Chapter One

The Conclusion Must Be Left to History (U)

From its formation in 1942, the Office of Strategic Services grew almost overnight into a leading American intelligence service in the war against the Axis Powers. By 1945, the OSS had some 12,000 men and women, both civilian and military personnel, scattered throughout the world, although the bulk of the overseas operations took place in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. The OSS dedicated a wide array of resources to the German target, including support to resistance forces in occupied Europe; support to domestic resistance efforts against Hitler; propaganda efforts; and collection against Germany's industrial and military capabilities. In the course of its operations from 1942 to 1945, the OSS came into contact with thousands of Germans, dedicated anti-Nazis as well as those who had fought for the Third Reich. The mission of any intelligence service is to penetrate the forces of its adversaries to learn as much as

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possible about the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. During wartime, few restrictions hinder an intelligence service in the pursuit of its objectives.3 (U)

Operation SUNRISE (U)

In November 1942, Allen W. Dulles took over the OSS station in Bern, Switzerland, which soon became the eyes and ears for OSS in Europe. From his post in neutral Switzerland, Dulles “used whomever he could to further his intelligence mission even if some of his agents may have been of dubious political persuasion.” Consequently, Dulles worked with dozens of Germans and others, some were communist while others were Nazis.4 (U)

In addition to his work with the German resistance and his recruitment of an agent who penetrated the Nazi Foreign Ministry, Dulles’s most notable contribution to the war effort was his involvement in the surrender of German forces in northern Italy prior to the collapse of the Third Reich. Undertaken in secret, the surrender shortened the bloody war in Italy and saved countless lives. Known as Operation SUNRISE, the talks did not remain a secret for long; indeed, they received public attention just weeks after the war ended. Twenty years after the event, Dulles’s himself wrote a detailed history of the

3As an example, the OSS recruited German and Austrian prisoners of war to serve as agents to cross Nazi lines to collect intelligence and to spread propaganda. See Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995). (U)
operation, *The Secret Surrender*, based on wartime documentation. Dulles’ book forms the general outline of our knowledge about the German surrender in Italy.  

In the last year of the war, the German military situation became increasingly desperate. The failure of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler and the bloody roundup of coup suspects meant that there was little chance for the German resistance to negotiate an end to the war. As the Soviets and Western Allies drew ever closer to Germany itself, various German officials began to extend peace feelers to the British and Americans. In December 1944, Dulles’s agent, Gero von Schulze Gaevernitz, told Dulles that Alexander von Neurath, the German consul in Lugano, was in close contact with senior German military and SS officers searching for an American contact to discuss surrender terms. Dulles was forced to reject this feeler because President Roosevelt and Gen. William J. Donovan, the director of OSS, had expressed concern about the reaction of the Soviet allies to any negotiations by the Western Allies with the Germans.  

Over the next several months, Dulles continued to receive feelers in Switzerland from senior SS officers, including such notable Nazis as Heinrich Himmler, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and Walter Schellenberg. But these contacts all came with strings attached, such as the requirement that the Americans and the British join forces with the Germans to fight the Soviets. At the same time, intelligence reports and simple rumors

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underscored the German determination to fight to the last man by fortifying the Alpine regions of southern Germany and Austria. The so-called “National Redoubt” concerned American planners who were anxious to avoid a major loss of lives at the end of the war. From the Allied perspective, Operation SUNRISE offered a way to end the fighting in Italy while ensuring that the Germans could not mount a last-ditch battle in the Alps.

By late 1944, various SS officials in Italy and in Germany decided to contact the Allies. One of these undertakings, codenamed WESTWIND, failed because of rivalries at the highest levels of the SS. By mid-February 1945, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff, the commander of all SS troops in Italy, told Walther Rauff, a subordinate SS officer, that he wanted to establish contact with the Allies in neutral Switzerland. Rauff mentioned this to another SS officer, Guido Zimmer, who suggested Baron Luigi Parilli as an intermediary.

Parilli, the prewar European representative of a prominent American company, was closely tied to Zimmer and may have been one of his agents. The Italian claimed that Zimmer’s love for Italy and his concern that the Germans would unleash a “scorched earth” policy motivated both men to seek the Allies. Through Professor Max Husmann, a Swiss schoolmaster, Parilli received a visa to visit Switzerland and present the German proposal to Maj. Max Waibel, a Swiss intelligence officer and a contact of Allen Dulles, the OSS station chief in Bern. This led to the first meeting between Gero von Gaevernitz and Parilli in Lucerne and the beginning of Operation SUNRISE.

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7 For an outline of Operation SUNRISE, see Waller, *The Unseen War*, pp. 366-390. (U)

SECRET
In March 1945, Dulles and Gaevernitz met in Switzerland with Wolff. Dulles knew that Wolff wanted to discuss surrender terms, but the OSS station chief made continued discussions conditional upon the release of several Italian resistance leaders in German captivity. Wolff told Dulles that he wanted to surrender SS forces to the Allies and that he would work to get Field Marshal Albert Kesslering, commander of all German military forces in Italy, and his successor, Field Marshal Heinrich von Vietinghoff, to do the same. (U)

Guido Zimmer played a steady role in facilitating German feelers with the OSS in Switzerland. Within days after the first meeting between Gaevernitz and Parilli in February 1945, Zimmer and another German officer, SS-Standartenführer Eugen Dollmann, traveled to Lugano to meet with the Americans. Dollmann had served as a translator for Hitler when he visited Mussolini. Himmler valued Dollmann for his social and political contacts in Rome. As events unfolded, Zimmer continued to be a key point of contact and even coordinated the placement of a Czech-born OSS radio operator, Vaclav Hradecky, first at the SS headquarters in Milano and later in Bolzano. With Zimmer’s protection, Hradecky, known as “Little Walter,” provided communications between Allied headquarters in Caserta and the Germans in northern Italy. (U)

In the meantime, Wolff met with Dulles and other British and American officers in northern Italy to continue the preliminary discussions. Feelers by other senior SS officials complicated Wolff’s own efforts to deal with the Western Allies. Hitler, in fact, learned of Wolff’s activities, but did not take any action against the SS general. The death of President Roosevelt in April also created new problems when Dulles received
orders to drop all contact with the Germans. After further delays and more frustration, Dulles nonetheless succeeded in getting two representatives of the German army and SS to sign the surrender documents on 29 April 1945.8 (U)

A More Moderate Element in the Waffen SS (U)

The fact that Operation SUNRISE ended the war in Italy has been overshadowed by other, more ominous, characterizations of the surrender in the decades after 1945. Historians, journalists, and even some intelligence officers have downplayed the importance of the secret surrender and criticized Allen Dulles for promoting his own role and that of the OSS. More damaging, however, are the accusations that Allen Dulles promised to prevent any postwar Allied retribution against the German officials involved in the surrender negotiations. Operation SUNRISE is regarded by some historians as “an early glimpse backstage before the curtain went up on a Cold War drama that dominated international affairs for a long time to come.”9 (U)

Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi regard Dulles’s efforts as an important milestone in the postwar struggle between East and West. “Implicit in the cold war evolution was a shift from the picture of Germany as an evil and aggressor nation to that of comrade in the struggle against Communism . . . . What Operation Sunrise

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8Ibid. (U)
9Ibid, p. 390. (U)
demonstrates is that individual Germans were eager to do what they could to push the Western powers into a cold war stance as quickly as possible."10 (U)

The case of SS Obergruppenführer Wolff is well known to historians, who claim that Dulles had made special arrangements for the German participants in Operation SUNRISE. After having met Wolff in Bern in March 1945, Dulles cabled Washington to say that “Wolff’s distinctive personality, our reports and impressions indicate he represents more moderate element in Waffen SS, with mixture of romanticism. Probably most dynamic personality North Italy and most powerful after Kesselring.”11 (U)

After the German surrender, the Allies did not put Wolff on trial at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, although the Americans extensively interrogated him. The British then held him as a witness in the trial of Field Marshal Kesslinger until 1949 and subsequently placed the SS general on trial in Hamburg. The British failed, however, to present a solid case against Wolff. Aided by affidavits from Dulles and other Allied officers involved in the German surrender in Italy, Wolff won an outright acquittal. The West German Government eventually filed its own charges against Wolff in 1962 when he was found guilty of being “continuously engaged and deeply entangled in guilt” for the crimes of the Third Reich. He received a 15-year prison sentence.12 (U)

11Petersen, From Hitler’s Doorsteps, p. 468. (U)
12Smith and Agarossi, Operation Sunrise, pp. 188-192; Dulles, The Secret Surrender, pp. 252-253. See also “SS General Was Aide to Himmler,” New York Journal American, 30 September 1964, a copy filed in vertical files at the Historical Intelligence Collection, CIA Library. (U)
As he wrote his recollections of Operation SUNRISE, Dulles had this to say about Karl Wolff:

This is not the place or the time to attempt to pass on the extent of Wolff's guilt or to analyze his incentives and motives in acting as he did in the Sunrise operation. The German court has rendered its judgment, and it is useless to attempt here to reconcile his conduct as a close confidant of Himmler's for many years with that of the man who, more than any other person, contributed to the final German surrender in North Italy... The conclusions must be left to history. One point seems to me to be clear: Once convinced that he and the German people had been deceived and misled by Hitler, and that by prolonging the war Hitler was merely condemning the German people to useless slaughter, Wolff determined that whatever his past purposes and motivations might have been, it was his duty, henceforth, to do what he could to end the war. During the weeks of our negotiations he never weakened in this determination, or varied from this course; he never, as far as I could see, made us promises which he failed to fulfill within the limits of his power and capabilities. Hence, he made his great contribution to the success of the Sunrise operation.13 (U)

While the case of SS Gen. Wolff has attracted the most attention, numerous intermediaries paved the road to the eventual German surrender in northern Italy. How did the other German participants in Operation SUNRISE fare at the hands of the Western Allies? Three SS officers —Eugen Dollmann, Eugen Wenner, and Guido Zimmer—also played important roles in Operation SUNRISE. When Obergruppenfuhrer Wolff decided to contact the Allies, moreover, he did so through an Italian businessman, Baron Luigi Parilli. The postwar records of those four men illustrate the dilemmas facing the conquerors in later years. (U)

Crisis in Rome (U)

The case of General Wolff was the best known of troubles that faced the German participants involved in Operation SUNRISE. As new players and political forces emerged in postwar Europe and Washington, the US government agencies in contact with the former German officers multiplied—and in many cases these organizational shifts erased institutional memories. Eugen Dollmann and Eugen Wenner created problems for the Allies in the years after the war, with Dollmann remaining active in the intelligence arena in Europe for the next decade. (U)

After a lengthy confinement, Dollmann and Wenner escaped from an Allied prisoner of war camp in 1946. In August of that year, Capt. James J. Angleton, the head of SCI/Z, the counterintelligence branch in Rome of the Strategic Services Unit (the successor to OSS), learned from Baron Luigi Parilli that Italian military intelligence had placed Dollmann and Wenner in custody in Milan. According to Parilli, a rightwing Italian faction planned to use both Germans to discredit the Allies. 14 (S)

To forestall such a plot, Angleton managed to bring Dollmann and Wenner to Rome and provided them with false identities. He also urged the US Army to publish a

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14Cardinal Ildebrando Schuster of Milan claimed that he had saved Italy from German destruction and had arranged for the Nazi surrender. A supporter of the Italian Fascist regime, Schuster had, in fact, been involved in separate unsuccessful negotiations between the Italians and Germans in the last year of the war. By using Dollmann and Wenner, Italian conservatives hoped to stir nationalistic fervor against the Americans and the British, just as the Allies were negotiating a peace settlement with Italy. Bringing German military and SS officers to justice for Nazi crimes committed in wartime Italy raised troublesome issues in postwar Italy, including wartime collaboration with the Nazis, the role of the Catholic Church, and how Italian Communists used Italy’s fascist past against the present Italian Government and the Allies. The Allies ruled Italy through the Allied Control Council under the terms of the September 1943 armistice, although the Italian Government was responsible for internal affairs after December 1945. The 1946 peace treaty, dictated to Italy by the Allies, aroused considerable antagonism on the part of both Italian left and rightwing parties. See Smith and Agarossi, Operation Sunrise, pp. 57, 66, 138, and 142. See also Giuseppe Mammarella, Italy after Fascism: A Political History 1943-1965 (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1966), pp. 159-175. For further details, see Cable, to Special Operations, 20 November 1946, IN 44607, (S), in Directorate of Operations Records, Box 7, Folder 201, CIA Archives and Records Center (hereafter cited as DO Records, job, box, folder, and CIA AARC). (S)
"white paper" on Operation SUNRISE to counteract the attacks by Italian rightists and communists. The Italian police, however, arrested Dollmann, and he became caught up in an internal power struggle within the Italian bureaucracy. Angleton, in turn, tried to get Dollmann released from Italian custody. After learning about Dollmann's arrival in Rome, the Italian Communism press raised his name as a witness, or as a possible defendant, at the trial of Nazi officers involved in the German massacre of 335 Italian civilians in March 1944.\textsuperscript{15} (S)

The British and Americans in Rome could not agree whether Dollmann and Wenner had been offered any sort of immunity or protection as a result of their role in Operation SUNRISE. British Maj. Gen. Terence S. Airy, one of the two Allied generals

\textsuperscript{15}Cable. \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} to Special Operations, 20 November 1946, 664, IN 44607, (S), in DO Records, Box 7, Folder 201, CIA ARC. Italian partisans attacked a column of SS troops in the Via Rasella in Rome on 23 March 1944, killing some 32 soldiers. Upon hearing the news, Hitler ordered German authorities in Rome to kill ten Italians for every German death. SS Obersturmbannführer Herbert Kappler, the head of the SS in Rome, hastily gathered Jews, communists, and other prisoners and brutally murdered 335 men and boys in the Ardeatine caves outside of Rome the following day. With the liberation of Rome by the Americans in June 1944, Italian authorities began the gruesome task of recovering and identifying the remains. In November 1946, the British tried two German generals for their role in the Ardeatine Caves massacre; Kappler was a witness for the prosecution. The court found the two generals guilty and sentenced them to death. As it turned out, the British later remanded the sentences to life imprisonment and then cancelled the jail terms. The British released one of the generals in 1952 (the other had died in prison of natural causes). In the meantime, the British also tried Field Marshal Kesselring in 1947 for ordering German troops to slaughter Italian civilians in Rome and elsewhere. He was found guilty and sentenced to death; a judgment that aroused great debate in Great Britain. Winston Churchill and other senior British leaders protested Kesselring's fate, and it was reduced to life imprisonment. In 1952, Kesselring also returned to West Germany as a free man. In July 1947, the British turned Herbert Kappler over to the Italian Government. In May 1948, the Italians tried Kappler and five other SS officers for their roles in the Ardeatine caves massacre. All of the officers, with the exception of Kappler, were acquitted. The Italian military tribunal found Kappler, as the commander, guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. After numerous appeals, the Italian Supreme Court confirmed the sentencing. Twenty-four years later, Kappler's wife assisted him in escaping from an Italian prison and smuggled him to West Germany. Claiming that he was a "Christ-like figure," Mrs. Kappler declared, "the more they hate Herbert Kappler, the more I love him. He was only obeying orders." Kappler died in West Germany in February 1978 at the age of 70. See Richard Raiber, "Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, Via Rasella, and the 'Ginny Mission,'" \textit{Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen} 56 (1997), pp. 69-106. See also Robert Katz, \textit{Death in Rome} (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967), pp. 225-238. For Kappler's postwar troubles, see "Herbert Kappler Dies; Nazi Fled Captivity in Rome," \textit{New York Times}, 10 February 1978, p. A5. (U)
who met with Wolff during the negotiations, denied that Dollmann played any role in the surrender proceedings. Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), in turn, issued a press release to this effect, stating that it had Dollmann in custody after his escape from a British POW camp earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{16} Angleton, however, continued to urge officials in Italy and in Washington to help Dollmann and Wenner, both of whom had since been transferred to an American military prison in Rome.\textsuperscript{17} (S)

In Washington, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG, successor to SSU) scrambled to find a way out of the mess. \textsuperscript{18} chief of CIG's Control branch, contacted the State Department to ascertain its views on the Dollmann-Wenner case.\textsuperscript{18} It
told State that “he was in agreement that the record should be kept clear in Italy and that we should not allow the Communisms to undermine our position on a false set of facts, which could be cleared up by an official statement setting forth the truth with regard to Dollmann and Wenner.” Walter Dowling, the head of the Italian Desk at the State Department and the official assigned to provide the Department’s views on the case,

\textsuperscript{16}Dollmann’s arrest is discussed in “Germans on Trial in Rome Massacre,” \textit{New York Times}, 18 November 1946, p. 5. The \textit{New York Times} provided limited coverage of the British trial of Gens. Eberhard von Mackenson, commander of the German 14\textsuperscript{th} Army, and Kurt Maelzer, German commandant in Rome, in November 1946. (S)

\textsuperscript{17}Cable, to SO, 20 November 1946, 664, In 44607, (S), in DO Records, Box 7, Folder 201, CIA ARC. (S)

\textsuperscript{18}Rome telegram 4255, 21 November 1946, provided the Secretary of State, with details of the Dollmann case as the State Department had learned from the Italian press and from the American military and intelligence. According to the cable, the Italian press “has commented bitterly, with usual strong anti-Allied bias and propaganda appeal to latent Xenophobia. Principal complaints are that Allies have derogated Italian police sovereignty and have further taken and hidden German officer who may well be connected with Ardeatine caves massacre.” A copy of the State Department telegram is found in DO Records, Box 7, Folder 201, CIA ARC. (U)
told C. that State felt that the US Government should not “protect” the two Germans.\(^{19}\) (S)

C also faced a problem of ascertaining whether the Allies had made any promises to Dollmann and Wenner during the negotiations. In researching the case for Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenburg, the Director of Central Intelligence, C reviewed the 1946 British interrogation report of Dollmann as well as Dulles’s 1945 report of Operation SUNRISE to see what information he could find. C determined that they had participated in the surrender negotiations “at no small risk.” He found no evidence that either had received any commitments. Dulles himself confirmed to C that he had “made no promises or commitments to Dollmann or Wenner, nor did he authorize any other person to make such commitments.” Dulles stated that “these men did participate in the negotiations and his feeling is that if they are in trouble that some effort should be made to help them.” C agreed and told his superiors that “whether or not binding commitments were made to Dollmann or Wenner, it seems that we owe some consideration to these two men.”\(^{20}\) (S)

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\(^{19}\) C: summary of the Dollmann-Wenner case and his discussion with Dulles are found in “Eugenio Dollmann and Eugene Wenner,” no date, (S), in DO Records, 7, Box 7, Folder 210, CIA ARC. Born in 1902 in Los Angeles, C was the chief of Control for the Office of Special Operations (OSO) in CIG. In this position, he was CIG’s liaison officer with the State and Treasury Departments, the military, and the FBI. He was a graduate of Yale University and its law school and served as a Foreign Service officer in Latin America, the Far East, and Europe from 1928 until he joined OSS in 1943. Upon his transfer to OSS, C served as the chief of intelligence operations at Allied Forces Headquarters in Caserta, Italy, and as Dulles’s successor as the OSS and later SSU chief of mission in Bern, Switzerland. C resigned from CIG in June 1947. See Personnel File, C.

\(^{20}\) “Eugenio Dollmann and Eugene Wenner,” no date, (S), in DO Records, 7, Box 7, Folder 201, CIA ARC. (S)
On 27 November, Gen. Vandenburg cabled to Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater and commanding general of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations United States Army (MTOUSA), stating that a review of the OSS operational records and discussions with both Allen Dulles and Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who had been the American general officer present during the SUNRISE talks, confirmed Dollmann's role in the surrender proceedings. The DCI told Gen. Lee that "it would appear that present representations by Italians is attempt to undermine Allied position in Italy and in view of the above facts and particularly the repercussions and results that any unjust treatment of these individuals would have on the future long-range United States intelligence activities in Italy." Following the recommendations offered by Vandenburg stated that "it would appear that Allied interests would best be served if AFHQ would confirm that Dollman[n] and Wenner participated in SUNRISE negotiations and show these individuals appropriate consideration in present circumstances." The DCI added that the State Department had no objection to this proposed course of action.

Gen. Lee replied to Gen. Vandenberg on 29 November 1946. According to research that Lee had done in Italy, Lemnitzer and Airey, the two Allied generals who represented Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, during the

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21 Lyman L. Lemnitzer served as chief of staff to British Gen. Sir Harold Alexander who was the Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean Theater. He later served as chief of staff to the US commander of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. See Ronald H. Cole, Lorna S. Jaffe, Walter S. Poole, and Willard J. Webb, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), pp. 66-75. (U)

22 Cable, Central Intelligence Group to Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (COMGENMED), 27 November 1946, War Department 86566, (S), in DO Records, Box 8, Folder 161, CIA ARC. A similar cable was sent from OSO to on the same date. (S)
meetings with Wolff had “had the strictest instruction not to offer any form of immunity or reward to any individual and only operate on the basis of unconditional surrender.” Lee stated, “they scrupulously carried out their instructions.” Any promises made by any other individual or party to the Germans ran counter to Eisenhower’s orders.23 (S)

Gen. Lee categorically denied that Dollmann played any part in the negotiations and refused to release him, claiming such a step would “not help Dollmann and would create confusion with respect to Allied Force Headquarters position.” The American commander noted that his headquarters had already offered Dollmann to the British as a witness and would hand him over to the Italians if an Italian court decided to press charges. “Since it is now known that Dollmann is held in United States custody, it would place Allied Force Headquarters in untenable position morally should it refuse request from Italian court that Dollmann testify.” If and when legal proceedings subsided, Lee promised, the Army would then “repatriate Dollmann through normal United States channels.”24 (S)

Lee’s cable brought a sigh of relief in Washington. On 3 December, Vandenburg informed Lee that he “greatly appreciate[d] proposed action on Dollmann.” Vandenburg, in turn, provided the Army in Italy with further information on Dollmann’s role as an intermediary between Wolff and Dulles as well as in facilitating the release of the two Italian prisoners held by the Nazis. “Records and Mr. Allen Dulles confirm that no immunity in any form was offered to any individual involved in SUNRISE,” Vandenburg

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23 Cable, War Department, 29 November 1946, F73492, IN 45013, (S), in DO Records, Box 8, Folder 161, CIA ARC, (S)

24 Ibid. (S)
assured Lee. "Interest of the Central Intelligence Group," the DCI stated, "is solely to
insure that long-range intelligence activities of the United States will be secured." 25 (S)

Continuing Intelligence Value (U)

By the end of December 1946, Gen. Lee in Caserta reported that neither the
British nor the Americans wanted to hold Dollmann for war crimes prosecution. The
Italians had not taken any steps to gain custody of either Dollmann or Wenner. Lee
recommended that Dollmann be returned to Germany where the Army could detain him
if the Italians decided to press criminal charges. 26 In relaying this information to
Angleton, the Central Intelligence Group stated that he should "confidentially advise
Dollmann solution of his difficulties and repatriation to Germany solely of efforts this
organization." 27 (S)

The Dollmann-Wenner case came to a head in the spring of 1947. In mid-April,
Joseph N. Greene, the acting US Political Adviser to Gen. Lee, reported to Washington
that the Italians had asked for Dollmann's transfer on two occasions in January and again

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25 Cable, CIG to COMGENMED, 3 December 1946, War Department 86882, (S), in DO Records, Box 5, Folder 76, CIA ARC. A copy of this same cable was sent by OSO to Angleton and is found in DO Records, Box 8, Folder 161, CIA ARC. Headquarters kept Angleton in Rome informed of the communiqués between Caserta and Washington. See HH (identity unknown) to BB8 (Angleton), "Dollmann and Wenner," 5 December 1946, (S), in Eugen Dollmann, DO Records. (S)

26 Cable, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (SACMED), Caserta to War Department, 28 December 1946, F 73983, IN 46259, (S), in DO Records, Box 8, Folder 161, CIA ARC. (S)

27 SO to BB8 31 December 1946, Washington 5263, (S), in DO Records, Box 7, Folder 201, CIA ARC. (S)
in April, but that the Army had failed to act.\textsuperscript{28} The Italians did not know that the Americans also had Wenner, but his fate was clearly linked to Dollmann's. Both men, the Army felt, had "continuing intelligence value" and should be transferred to the Army's control in Germany.\textsuperscript{29} By the first week of May, the State Department reported that the Army now wanted to "dispose" of the two SS officers "without further delay."\textsuperscript{30}

In mid-May, the Army provided the State Department with an Italian warrant for the arrest of four German SS officers, including Dollmann, for the murder of Italian citizens. Of the four, the Americans had only Dollmann, who was ill at the time and receiving treatment at the American military hospital in Rome. By now, however, State Department officials in Italy wondered if handing Dollmann over to the Italians was a good idea. The US consulate in Leghorn advised the State Department that the "long range interest (including CIG) in Dollmann hinges on likelihood that if he is abandoned to Italian jurisdiction other agents will doubt American ability [to] protect them."\textsuperscript{31}

Italian interest in trying Dollmann finally prompted the Army to act. On 17 May, the Army in Italy turned over Dollmann and Wenner to representatives of the Army's

\textsuperscript{28} As the Army cut its troop strength in Italy, MTOUSA headquarters moved from Caserta to Leghorn in April 1947. Most of the 25,000 American soldiers in Italy in early 1947 were employed in occupation duties in Trieste, graves registration work, civil affairs and war crimes activities in Rome, and maintenance of lines of communication from Leghorn to Austria, as well as training support for the new Italian army. See US Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947}, Vol. III: \textit{British Commonwealth, Europe} (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 880-882. (U)

\textsuperscript{29} Leghorn to Secretary of State, 12 April 1947, State 53, (S), in Dollmann, (S), DO Records.

\textsuperscript{30} Leghorn to Secretary of State, 8 May 1947, State 73, (S), in Dollmann, (S), DO Records.

\textsuperscript{31} Leghorn to Secretary of State, 15 May 1947, State 77, (S), in Dollmann, (S), DO Records.
Office of the Director of Intelligence (ODI) of the European Command in Germany.\(^32\)

informed CIG Headquarters of the transfer two months later and observed that American intelligence had done everything in its limited power to not only prevent handing over Dollmann and Wenner to Italian authorities, but also to the British. \(^32\) asked Headquarters to contact both men in Germany to assist in their “rehabilitation”; Dollmann and Wenner had “information which would place present Italian political regime in bad light if published.” Likewise, CIG in Rome was still anxious to inform the two Germans that their deliverance from the Italian authorities had come through its good graces.\(^33\)

Dollmann’s and Wenner’s return to Germany did little to diminish their reputation as hot potatoes.\(^34\) The Army confined both men to its interrogation facility in Oberursel, near Frankfurt, although they soon agitated to return to Italy in the fall of 1947. The new Central Intelligence Agency argued against their return and stated that they should remain in the American zone and, if they traveled to Italy, “we will not [original italics] intercede

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\(^{32}\) COMGENUSFMTO, Leghorn, to CIG, 28 May 1947, F 76420, IN 15447, \((S)\), in DO Records, Box 7, Folder 203, CIA ARC. \((S)\)

\(^{33}\) SO, 7 July 1947, \((S)\), IN 17693, \((S)\) in Dollmann, \((S)\) DO Records. The next week, Foreign Branch M, which ran OSS’s operations in central Europe, requested Foreign Branch P, responsible for southern Europe, to provide the German Mission with a summary of the Dollmann-Wenner case. See \((S)\) to FBP, “Dollmann and Wenner,” 14 July 1947, \((S)\), and Chief, FBP to Chief of Station, Heidelberg, “Dollmann and Wenner,” 31 July 1947, MGH-A-253, \((S)\), both documents in Dollmann, \((S)\) DO Records. \((S)\)

\(^{34}\) Dollmann and Wenner were not the only Nazi intelligence personnel returned to Germany from Italy by the Americans. In August 1946, SSU in Germany asked the Army to transfer Carmine Renato Senise, an Italian citizen who spied for the Germans in the United States and Sweden during the war. SSU had arrested Senise in January 1946 and held him for questioning in the Italian capital. By August of that year, SSU grew concerned that Italian authorities would try Senise for collaboration, and he would then divulge his penetration of OSS in Scandinavia during the war. SSU wanted the Army to transfer Senise from Italy to Germany for further interrogation under American control. See Henry D. Hecksher to Chief, CIB, USFET, “Senise, Carmine Renato (Request for Transfer of Senise from AFHQ, Italy to USFET),” 26 August 1946, LWX-991, XARZ-27328, \((S)\), in DO Records, Box 2, Folder 15, CIA ARC. \((S)\)
their behalf to get them out again.” If they went south, the two Germans ran the risk of being arrested, interrogated, and held for war crimes by the Italians. CIA in Washington agreed to pay for the rehabilitation costs for both Dollmann and Wenner, but only in Germany.\(^35\) (S)

The case led to further disagreements within the CIA and the Army in November 1947. Col. Donald H. Galloway, the Assistant Director for Special Operations, and Gordon M. Stewart, CIA’s chief of mission in Germany, met with Maj. Gen. George P. Hays of ODI to discuss Dollmann and Wenner. Hays criticized the CIA’s position in advocating amnesty in Germany for both men. He “again pointed out that the American army had won the war in Italy and that OSS publicity about Sunrise was in extremely poor taste and that these individuals, although they may have helped us were, at the same time, possible war criminals or war profiteers.” Hayes opposed any form of amnesty because it would “condone their crimes without proper examination.”\(^36\) (S)

Hayes’s position, however, was not shared by all of his own office. The chief of ODI’s Operations Branch, a Col. Wentworth, insisted that the two German officers be allowed to proceed to Italy. Gordon Stewart again opposed this because it “would be embarrassing to us and dangerous to them.” As a compromise, the Army and CIA agreed to let the two SS men return to their homes in Germany on a pass in order to settle their domestic affairs. Stewart, however, expressed continued concern about the two Germans. “It is presumed,” the mission chief told Washington, “that Dollmann and

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\(^{35}\)SO to Heildeberg, 22 October 1947, Washington 8089, OUT 53419, (S), in Dollmann, IC DO Records. (S)

Wenner will not return after their leave, and it is expected that they will not be heard from in the future. When their failure to return is noted in ODDI, they will be entered in the rogues' gallery, and if they are picked up in Germany, they will be consigned to a civilian internment enclosure to await [a] spruchkammer [denazification] trial. If they decide, against our orders, to return to Italy, they understand that absolutely no support will be forthcoming from the Allies."\(^{37}\) (S)

Stewart privately expressed his frustration over the US Government’s handling of Dollmann and Wenner. "Had this case been purely and simply ours, I should have been inclined to consign Dollmann and Wenner to a civilian internment enclosure and to have helped them with their trial. As it happens, however, the case passed out of our hands in the Italian phase, and complete responsibility for the two bodies rests with ODDI [sic]." Army officials, Stewart noted, "realize the chance they are taking in attempting to shield Dollmann and Wenner from the spruchkammer trial."\(^{38}\) The Army released Dollmann and Wenner from its interrogation center in November 1947, at which time the Central Intelligence Agency considered its affairs with both men closed. (S)

Wenner soon disappeared from sight, only to turn up later in South America. Dollmann, however, did not vanish. An Italian source told the CIA in the summer of 1948 that the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps employed him in Milan.\(^{39}\) His life story soon appeared in serialized articles in the Italian press in 1949, and he published a

\(^{37}\)Ibid. (S)  
\(^{38}\)Ibid. (S)  
\(^{39}\)Chief, FBM to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "Eugen Dollmann, Eugen Wenner," 6 May 1949, MGK-W-2069, (S), in Dollmann, \(\Box\) DO Records. (S)
memoir, *Call Me Coward*, in 1955.40 Dollmann moved from Italy to Switzerland and then to Spain and Germany, occasionally coming into contact with US diplomats.41 The Agency kept its distance from the former German SS officer, even informing its _[omitted]_, “We warn against operational use of Dollmann during his stay in Spain because he has already been involved with several intelligence organizations in Western Europe since 1945; his reputation for blackmail, subterfuge and double-dealing is infamous; he is a homosexual.”42 (S)

The Zimmer Case (U)

Dollmann and Wenner were a handful, but the Americans also faced problems with what to do with Guido Zimmer after the war. Like Dollmann, Zimmer’s connections in Italy were extensive. Unlike either Dollmann or Wenner, OSS recruited Zimmer as an agent at the war’s end and harbored him in the months afterward. (S)

Born in Germany in 1911, Zimmer joined the Nazi party in 1932 and became an SD officer four years later. He was posted to Rome under Foreign Ministry cover in

40Dollmann’s book describes his convoluted wartime and postwar activities, but focused on his experiences after 1945. He claims that Allen Dulles told Karl Wolff at a meeting on 19 March 1945 in Ascona that “although you have put forth no demands of a personal nature whatever, and although you have not even asked for any undertaking concerning your future activities in Germany, I hope nevertheless that after the surrender has been carried through we shall be able to count on your co-operation and that of your closest associates.” Eugen Dollmann, *Call Me Coward*. Trans. by Edward Fitzgerald (London: Kimber, 1956), p. 191. (S)

41For example, see Chief of Base, Pullach to Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, “Eugen Dollmann Case,” 18 August 1954, EGL-A-10377, (S), enclosing _[omitted]_ Memorandum of Conversation, 6 August 1954, (C), and Chief of Mission, Frankfurt to Chief, EE, “Eugen Dollmann Case,” 22 September 1954, EGQ-A-48865, (S), all in Dollmann, _[omitted]_, DO Records. (S)

42Acting Chief, WE, to Chief _[omitted]_, “Germans in Spain: Eugen Dollmann,” 23 April 1952, WSM-W-1725, (S), in Dollmann, _[omitted]_, DO Records. Dollmann was known to have been involved with the Italian intelligence services, and the Swiss had expelled him after uncovering his homosexual involvement with a Swiss police official. (S)
1940, working for Herbert Kappler, a police attaché because the Nazis had agreed not to assign intelligence officers on Fascist Italian soil. Zimmer’s true role as an officer in Amt VI, however, was exposed to the Italians, and he was forced to return to Germany.\(^{43}\) 

_Hauptsturmführer_ Zimmer did not return to Italy until February 1944, when he opened Amt VI’s office in Milan, where he organized networks of German and Italian staybehind agents in northern Italy. (S) 

Zimmer was also involved in the roundup of Jews in Milan and Genoa, working under _Hauptsturmführer_ Theodore Saevecke, the chief of the SD’s _Aussenkommando_ Milan. Saevecke’s senior officer, _Standartenführer_ Walther Rauff, headed the SS _Gruppen Oberitalien West_ in Milan. Rauff, in turn, reported to SS _Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei_ Dr. Wilhelm Harster, the chief of the _Sicherheitspolizei_ and _Sicherheitsdienst_ in Italy. While only a relatively small number of SS officers served in Italy during the latter part of the war, all of these men had notorious criminal records. Rauff, for example, had previously headed SS efforts to liquidate Jews through the use of mobile vans after the invasion of the Soviet Union.\(^{44}\) (S) 

With his ties to both Nazi war criminals and to Operation SUNRISE, Zimmer found himself in a unique position when the war ended in Italy. Two parts of the OSS sought him—one to recruit him as an agent and the other to arrest him as an SS officer. 

James J. Angleton, the commander of the SCI/Z in Italy, began rounding up SS officers

\(^{43}\)According to one source, Zimmer received a report from a German agent in Rome about a threat to Mussolini’s life. In Kappler’s absence, Zimmer gave the information to a German Embassy official who, in turn, provided the details to the Italian authorities. Zimmer’s role in the Embassy and the identity of his source were thus compromised, and Zimmer was brought back to Germany. See SAINT BB8 (Capt. James J. Angleton) to SAINT AMZON, “Zimmer Guido,” 28 November 1945, JZX-5519, (S), in Guido Zimmer, _Guido Zimmer_, DO Records. (S) 

\(^{44}\)For further details, see Walter Rauff, _Guido Zimmer_, DO Records. (S)
and Italian agents and collaborators even before the war ended.\(^45\) Zimmer, as the head of Amt VI in Milan, was a key suspect, especially as the Americans had uncovered his extensive files, which outlined the organization of the SD’s networks in Italy. (S)

On 11 September, four months after the end of the war, Angleton reported to the head of X-2 in Washington that “Zimmer has become the CI ‘ghost’ of this theater.” The German officer was “evidently receiving protection from some high AFHQ quarter on the basis of his contribution to the Sunrise operation.” Angleton denounced this alleged special treatment and noted that even Gen. Wolff had been arrested and sent to Nuremberg. Zimmer, he said, “should be given at least a complete tactical interrogation on Abt [sic] VI activities in the Milan area, details of which, from all available evidence, he knows thoroughly.” The X-2 office in Milan, Angleton observed, “has been considerably exercised by the sloppiness with which the case has been handled and the apparent ‘clamming-up’ which takes place when straight questions are asked.”\(^46\) (S)

What Angleton did not know was that Zimmer had escaped from Italy and made his way to Germany, where he had been recruited as an agent by X-2. On 27 August when Zimmer reported to US Army authorities in Erlangen, near Nuremberg, he claimed to have just arrived from Salzburg in Austria. Zimmer asked to be turned over to the


\(^{46}\)SAINT, BB8 (Angleton) to SAINT, DH1, “Guido Zimmer, CO, Abt VI, AKO Milan,” 11 September 1945, JZX-4039, enclosing “The Case of Guido Zimmer, Obersturmführer SS/Feldpost No. 02039,” (S), in Zimmer, C \(\rightarrow\), DO Records. (S)
local Special Counter Intelligence (SCI) unit. X-2's Capt. George A. Schriever soon made arrangements for Zimmer to settle at his wife's house in Erlangen and submitted a request to use Zimmer as an X-2 agent. Schriever wanted Zimmer to penetrate a shadowy German underground group known as Freikorps Adolf Hitler.

By the end of 1945, however, Zimmer's usefulness as an agent had diminished. The Freikorps Adolf Hitler had "not developed into anything really interesting," Schriever reported. "We are now beginning to feel that it is one of those organizations which exist only in the minds of some men along with the broken splendors of Dr. Goebbels' propaganda."

47 According to a postwar source, Zimmer ended the war in Switzerland although he reportedly returned to Milan in an American officer's uniform in the summer of 1945. See Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, Foreign Division M, "Guido Zimmer," 28 March 1951, MGLA-5858, (S), in Zimmer, C.

48 Born in February 1911, George A. Schriever received a B.S. in Political Science from the University of Missouri in 1933. He joined the US Army as a private in February 1942 and served in the Aleutian Islands, rising to the rank of sergeant major. After completing the Officer Candidate School at Ft. Benning, GA, Schriever joined OSS where he served in Special Operations (SO) until transferring to X-2 in December 1944. Schriever remained as an Army officer until the spring of 1946 and worked as a liaison officer between the Central Intelligence Group and USFET on CI matters in Germany.


Capt. Angleton in Italy, who continued to argue that Zimmer did not
deserve any special favors from American intelligence, pressed for a full interrogation of
Zimmer by SSU officials in Germany. “The measure of [Zimmer’s] good faith,”
Angleton wrote, “will be found by comparing whatever he has told you” with the facts as
uncovered by SSU in Italy.\(^5\)

SSU in Germany eventually agreed, but wanted Zimmer handled in Italy. Capt.
Angleton still wanted to interrogate Zimmer if he returned to Italian soil.\(^5\) He protested
to the Army officials in Italy, “Zimmer has enjoyed privileged treatment at the hands of
non-CI agencies in this Theater because of his role in the SUNRISE Operation. This
fact,” he warned, “makes it difficult for this Unit, under present circumstances, to take a
position” regarding Zimmer’s disposal in Italy. Angleton offered his opinion that
Zimmer “at the outset was deserving of no better or worse treatment than that afforded
persons of much greater importance to the success of SUNRISE than he, namely General
Wolff and Dollmann.”\(^6\)

The Army now intervened to keep Zimmer in Germany because it opposed
bringing Zimmer and his family to Italy. The Army declared that Zimmer should be
treated like any other enemy intelligence officer and held for interrogation in Germany

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\(^5\) Zimmer, in the meantime, had written both Husmann and Waibel in Switzerland to ask for their help.
Husmann told Zimmer that Waibel had taken up his case with Gero von Gaevernitz. See Husmann to
Zimmer, 15 November 1945, in Luigi Parilli, \(\ldots\), DO Records. (S)
\(^6\) SAINT BB8 (Angleton) to SAINT, AMZON, “Zimmer, Guido,” 28 November 1945, JZX-5519, (S), in
Zimmer, \(\ldots\), DO Records. (S)
\(^3\) Capt. Angleton to AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, “Lt. Guido Zimmer,” 11 February 1946, JZX-6613, (S), in
Zimmer, \(\ldots\), DO Records. (S)
\(^4\) Ibid. (S)
and then eventual repatriation there. This decision, in turn, prompted SSU in the American Zone to ask that Headquarters step in to reverse the Army’s decision. (S)

Anxious not to get caught in the middle of the two arguing missions, Headquarters simply sent a cable to Germany and Italy asking what steps have been taken to review Zimmer’s request with Allied Forces Headquarters. Washington emphasized that Dulles wanted to provide aid and comfort to Zimmer for his work with Operation SUNRISE and his postwar efforts on behalf of X-2 in Germany. Angleton’s response on 6 March was succinct. “In view of hostility to Zimmer reentering, believe it necessary for you to take action through the War Department. We can take no further action,” he declared. (S)

SSU officials in Washington now scrambled to gather the facts to resolve the Zimmer dilemma. A former OSS officer in Switzerland, Frederick J. Stalder, summarized his activities with Zimmer during the surrender proceedings. “There is no doubt,” Stalder quoted Dulles' report on SUNRISE, “that if Zimmer had ever been caught in any of these operations, he would not be alive today.” Stalder concluded by saying that while Dulles offered no promises to those involved in the surrender

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55Cable, Rome to Washington, 22 February 1946, Rome 2167, IN 33190, (S), abstract in Zimmer, DO Records. (S)
56Cable, AMZON to Washington, 25 February 1946, AMZON 5107, IN 3328, (S), abstract in Zimmer, DO Records. (S)
58Cable, Rome to Washington, 6 March 1946, Rome 2677, IN 33808, (S), abstract in Zimmer, DO Records. (S)
59Frederick J. Stalder to [first name not identified, but probably Philip] Horton, “Max Zimmer, Gen. Wolff’s Aide in the Sunrise Operation,” 3 April 1946, (no classification listed), in Zimmer, DO Records. Philip Horton was the chief of the Reports Board at OSS Headquarters in Paris in 1945; he later served as the SSU chief of mission in France. (S)
negotiations, he hoped that Allied officials would give Zimmer every 'consideration.'\textsuperscript{60} (S)

SSU's Bern Station weighed in with a cable on 9 April and said that the decision to send the SS officer back to Italy "should rest largely on 110's [Dulles's] analysis moral obligation to Zimmer." In any case, SSU in Bern advocated a full interrogation because Zimmer "was very active various branches German espionage and sabotage agencies until beginning of end north Italy."\textsuperscript{61} (S)

In an effort to provide further evidence of Zimmer's importance to American intelligence, Cdr. Edward J. Green, the Deputy Chief of the German Mission, wrote to Washington on 12 April. Green quoted Gero von Gaevernitz as saying that "Guido Zimmer was of outstanding help in Sunrise Operation by sheltering and protecting Allied radio operator in his house in Milano, Italy, under great personal risk, right under the nose of the Gestapo." Green also endorsed a proposal by von Gaevernitz and Lt. Col. Max Waibel of the Swiss General Staff that the US Government pay for the therapy of Zimmer's children in Switzerland as they recovered from bouts of tuberculosis.\textsuperscript{62} (U)

Even as Green wrote his memorandum to Washington, Headquarters announced its decision in Zimmer's case on 10 April. In a brief note, X-2 stated that "you are advised that no action will be taken in Washington insomuch as it is believed from a

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid. (S)
\textsuperscript{61}Cable. Bern to Washington, 9 April 1946, Bern 388, IN 35548, (S), abstract in Zimmer, \textsuperscript{□} O Records. (S)
\textsuperscript{62}Cdr. Edward J. Green, Deputy Chief of Mission, to Chadbourne Gilpatrick, "Zimmer Children," 12 April 1946, (no classification listed), in Zimmer, \textsuperscript{□} , DO Records. (S)
review of this entire matter that Zimmer is not entitled to any such preferential

treatment."63 (S)

After this flurry of attention in 1946, Zimmer disappeared from the intelligence
scene.64 His former partner in Operation SUNRISE, Luigi Parilli, however, continued to
interest the new Central Intelligence Agency.65 Through Parilli, the Americans
eventually renewed acquaintances with the German SS officer when the paths of Parilli
and Zimmer crossed again in late 1948. When the Italian made his first trip to Germany
since the war, he visited Zimmer in Erlangen and offered him a position as his private
secretary. By this point, Parilli had become the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the Sovereign Order of Malta to the Bavarian government and the US
military occupation authorities. Parilli, in fact, had spent a fascinating time after the war,

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63 SAINT to SAINT, AB 2, "Guido Zimmer," 10 April 1946, (S), in Zimmer, Records. (S)
64 While Zimmer’s case came to a fitful close in the spring of 1946, Angleton in Italy remained interested in
Zimmer’s wartime activities. In late June, Angleton reported to Washington that the so-called Zimmer
notebooks had been translated into English. The four notebooks, written in shorthand, were first translated
into German and then into English, accounting for their lengthy delay following X-2’s seizure in Milan at
the end of the war. The notebooks, broken into 167 separate memos, covered the period from late 1944
until May 1945, although the months of November and December 1944 were missing. In Angleton’s
viewpoint, Zimmer’s notes “provide one of the richest single bodies of information on the activities of Abt.
VI Milan and the background of the Armistice negotiations.” The notebooks contained detailed
descriptions of Italian agents in the employ of the Germans as well as on the activities of the SS in Italy. In
reviewing the notes, Angleton observed, “it is apparent that the pre-armistice negotiations were as much the
work of the Intelligence (most particularly Abt VI) system on the German side as it was from the side of
the Allies.” See BB 8 (Angleton) to JJ2, “The Zimmer Note-books,” 28 June 1946, JRX-3748, (S), in
Zimmer, Records. (S)
65 As early as July 1945, Parilli had fallen out with the OSS, who viewed him as a German agent. In 1946
and again in 1947, a series of articles appeared in Italian newspapers on the German surrender in Italy.
American intelligence felt that Parilli was the source of information for these articles and a self-promoter of
his role in facilitating the German contacts with the Allies. (S)
and he had traveled to the United States on three separate occasions in 1946 and 1947 for business purposes.  

In meeting with Zimmer in late 1948, Parilli was on the verge of making contact with the Gehlen Organization, the nascent West German intelligence service. Parilli felt that Zimmer could be of benefit in reestablishing ties with many of his wartime German intelligence officials now in the service of the United States. In fact, Parilli’s visit to Germany smoothed the way for Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the German service, to travel to Rome in January 1949. Accompanied by Col. William R. Philp, the US Army officer responsible for the Gehlen Organization, Gehlen met with the American military attaches in Rome, Madrid, and Paris. The meetings in Rome were particularly important because Gehlen wanted to renew his wartime ties with the Vatican.  

The CIA, however, expressed concern about the developing close ties between Parilli and Gehlen, in part because of the Italian’s efforts to get the Gehlen Organization to aid his former colleagues, including Dollmann and Wolff. The Agency, in turn, warned Gehlen of Parilli’s real intentions and the German intelligence chief began to suspect Parilli’s own motives when it came time to discuss joint business ventures. By

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66 CIA did not learn that Parilli had been to the United States until late 1948. This led to a flurry of memos between the Agency and the State Department trying to ascertain just how often Parilli had been to America. In 1947, the State Department rejected Parilli’s non-quota immigrant visa sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of his involvement with the Nazis and his misrepresentation of the facts about his relationship with OSS. See Cable, to Special Operations, 17 December 1948, C 1649, IN 19585, (S); Cable, to Special Operations, 6 January 1949, C 1688, IN 20804, (S); D.L. Nicholson, Chief, Division of Security, Department of State to Robert A. Schow, Assistant Director, CIA, “Baron Luigi Parilli, 1 April 1949, (S); Chief, Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, C, “Baron Luigi Parilli,” 20 April 1949, MSB-W-1129, (S); Nicholson to Schow, “Baron Luigi Parilli,” 21 April 1949, (S); and Chief, Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, C, “Baron Luigi Parilli,” 28 April 1949, MSB-W-1166, (S); all in Parilli, C, DO Records. (S)

67 Cable, Munich to Special Operations, 7 January 1949, Munich 252, IN 20936, (S), in Parilli, C, DO Records. (S)
the fall of 1949, Gehlen told his CIA contact that he would maintain “only the most casual and friendly relationship” with the Italian. This news was well received at Headquarters where it had learned that even Parilli’s SS contacts, including Gen. Wolff, considered him as an “out-and-out mercenary.”

In 1951, the CIA opposed the move on the part of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) to nominate Parilli as the semiofficial liaison between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner nations and the Vatican. In a cable from Headquarters to the CIA observed “Parilli undoubtedly has numerous Vatican contacts and even direct access to Pope, we are advised that his proposed appointment would cause unfavorable reaction among many influential Italians, because of Parilli’s double agent role during the war.” The Agency also opposed Parilli’s appointment due to “certain questionable postwar activities and manipulations.”

The Agency’s interest in both men diminished after the early 1950s. In Zimmer’s case, the CIA reported only an “academic interest, despite his long disappearance from the intelligence scene.” Another report noted that Zimmer was connected to Parilli and probably with SS groups in Germany. The Agency regarded Zimmer as “unimportant

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68See Cable, Munich to Special Operations, 23 June 1949, Munich 574, IN 35287, (S); Pullach to Special Operations, 25 June 1949, Pullach 001, IN 35477, (S); and Special Operations to Pullach, Karlsruhe, 30 June 1949, Washington 5954, OUT 84266, (S); all in Parilli, DO Records. See also Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, Foreign Branch M, “Baron Luigi Parilli,” 9 August 1949, MGL-A-192, (S); Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, Foreign Branch M, “Luigi Parilli,” 21 September 1949, MGL-A-425, (S); and Chief, Foreign Branch M to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, “Luigi Parilli,” 4 October 1949, MGK-W-3082, (S), all in Parilli, DO Records.

69Cable Special Operations to 15 June 1951, Washington 46436, OUT 53886, (S), in Parilli, DO Records.

70Chief, EE to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, “Guido Zimmer,” 9 January 1951, MGK-W-7381, (S), in Zimmer, DO Records.
and not of sufficient stature to take the initiative and thus become dangerous.""\(^7\) By the time that Dulles wrote *The Secret Surrender* in 1966, Parilli, who had long suffered from poor health, had died twelve years earlier. Guido Zimmer, "the aesthetic captain who had always cut a rather unlikely figure in the SS uniform," had moved to Argentina.\(^2\) (S)

**Unique Contributions (U)**

In its historical summary of the wartime years, the Strategic Services Unit concluded that "the negotiations carried out through OSS/Bern for the surrender of the enemy armies in northern Italy and southern Austria had underlined one of the unique contributions an undercover—and hence quasi-official—agency could make in the course of modern war."\(^3\) But, in order to bring about the surrender, the OSS had to deal face-to-face with the enemy. While Wolff, Dollmann, and Wenner did not suffer as harsh a fate as some of their SS colleagues in terms of lengthy imprisonments or even capital punishment for their war crimes, the CIA and its predecessors did little to assist them in the years after the war. Dollmann, in fact, harbored resentment against the Americans for his postwar circumstances. Only in the case of Zimmer do we find that X-2 in Germany sheltered the SS officer while, ironically, X-2 in Italy pushed for his confinement and interrogation as an enemy intelligence officer. From the available documentation, it is

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\(^7\) Abstract, 4 April 1950, "Activity of Military Circles in Western Germany," MGL-A-34, (S), in Zimmer, C, DO Records. (S)

\(^2\) Dulles, *The Secret Surrender*, pp. 250 and 252. (U)

apparent that the CIA preferred to keep the Operation SUNRISE negotiators at a distance
and, in the case of Luigi Parilli, distrusted their motives and actions. (U)