

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGNA 21762
TO INFO	Chief, EE COS		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. []
FROM	Chief of Base, Bonn		DATE 27 July 1961
SUBJECT	Operational/CASTIRRUP Dr. BRUECKNER's Visit to Washington		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
ACTION REQUIRED	For your information		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
			INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)	EGNW 2274, 19 June 1961		
	<p>1. Dr. BRUECKNER's remarks concerning the discussion on the use of machines were to the effect that the KUBARK staffers at Headquarters attempted to sell him on the idea of a machine program for the processing of all individuals investigated by [] for espionage. In this connection he mentioned [] specifically as one of the proponents of the idea. BRUECKNER said that he differed sharply with KUBARK on the value of such a program, since it is his opinion that persons once investigated by the executive authorities are no longer of potential interest to the opposition intelligence services. He stated that, despite a lively exchange of opposing views, the KUBARK staffers failed to convince him of the value of such a program. He expressed mild concern that his stubbornness on the matter might have created a certain amount of ill will.</p> <p>2. It has been our impression from conversations with him that BRUECKNER is generally interested in learning about machines as an efficient, and in the long run inexpensive, tool in records management, but he is not convinced that the SG establishment, in view of its mission and relatively small size, can put machines to any practical use at the present time. He is also convinced that careful processing of information on past executive action cases will contribute little to exposure in the future of unidentified hostile agents. We have reminded him of a number of examples where agents have again become active for the opposition after serving a sentence for espionage, but it is obvious that he is not prepared to let a few isolated examples shake him from his basic premise. Dr. BRUECKNER's views on this matter should not come as a surprise. The SG, being a police agency, must confine its activity to legal and overt, or semi-overt, methods. Therefore it is not in a position to take full advantage of the full investigative benefits which might derive from IBM processing of all retinue personnel of the hostile intelligence services. The BFV is in a much better position to appreciate the usefulness, and reap the benefits, of such a program.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[]</p>		
	<p>Distribution: 3 - EE 2 - COS</p> <p style="text-align: right;">DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</p>		
FORM 53b 10-57 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PAGE NO. <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED

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