

EWI

DISPATCH

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TO	Chief, European Division	NO INDEXING	TRAVEL PROGRAM
INFO.	Chief, Soviet East European Division	APERTURE CARD REQUEST	ABSTRACT
FROM		IP/CR/V	PREPARE FOR FILING
SUBJECT	CKLEG CATOMIC - Quarterly Operational Report for the period 1 December 1976 - 28 February 1977		CODE NO. (2, 3)
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			RYBAT REST. CODE
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REFERENCE: EGXA-5664, 8 December 1976

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. In this Quarterly Operational Report on the CATOMIC Project, we have included additional information which should give Headquarters a more complete and balanced picture of our overall Soviet/East European operational program. We did not include this information in our last report, because the instructions and prescribed format for these reports called for reporting only on project "assets". This additional information includes direct case officer contacts with targets; spotting, assessing and developing new CATOMIC assets; and going operations. We have also touched on other areas which are either related to this program or affect it significantly.

2. In preparing this report we have been acutely aware that Headquarters has evaluated this program unsatisfactory through the last two previous reporting periods. We understand Headquarters basic criticism is that it lacks focus and direction. We have gratefully acknowledged receiving Headquarters helpful suggestions in WASHINGTON 955217 for improving this program and shall respond to them in detail soon after this report is forwarded. At that time we shall also outline for you the steps we have taken to make the program more effective.

3. We have had one overriding concern during this reporting period - the Soviet operation against [redacted] officer who is responsible for handling seven of the sixteen encrypted CATOMIC assets with whom we currently maintain contact. As this case is sensitive, on several levels, it is not possible to report fully here on the effect it has had on our Soviet/East European operational program. Nevertheless, as it does bear heavily on this program, we

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	EGXA-5859	23 March 1977
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have provided some general perspectives of this case in this report. We must ask Headquarters to search out any details from our extensive reporting on it this quarter.

4. In about early December, we were urged to complete our reporting on this case expeditiously. By early January we had reported in detail on [] extensive contacts with Soviets and East Europeans since they began in December 1975. Many of these contacts had never before been reported to Headquarters. We have not yet been able to give full attention, however, to the effect this Soviet operation might have had on [] developmental contacts, the CATOMIC assets he handles, or other sources but before each such contact he has made this reporting period we have carefully weighed all relevant factors before permitting him to make it. We have also had to proceed cautiously this quarter in other areas of our operational program touched by the [] matter until we could complete our investigations.

5. In mid-December 1976, when the Soviets renewed their pursuit of [] we moved to blunt their effort and to try to obtain some operational benefit from it for ourselves. In January, through surveillance and CAFISSION, we monitored the Soviet responses to our move and in February retaliated in kind by pitching Jonas Vitautovich LUKYANSKAS [] Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, one of the Soviets involved in the operation against [] The Soviets, however, indicated at the end of this quarter that they are still interested in []. Throughout the period covering these events we carefully followed on CAFISSION a series of Soviet conversations, unique to our experienced AESCREEN transcribers, which we believe concerned their operation against []. Though guarded, these conversations enabled us to anticipate Soviet moves and to identify various Soviets involved in the operation. Although these identifications might not meet strict standards for assigning I.S. status to Soviets until confirmed by other information, they represent an important start for us in understanding the duties, personalities and interrelationships of many of the Soviets currently here.

6. Obviously, the [] matter has taken time from other things we would have rather been doing in our Soviet program. A solution, suggested by Headquarters, would have been to transfer [] immediately. [] did not favor this solution, primarily because it would have suggested to the Soviets that pitching our officers, even if the pitch is rejected, can be profitable. (There were other sensitive reasons for keeping this operation going.) Having chosen this course, we would hope Headquarters would carefully consider all of its consequences when evaluating our program this quarter. In our view, too, this case has been a "substantially extenuating circumstance" which has affected our work. We also believe, however, it has sometimes worked for our benefit and thus it deserves more scrutiny than it received in last quarter's evaluation. We also believe our CI reporting, such as on the [] affair should have been evaluated against Objective A-3.

7. We plan for [] to transfer this summer. In the next quarter, therefore, we shall have to be alert to further Soviet initiatives against him and perhaps also make moves of our own. In the meantime, we shall continue phasing [] out of our Soviet/East European program.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

8. Field Case Officers:

[] has the primary responsibility for the overall CATOMIC effort and handles HUFENCE/7. He is [] but his minimal [] duties do not detract appreciably from his Base responsibilities. HIS [] however, denies him access to [] offices after normal working hours, unless non-integrated [] officers are present. He is also [] on Soviet/East European matters.

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[] handles CATOMIC/6 and /79. CATOMIC/6 was turned over to [] by [] during the reporting period. He is also responsible for running [] operations against narcotics and terrorist targets. These activities take about 25 per cent of his time.

[] handles CATOMIC/5, /19, /33, /72, /73, /74 and /85.

[] handles CATOMIC/40 and /41. These cases were turned over to [] by [] during the reporting period. He also handles CAFORAGE/20 [] responsibility for which was moved to [] with [] transfer from [] in January. He assists [] in managing the overall CATOMIC effort and has primary responsibility for three sensitive operations.

[] handles CATOMIC/36 and /81. She is [] and spends at least 50 per cent of her time [] duties.

[] handles CATOMIC/47 and /86.

[] handles CATOMIC/87. His primary duties, however, are responsive to the CATHATCH Project.

9. Expenses:

- a. Salaries : []
- b. Safehouses : 898
- c. Operational Entertainment : 400
- d. Other Operational Expenses : 352

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

10. This project is primarily concerned with SE targets (OD A-1 and C-1) and usually produces only operational information. [] 53798, the economic intelligence report mentioned in the Reference, which was based on information provided by CATOMIC/79, was disseminated as FTRDB-312/03686-76. CATOMIC/79 also provided economic information [] (6675) which was deemed not suitable for dissemination, but which was considered to be of possible interest to working analysts.

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTS

11. Assets:

a. CATOMIC/5 was met once during the reporting period. He continues to work for the same Soviet company where no Soviets of interest are currently assigned and where he has only rare contact with Soviets at CAPAYOFF. He remains fully cooperative, however, and volunteered information on a Soviet friend who used to work at his company but who is now assigned to Antwerp as head of the joint Belgian-Soviet company BELSO. This lead is being passed [] and [] (EGXA-5848). We shall continue to consider CATOMIC/5 terminated but shall meet him occasionally to check on his access or to follow up on leads he has provided.

b. CATOMIC/6 was met six times during this quarter. She continued to report on her Soviet and East European contacts in the local foreign press and diplomatic circles, including Nikolay Yevgenyevich POKEAK-POLYANOV [] the new Izvestiya correspondent in Bonn [] (56505); Yevgeniy Vasilyevich BOVKUN [] a young, newly-arrived Soviet journalist at Sowjetunion Heute; and Szepesi GYORGY [] , the new correspondent for Hungarian

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radio. She has been directed to cultivate these three individuals. A report on her contact with BOVKUN is being prepared. She also reported on the annual general meeting of the Foreign Press Association and its bearing on the PDHUM case [] 55726).

c. CATOMIC/19 is an inactive asset. He was met twice during the month in preparation for his termination, which is planned for early in the next reporting period [] 56460).

d. CATOMIC/33 was met three times during the reporting period. He has been elected to an even more leading position in the Foreign Press Association than he held previously, which should add to his stature and thus might provide him with better access to targets. Although at our direction he has tried to expand his relationship with Vladimir Mikhaylovich POLENOV [], Protocol Officer, Soviet Embassy, to a social level, POLENOV has not yet responded. CATOMIC/33 is also reluctant in general to socialize openly with Soviets and East Europeans, because as a stateless person he does not want to attract the attention of German authorities and thereby jeopardize his alien residency status here. He has reported on other contacts he has had at the Association with Soviet and East Europeans, his brother-in-law who is of interest to Headquarters, various Arabs and on the activities of the Association. We are inclined to believe CATOMIC/33's overall access serves broad BKHERALD interests, but it has limited value for our Soviet/East European program. We shall reserve judgment on his future use until the end of the next quarter.

e. CATOMIC/36 and his wife, CATOMIC/81, are inactive assets. They were not met during the reporting period. Their move away from the Bonn/Cologne area will make it difficult to re-tool them for our program, but we continue to consider them when leads with which they might be able to help are assigned to the Base for exploitation.

f. CATOMIC/40 and CATOMIC/41 continued to maintain the PDHUM telephone tap and personal contact with PDHUM and his wife. Although the tap produced no intelligence reports this quarter, it continued to provide background information [] analysts consider valuable in their work. In response to a Headquarters requirement, CATOMIC/41 established contact with the visiting Yugoslav doctor believed to be knowledgeable about President Tito's medical status, but the doctor was suddenly called home before CATOMIC/41 was able to develop this contact [] 54213). He opened private practice in Bonn during this quarter, and we expect this change will allow him more time and opportunity for our work. We are investigating the possibility of using him and CATOMIC/40 on other targets.

g. CATOMIC/47 was met three times during the reporting period to debrief him on his business contacts with two Soviets (POLLAK-POLYANOV and Viktor Petrovich PSHENKIN, [] another Izvestiya correspondent), two Bulgarians (Todor Aleksandrov ATANASOV, Third Secretary, and Ilia GAIDEROV, Second Secretary) and one member of the Vietnam delegation. He continues to enjoy a good business relationship with these officials, e.g., the Bulgarians promised to give him all their business, but he has not yet been able to move any of these contacts into a social relationship. His main value to us, we believe, lies in his ability to give us advance notice of target interest in particular pieces of real property.

h. CATOMIC/72 and CATOMIC/73 were not met during this quarter, because relatives, unwitting of our arrangement with them to use their apartments as observation posts, were visiting them. We also did not want to risk exposing our relationship with them by having their current case officer, [] meet them. We plan for [] or [] to take over these cases next quarter and to use their apartments for several photographic efforts against CAPAYOFF.

i. CATOMIC/74 was met twice during the quarter. He reported that his neighbor, Eduard Avenosovich MNATSAKANOV [] Soviet Radio and TV representative, attended a dinner party CATOMIC/74 held at

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his home in December and even postponed his departure for vacation in Moscow to come. CATOMIC/74 will attempt to resume this contact next quarter when MNATSAKANOV returns to Bonn. He remains willing to assist us in working against the Soviet East European target, but his official duties and heavy social schedule severely limit his activities for us.

j. CATOMIC/79 was met three times this quarter. He was the only CATOMIC asset whose reporting produced both intelligence (See paragraph 10, above) and operational information during the quarter. His operational reporting concerned CAPAYOFF personnel and one Soviet acceptance engineer working for a firm which CATOMIC/79's company does business (56246). As he is our only CATOMIC asset with any access to CAPAYOFF activities and personnel, we are exploring other ways in which he might be useful to our efforts against CAPAYOFF. For example, we have tasked him to provide information on Neotipe, a joint Soviet-German firm near Cologne with close ties to CAPAYOFF, which came to our attention for the first time recently during the [] affair.

k. CATOMIC/85 was met only once during the reporting period, at another party sponsored by his firm in December (53789). We have refrained from having [] hold operational meetings with him this quarter and last because these parties were focal points for Soviet contact with [] and we are uncertain to what degree of control, if any, the Soviets exercise over CATOMIC/85. Late in this quarter, however, CATOMIC/85 informed [] that he wanted to meet soon with [] and we anticipate having [] resume contact with him in March. We believe, however, the [] affair has ended his asset's usefulness as a catalyst for case officers meeting Soviets and East Europeans, because any American who replaces [] at these parties would be immediately suspect to the Soviets. CATOMIC/6 and CATOMIC/33 continue to attend and monitor these events for us.

l. CATOMIC/86 was not met during the reporting period, because he has not yet reported receiving some reaction from Moscow to his business proposal.

m. CATOMIC/87 was met twice during the reporting period. Anatoliy Georgiyevich NOVIKOV [] Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy, resumed cultivating her in December after his lengthy bout with pneumonia. (EGXA-5704) She has been given a copy of the German edition of Smith's "The Russians" to pass to him. As NOVIKOV is one of the few Soviets with whom we are in touch who seems to want to further contact with one of our assets, we shall be examining other options for exploiting his initiatives. CATOMIC/87's heavy workload, however, is a major limitation in this case.

n. HUFENCE/7 was met four times during the quarter, mainly to establish rapport and to monitor his settling into the Bonn area. He has had one official contact each with his Soviet and Cuban counterparts since his arrival and plans to begin moving soon on the social circuit. At this point, we are unable to predict how useful a CATOMIC asset he might be, but he is willing to help us in any way he can.

12. Direct Case Officer Contacts.

a. As we continue to review our files on Soviets and East Europeans in search of targets, we have so far identified 42 Soviets and 36 East Europeans in Bonn/Cologne with whom there has been contact by case officers and/or other assets in the past year. [] has had direct contact with 19 of these Soviets and 18 of the East Europeans. We shall weigh this factor with all other considerations when we decide on which, if any, of these individuals we should focus.) Case Officers other than [] have had direct contact with eleven of these Soviets and ten of these East Europeans. Our tentative judgment is that eight of the 42 Soviets and four of the 36 East Europeans might be open to direct case officer development. The Subject of EGXA-5802 is one such East European. As recently as two weeks ago, however, two of these eight Soviets failed to respond to our officers attempt to follow up on an initial contact. This is the normal Soviet reaction

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<p>here to such initiatives.</p> <p>b. CASLY affairs are regularly attended by [] and other [] officers. Soviets and East Europeans also attend these affairs, probably for the same operational purpose that we have - to meet and assess other diplomats. We shall continue to be represented there to look for any officials who might be worth targeting.</p> <p>c. The local LNSHOE office has been cooperative in our direct contact efforts. They have facilitated [] cultivation of VSDOVE and have indicated willingness to assist us in meeting similar officials. They have also provided biographic information on the new Romanian attache. We shall continue to develop this important adjunct to our program.</p> <p>d. [] met VSDOVE five times during the quarter and succeeded in [] hitting it off well with him and his family [] 53772, [] 54227 [] 56522).</p> <p>e. PDOBSTACLE remained elusive, in spite of our concerted efforts to place [] in contact with him when he traveled. [] and [] covered three of these "trips" alone and a fourth with [] and [] PDOBSTACLE was observed on only one of these occasions as he arrived home - too late for exploitation. The total case officer effort expended on these aborted trips was approximately seven man-days. In February we proposed a new tack to draw PDOBSTACLE to [] 55853), but Headquarters did not believe it would succeed. (DIRECTOR 989658). As PDOBSTACLE did not register to travel in February and a new Deputy Chief of CAPAYOFF, also PDGRAVE, had arrived, we now suspect PDOBSTACLE has departed PCS.</p> <p>f. [] posing as a businessman, succeeded in establishing direct contact with [] target PDHERB. PDHERB agreed to meet with [] again to discuss [] business proposition. [] will re-contact PDHERB in March to follow up on this opening [] 55669, [] 56627).</p> <p>g. Direct contact with KSRUSTY has lapsed as a result of the [] affairs. (We reported this development in [] 1162. See also [] 54163) The recent defection of his colleague, Svetozar SIMKO, has added a new dimension to this case. We have not abandoned KSRUSTY as a target, but we must begin anew, if we should decide to keep him, because neither [] nor [] should pursue him further.</p> <p>h. OZDRIVE remains friendly to [] but has so far not allowed their relationship to expand beyond the CASLY milieu. [] has also met him at these affairs. Shortly after the quarter ended, [] met OZDRIVE on the diplomatic circuit and, as is often the case with [] immediately established rapport with him. Two days later, after an earthquake had devastated the capital of his country and apparently severed its communications with OZDRIVE's embassy, he called [] at work. He said his Ambassador had authorized him to contact the Americans to see if they could help him find out whether the American Embassy in his capital suffered damage. He wanted to know, because he had close relatives living near our Embassy and his Ambassador suggested only the Americans were likely to have communications. [] was not available to take the call, but [] fielded the problem beautifully, obtaining the information from Washington through NVIDEA channels, passed it on to [] who phoned it to a grateful OZDRIVE. Three days later [] followed up this effort with another phone call to OZDRIVE during which OZDRIVE repeatedly expressed his thanks for []'s concern and our prompt assistance. His relatives, he told [] he had since learned, were not injured. We hope this episode has broken some of the ice around this target.</p> <p>i. Vladimir K. SHENDERA [], Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, called [] in December to arrange a meeting, but</p>		
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<p>the Soviet backed out at the last minute without explanation. He sent a Christmas gift to [] soon after, indicating he might still be interested in contact. [] will attempt to renew their relationship at the next SPD event they attend together.</p> <p>j. We have not taken any new initiatives for direct contact with Vladislav Anatolyevich STARIKOVICH [], Attache, Soviet Embassy, after learning from a sensitive source that German authorities were considering arresting him for espionage activities [] 53280). Our basic reason for this decision is that we did not want to expose our officers to any coverage the Germans might have placed on STARIKOVICH, but we also did not want to complicate the German operation.</p> <p>k. Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich GRISHIN [] TASS representative, is one of the Soviets with whom CATOMIC/33 has had contact during the quarter. We are preparing a summary of these contacts, together with CATOMIC/33's assessment of GRISHIN and our comments, which will be sent to Headquarters soon.</p> <p>NIKIFOROV [] was able to get Oleg Nikolayevich [] Socialist Industry journalist, to meet briefly for coffee in late October to discuss politics and economics. NIKIFOROV, however, was not enthusiastic about [] suggestion for another meeting. We plan for [] to try for another meeting soon, but we are not optimistic this case will be making great strides forward.</p> <p>m. We have not yet been able to focus on TASS correspondents Aleksandr Aleksandrovich URBAN [] and Vitaliy Sergeyeovich VINOGRADOV [] but we shall begin to do so in the next quarter.</p> <p>n. While trying on the one hand to make our CATOMIC program more effective against Objectives A-1 and C-1, we have on the other hand been considering ways to improve our overall Base efforts against Objective (TORADIUS) A-2. Although there has been considerable [] reporting on TORADIUS from CATHATCH assets, Headquarters has chosen not to evaluate this effort specifically against Objective A-2. The PDHUM telephone tap and CATOMIC/79 reporting is also responsive to this objective. By not evaluating our TORADIUS reporting, we find ourselves in the position of not knowing how much additional effort, if any, we should expend on this important objective. We are particularly reluctant now, for example, to target someone like PDWARBLER; Leonid Grigoryevich USYCHENKO [] Political Counselor; or Yuriy Aleksandrovich GREMITSKIKH [] Counselor for Press and Information, because this effort would inevitably diffuse to a degree the focus we are trying to achieve in the A-1 area, unless there is a real need to do so. Yet we note with some concern that Headquarters mentioned our lack of reporting on them in 1976 in its latest evaluation of our CATOMIC (A-1) effort and this A-2 shortfall apparently contributed somehow to our unsatisfactory A-1 rating. As potential sources of TORADIUS reporting, these Soviets were not being considered as possible recruitment targets, but only for monitoring their activities. CAEXCEL, of course, is already reporting on PDWARBLER's TORADIUS activities, so we are not sure what more we can or should be doing against him. (FYI, CAEXCEL has just reported PDWARBLER leaves PCS 20 or 21 April.) We have learned that USYCHENKO might have met recently with an LNFALL political officer, but we have yet to see any reporting on this. We shall check. [] did meet GREMITSKIKH once at a reception a year ago [] 54555), but this event is totally unrelated to our later thinking that he might make a TORADIUS target. He has never met PDWARBLER and USYCHENKO. We also want to point out that Headquarters has also tasked [] with providing semi-annual wrap-up reports for Chief, WOMACE on TORADIUS and A-3 (CI) activities to which [] has made substantial contributions. If Headquarters had included this reporting in its overall evaluation of our Soviet program, [] officers who must meet this requirement, usually at the expense of CATOMIC focus, could see some results from their efforts, and perhaps also appreciation.</p>		
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o. For the record, [] has never met Atanas NASTEV, First Secretary, Bulgarian Embassy, but [] did meet him [] (30961). We said we were cool to following up on this contact, because NASTEV appeared to be a little too close to the Soviets to warrant much attention [] (54035), but the real reason was we did not want at that time to continue dispersing our efforts, until we could see in which directions we should focus them.

13. Developmental CATOMIC Contacts.

a. Subject of [] See status report on this case for developments through January (EGXA-5764) and Headquarters comments on it (WASHINGTON 997026). [] continued to meet with Subject in February. On 2 March [] broke [] with him and asked him to keep him informed of his contacts with Soviet Embassy attaches Nikolay Ivanovich ANDROSOV [] and Anatoliy Ivanovich RAZGULYAYEV [] Subject, who is rather pro-Soviet, was initially quite upset, but after much discussion of this request and his personal situation, we are hopeful [] will yet secure his cooperation.

b. Subject of [] 5775. A POA has been requested on him. Jan HABERKA, Second Secretary, Polish Embassy, is one target we are interested in using him against (EGXA-5802).

c. Subject of [] We have a POA on her for use against her Yugoslav Embassy contacts (WASHINGTON 975956).

d. Finnish diplomat. [] has had seven social contacts with him during the reporting period. The Finn, per CAFISSION, is in frequent contact with Gennadiy T. YASHIN [] Soviet Embassy official. As the Finn will be leaving Bonn for Nairobi in June, it is doubtful the relationship can be brought to recruitment before his departure.

e. Argentine diplomat. CAFISSION also indicates YASHIN is in social contact with this diplomat. To date [] has had only one social contact with him, but he will try to pursue this relationship more in the future.

f. American businessman. [] has recently met an American businessman who travels often to East Europe, has contacts with East European trade missions here and lives near CAFILE. [] plans to take over this contact.

14. Other Operations.

a. CAFORAGE/20 continues to provide interesting information on Soviet scientists with whom he has contact during his trips to the USSR, including two in whom Headquarters has strong operational interest [] (56014, [] (56006, [] (56007)). Through CAFORAGE/20 and in other ways we are examining the Soviet scientists who visit West Germany for varying periods as possible operational targets. We shall be forwarding our planning along these lines, including its possible relationship to the Pilot Collection Project No. 1 for directed energy program, during the next quarter.

b. [] is responsible for three sensitive cases, one Soviet and two East European, on which we report in other channels. He is alternate case officer for three LH DEN cases. During the quarter he also supported a visiting Headquarters officer on another sensitive East European case. [] met a sensitive East European internal asset, in place of his regular Headquarters case officer, and is now designated alternate Europe-based case officer for this asset.

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