

Chief of Station, Germany
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REGISTRATION FILE NO.

32W-006-022

CABATON Project

Chief of Base, Berlin

DATE

28 September 1962

Operational/CALL

RE "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)

Use of Accommodation Address in Denied Area Reporting

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MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

For Your Information

INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

Attached for your information is a paper prepared locally for the guidance of BOB officers and the local services on the uses and limitations of accommodation addresses in communication with agents in East Germany. Copies for distribution at your discretion to the 7000th Support Wing and Headquarters, 513th MIG will be forwarded separately.

APPROVED:

[Handwritten signature]

WHT JMS
MK
FS

Att: Paper on Accommodation Addresses

Distribution:

- 2 - COS, Germany w/2 copies att.
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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

East-Berlin 823



22 September 1962

SUBJECT: Use of Accommodation Addresses

The following information is for the guidance and assistance of operations officers who must depend upon accommodation addresses as a means of maintaining contact with agents in a denied area. It points out some of the less obvious pitfalls and suggests some means which may be used to overcome these hazards. This information is based upon recent experience specifically with operations in East Germany and is sensitive since it reveals detailed current U. S. intelligence modes and methods. It should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis.

1. The most basic principle and one which must be scrupulously adhered to is that only one agent should be assigned to an accommodation address. The reason for this is that only one agent will be endangered if the address comes under scrutiny by the opposition. It is also important to remember that so long as the agent to whom an address was issued remains in a denied area that address should never be issued to another agent in a denied area, even though the address is no longer in use.

2. To ensure the maintenance of contact with an agent in a denied area, it is most desirable that he be provided with at least two, and preferably three, addresses, all located in different cities and/or countries. The agent should rotate his correspondence among these addresses, not only to make it more difficult for a censor to isolate his correspondence, but also to insure that each of the addresses is kept active and functioning properly. The use of multiple addresses is also a guarantee that contact will not be lost if one address ceases to function.

3. Accommodation addresses are originally often acquired without regard to the agent to whom they will be assigned. In these cases the accommodation address agrees to receive mail from a denied area, but does not know the identity of the person who will write to him. Such a situation is highly undesirable, particularly where contact is being maintained with an important agent. In special cases it is sometimes necessary and desirable to recruit a specific person to serve as an accommodation address for a specific agent. Usually this accommodation address will be someone who is known to the agent, a friend or relative who may already be in correspondence with him. Such an arrangement generally contains more security pitfalls than the other system described in this paragraph.

4. There is another category of accommodation address, the unwitting letter drop. This is a person who has agreed to receive mail from a denied area, usually from an unknown person, but who is not aware that any clandestine intelligence activity is involved. An example of this type of address is an individual who agrees to receive mail from the East on behalf of a personal friend who, either for personal

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or business reasons, prefers not to receive correspondence from the East in his own name. It has been our experience that this type of address functions quite well and securely, although it is apt to be a bit slower than a witting accommodation address often because there may be a cut-out between the drop and the case officer.

5. One of the most significant observations we have made is that accommodation addresses fairly rapidly become worn out if used frequently. By this we mean that for one reason or another either the writer or the accommodation address, or both, perhaps through no fault of their own, come to the attention of the opposition service. The causes for this are numerous but two worth mentioning because they can occur so easily are (1) poorly written cover letters and (2) imperfectly employed secret writing. If the writer has used a false name and address in the return address, as should usually be the case, a perfunctory check with the local Meldeamt or an address book will confirm the censor's suspicion that something is wrong. From that point on, any letter to that particular accommodation address can be intercepted fairly easily. It must also be assumed that the name used in the return address will be noted on a watch list. Add to this the fact that the letters from the agent using the accommodation address will usually be in the same handwriting and the whole channel becomes quite clear to the opposition.

6. To lessen the chances of detection, agents writing to accommodation addresses should be instructed to change frequently the complete name and address in the return address. It is best to use an existing address in order to foil a cursory examination on the part of the censor. If at all possible, letters should be mailed from various cities or areas. If the agent is confined to one of the larger cities, he should at least attempt to vary the postal district he mails from and he should never mail from the postal district of his own residence.

7. On the assumption that watch lists are maintained in alphabetical order by last name, it is also possible to add to the security of operational mail by using only the first name or a first initial as the recognition signal to the accommodation address. Of these possibilities, the initial seems the most desirable, particularly in those cases where the drop needs some indicator to identify agent mail from his regular mail. Insofar as the cover letter is concerned, the agent should be told to write long, chatty handwritten messages about very boring personal matters. No checkable items such as travel arrangements should ever appear in the cover letter.

8. In addition to the precautions discussed above it is also important to be alert for danger signals in an apparently smooth functioning accommodation address. Some examples of danger signals are indications of tampering with the envelope, a

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sudden change in S/W technique which might not be the agent's fault, but an indication of rubbing, missing letters, delayed letters, any change in the pattern of mailing if a pattern exists.

9. In order to lessen the risk of detection of agents through their accommodation addresses, and to protect the information forwarded through postal channels, it is recommended that new addresses be issued to those agents who report regularly and frequently by mail. This should be done at least yearly and more often if the importance of the agent and the quantity of his mail justify it.

10. Post office boxes should never be used as accommodation addresses. They are automatically suspected by censors and letter channels using them will be subjected to strenuous investigation in an effort to detect the identity of the writer. Similarly, addresses which elementary investigation in the West would reveal as intelligence-connected are not safe for permanent use (examples include procurement of false addresses through liaison arrangements with West Berlin or West German post offices). The best accommodation address continues to be the live letter drop with legitimate address.

11. The burden of acquiring accommodation addresses and replacements for even one agent has been found to be no small task. However, if contact is to be maintained by mail between an agent in a denied area and his case officer in the West, every possible precaution must be taken to see that the channel is uncontaminated and above suspicion. If the operation is worth running at all, it deserves the best tradecraft application to all its elements.

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