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PROJECT OUTLINE

Project Cryptonym or Subject: MADROIT

Sub-Project Cryptonym or Identification:

Amendment No. 3

Originating Division: H

- |                    |            |           |
|--------------------|------------|-----------|
| a. Division Chief: | [redacted] | Ext. 2062 |
| b. Branch Chief :  | [redacted] | Ext. 3311 |
| c. Case Officer :  | [redacted] | Ext. 3303 |

Target Area: East Germany

Type of Project: Psychological and Political Warfare

Financial Mechanism: Subsidy

Funds requested: [redacted] for Fiscal Year 1955. 0

Current Status: Operational since 1949 under authorization of Project Outline, approved 21 December 1949; Project Amendment No. 1, approved 21 December 1950; Project Amendment No. 2, approved 26 January 1952; and Project Amendment No. 3, approved 10 April 1952.

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## 1. Objective:

To help promote and sustain popular anti-Communist resistance in East Germany (including East Berlin), to lessen the efficiency and reliability of the East German governmental and political administrative instrumentalities, to retard East German economic development, to foster popular East German support for U. S. foreign policies, and to expose Soviet Zone injustices to the Western world. This project supports an effective CIA-influenced propaganda organization engaged in East German operations and the only such organization that bases its appeal primarily on legal concepts of justice.

## 2. Origin & Policy Guidance:

### a. Origins:

- (1) NSC 5412, approved 15 March 1954
- (2) NSC 162/2, approved 30 October 1953
- (3) NSC 174/1, approved 23 December 1953
- (4) NSC 160/1, approved 13 August 1953
- (5) NSC 5404, approved 25 January 1954
- (6) FSB D-21
- (7) Project Outline (TPAMBER), approved 21 December 1949
- (8) Project Amendment No. 1, approved 21 December 1950
- (9) Project Amendment No. 2, approved 26 January 1952
- (10) Project Amendment No. 3, approved 10 April 1952

b. Hence proposed: The project originated in the field.

## 3. Situation:

a. In the course of the nine years since mid-1945 that it has been occupying East Germany and East Berlin, the Soviet Union has been able to establish effective controls over the German population of these areas through its own military forces and security police, and through the instrumentalities of its German Communist proteges. Western concepts and principles of justice and the due process of law have been consistently violated in the name of state security, the lives of the residents of East Germany and East Berlin have been systematically regimented for the purposes of political indoctrination and camouflaged remilitarization, and the economy has been rigorously regulated in order to maximize its strategic contributions to the Soviet bloc. There is every indication that the ultimate Soviet aim is to gain political and strategic control of all Germany.

b. Despite Soviet-sponsored indoctrination efforts and repressive measures, a substantial amount of popular dissatisfaction with the Communist regime exists throughout East Germany and East Berlin, and there remains a considerable resistance potential. So long, however, as Soviet military forces remain in East Germany in strength and the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the political reunification of Germany on the basis of genuinely free and impartially-supervised all-German elections, there will be few practical prospects for achieving East German liberation.

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from Communist control without resort to military action. On the other hand, it is essential from the U. S. standpoint to prevent the complete Sovietization of East Germany, and to minimize its strategic economic, military, and political contribution to the Soviet bloc.

c. In view of present U. S. policies against the use of aggressive military action to reduce Soviet power, and in the light of the probable indefinite continuation of Soviet control in East Germany, the U. S. faces the difficult task of sustaining, increasing, and exploiting East German popular resistance over a relatively long period of time, pending some decisive shift in the balance of power in favor of the non-Communist Western nations. The task is complicated by the suppression of the 17 June 1953 disturbances, which evidenced the extent and intensity of East German popular dissatisfaction, but which did not and could not lead to liberation or materially improved conditions for the East German people; by the failure of the January 1954 Berlin Conference to achieve a political basis for reunification; and by the recent Soviet steps to formalize the division of Germany through the bestowal of so-called "sovereignty" on the East German puppet regime. In the face of these inherent problems, the U. S., through CIA, must exert every possible effort to continually discredit the Soviet Union and the East German Communist regime in the eyes of the East German people, strengthening East German popular support for U. S. European integration policies, demonstrating that the East Germans have not been forgotten or abandoned by the West, and persuading them that they have the power to alleviate their condition to some extent through their own current resistance actions.

d. The Investigation Committee of Free Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss freiheitlicher Juristen) (UfJ), which has been subsidized and guided by CIA since inception in 1949, has developed from one man as the ostensible head of a notional committee in West Berlin to an active organization with a West Berlin headquarters staff of 75 and approximately 2,000 East German covert contacts, many of whom are members of the legal profession or holders of responsible positions in the East German governmental bureaucracy or economic field, and the majority of whom are professional people. The UfJ, with CIA assistance, has conducted extensive propaganda campaigns in East Germany, based largely on information received from its East German informants, for the purpose of exposing acts or practices of injustice perpetrated by Soviet and German Democratic Republic (GDR) authorities in East Germany in violation of their own legal codes, identifying and denouncing to the East German population, known or suspected Communist informers outlining relatively safe methods for successfully carrying out passive resistance, and conveying the non-Communist interpretation of general news and international developments to the East German people. These campaigns have involved the distribution in East Germany, by both mailing and hand methods, of approximately 175,000 printed items per month and the sponsorship of approximately 35 radio programs per month at West Berlin radio stations, including 15 radio spot news reports and 10 longer radio programs. In addition, at its overt West Berlin office, the UfJ receives, debriefs, and where possible assists an average of more than 4,000 East German visitors per month. On the basis of information received from its regular informants and its casual visitors, the UfJ also prepares positive intelligence and counter espionage reports for FI use.

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e. Project CADROIT (formerly TPANBAR), which was originally approved by ADPC on 21 December 1949 to support the UfJ, has been substantively amended twice (Amendment No. 1, approved 21 December 1950, authorized the use of counterpart funds to support the project, but did not otherwise alter the project's terms):

(1) Amendment No. 2, approved 26 January 1952, authorized one-time support of the UfJ-sponsored International Congress of Jurists, which was held in Berlin in May 1952. An outgrowth of this congress was the International Commission of Jurists, which was established at the Hague and which is currently supported under IO Division project QKFEARFUL. The head of the UfJ has continued to be active in the International Commission of Jurists as a member of its executive committee.

(2) Amendment No. 3, approved 10 April 1952, authorized and provided funds for the establishment of an East German paramilitary apparatus for wartime use, which would draw some of its personnel from the UfJ, but which would be separately administered. The activities approved under Amendment No. 3, subsequently redesignated project CADRONH, are currently in the last stages of termination because of adverse security developments. CIA support of the UfJ proper has, however, continued on an expanding basis.

f. CIA has contributed approximately 95 % of the UfJ's overt and covert overhead and operational expenses, the remaining 5 % having been furnished by the Berlin Senate to support the overt refugee office. Outside of occasional small gifts from West German and West Berlin organizations and individuals, the UfJ has no other sources of income.

#### 4. Proposals:

It is proposed that CIA continue to subsidize and direct the propaganda and intelligence activities of the UfJ in order to further project objectives.

#### 5. Operational Outline:

a. Sub-proposals or tasks: CIA will continue to provide operational guidance to the UfJ and to subsidize the organization to defray its expenses for the following items:

(1) That portion of the UfJ's organizational overhead expenses that is not provided for from other financial sources. CIA subsidies will cover all salaries, rents, and necessary administrative expenses associated with the maintenance of the UfJ's covert organization and will help provide for similar expenses required to maintain the UfJ's overt staff and office.

(2) The editing, printing, and East German distribution of booklets, pamphlets, newsheets, information bulletins, and other

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publications denouncing East German injustices and the East German officials responsible for the perpetration of such injustices, listing Communist informers, encouraging work slowdowns and passive resistance, presenting legal methods whereby the East German populace can circumvent the requirements of the Communist regime, and informing the East German population on international, West German and local East German developments. These publications may be either attributed to the UfJ or camouflaged as to sources.

(3) The preparation and presentation of radio scripts and news reports for broadcasting to East Germany.

(4) The planning and execution of special administrative harassment operations designed to lessen the efficiency of the East German government and economy. Such operations may involve the production and carefully-targeted distribution of falsified administrative instructions, or other special methods that have been approved by headquarters.

(5) Research activities for and editing and printing of studies and other materials documenting Communist injustices in East Germany and the Satellites for dissemination to interested international and other groups and organizations such as the United Nations, the Federal Republic Government, the International Commission of Jurists under project OKFEARFUL, etc.

(6) The preparation of articles for dissemination in Western magazines and newspapers.

(7) Lectures on East German and Satellite injustices and legal practices before selected West Berlin and West German legal, industrial, trade union, university, and other groups.

(8) The furnishing of legal advice and assistance to, and the debriefing of, the several thousand East Germans who come each month to the overt West Berlin UfJ headquarters to furnish information and/or to present their personal problems.

(9) The maintenance of secure contact with regular UfJ covert East German informants for information gathering, operational, counter-espionage, and positive intelligence purposes.

## b. Key personnel:

(1) The principal agent, who is the founder and incumbent head of the UfJ. A forty-three year old refugee lawyer from East Germany, he was originally recruited by OSO in early 1949, then turned over to OPC in October of that year. Although he does not have a law degree, due

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to Nazi anti-Semitic regulations, he has used his broad legal background and dynamic personality and initiative, while under CIA guidance, to expand the organization to its present size. He has a full operational clearance.

(2) The deputy to the principal agent, who is deputy director of the Ufj and chief of its Legal Division. He is thirty-seven years old, a German by birth, and formerly a State's Attorney and Judge. Originally hired by the principal agent as a member of the Ufj West Berlin headquarters staff in 1950, he has been deputy director to the organization since 1952. He is fully cleared and has been in periodic operational contact with CIA field case officers. He has performed his duties in a competent manner.

(3) The chief of the Ufj security section. A former OSO, and FI agent with considerable experience in German police and security matters, he was placed in the Ufj in 1953 to review and improve its internal security practices. A former civil servant in police matters, he is thirty-nine years old and German by birth. He has continued to perform certain counter espionage services for FI, but his primary responsibility is Ufj security. Intelligent and adaptable, he has succeeded in instituting and supervising sound and systematic internal and operational security procedures. He has a full operational clearance.

c. Indigenous groups: The Ufj West Berlin headquarters staff consists of approximately 75 persons who are employed within the various divisions of the organization which handle legal, economic, labor, women's affairs, refugee, youth, press and radio, political, and administrative matters. These personnel are all legally registered employees of the Ufj's overt headquarters. Distribution of propaganda material is handled by 33 covert personnel who mail the material to selected East German addresses. Information upon which this propaganda is based is supplied mainly by approximately 2,000 covert informants who visit the organization at irregular intervals to tender their reports. These personnel have been name-checked in the field, and personnel data on over 80% of them has been forwarded to headquarters.

d. Target groups: The main target of project CABROIT is the general population of East Germany and East Berlin, with special emphasis on those of the legal profession as well as intermediate governmental and Communist Party functionaries. The secondary target is the population of Western Germany, and, to a slight degree, that of Western Europe.

e. Duration: Indefinite

f. Graphic Illustrations: NA

Security:

a. Cover: All three of those listed under key personnel above are knowledgeable of the fact that they are working for a U. S. intelligence service, and no cover is utilized in the contacts of the CIA field case officer with these personnel. CIA funds are camouflaged as donations from organizations and individuals sympathetic to the aims of the UfJ. As the organization has an internationally known overt function of aiding and giving advice to East Germans, as well as carrying out a vigorous anti-Soviet campaign within both West Berlin and West Germany, its covert operations are being conducted behind an overt facade.

b. Knowledgeability:

(1) The key personnel are knowledgeable of U. S. intelligence support.

(2) Although never officially informed about U. S. financial support, German employees of the West Berlin UfJ headquarters should be presumed to suspect that an Allied Power, and probably the U. S., subsidized the UfJ. These probable suspicions would be based on Soviet and East German allegations, allegations in Western news media, local gossip, and the magnitude of UfJ activities.

(3) The East German and West Berlin governments, the British (and presumably the Dutch) intelligence service, and HICOG are all knowledgeable of U. S. Government interest in the UfJ.

c. Operational security: Standard operational security precautions, including the use of safe houses, etc., are taken by the CIA field case officers in all contacts with key personnel of the UfJ. All UfJ headquarters personnel have been cleared or are in the process of clearance. Compartmentation and other operational security measures are carried out among the covert personnel under direction of the field case officer. In addition, the personnel, organization, and operational security practices of the UfJ are being constantly reviewed and analyzed by CIA both in the German Mission and in Washington in order to identify and overcome operational weaknesses.

d. Risks: The most serious risk involved in this project would be incurred by the kidnapping of one or more of the key personnel listed above. As the UfJ has received favorable international publicity and support for its anti-Communist activities, it is believed that repercussions in the event of a compromise would not be very great in Western Germany or Europe, and little capital could be made of such an event by the Communist authorities. Furthermore, as the UfJ is engaged in a basically humanitarian and anti-Communist program, it is felt that exposure of U. S. Government support would cause little or no adverse reaction in the United States.

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e. Personnel disposal:

(1) The main problem envisaged in the disposal of key personnel either before or after the termination of the project would be the disposition of the Principal Agent. If an alternative employment position could be found for him (see paragraph 8a below), however, no serious difficulties would be anticipated. Disposal of the deputy and security officer should create little or no difficulty, as it is probable that, due to their long governmental experience, they would be offered governmental or similar positions that they would accept.

(2) Although CIA does not have a direct or formal responsibility for other UfJ headquarters personnel, and could effectuate the disposal of such personnel during the life of the project through instructions to key personnel, it is probable that, in the event of project termination, CIA would find it necessary for operational or moral reasons to assist in the secure and amiable termination/disposition of UfJ staffers. On the basis of previous experience with the termination of similar projects, some individual disposal problems are considered likely.

f. Disaster Plan: Transfer of key personnel involved in this operation and the abandonment and/or destruction of incriminating materials in the event of a hot war will take place in accordance with the Eastern European Division's disaster plan for Germany.

7. Coordination:

a. Relation to other projects:

(1) Project QKFBARFUL is related to project CADROIT in that the Principal Agent of CADROIT, as the director of the UfJ, is a member of the executive committee of the International Commission of Jurists. Through him, the Commission calls upon the UfJ to provide documentary evidence and other materials for their anti-Communist activities.

(2) Although project CADROIT has no direct connections to other CIA projects, the UfJ has coordinated its activities upon occasion, without CIA intercession, with such other PP-supported organizations as the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity (project BYLINER) and the People's League for Peace and Freedom (project CAVOLT).

(3) Project CADROIT supports the CIA Berlin Base's counter-espionage and Soviet defection program. To this end, the UfJ indigenous security officer refers selected East German personnel to an outside contact office for further processing. In addition, the UfJ furnishes the Berlin Base case officer with positive information produced as a by-product of its East German PP activities. Such information is transmitted to the Berlin Base positive intelligence section. (See attached FI Annex for further details.)

b. Significance within over-all program in area: Project CADROIT constitutes one of the major PP operations within the field of anti-Communist activities directed against the Soviet Zone of Germany. The UfJ is the principal CIA-supported outlet which produces and distributes within East Germany pro-Western, anti-Communist propaganda that is aimed at the legal profession and the intermediate governmental and party functionaries of the Communist regime.

c. Extent of coordination:

(1) The project was originated by the German Mission and has been coordinated with all appropriate CIA components at headquarters. As stated above, the intelligence material gathered as a by-product of this project is passed to the Positive Intelligence Section of the Berlin Base. In addition, personnel of interest to the CASTALIA and REDCAP programs are passed to the CALCIED office for debriefing and final disposition.

(2) Cleared personnel of the State Department in Washington have been orally briefed on the purposes and activities of the project. There is regular coordination between representatives of the German Mission and HICOG pursuant to policy measures as pertaining to the UfJ and its activities.

(3) Key individuals in the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments have been informed of U. S. interest in the UfJ, and general policies affecting certain CIA-supported UfJ activities have been discussed by the German Mission with these individuals (see paragraph 11j, Special Considerations). Representatives of the British Intelligence Service have been informed of U. S. support for the UfJ.

(4) The UfJ indigenous leadership maintains a continual liaison with various offices of the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments on matters of mutual interest affecting overt UfJ activities (the UfJ assists in investigating and certifying East German political refugees, furnishes reports on East Zone conditions, and consults on East Zone legal problems). This liaison, which is conducted with the knowledge and approval of CIA, does not impair CIA control over the UfJ and does not interfere with the fulfillment of the UfJ's covert mission.

8. Controls:

a. Nature of:

(1) Direct control will be exercised by the Berlin station by

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of the administration of the financial subsidy and supervisory guidance. Secondary control will be exercised by the German Mission, while final control will rest with Headquarters in Washington.

(2) Although no control difficulties are envisaged as pertaining to the deputy of the UfJ or the security chief, as both seem well satisfied with their present positions and highly motivated ideologically, the principal agent periodically has been a control problem. The cessation of growth of the UfJ and the resultant establishment of a routine, with increased emphasis on matters such as security, have led him to become dissatisfied. His desire for greater activity has encouraged him to seek more authority within the International Commission of Jurists, a factor desired by neither IO Division nor the Berlin Station. For this reason, the Berlin Station is currently reviewing his status within project CADROIT with a view to possibly transferring the Principal Agent to another project or endeavor.

b. Administrative plan: The revised administrative plan for project CADROIT was approved by the Acting DD/A on 14 April 1954.

c. Reports: The usual reports requirements, as outlined in RI 50-11 and implementing regulations, apply to this project. Reports on propaganda distribution and other covert activities are consolidated by the Principal Agent and submitted to the field case officer for transmission through the Chief of Mission to Headquarters.

9. Budget Data:

a. Total CIA funds required for FY 1955: [ ] (See Attachment A)

b. Availability of Funds: CIA funds in the amount of [ ] have been authorized for project CADROIT within the Eastern European Division's Program for Fiscal Year 1955.

c. Non-CIA funds: The UfJ receives a monthly subsidy of DM 3,000 from the Berlin Senate for the support of its overt refugee office.

d. Foreign currency: NA

e. Funding: See Section I of the Administrative Plan.

f. Financial history:

(1) Fiscal Year 1953 - Authorization: [ ] Obligations: [ ]

(2) Fiscal Year 1954 - Authorizations: [ ] Obligations: [ ]

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g. Future requirements: It is anticipated that a total of \$250,000 will be required for Fiscal Year 1956.

10. Support Data:

a. Total CIA personnel: Total CIA personnel necessary for this project are one field and one headquarters case officer on a part-time basis. These personnel are currently available.

b. Material: NA

c. Communications: No communications facilities beyond those now available to the CIA German Mission are necessary.

d. Other CIA support: NA

e. Support from other United States agencies: No support from other United States agencies is required other than that presently available to the CIA German Mission.

11. General Consideration:

a. Current status: Approved and operated under original project outline as amended.

b. Commitments: Although no written commitments have been made to the key personnel, they understand that they will receive assistance from CIA should they, because of their activities on behalf of CADROIT, be forced to evacuate Berlin for security reasons. Such assistance would entail a resettlement bonus, transportation to West Germany for the employee involved and his immediate family, pay for a three month period, and whatever assistance possible in obtaining a new job. In addition, should any of these personnel be kidnapped or otherwise rendered incapable of supporting his family because of CADROIT activities, CIA would continue to submit monthly pay checks to his family.

c. Effectiveness:

(1) The UfJ has grown from one man, operating a fictitious organization, into a legalized committee with a headquarters staff of 75 persons and over 2,000 covert informants. East German support of the organization has been evidenced by the large number of visitors to its West Berlin headquarters as well as the letters received by the UfJ. We have learned from Soviet Zone governmental functionaries who have come to the UfJ headquarters to plead that their names be dropped from the organization's "black" lists, that they and other functionaries have feigned illness to keep from executing official duties as a result of having received "warning letters" from the UfJ. West Berlin

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and West German support has been expressed through the organization of a voluntary "Circle of Friends." 6

(2) The West Berlin and West German governments have frequently requested the UfJ to prepare documentary briefs against specific former members of the Soviet Zone regime who were then on trial in the West. The UfJ's "black" and "white" lists, the latter being a compilation of names of Soviet Zone personalities who have demonstrated their anti-Soviet and/or anti-Communist sentiments, are considered by the Bonn Government to be of importance for the period after the reunification of Germany.

(3) The UfJ has achieved an international reputation as an efficient anti-Communist organization. Articles praising the UfJ and its activities have appeared in Time, the New Yorker, the Reporter, Focus, the New Statesman and Nation, the Reader's Digest, and Leading Times, Dutch, Italian, French, and other European newspapers and periodicals.

d. Anticipated results: On the basis of past experience with project CADREIT, continued CIA support of the UfJ should provide the residents of East Berlin and East Germany with information and advice otherwise denied to them -- exposing, and often limiting, the deliberate perpetration of injustices and clearly demonstrating that the Soviet Zone authorities rule by arbitrary decree rather than by law. The UfJ's campaign is expected to continue to encourage passive resistance to the Soviet regime as well as bolstering the hope of the East German population for the ultimate reunification of Germany and concurrent freedom from their Soviet oppressors. The UfJ will persist in helping to undermine and discredit the power, prestige, and efficiency of Soviet and Communist control over East Germany. It is therefore believed that further CIA guidance and the extension of the subsidy to this organization will assist in the realization of our aim to gradual reduction of Communist influence in East Germany.

e. Evaluation: The effectiveness of the project will be evaluated by the following means; support of the Positive Intelligence Section of the Berlin Base will be required:

(1) General, over-all project effectiveness is assessed on the basis of independent intelligence and overt media reports, debriefing of East Germany refugees by CIA and other government agencies, and popular and press opinion in West Berlin and West Germany. In addition, the field case officer reviews the Principal Agent's reports and UfJ propaganda material to be released.

(2) Distribution effectiveness is evaluated by means of a system of control letters prepared by the UfJ distribution chief. Return of these

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letters, which to the distributor are indistinguishable from the remainder of his material, gives a fairly accurate estimate as to the thoroughness and reliability of the individual mailers. In addition, this distribution system is under continuous review by the German Mission as part of their over-all Distribution Net Survey program.

(3) Reader reaction is judged both by the letters received from the Soviet Zone and by reports of interviews with the numerous East German and East Berlin residents who voluntarily visit the overt headquarters in West Berlin.

(4) Indications of general effectiveness are provided by the reaction of the opposition as based upon their attacks in the Soviet Zone press against the UfJ, their formation of counter-organizations, etc.

f. Policy questions: An unresolved policy is whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances, the Federal Republic and/or West Berlin governments should be allowed increased participation in determining the policies for and supervising the operations of the UfJ. See paragraph 11 j, Special Considerations, for the background of this policy question.

g. Congress: NA

h. Extra-Agency action: NA

i. Proprietary companies: NA

j. Special considerations:

(1) In the summer of 1952, the German Mission officially advised representatives of the Federal Republic and West Berlin governments that the U. S. Government was furnishing guidance and financial assistance to the UfJ. The German Mission also furnished a statement of intentions to a point of contact in the Federal Republic government acknowledging a proper German governmental interest in East German resistance activities and indicating that a cooperative U. S./German governmental relationship regarding such organizations as the UfJ was foreseen. Since the summer of 1952, periodic policy discussions between German Mission and Federal Republic representatives have been held, but the CIA operational relationship with the UfJ has not been materially altered.

(2) With the possibly imminent restoration of full Federal Republic sovereignty through implementation of the London agreement, Federal Republic governmental pressure on CIA to achieve greater or complete influence and control over such CIA-sponsored East German resistance activities as the UfJ has increased. Since a legal basis for the continued presence of U. S. and Allied forces in West Berlin will continue to exist, the U. S. could

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indefinitely retain reserved powers affecting the security and administration of West Berlin, which would technically permit continued exclusive U. S. control over such U. S. Sector groups as the UfJ. In practice, however, for political reasons the U. S. will probably not choose to exercise its reserved powers for this purpose to the same degree as heretofore.

k. Liquidation: NA

FRAN 1288 (IN 45467)

1. Area of operations: East Berlin and East Germany.

2. Purpose: To utilize the German Mission-subsidized Investigating Committee of Free Jurists (Untersuchungsausschuss freier Juristen) to collect positive intelligence on the area of operations through passing to the Intelligence Section of the Berlin Base both information collected as a by-product of the PP activities of this group and those personnel whose knowledge may assist the section in obtaining information about and/or infiltrating the East German Communist Party, State Security Service, and People's Police (CASTABIA program) and the defection of Soviet military forces (REDCAF program).

3. Background:

a. The indigenous security officer of the UfJ, who is head of the SfS and Police Section within this organization, interviews all visitors to the UfJ's West Berlin headquarters who have information to give on Communist, police, and military personnel and operations in East Berlin and East Germany. If the security officer finds any of these personnel to be of interest to the CASTABIA or REDCAF programs, they are directed to an outside FI-controlled office (CALCINO), for further debriefing and final disposition. No further contact with them is maintained by the UfJ.

b. All reports and information submitted by UfJ co-workers and visitors to UfJ headquarters are screened for potential intelligence value. Reports of this nature are then transmitted by the CADROIT field case officer to the Intelligence Section of the Berlin Base.

c. For general background information on the project, see paragraph 3 of the PP Project outline.

4. References:

a. FRAN 1288 (IN 45467), dated 17 October 1950.

b. See paragraph 2 of PP Project Outline.

5. Objectives: To establish penetration of the East German Communist Party, State Security Service, People's Police, Soviet military forces, and other Soviet Zone governmental functions for positive intelligence purposes.

6. Targets: See paragraph 5d of PP Project Outline.
7. Tasks: See paragraph 5 above.
8. Personnel:
  - a. Pseudonyms and Cryptonyms: The pseudonyms of the Principal Agent and his deputy are Nelson G. Benard and Paul M. Ladell respectively. The cryptonym of the indigenous security officer is CARBOHYDRATE.
  - b. Personnel data: See paragraph 5b of PP Project Outline.
9. Operational and/or Security Clearance: See paragraph 6c of PP Project Outline.
10. Cover: See paragraph 6a of PP Project Outline.
11. Contact and Communications: See paragraphs 6c and 10c of PP Project Outline.
12. Control and Motivation: See paragraph 8 of PP Project Outline.
13. Equipment and other support: See paragraph 10 of PP Project Outline.
14. Coordination: See paragraph 7c of PP Project Outline.
15. Timetable: Indefinite



E. FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

for fiscal year 1955

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F. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS