

UNCLASSIFIED

CIA INTERNAL ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

SR/Red []

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

REC'D

FWD'D

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

F/STD/CE []

3 OCT 1957

an

*has read this
Wed, Oct 2, 1957*

2.

3.

[]

*SR
JHC*

4.

5.

SR/Red []

*1046
J*

ing

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

7.

SR/2 []

9 OCT 1957 9 OCT 1957

ja

pls. read top of []
*7-8: The dossier on
BALODIS - concerned the
mechanism KOLTA only.
and could not be
identified with KOLTA.*

8.

SR/2/Lat.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

fill in []

SECRET

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1
30 December 1953

JH
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/2

CAMUSO 3

SUBJECT : Operational/AECOB - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Progress Report
for December 1953

1. Five W/T messages were received from CAMUSO 3, all of them consistently containing both fixed-text and communications control and compromise indicators showing the agent is under Soviet control.

2. Message No. 11 contained positive economic intelligence and has been evaluated as "probably true".

3. Message No. 14 contained positive military intelligence and concerned the drafting and induction into military units of certain age groups of the population. This information has been evaluated "probably true" and confirms other reports as well as a published announcement in the Soviet press of September that such a draft was planned.

4. Message No. 12 is operational and has to do with the freedom from militia controls. The information contained is considered to be probably false.

5. It is not considered likely by the undersigned that the opposition would jeopardize their investment in this agent by transmitting - at this time - other than true information, particularly information of relatively minor importance such as that contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 above. As yet, the opposition does not appear to be "building up" this agent to the point where we will accept him as a major source of good intelligence and thereby become targets for their deception material. It is the undersigned's opinion that the opposition, rather than utilizing the agent as a channel for deception material intends to employ him primarily as a means of neutralizing our present and future assets in the Latvian SSR. This view, although somewhat premature, may partially explain the motives for transmitting the information in paragraph 4 above. A further indication to support this view is the agent's message No. 4 wherein he recommends an individual for use as a support point for future arrivals.

6. Message No. 14 (referring to the draft and present whereabouts of the draftees) offered an obvious opening for a future course of action on our part. Inasmuch as CAMUSO 3 was reporting the present location of the draftees (in Riga), their military units, and expected future assignments, and since he has no direct access to Riga, it would probably be logical for us to arrive at the assumption that his source of information could only be derived through contacts or sub-contacts with parents of various draftees who are in correspondence with their sons in Riga.

*or from overt informants
nearby.*

JH
file in

TH23 - I doubt it. If they have the body, they would have the family. The only way they could find out is if they had the family.

up all his control signs. It is felt much more likely that the opposition has either learned of his family through independent means in Germany or that they are merely "fishing" for confirmation of a suspicion they may have that CAMUSO 3 is holding out. The latter alternative seems more likely, and if such is indeed the case, the consequences of the Soviets identifying his family are obvious. It is therefore proposed that the next message to CAMUSO 3 contain a query to him as to what family he is talking about.

OK

9. It is felt that under the present circumstances the next message to CAMUSO 3 consist solely of queries as to the reasons for his move and all details concerning it and his present conditions. It is anticipated that the next message from CAMUSO 3 will probably purport to originate from his new location. Pending the receipt of such a message, specific intelligence requirements for that location will be obtained from SR/6 and have already been requested. The long-range and major problem, it is felt, is in formulating a plan whereby we would be able to forestall an eventuality such as outlined in paragraph 7 (b) and prevent the opposition from placing us in a position wherein we could not logically refuse to commit ourselves. This aspect will be taken up with CSR/CE and a long range plan to guard against this eventuality will be formulated with his concurrence. Meanwhile the handling of CAMUSO 3 will be continued with the objectives in mind of primarily securing positive intelligence, and secondarily with overtaxing the opposition's assets.

I don't think it will come up.

If it does the counter is simple - see exploit strategy in the half is only good change such as factors in the situation. This one will see.

[]

For immediate future prefer to play up HGR/MVD split with MAZEVKOV as introduced in MEMO NR7. Para 7 suggestions above may be made easier - would be better reviewed at next meeting.

TH2

See attached next