

~~TOP SECRET~~

27  
March, 1945

MEMORANDUM

To: Puritan  
From: Chief Balkans Section, (BB-049) *BB-049*  
Subject: BB-012's Mission to Bucharest

The following seem to me to be some of the points which should be discussed and on which, if possible, decisions should be reached before BB-012's departure to Bucharest:

*Can Puritan  
Pair be sent to  
Bari*

A. PAIR. 1. Is there any reason why he should not go loaded with all the most recent information (names, addresses, possible contacts, methods of receiving money, special interests of GIS etc) even though he cannot take executive action?  
2. Could he be refueled in Bari if he made occasional trips out?

B. COVER  
1. Will he be openly taking AH-002's place?  
2. Could he have a position on the ACC keeping his OSS connection secret?  
3. What plans are being made for an X-2 representative to go in under diplomatic cover?

C. HANDBOOK and PRIMER  
1. Has AH-002 copies of the Basic Rumanian Handbook and Primer? (Should we cable to find out?)  
2. If not, could you please secure copies from the British for him?

D. RUSSIAN LIAISON  
1. What is the arrangement (if any) and how far should he go (PAIR of course is barred by a British decision) toward trying to give in order to receive?

E. ACTIVITIES  
1. X-2 needs and interests should come first. Vetting for ACC etc is of course an X-2 function. But can he be protected from the dissipation of energy indulged in by AH-002 (Trip to Istanbul solely for ACC; masses of copying of documents not of interest to X-2 etc of which Ah-002 has written)

F. GESANDSCHAFT DOSSIERS  
1. The information these 17,000 (odd) dossiers contain, as we have before reported, seems of no real value to X-2 but might be of considerable value in Bucharest in identifying and clearing people there. Should BB-012 have any instructions about them?

*TOP SECRET*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

*From Taylor  
Chair*

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*MM*

MEMO RE SUGGESTIONS FOR  
MAJOR HOSTLER'S MISSION  
TO RUMANIA

The unsatisfactory character of the reports emanating from SAINT BUCHAREST in recent months appears, in some measure, to be due to (1) unsatisfactory agents, and (2) a failure to appraise and evaluate reports before dissemination. It is appreciated that the inadequacy of personnel may be a factor contributing to the latter. However, it seems clear that there is also a lack of clarity as to the type of information intended to be transmitted to SAINT LONDON. If this be result of a failure to clarify the policy prevailing then a clearer defining of policy is requisite prior to departure on the Mission. In any event many of the reports which have recently come in bear no evidence of either "CE" or political significance. The extent to which comment upon and the reporting of political events should be made or undertaken is such as should be taken up with the "front office", particularly with regard to the effect of post-war considerations as affecting any change in the policy heretofore existing. At the same time consideration can be given to the desirability of reports on individuals of no clear "CE" or political interest but perhaps chargeable with some moral turpitude, particularly with regard to any prospective assumption of duties by this organization of matters pertaining to "passport-controls". Only the latter would justify some of the recent reports from SAINT BUCHAREST. Other documents are not even justified by this consideration, and why they were ever sent on is difficult to understand. If they are the result of inquiries made by SAINT BUCHAREST there is no indication of such in the reports submitted to us, and if such be the case the reason for such inquiry should at least be reflected in the report if it is to be passed on to us.

The substantive weakness of many reports is undoubtedly attributable to the unsatisfactory character of the agents and sources of information. This, perhaps, may be due to paying for "volume" rather than "quality". There is evidence that this may be the case. Several reports are wholly similar even to the extent of punctuation with the addition of several lines of "new" material. Perhaps this may also explain the receipt of reports of no "CE" or political interest. Many of the reports are inherently contradictory and such contradictions could, apparently, have been straightened out by SAINT BUCHAREST after a cursory reading of the reports which would reveal the contradiction. For example, a person is stated to be Military Attache in two countries, one of which might be of particular interest, at one and the same time. There is a failure to follow through information which completes and gives value to a report. If information is not available or known it should be so stated. It is necessary that the "sources" of information, the names of agents given symbols, be made available to SAINT LONDON so as that the reports may be further evaluated in the light of any other information available at this end.

"Most Secret Source" reveals the names and addresses of German agents and collaborators in the vicinity of the area of interest. Notwithstanding restrictions existing because of Russian controls some fruitful investigations may possibly be conducted. A recent message disclosed a dropping of vast quantities of pharmaceuticals which were to be sold by the SD for the purpose of financing its activities. The number of pharmaceutical concerns or agencies capable of disposing of such material should be very limited, and an investigation might give leads which could possibly "blow" an important network and lead to the arrest of many agents.

S.D.F.