

Courier

MGK-A-21415

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Chief, Frankfurt Operations Base

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Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

CALABRIA

~~Agents & Informants Germany~~

Ref: MGF-A-4015

1. The best news to date is that subject has prospects of getting a job by his own efforts. In deciding not to pursue your efforts to place him with AOA, you no doubt must have thought along the same lines as we have, namely, that subject's future usefulness to us could be irreparably damaged by his working for an occupation-tainted firm and/or by anything that would point to his receiving aid or comfort from American quarters. This would probably apply equally well whether it is decided to use him as a key agent in the new "project Militarization," in the Albany field, or, as suggested in MGKA-19809, in the Consul (or, more specifically, Offspring [] field.

2. In reviewing the record with [] for the purpose of estimating his prospects in each of the three fields mentioned, it was noted that (a) subject had made an excellent start upon coming out of prison in that he was attracting important personalities in the first field (Para 2, MGFA-3663), (b) made an innocent mistake of no great consequence in giving the Landsberg prison a clean bill, and (c) got a line into the Bruderschaft. We may safely assume that his behavior since your first contact with him has not affected his viability in any of the fields mentioned very seriously.

3. Remains to be determined whether subject's viability has been or will be affected by the (a) Eckart connection, (b) the common-law wife relationship, or (c) the Francis connection. On the score of (a), we need have no worry, since the connection was one between ex-prisoner and ex-prosecution official and natural enough. On the score of (b), in view of the conviction expressed in Para 1 MGFA-3874 that the lady cannot be kept out of the operation, it is clear that your plan to have her assessed as to her suitability and willingness to share in a long-range serious penetration operation against German targets is the first thing to do. On the score of (c), this may have affected subject's viability, though certainly not beyond repair.

4. Subject has not told Francois who his friends in the I.S. game are, but it can be assumed that Francois took them to be one of the three Western Allies, most probably - due to subject's background - the BIS. It was natural enough for an Offspringer, especially a partly-dropped one, who has "III" info for which Offspring has shown no interest, to utilize an ex-Gauleiter with "friends" for the sale of such info elsewhere. On the other hand, even if we assume this to be the innocent case and that Francois has neither drawn subject

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out nor reported the whole story to Offspring. It is clear that subject has to disengage himself from the Francois connection with all speed and naturalness possible if he is to remain of any value to us in any one of the target fields discussed. For, if the Eckart connection has left subject fully viable as a penetration agent in either of these fields, and assuming that his common-law wife is found to be both willing and reliable enough to share in such a penetration project, the extension of the circle of those in the know to an Offspring or ex-Offspring intelligence professional would render the penetration operation untenable security-wise.

5. The most constructive suggestion we can think of would involve the following steps:

(a) Preliminary assessment of the common-law wife's participation in the operation by thorough discussion with subject himself. If subject is convinced that he could not carry the job through without taking her into his confidence (or if he has already taken her into his confidence to a point from which he cannot retreat and convince her that he has dropped contact with AIS), the next step would be

(b) Direct assessment of the woman by the case officer.

(c) If the woman can after all be kept out of the case under (a) above, or is favorably assessed under (b) above, subject (or the couple, as the case might be) could be both persuaded and trained to penetrate the target given in Para 5 of reference. Although it is still our firm conviction that subject could become a classical Offspring-penetration agent under your Consul program -- possibly even in that segment of Offspring which is the most significant and at the same time the most difficult for us to tam, i.e. Offspring activities in other Western countries -- we are willing to admit that it is premature to even begin to take subject into our confidence on this extremely delicate task. If subject (or the couple) accepts the relatively safe assignment outlined in Para 5 of reference and do a loyal job for a number of months, you might want to re-assess the pros and cons of putting him (or them) on Offspring -- a job for which he (or they) would require a great deal of training, guidance, and, above all, ideological persuasion and indoctrination.

(d) Disengage subject from the Francois connection. In the circumstances, you might as well rehearse him precisely what to say to Francois and how to account for his loss of interest or confidence in the "friends" to whom he had taken the two Francois reports. Could subject convince Francois that he had thought his "friend" was in a purely German organization but discovered that he was probably an American (or French, or British) "stooge" and so dropped the contact definitively?

(e) Finally, it may be a worthwhile thing to discuss with subject the BIS angle. It is more than possible that BIS is interested in him. Whether or not they have already attempted to recruit (or watch) him, they are pretty certain to get around to it before long, and it may not be amiss to have him prepared for the applicable contingencies.

6. Note to POB: Your views on Para 10 of reference, i.e. whether and how Francois should be tackled by a POB case officer, are requested. Traces of the names mentioned in the Francois "wangle" report are being requested from FIM, EIS and OIS.

POP-1; FIM-1; POB-1; COS-1
(E.O.)

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