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Air Fouch

OSSA-3783

: Chief, WE

30 June 1955

: Chief of Station, []

REDSOX/TILBURY/AECOB
S/W Briefing of TILBURY/1

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

REFERENCES: A. DIR-07273
B. OSSA-3758, 20 June 1955

- In accordance with the suggestion in reference A, TILBURY was instructed to give TILBURY/1 briefing in the use of the scorch method of development and a set of control indicators. A copy of the instructions are transmitted as an enclosure to this dispatch. The control indicators were devised by [] whose help on this case was very much appreciated by the [] Station. As soon as an English translation of the Latvian instructions are received from [] they will be transmitted to Headquarters.

REC'D 10 / PAMER
2. TILBURY/1 provided the following addresses for receiving letters in Latvia:

X
a. Frisis BUMBIERS
Sauldraetes rajons
Garkaines ciema padome
Vanou mājās

LATVIA

BUMBIERS is about 65 years old, a farmer and has an elementary school education. Although he does not belong to the resistance organization which TILBURY/1 represents, he is considered to be absolutely reliable by TILBURY/1.

X
b. Augusta BRIEDIS
Rīga
Artilerijas iela 22 dz. 16

LATVIA

BRIEDIS is about 60 years old and is a widow. She has an elementary school education and now is employed as a part time worker as a charwoman, doing knitting, and receives pay for standing in queues for other people who do not want to take the time.

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Both of these persons were chosen because they are rather aged. According to TILBURY/1 only old people can receive mail from abroad without fear of reprisal. Because of this it should be possible to mail letters from outside the USSR to both of these addresses. There are no traces in the Stockholm Station files on either of these persons.

3. Both TILBURY and TILBURY/1 were very enthusiastic about setting up an independent s/w channel. However, they stated that if the system was one that the Soviet censorship could develop merely by warning it would be too dangerous to use and that they would prefer to have no s/w at all. TILBURY was not informed that it would be possible to instruct TILBURY/1 in a more secure system in the first scorch letter mailed from inside the USSR. TILBURY had expected to receive the s/w material before TILBURY/1's departure. He therefore believes that it is no longer possible to set up the s/w commo. TILBURY explained to TILBURY/1 that he could get the ingredients for the s/w ink from a local friend who is a chemist.
4. The following procedure for establishing the s/w link is suggested:
 - a. The first letter containing s/w that can be developed by the scorch method should be mailed from inside the USSR. This letter should contain instructions for a s/w writing and development system chosen by Headquarters. It is suggested that something like white carbon would be most easily learned.
 - b. In the first letter TILBURY/1 should be instructed to write a test message (possibly containing details of his infiltration and return home) to one of the addresses provided by TILBURY. These addresses will be sent to Headquarters as soon as obtained from TILBURY.
 - c. As soon as it is demonstrated that the s/w link is working, the operation will be run either as ICIMPROVE or as a positive operation depending on Headquarters' comments on the TILBURY/1 debriefing transmitted in reference B.
5. Since TILBURY/1 at present does not believe that the s/w link will be set up, it is imperative that the initial letter be sent as soon as possible before he forgets his s/w briefing. Therefore, Headquarters' comments, suggestions in regard to s/w material, and name traces, are requested as soon as possible.

Enclosures:

1. Letter
2. Instructions

29 June 1955

Distribution:

- 5 - Headquarters, w/2 encls. 5 copies each
- 2 - [] w/2 encls. 1 copy each

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