

When it became clear that we might one day have to give up the use of the DTLINER crew for ballooning of Russian material, it was decided that an AEVINGIL-1 team should be organized in Berlin, using, of course, local Berlin Germans for the manpower. The team was recruited and put into operation by SIB, with technical aid from our Danish balloon expert, in remarkably short time. We don't want to jinx a beginning operation, so we will say only that [] has stated that the Berlin crew (Germans) is already more efficient and capable than our Bavaria crew (Russians), despite their short period of experience.

Other operational developments will be treated in succeeding paragraphs.

3. German Sector

As the fact of German sovereignty drew nearer we were forced to consider what sort of changes might eventuate therefrom and how we should go about preparing for the new relationships which were to be expected. Nobody, apparently, had the answer to the first part of the question, but it did seem fairly clear that the group should set to work to make itself known, liked and appreciated

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by these German groups and individuals, in and out of Government, which might one day be influential in deciding whether the group could continue to exist and operate on German soil. This was initiated by several actions on the German border, some fairly successful, some more or less still in the talk stage. Several of the top AFTVHILL-3 members have made pilgrimages to Bonn and have developed useful contacts in the Interior Ministry and elsewhere. AFTVHILL-3 continues to attend meetings and deliver talks at various conventions and conferences in Western Germany. The German-language magazine "Der Arbeiterfreund" is appearing approximately quarterly, and we hope to continue to do business with the Interior Ministry in distributing it. The public relations campaign in Berlin by AFTVHILL-3 has done a good deal for the group, so that it is perhaps better known there than in the Western zone, and we wish to continue and expand this front of the operation with the aid of AFTVHILL-3's assistance. Much more needs to be done in the way of developing contacts with German state and local officials, and this action is also well up on the pending list.

b. Development of Organization

Here we will list briefly what has been done in the direction of building and strengthening the group itself, its subdivisions and some of group unity. Some plans have been made, and yet the organization is far from being a growing flourishing body.

a) Organization of Germany, 1958

Thoughts conceived from the approximately 200 members in Western Germany, the principle business being election of leaders and improvement of organizational structure (not by-laws, etc). We were able to keep control of the growing body in the hands of people worthy of ~~trust~~ support, and our man James E. Dussardier won re-election as group leader. He was very thankful that we succeeded in bringing back AFTVHILL-4 from Berlin, and his election as Dussardier's deputy paved the way for his taking over the leadership in September 1955 when Dussardier left for the U.S.

b) Work with Headquarters in Germany

It was realized that the rank and file of AFTVHILL-4 membership in Germany, particularly those outside the Munich area, were not being given sufficient attention by the top activists on our pay-roll. A good deal has been accomplished here during the past year through visits by AFTVHILL-4 and J, through regular correspondence, and by no means least through contact work by the Hamburg representative. The welfare problem is here of great importance, and the Hamburg representative spends perhaps the greater part of his time in arranging aid for needy post-war emigrants in the British zone.

c) AFTVHILL-4 Chapter in the U.S.

During the visit of James E. Dussardier to the States in October 1958 some of the more ideologically-minded post-war emigrants were induced to come together and set up a U.S. section of the organization, under more or less direct guidance and direction from the Headquarters case-officer. Headquarters will be far better aware than we are here of the problems and limitations attendant upon this action, stemming presumably from certain charter limitations in the matter of KUBARK sponsoring and supporting anti-communist courses in the United States. It would appear that some sort of minimum budget allocation would be required at least to support

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an office and a full- or part-time representative as front-man, organizer, and central point for the organization, consisting as it does of individuals geographically separated from each other and each occupied with the immediate problems of existence and assimilation in a new and complex environment. Meanwhile, however, the group has at least made a start. It has organized or participated in several interesting public affairs and has contributed some good material for the magazine.

d) Other AEWIGIL-1 Chapters

While the U.S. Chapter is at least a going affair, we are unfortunately not able to say as much for the other chapters which we had hoped to get in motion during the past year. The main difficulty here is that the top AEWIGIL activists have great problems in obtaining travel visas, and a personal visit by a leading member of the Presidium is a necessary beginning for the formation of a local chapter. Dussardier was never able to obtain a visa for Belgium, where there are a good many post-war emigres, and the planned organizational tour did not come off. There are possible mailings which we hope to organize by correspondence, and this refers particularly to groups in Argentina and Israel, and we have by no means given up the plan for setting up other local chapters in several Western European countries. These plans, however, should now be re-examined in the light of our probable expansion of the group membership through broadening of the action to include other than post-war emigres.

e) Addition of Recent Defectors

Here we have to admit probably the outstanding weakness of the organization and the one which more than anything else is now forcing us to examine ways and means of changing the organizational concept in the interest of strengthening the operational usefulness of the group. The fact is, to put it bluntly, that we have not been getting any good, mature, competent new defectors to add to the original group, consisting as it does mainly of people who came over in the period 1945 to 1948, and thus the concept of "today's Russian speaking to his brothers" becomes increasingly more fiction than fact. The number of Soviet defectors has not appreciably increased, and the take continues to consist mainly of young lads with very little schooling and no significant leadership qualities, so that they can add little to the personnel strength of the group, although it is nevertheless important to keep a small flow of such young recruits coming in so that the activists may be kept more closely in touch with their target audience.

We have repeatedly attempted to emphasize both to Headquarters and in the field that this personnel need is perhaps our most pressing organizational problem, and despite this we have often felt, from our admittedly biased case-officer viewpoint, that not sufficient consideration was being given to it. Just as one sad example which we happen to be aware of we might point to the fiasco involving ALLANOR, where a really fine young man was kept in a Frankfurt apartment for a year or so while decisions were being arrived at concerning his use in "operations", and at the end the boy was turned over to the Army despite the fact that Headquarters had agreed to his assignment to AEWIGIL. In the case of DS-623, we managed

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have a distribution arm which appears to be quite satisfactory for our purposes. We believe that this team can be readily expanded in the event that the British code DEFLINER team becomes unavailable in the future.

The ARDABERRERA office is funded as a separate KUFIRE project, while the AEVIRGIL-3 representation and the ABCACOTOL net are funded from the AEVIRGIL budget.

6. Improvement of Propaganda Output

We have tried during the past year both to raise the quality of the AEVIRGIL-1 output and to strive for a greater variety in format and method of presentation. We feel that certain successes have been gained, but there is a great deal still to be done and we hope to address ourselves to this as vigorously as possible during the coming months. We need to bring our propaganda writers closer to the scene, closer to the target audience for which they are writing, and we expect to accomplish this through several expedients, the most promising being establishment of regular contact with recent defectors at CAHEKONE. This has been done in the past, and we expect to continue and expand the procedure. We are aiming for production of more brochure and pamphlet material. A penny edition of AEVIRGIL-70 is in planning and we hope to make it a regular feature. A new satirical cartoon pamphlet is about ready for press. The leaflet production needs to be more varied in format, type, and size, and we should be able to use more graphic means of presentation.

One difficulty here has been the fact that our print-shop has barely been able to keep up with the quantity load we have imposed on it, and so the opportunity for branching out with more varied (and time-consuming) material has been limited. Now we are about to explore the possibility of commercial printing in Berlin for the ABCACOTOL balloon and rocket net, and if this works out it will have the dual advantage of saving us the costly and burdensome monthly shipment of leaflets from Munich to Frankfurt to Berlin while at the same time freeing our shop for printing of some of the special items referred to above.

7. Social Welfare Work

Right from the beginning of the project it was recognized that the job of improving the material lot of the membership would be a most important aspect of the operation, and a good deal of attention has continued to be devoted to this problem. The role of AEVIRGIL-1 has been to keep in close contact with the needy members of the organization and to exert pressure on the voluntary welfare agencies in order to gain acceptance of certain group projects or to get help for a particular needy individual or family. At the beginning there was evident a certain resentment on the part of the voluntary agencies, possibly because a group suspected of having CEIOKE support was being critical of the agencies' inadequate performance of their job. Lately the group has been working more closely with USEP itself, and we have a really useful liaison contact developed between the USEP Chief for Germany and the new AEVIRGIL-1 welfare officer, AEVIRGIL-30. The latter individual has done a remarkably fine job in breaking through some of the bureaucratic delay and obtaining help for AEVIRGIL-1 members as well as for other non post-war exiles.

D. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF FRONTIST

1. The AEWINGIL project can, we believe, point to a considerable measure of success in developing a psychological warfare mechanism responsive to KUBARK guidance and direction and capable of performing certain specific tasks in the operational field. There is much that is good about the present set-up, starting with the fact that we do have a few really competent and hard-working activists who are able to get along well together and whose political views generally coincide. There are, however, certain basic weaknesses. AEWINGIL-1 is not a growing, flourishing body because we are not able to add new people of stature from among the most recent emigres--and these are the only people we can draw from under the present organizational scheme which limits us to "post-war emigres". This problem has been recognized for some time and has been the subject of discussion in Headquarters and in the field for a year or more. The matter of how and by what means a reorganization is to be effected has also occupied us, and we believe we have arrived at a plan which will permit us to broaden our membership base and activate regional sections while at the same time not risking the loss of the apparatus which we have built up during the past three years.

2. The latter point is important. Anyone who has observed the sad history of emigre political activity during recent years must be struck by the fact that political divisions and differences have by now become so consolidated that new groupings and consolidations are very nearly impossible to achieve. What we certainly must avoid, therefore, is any attempt to bring into this already moderately successful action elements which will prove to be not mutually harmonious and which will succeed only in expanding our present organization until it breaks apart in typical emigre political fashion. The fact that a group as strong and cohesive as SHUMA-100 could have suffered a damaging internal split, for whatever reasons, should be lesson enough for all of us concerned with emigre political warfare. AEWINGIL-1, while often thought of as the second in operational potential of the Russian emigre organizations, is still very far indeed behind SHUMA-100 in terms of internal organizational and ideological strength, and there should be no doubt whatsoever on this score.

3. Thus, in attempting to create a more healthy organizational framework we must be careful not to throw away lightly those positive elements which, perhaps without our being completely aware of it, have made it possible for the group to make the gains which it has already achieved. What, then, must we retain? We believe there are at least three several factors which are important:

a) The present organization pretends to represent today's Soviet man speaking to his brothers. This, more than anything else, is its political stock in trade--its claim to be different from any of the scores of emigre groups because it is far closer to the Soviet man of today and his thinking and is thus able to represent itself as the voice of the free Soviet citizen. This is an asset which we should attempt to retain in some measure, although the truth is that the present group, consisting as it does of emigres of the 1945 - 1950 period, is in fact no closer to Soviet reality of 1955 than the mere observant and alert of the war-time emigres. In other words, we are maintaining a fiction of freshness and closeness to our Soviet citizen and in so doing are depriving ourselves of valuable talents which can not be squeezed into our 'post-war emigre'

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concept. The solution here would seem to be to scrap the 'post-war' label and to take in at least some war-time emigres, while still attempting, both through an appropriate group name and through a well devised platform, to maintain the sense of "newness" which we feel to be important.

b) We have as good a measure of control over the group's operations as could be desired, principally because the leading members of the organization, who constitute a majority of the governing Presidium, are completely witting of ODYSEE support and are in contact with the case-officer. This is a somewhat delicate thing, the happy balance of ODYSEE support combined with initiative on the part of the activists, and we have been careful never to allow the feeling to develop that the AEWIRGILites are responsible command-wise to an American case-officer. Fortunately, they are reasonable and sensible individuals, and there has therefore never been a control problem. In any new organizational scheme we will want to make every effort to maintain exactly this sort of relationship, that is, a majority of the governing group to be cleared individuals witting of ODYSEE support and thus not liable to jeopardize the relationship by unwarranted unilateral action in a direction not acceptable to KUBARK.

c) The present group started as an "apolitical" organization, only to find that inevitably it was taking on some sort of political coloration whenever it attempted to speak to the East in terms other than "throw the russals out". It would be more proper, perhaps, to call the group "non-party" at the present stage, and the announcement of its 'Political Manifesto' in the Spring of 1954 marked AEWIRGIL-1's emergence as a "political" organization. The platform of course, is extremely broad and extremely liberal, and there is room here for very nearly any sincere anticommunist who will subscribe to the principle of nonpredetermination and who is anti-Marxist, and these are not mutually incompatible viewpoints. Any new grouping should be built about this same platform and should accept only those individuals who will subscribe to it.

d) The present group considers itself a true mirror of the Soviet scene in its approach to the minority problem--that is, Russians and other nationalities work together without difficulty and the matter of nationality never arises. The present leader and many of the others are of Ukrainian origin. There is no question, however, about the fact that as far as the emigre political scene is concerned AEWIRGIL-1 belongs to the Russian, not the nationality side of the political spectrum. We have absolutely no intention of getting burned on this particular hot coal, and a new group will stand in exactly the same relationship to the minority problem as does AEWIRGIL-1.

h. We are ready, then, to go ahead with a carefully devised action to create a new organization with a broader membership base, and it seems to us that the most auspicious method for launching this endeavor would be through a "SVESODA" conference--that is, a meeting convened by SVESODA magazine to which would be invited activists from Germany, Western Europe, and a few from further places, the selection being made not only with an eye to their contribution forward an editorial conference but to their possible inclusion in the founding committee for our new group. The Pessay conferences of this and

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previous years are roughly indicative of the kind of meeting we propose, although we believe this will be sufficiently distinctive so that no question of imitation will arise--nor would it matter very much if it should. As for timing, we feel that two to three months will be required in preparation, particularly if we attempt to bring a number of people from abroad, so that the target date at the present writing would be late January or early February. The framework of the organization, the possible list of candidates, the names, have all been discussed and debated, but we will refrain from presenting a definitive outline in this memorandum since certain of the problems are still not decided.

5. One point, however, should be mentioned. For any number of reasons we believe it best not to dissolve the present organization and start afresh, but rather to create a new "Combat Organization" for practical anticommunist work which would exist in conjunction with AEVIRGIL-1, and into which AEVIRGIL-1 members could be accepted along with non post-war emigres, both those belonging to existing groups and those without present group affiliation. This device will enable us to hold on to an existing nucleus, one which has legal entity, bank accounts, and a name and reputation while we proceed with the development and expansion of the new organization. It provides us with an insurance element, in that we would retain the possibility of continuing with AEVIRGIL-1 if anything should go amiss with the development of the new group, and we could as time progressed make our own decisions about liquidating AEVIRGIL-1 completely when and if it should seem necessary or advisable so to do. Further, if we are to have a go at the proposal put forward by Headquarters for accreditation as a USEP contractual agency (and we will discuss this below) it would appear to be more logical for such status to be afforded to AEVIRGIL-1, a known name and a group which has already some basis for action in the welfare field than to attempt to create a brand new group and immediately have it recognized by USEP as a contractor.

6. So far, it would appear, our thinking is along the same lines as that of Headquarters as outlined in EGMW-1276, and if we have been slow in accepting the necessity for reorganization we will readily admit to the charge of conservatism. The welfare proposal is interesting and challenging, and its positive values, so well presented in the Headquarters memorandum, make it difficult to do other than accept it. There are a number of considerations, however, which must be weighed before making this decision:

a) The welfare program, as everyone knows, has been less than successful. During the past year, with more vigorous leadership and less bureaucratic approach on the part of USEP it has perceptibly improved, but we do not yet have any definite results from the "crash program", and the weaknesses of the two voluntary agencies are a matter of record. In previous discussions of a "third force" it did not appear to us that an emigre political group would in fact qualify for USEP contractual status. Assuming that it would, we would have a somewhat peculiar situation in that the group administering the funds would be itself an interested party --that is, AEVIRGILites would disburse USEP welfare aid to other AEVIRGILites and to themselves. As a reductio ad absurdum, would AEVIRGIL-1, needing household furniture as he does, be empowered to recommend the disbursement

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for approval by USEP, or would his colleagues have such authority? It may be that we are here raising a technical and administrative matter which is possible of easy solution, but it is only proper to point out the possibilities for abuse in such a system.

b) If AEVIRGIL-1 should receive official contractual status from USEP, and ODYSEE agency, it would be the only emigre political group to be given such recognition, and the assumption of ODYSEE control would be strengthened. Perhaps this would be no tragedy--whether the fact is suspected less or more may be of comparatively little moment. We could expect cries of grief in the opposition emigre press roughly along the lines--"ah! we knew it all along!"--and the Soviets would have new material for use in "Return to Homeland". On the whole we are prepared to accept the possible political loss resulting from the fairly open ODYSEE support of the AEVIRGIL-1 action implied in official USEP contractual status.

c) The question of AEVIRGIL-1's ability to function in this field is difficult to answer. Unquestionably the AEVIRGILites know a good deal about the problem as it relates to local resettlement in Germany because they are part of it, and they see it, of course, from the standpoint of the individual who needs the aid. There are at least several fairly competent members of the Working Group who could be used on a welfare staff, and there are a number of others who could be recruited. There would by all means be a need for a competent non-Russian welfare director of sufficient stature to be able to organize the whole procedure, but would it not be a little strange for a high-salaried American executive to be employed by an emigre group--even with the fact acknowledged that his salary was being paid out of USEP funds? In any event the matter of success or failure in this field has now become a somewhat relative matter. There are scores, perhaps hundreds of cases which are not susceptible of solution since the individuals have degenerated into chronic welfare cases and will probably continue on some sort of dole for the rest of their lives. We are by no means able to guarantee that an AEVIRGIL-1 welfare arm would show electrifying results in very short order, but other things being equal we are ready to give it a try.

d) Welfare for Soviet refugees in Germany generally divides itself into two possibilities--local resettlement or resettlement, and emigration. The first involves a complete knowledge of the local scene, job possibilities, legal and documentation problems affecting emigres, work laws, health and hospital care, etc. Here we at least have a start, and a good American director would pretty soon have acquired the necessary liaison connections to make a go of the local resettlement cases. Emigration is another matter, since we would have to build up staffs and liaison facilities in the several countries to which we would want to send our cases and this could not be done overnight. On the whole we would feel it advisable to start with local resettlement and aid in Germany and then determine whether or when it would be feasible to attempt the more difficult emigration aspects.

7. One element of the proposal continues to disturb us: by accepting the welfare assignment, the high-priced welfare staff and the USEP contractual status will we not inevitably find the action very largely diverted away from

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its political and psychological warfare objective--will we not, in short, be turning ourselves into a welfare agency to the detriment of the proper KUBARK mission? Perhaps this risk might be avoided or at least minimized by the expedient suggested above, that is, by making AEVIRGIL-1 responsible for the welfare job while the new group with expanded membership devotes itself to the KUCAGE operational tasks, and this might prove feasible if we are able to find enough competent people to effect such a division of function.

8. So much for our doubts and fears. The positive aspects of the proposal are well summarized in the Headquarters memorandum but we will restate them here in the interest of providing proper balance to the analysis.

a) Accepting as fact the so-far inadequate performance of the two existing voluntary agencies, and despite any improvements noted during the past six months or a year, it is at least possible that AEVIRGIL-1 may be able to make a real contribution to the welfare problem both through its own endeavors as a USEP contractor and through the stimulation of the other agencies which would ensue from the entry of a new force into the field. This is by all means an end to itself, particularly in light of the Soviet defection campaign, thriving as it will among those emigres whose material lot in the West appears to be impossible of improvement. AEVIRGIL-1, guided by KUBARK staffers, would be better able than the other agencies to decide which cases were most deserving of priority handling from the standpoint of significance to the anticommunist cause, rather than from purely social welfare considerations. The present voluntary agencies are often bound by rules so impossibly bureaucratic that any reasonable judgment of an individual case becomes impossible. Just as one example, the Henry family could not be considered for a long-range adjustment plan because they had omitted the little formality of obtaining a marriage certificate, although they have since shown every willingness to legalize their status. It would appear that more intelligence and less bureaucracy would have found a way to help in such a circumstance, and we believe that AEVIRGIL-1 would be able to cut through some of the man-made obstructions which have so far rendered the program ineffectual in whole or in part.

b) There is no doubt that the granting to AEVIRGIL-1 of USEP status would have the effect of attracting many emigres to the action, and we could expect a sort of centripetal force to bring in not only the hungry relief cases but many who would be more useful in terms of present psychological warfare programs as well as others who could be used over the long term for REDSKIN and other KUBARK missions. This is the other side of the coin to the possible political loss mentioned in paragraph 6 b above--that is, while some idealists might shy away from a program so forthrightly labeled as ODYSSA, others would willingly join an action intended to improve the material well-being of the emigre while at the same time carrying on political warfare against the Soviet regime. This is a question at least as old as our KUBARK involvement in support of anticommunist causes, and perhaps still not resolved--whether more or less open admission of ODYSSA interest is in the long run politically poisonous or not.

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c) The longer range operational possibilities envisaged in this status are certainly worthy of consideration in the ultimate decision. If we understand the Headquarters proposal correctly, the AEVINGIL-1 group or its successor would be able over a period of time to undertake welfare tasks in other areas, including both emigration and local resettlement problems, and this would afford us an opportunity to place KUBARK-cleared individuals in various parts of the world under welfare cover, thus providing operational assets which will surely be of increasing importance over the long pull as our Soviet KUPIRA program turns increasingly to REDSKIN type operations mounted from all possible areas.

9. To answer the specific question posed in paragraph 9 of the Headquarters memorandum, we would be able to nominate for a nucleus of a welfare staff AEVINGIL-30, 17, 24, and the latter's wife; AEVINGIL-5 could certainly be used in a key position here provided we were willing to forgo his services in more substantive political work, and this would depend on our recruiting other capable individuals for our expanded AEVINGIL-1 action. There would very likely be one or more individuals presently employed by the other voluntary agencies who could be recruited by mutual agreement, and the single name which comes to mind here is Nicholas F. Walford of AFKF. Starting with this small group, we believe it would be quite feasible to build a staff of eight to ten individuals, including the American director and one or more American aides. The question of how large a "case-load" could be "serviced" by such a staff is less easy to answer, but we will forgo discussion of the many imponderables and come up with an educated guess of 400 to 500 cases.

10. In summary, then, we believe that the reorganization of AEVINGIL-1 divides itself into two aspects which are not necessarily mutually interdependent. The broadening of the action to include other than post-war emigres, in the interest of providing us with new cadres for our various operational tasks as well as for the purpose of invigorating and stimulating the growth of the group itself, is now agreed upon, and the proposed method of implementation will be outlined in a subsequent memorandum. Headquarters will already have had some discussion with James H. Dussardier of the possibilities for formation of a new organization, and we assume that his "Supplementary Memorandum" dated 12 October 1955 has been gone over in detail with the Headquarters case-officer. The proposal for granting of USSR contractual status is a matter which we assume will necessitate approval by appropriate KUBARK staffs as well as by the USSR agency itself. Despite the several reservations noted above, and despite the difficulty of assuring that the program will be an unqualified success, we are prepared to accept the proposal and the responsibilities implied therein.

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