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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-1096

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, RE
Attention: C
FROM : Chief of Base, Salzburg
SUBJECT: GENERAL—Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC—GROSSBAHN - CC-2, etc.

DATE: 30 March 1953

- References:
- a. EASW-188
 - b. EASA-770
 - c. EASW-88
 - et. al.

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 31 1953	
FBI - SALZBURG	

1. [] re-examined CC-2 on LCFLUTTER, on 12 March 1953. Results are attached hereto in single copy only (as Attachment A), as [] wished us to have the results of the test promptly and furnished same in rough draft form. His formal report will be furnished from his home base.

2. Grossbahn met CC-2 just prior to the LCFLUTTER test and again the next morning after the test. These Grossbahn reports (G-180 and G-185) are attached hereto as Attachments B and C, respectively. The results of the test, taken together with Grossbahn's later report (G-185) lead us to the conclusion that CC-2 is probably truthfully unaware of how much and what specific information he did pass to HOETTL. The key point of the relationship seems to occur when Hoettl started to push on the person of Grossbahn and CC-2 exhibited two clear facets; he, first of all, was unable to adequately answer Hoettl's questions for he never met or saw any U. S. personnel and Grossbahn was always scrupulously careful to keep financial transactions away from the other members of his staff. Secondly, from what we can read between the lines, CC-2 was having pangs of conscience in even toy-ing with the idea of reporting on his friend and boss, Grossbahn. We feel []'s conjecture at this point is probably accurate; he used LCFLUTTER as a dodge in attempting to avoid Hoettl's line of questioning, stating that even if he could answer the questions it would do no good for when he got back on LCFLUTTER the fact would come out. (CC-2 appears to admit this fact, though somewhat vaguely. See middle of Page 2, G-185.) []'s other conjecture, post-test, that probably a culmination of personal problems plus the unbearable pressure from Hoettl resulted in CC-2's decision to offer his resignation to Grossbahn. We feel this theory is probably a sound one whether CC-2 is conscious of his reasons for quitting or not. As can be surmised from []'s report, CC-2 is rather a complex type personality and especially difficult to pin down to specific points. He seems to reason his change of employment in terms of a more attractive job, but we are inclined to feel, all in all, matters just became too much for him and the only solution appeared to be a complete change of scenery.

FORM NO. 51-28A
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3. We are still inclined toward the view, as expressed in EASA-770, that the damage to Grossbahn operations does not appear serious, though we are still at considerable loss, despite the LOFLUTTER test, to accurately estimate the damage, if any. Providence, plus the ineptness of friend Hoettl, seems to have spared us from a greater blow. CC-2's mind appears quite remarkable to the extent he appears to have the dubious faculty of not letting himself remember that which he finds unpleasant to recall, and, as [] correctly points out, the one real solution left open to us for getting at the bottom of the matter appears to be the interrogation of Hoettl himself. We are indeed happy to report that a warrant for Hoettl's arrest was issued by G-2, USPA on 21 March 1953 on the basis of his complicity in the Tophole case. [] of VOB will handle our end of the interrogation. He has spent the 21st and most of the 24th preparing his brief in conjunction with members of this base, plus [] of POB, who has many questions regarding Zipper operations he wishes to clear up with the good Dr. Posing questions which will lead up to a revelation of how badly CC-2 compromised Grossbahn's operations with Hoettl is of necessity a fairly delicate matter, for we wish to avoid disclosing undue interest in either CC-2 or Grossbahn, if possible. We hope to be able to get him to open up on this matter by dealing with various personalities in which the names of CC-2 and Grossbahn will be inserted. It may well be that we will finally have to resort to direct questioning, but even though we do, are not inclined to feel this will be especially damaging as the entire interrogation will be under G-2 auspices and [] is fairly well identified in the Salzburg area as a G-2 person. Direct KUBARK interest in CC-2 and Grossbahn should be adequately camouflaged. The results of the Hoettl interrogation should be most enlightening and we will pouch the results in the near future.

4. The wire recording transcript of []'s interrogation of CC-2 is completed and a copy is attached hereto as Attachment D. The matter of Theodor von ALBERT, which you raise in para 4 of reference a, is apparently cleared up on pages 31 and 34. Note that CC-2 did handle the money transaction for von Albert, but through an intermediary and thus never came into direct contact with von Albert.

5. The point which you raise regarding payments from Hoettl to CC-2 in para 5 of reference a appears to have a fairly simple explanation. The actual sum of cash which changed hands between the two each month did vary considerably and probably did, at times, reach the amount of 2,000 schillings. However, as you will note from the transcript, CC-2 points out that a larger part of this sum was for his share in the royalty commissions on Hoettl's book for his translation work. The sum which Hoettl was paying for the political reports was never set exactly, but varied from 500 to 1,000 schillings per month, so that CC-2 claims it was difficult, if not impossible, to now recall what amounts were for royalties and what amounts were for the reports. We find it difficult to believe that anyone could be so naive about money matters as CC-2 pretends to be. One fact worth noting in this regard is that Hoettl still owes CC-2 money for the Italian, French and Spanish editions, which means they will probably be coming together again in the future to straighten out their financial affairs.

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6. Other points raised in EASW-188 will be made the subjects of separate dispatches.

LCM.

Attachments:

- A. LCFLUTTERING o. GROSSBAHN Agent, CC-2
- B. G-186
- C. G-185
- D.] Interrogation of CC-2

Distributions:

- 2 - ~~RM~~ (1 w/atts.)
- 3 - Wien (1 w/atts.)
- 1 - Sals chrono
- 1 - Sals #101 (w/atts.)
- ~~1 - Sals chrono~~
- 1 - Sals RCM Notebook (w/atts.)

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(EXCL. EASA-770)
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