

AIR

EGRA- 12718

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MAR 18 1954

Chief, RB

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Info: COM (Attn: C)

Operational/CART/CADSBY

IF
CARTAIN

CARTAIN/CART Relationship

- REF: A. SBHLS-2571
 B. SFRAN-3647
 C. DIR-32918
 D. SFRAN-2664
 E. EGRA-11485
 F. EGRA-11466
 G. EGRA- 12717

1. Recent developments in both the CARBON and CARBOHYDRATE cases highlight the need for a current evaluation of the basic CART responsibility for CARTAIN operations in order to clarify the precise limitations of the informal but real security responsibility which BOB/CART now exercises with respect to the conduct of CARTAIN projects.

2. Given the fact that this phase of BOB/CART's function has at best been ill-defined and ad hoc in the past, it is also felt equally desirable to delineate the precise functions of the CART section in its future relations with CARTAIN.

a. Subsequent to the revelation of CARBOHYDRATE's ^A Berlin connection, reference "C" above recommended that CARBOHYDRATE be turned over to the exclusive control of the CARTAIN/CADSBY case officer, pointing out certain advantages which would accrue to the more efficient operation and increased security of CADSBY thereby.

b. It is concomitantly true that there exist certain fallacies in the CART/CARBOHYDRATE relationship which make a change to exclusive CARTAIN control of CARBOHYDRATE desirable from several points of view:

Approved by: _____

11 March 1954

Distribution:

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- (1) The equivocal position of CARBONELL with himself certainly detracts from the efficient accomplishment of his assigned duties in the CAGMOIT organization, since regrettably certain members of the CAGMOIT staff look upon him as a control mechanism employed to pry into their conduct of CAGMOIT affairs.
- (2) At the same time, CARBONELL has on occasion found himself in receipt of specific instructions from his case officers which have then been countermanded by his CAGMOIT superiors.
- (3) It is further noted that the absence at operational meetings of the CAGMOIT/CAGMOIT case officer requires an exchange of paper, and in some cases a definite lapse before appropriate remedial action can be taken. The CAGMOIT case officer must first prepare a contact report, and then an inter-office memorandum to make certain that latent issues become a matter of the written record.
- (4) Moreover the CAGMOIT case officer cannot be fully cognizant of all aspects of CAGMOIT operations, so that in some cases he is not qualified to make specific recommendations concerning points which CARBONELL raises; this is, of course, particularly true when the CAGMOIT/CAGMOIT case officer is detained by other duties.

c. It is therefore the intention of SCS/CAGMOIT, in accord with references "C", "D", and "E" above, to deliver CARBONELL to exclusive CAGMOIT control, as soon as the practical mechanics of this change can be worked out.

d. Once CARBONELL has become the exclusive charge of CAGMOIT, it is clear that a further re-examination of the CAGMOIT/CAGMOIT program is in order for a number of cogent reasons:

- (1) The removal of CARBONELL from direct CAGMOIT control in effect removes the last vestige of direct insight into CAGMOIT operations, and constitutes a change from the previous remote and ineffectual intervention of CAGMOIT in the daily conduct of CAGMOIT affairs.
- (2) The recent appraisal of the CAGMOIT mission and its fulfillment by SCS have led to the inescapable conclusion that a concerted effort must be made towards the accomplishment of the primary function of CAGMOIT as an aggressive weapon against the RIB and the SCS.

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To this end, it becomes clear that in its more passive CANT functions (the investigation of flaps, the staff function of preparing general recommendations in the field of operational security, etc.) a considerable reduction must be made; hereafter no direct intervention in the daily conduct of SOB operations in general as opposed to specific cases as the need arises is feasible or desirable if the aggressive CANT effort is to have a minimal chance of success.

- (3) It is equally obvious that the acute shortage of CANT case officers makes it even more incumbent upon the section to assign its qualified personnel to the contemplated aggressive operations against the KGB and the SFR. By the same token, however, it is precisely the qualified CANT case officer who should exercise those staff functions of a CANT nature which concern other SOB and CANTAIN operations. In order to resolve the apparent paradox presented by this situation, it is presently contemplated that the new function of operational security officer under the SOB Operations Officer, will in time be incorporated into the SOB organization to exercise precisely that continuous scrutiny of the daily conduct of all SOB operations.
- (4) In the daily operational conduct of CANTAIN operations, it is further not reasonable to expect that the minutiae associated therewith should become the subject of correspondence between SOB/CANT and CANTAIN. The latter undoubtedly realizes that any attempt by CANT to intrude upon the operating level of CANTAIN operations would be catastrophic to all concerned; therefore, such a course of action must for practical reasons be excluded a priori.
- (5) In the light of the equivocal situation which is currently in the process of resolution, it is practically impossible for any CANT case officer to remain fully conversant with the multiple phases of CANTAIN operations, nor is it further desirable for him to belabor the CANTAIN case officers for operational details which in essence do not constitute an integral part of his present function as "security officer" for the projects concerned. Clearly then, a more precise formulation of this security responsibility is indispensable to the continued function of SOB/CANT in an

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advisory capacity, and to the further maintenance of available, efficient and timely coordination of COMBAT activities with the COMINT section, where appropriate.

a. Given the varied factors which constitute an impressive weight of evidence to support the contention that a close re-examination of COMINT functions is in order, the following paragraphs will attempt to set forth the future COMINT - COMBAT relationship as it is presently being evolved.

5. First and foremost, following the transfer of COMINT staff, the position of COMINT/COMBAT must become analogous to that of the military staff; it can conduct only general supervision of going operations and offer its comments and recommendations thereon when matters of interest to COMBAT appear. Further, when the specific need arises, direct intervention by COMINT on an ad hoc basis may be required, yet such an involvement in the operational details of any project must be considered an emergency and purely transitory measure to be employed solely in extreme cases; and only in those cases where the opposition service has clearly appeared as a matter of purely COMINT interest or as a security threat to the operation at hand, as opposed to simple intervention to enforce operational security practices.

b. In view of the decreased yet more realistic and effective role which the COMINT/COMBAT section will play in the future conduct of COMBAT operations, a number of possible solutions are set forth for the conduct of the daily COMINT (in the generic sense of the word) supervision of COMBAT projects:

a. Basically, the responsibility for the operational security of any project must rest squarely on the shoulders of the case officer concerned. This principle means simply that each case officer must be expected to manage his projects with a reasonable and average sense of operational security, and make the basic decisions affecting it which are required by the daily requirements of his operations. A further point which militates in favor of this principle is the fact that most COMBAT case officers have at least as much, if not more, experience than the large majority of the junior COMINT case officers, and are thereby as well equipped to exercise this security function personally. This general rule not only applies to, but is the fact concerning every other operational section at COMINT.

b. Ultimately, however, it may be possible to incorporate a trained COMINT officer into the structure of COMBAT who will be in a position to exercise this function in a much more detailed manner if that is considered necessary. We feel in this respect, however, that insufficient grounds exist for special COMINT treatment to COMBAT operations over any other COMINT operation.

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a. Within the near future, however, the position of operational security officer within the BOB organization will become a reality, and it is precisely this senior member of the staff who will bear the responsibility for all BOB operations which CAST has in a general way exercised with respect to the conduct of WASSCO projects in the past.

5. The implementation of these new arrangements for BOB operational security will find the position of BOB/CAST to be as follows:

a. The primary efforts of BOB/CAST will be devoted to its aggressive penetration efforts against the SIS, RIF and the SCS, and all other functions will of necessity be subordinate to this basic mission and effort.

b. In spite of the preclusive nature of this future orientation and direction of the BOB effort, it should be stated that the section still stands ready to offer general recommendations commensurate with its secondary role in a staff advisory capacity. Such a function would of necessity be on broad, general CAST matters, leaving the immediate resolution of daily operational problems to the appropriate case officer. This generally is the position which BOB/CAST occupies with respect to other segments of BOB, and this is the only manner in which BOB can do justice to its overall mission.

c. Further, where emergencies do arise requiring the direct intervention of the CAST section in an active operation, then the group stands ready to contribute substantially of its time and efforts to the immediate resolution of a temporary crisis, always with the understanding that the CAST section will revert at the earliest opportunity to its primary functions and advisory capacity as soon as circumstances permit.

6. As for the present, however, pending the establishment and activation of a BOB operational security officer, the immediate change we are now implementing as far as BOB/CAST relations are concerned is two fold:

a. Transfer of CASBYMOUTH to CAS AIN case officer.

b. Relegation of all other WASSCO matters concerning this limited field, as it CASBYMOUTH, WILKINS, CASBYMOUTH, to same position occupied by BUNGAP, BUNGOL, BUNGOL and BUNGOL in relation to BOB/CAST.

c. An internal BOB Command/CAST memorandum will record the actual mechanics necessary for the fulfillment of the changes outlined herein.

7. We are convinced that such changes not only will not lessen the effectiveness of CAST/BOB relations heretofore maintained, but will represent a distinct improvement in the fields of personnel relations, WASSCO amalgamation, and WASSCO efficiency.

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